Authority of Magistrates About Religion, Section 5
Sect. 5.
The ſecond diſtinction then, that muſt bring ſome light to this young Doctors underſtanding, if he be not yet too old to learn, and confutation to his charge, which he ſo frivolouſly without any cauſe, & to no purpoſe, does advance againſt he knows not whom, may appear with conviction upon himſelf from theſe words, ſpeaking of the Non-Conformiſts exceptions, which relate (ſays he) either to the Power it ſelf, or the matters of the command. If then he diſtinguiſhes well, the power it ſelf and it commands, the duty or obligation that ariſes upon the ſubject, in reference to theſe which are two, muſt be diſtinct likewiſe. The force of it cannot be avoided, let him ſeem never ſo much to neglect it. He is pleaſed indeed, to ſay that we exhort people in effect to make no conſcience of ſubjection to Princes, becauſe we ſay that they are not always bound in conſcience to their Commands; that is becauſe we do inſtruct them ſo about the obligation of human Laws, as they may know they are not to make the will of the Magiſtrate, but the will of God alone, to be the rule of the Conſcience. We do therefore here inſtruct them right, and that which this man would have, were to pervert them. He does diſcover plainly his ignorance of this diſtinction, and this diſtinction the vanity of his accuſation. We are always bound in conſcience to ſubjection unto the Powers that are, we acknowledge this, this, we Preach it, we Print it, and are ready to maintain it: but we are not always bound in conſcience to Obedience: And God forbid that we ſhould. If he could have diſtinguiſhed theſe two things, he might have ſpared moſt of his labour. There is a Book entituled, The Obligation of human Laws diſcuſſed, which I Printed a year ſince; I muſt deſire my Reader to get it (and bind it together if he can with this), for they are of two ſubjects that do enterfare very much; The authority of the Magiſtrate in the matters of God diſcuſſed, was the entended Title of this, but I could not Print it till this Preface now hath given me the occaſion. I uſe the expreſſion of Scripture in the matters of God, becauſe I would include all matters wherein the conſcience is concerned, as well as Eccleſiaſtical matters. Now I have in that Book laid down this diſtinction with one more, as the ground work of my determination of that point, and I have need to ſay a little more to prevent ſome cavil, which may be raiſed by this perſon upon my reproof, which I muſt alſo give him for the next words he uſes, viz. 'Tis conſcience onelyonly (ſays he) that is capable of the Obligation of human Laws, ſo that if that be exempt, the whole man is at liberty. I wonder at the Man for this; I do hate this pride methinks for being indocible and perverſe no leſs then for being ugly. Pride is an overweening conceit of ones ſelf with the contempt of others. There is nothing more viſible than this filthy pride in this young man, and that Author who wrote the Friendly Debate, but only with this difference, that I judg this the more ingenuous or open, the other the more cankered and ſly; I pray God forgive them both with all my heart. It is a baſe piece of immorality I am ſure in either, that when they have to do with any ſuch perſon as Dr Owen, of years ſo much elder than themſelves, and who are not without ſome reputation at leaſt with other perſons, to uſe ſuch contemptuous diſdainful ſcorning language as they do altogether, which ariſing ſo manifeſtly too from the conceit and confidence alone they have of themſelves, does declare them two ſuch Sons of the morning, ſuch a couple of proud Deſpiſers, that until they do ſhew ſome repentance and acknowledgment for their fault, they do deſerve really to be excommunicated out of the good thoughts of all men, that moſt deſervedly otherwiſe do honor them never ſo much. Well! This man cannot it ſeems underſtand how he ſhould be obliged at all, unleſs he be obliged in Conſcience. He cannot diſcern belike between an obligation ſimpliciter, & the obligation of conſcience. He cannot diſcern that the conſcience which judges of our duty only in relation to God is bound only by a Divine obligation, and that a Divine obligation may be diſtinguiſhed from an Human obligation. Is it not indeed ſtrange that a man of ſuch quick parts, hath yet ſo little ſolid judgment? Is it not one thing (thinks he) to be bound to an action, becauſe it is Gods will, and for fear of Hell, or Divine puniſhments: and another to be bound to it out of fear only of the Law, and to eſcape ſuffering? Does not the Apoſtle, when he tells us, We muſt be ſubject not only for wrath, but alſo for Conſcience ſake, imply this diſtinction, that there is an obligation then only for wrath ſake, and an obligation out of conſcience? And cannot this exceeding fine witted man by any means diſcern this? And will not he nor the Debater learn, though it be never ſo ingenuous for them to come here to ſome acknowledgment, that themſelves as well as others may be able to live in this World under Laws, with peace to their ſouls? I do profeſs ſincerely that of all the Books that ever yet I wrot, I am moſt pleaſed in my heart with that Book I now mentioned, as being a ſubject ſo needful for all perſons, though it be the worſt printed. I will ſupply ſome little I want in it in this place. It is this.
If this Author were a man of as much judgment as wit, he would not have laid down himſelf ſo rawly, and excepted at the thing, but at the terms of the diſtinction which I have uſed with other Divines. For when Doctor Taylor ſpeaks of the Bodies being bound, and I have ſaid the outward man, in diſtinction to the Conſcience, it muſt be confeſſed that theſe terms are taken from cuſtom, and that it does fare with them, as it does uſually with other School-terms, that they will not ſtrictly hold the examination. The Law of man which binds the ſubject for wrath ſake only, does ſo bind him to the external act, as the will to that act muſt be included; for to bind him in the Body without the Will were to put him in Fetters, but it is no human obligation. This I have ſaid in my Book, and I add here, when I ſay, we diſtinguiſh not the Will from the outward Man, in the Obligation of human Laws, it muſt be conceived that the will is guided ſtill by the underſtanding, and is ſuppoſed by ſome to be nothing elſe but the laſt practical act of it. I diſtinguiſh not then the outward man from the inward ſo far as the inward acts are neceſſary to that which is external, when I diſtinguiſh both from the conſcience. There is the underſtanding (N.B.) that I ſhall ſuffer if I do not ſuch a thing, and therefore I will do it, is one thing: and the underſtanding that I ſin if I do it not, and therefore I will do it, is another. The one is that our Divines mean by this term of the outward man ſtill: and the other is the conſcience. You may ask how comes it to paſs that when there goes all this to an act the Magiſtrate commands, ſo that the ſubject in his will and underſtanding (ſo far as to do the thing) is obliged, we do yet call it but the outward man, or forum exterius, and can diſtinguiſh it with all that, from the conſcience? I anſwer, we call this the outward man upon this account, becauſe it is the external acts only that are ſubject to the Magiſtrates Government, or can be required for themſelves, and the acts of the will and underſtanding are not required, but indirectly in relation only to theſe external acts; therefore I ſay do we well call all this ſtill but the outward Man: and this is diſtinguiſhed plainly from the conſcience, becauſe a man may know that ſuch a thing is not required of God, and that God will not puniſh him, though he does not do it, when yet he does know that it is prudent for him rather then ſuffer, and therefore wills it. In the one there is the external act with the will and underſtanding ſo far as that act is concerned: but ſo long as my underſtanding is that it is not Gods will, but mans will that I perform, ſuch a thing may be ſaid to be done out of underſtanding (and will as well as by the outward man): but not out of conſcience. It is not my knowledge of a thing, and that I am to do it: but my knowledge that it is God will, or my knowledge of his judgement of the thing to be the ſame with mine, that makes it Conſcience. I think I am full enough now. You may then object, that I ſometimes ſeem in that Book, to make the obligation of the outward man to be negative, not to rebell; and another time to be poſitive alſo to ſome act. I anſwer, 'tis true that from the beginning, I do make the obligation of the outward man to lye in both theſe, a neceſſity never to reſiſt, and upon that neceſſity to act rather then ſuffer. But intereſt of fear or ſelf preſervation, binds the reaſon, as well as the senſe. I ſay true, and that there is the reaſon then of the outward man which is one: and the reaſon of the conſcience, which is another. When my reaſon is the fear of ſuffering, becauſe I may not reſiſt and therefore I will, it is my outward man is bound: but when my reaſon is, that the thing hath Gods Authority, and it will offend him if I do it not, and therefore I will, then am I bound in conſcience. A human Law which is for the common good, binds me from reaſon of conſcience: a Law which is unprofitable or againſt it, binds me only from the outward mans reaſon. There is Candour indeed to be allowed to this diſtinction (which I have intimated) as to moſt terms of Art, but they are not therefore to be left, both becauſe of their conſtant uſe, and alſo for their profit, in the ſhorter cut which we get to what we would have by the uſe of them. OnelyOnly they are verily to be at once firſt throughly underſtood, and then ſhall all that which we ſignifie by them be as compleatly repreſented with a word, as if it were drawn out in the full expreſſion. That which I have to offer upon this, againſt the Prefacer and Debater who are companions in this cauſe, is this, that whereas they ſee no more, but to think that the ſtability of Crowns and Scepters, and ſo of all Government does lye in the Miniſters, eſpecially the Epiſcopal Divines, preaching ſuch Doctrine as theirs, which is to lay an obligation upon the conſcience of the ſubject to obey them in all things indefinitely, unleſs they be apparently forbidden in the Word of God, they are exceedingly miſtaken: for if there were nothing elſe to ſupport Soveraignity but that, the Kings Crown might perhaps ſtick no longer on his Head, then till the Parliament ſits again, ſeeing we may then very likely have more Laws that we ſhall make no conſcience to obey, and yet we ſhall make conſcience (God willing) of our Loyalty to his Majeſty, and muſt do while we live, by the command of the A…mighty. It is not the point of Obedience then, it muſt be inculcated upon which the Government of Kings is eſtabliſhed: but upon the point of Subjection. Let me ſay it over again. It is not on the point of obedience out of Conſcience: but on the point that we muſt obey, becauſe the Magiſtrate beareth the Sword, and that not in vain, that the whole World is kept in Order. And alſo upon this point of Conſcience, that whether we have cauſe to obey or not obey, we muſt however never reſiſt upon pain of damnation. Let the Book before mentioned be herein further conſulted.
And after this, there will be little reaſon for our Prefacer to talk any more of exceptions levelled at the Power it ſelf, by any Pretences of the Non-Conformiſt againſt the Soveraign right of the King in the matters of the Church any more then of the State, for we own no ſuch, no more then he, though the way of his expreſſing himſelf by putting a reſtraint upon his Subjects conſciences, is ſo feat and grating till it be digeſted, and withal ſo wayward, that I cannot but point it to the Readers correction, by what will hereafter follow. If he hath any thing then to charge us with, it muſt be in regard to the matters of the command, unto which therefore he proceeds. But then they ſay there are ſome particular things exempted from all humane cognizance, which if the Civil Magiſtrate preſume to impoſe upon the conſciences of his Subjects [He ſhould ſay upon his Subjects, not upon the conſciences of his Subjects, for the Magiſtrate impoſes nothing but upon the outward man, requiring the external act, and the inward acts follow onelyonly ſo far as they are neceſſary to the external], as he ventures beyond the Warrant of his Commiſſion, ſo he can tye no Obligation of Obedience upon them, ſeeing they can be under no ſubjection in thoſe things, where they are under no Authority. Now this pretence reſolves it ſelf thus, that they do not quarrel his Majeſties Eccleſiaſtical Supremacy, but they acknowledge it to be the undoubted right of all Soveraign Princes, as long as its exerciſe is kept within due bounds of modeſty and moderation. Which being granted all their general exceptions. [Very fine, when we have indeed none at all!] againſt the ſufficiency of the Authority it ſelf are quitted, and they have now nothing to except againſt, but the exceſs of its Juriſdiction. So that having gained this ground, [Mighty, to gain what never was with held!] the next thing to be aſſigned and determined, is the juſt and lawful bounds of this Power, which may be ſummed up in this general rule. That Governours take care not to impoſe things apparently evil, and that Subjects be not allowed to plead Conſcience in any other caſe. This is the ſafeſt and moſt eaſie Rule to ſecure the Quiet of all that are upright and peaceable, and all that refuſe ſubjection to ſuch a gentle and moderate Government, make themſelves uncapable of all the benefits of ſociety.
It is well we are come now at laſt where the water …cks. The Non-Conformiſt differs not from the Conformiſt in the main point that ſecures all Government that is Subjection: but it is in the point of Obedience only we differ. And here are two queſtions, The one is about the matters of our obedience in general, what is the rule, or the bounds that muſt be ſet to the Magiſtrates commands, that we exceed not our duty to God, while we are obedient to our Governours? The other is about the particular matters of it, whether the preſent impoſitions of Conformity do keep within that compaſs, and conſequently are lawful or unlawful?
The latter of theſe is the pitcht Field, between the Conformiſt and Non-Conformiſt, and neither of us have a mind to enter into it. Only I will offer thus much by the way. The Conformiſts generally do hold that the things we differ about are indifferent, and conſequently thae they may be removed out of the Church by Authority without ſin: The Non-Conformiſts ſay generally they ſhall ſin if they obey them. What then is to be done in the caſe, but if my friend be weak and cannot indeed come to me, I muſt go to my friend, if ever I and my friend come together? Nay, if he be my friend, there is ſomething too I muſt do elſe; I muſt part with ſomething, if he need it, and which I can-ſpare, to accommodate him with it; to accommodate with him by it. I wiſh heartily I might live to ſee a Law, that no man ſhould have any more then one Cure of ſouls, ſo long as there are others no leſs able then they, who may take the burden off their hands. It was upon this account, becauſe they wanted men of ability, that Pluralities were allowed in the Church at firſt: and when ſuch men do abound, it is wicked to continue them. There is one diſpenſation only ſhould be authentick for a Miniſter that fears God to have two Livings, and that is when he hath two Tongues. It is this damned hard Argument at the bottom, the Prieſts covetouſneſs and corruption, and not their diſpute about the Ceremonies, that really hinders our Accommodation. I know theſe ſons of the Horſeleech will never be contented with a ſingle portion, whoſe voice ſtill is give give: A Dignity therefore with a Living, may be allowed to anſwer their double give: but one Dignity, and one Cure of Souls ſhould be all. If there be any will yet cry give, give, and give, they may be the ſons of the Aſpe, or the Adder, for the Horſeleech her ſelf muſt ſay ſhe never had any ſuch ſons as theſe, who enlarge their deſire as Hell, and are as Death, and cannot be ſatisfied.
The former is the queſtion to which we muſt return, and we are indeed beholding to the Gentleman, for compriſing his Books into the Compendium of this Rule. The Governour muſt not impoſe things apparently evil: and the Subject muſt be allowed to plead Conſcience in no other caſe. For the examination of this poſition, I will ask in the firſt place who ſhall be Judge, whether a thing be apparently evil or not? The Magiſtrate judges it good, the Subject holds it notoriouſly evil. Shall the Subject take upon him now to controul the judgement of his Soveraign, and tell him that is evil which he calls good? Who ſhall ſay to his Prince, Thou art wicked? I am not ſure what he will firſt ſay to this. In the next place, ſuppoſe a thing not to be apparently evil, but thought indifferent by the Prince and his Subjects generally, and yet ſome perſon hath his reaſons upon deep conſideration that prove it evil. He is convinced in his own conſcience upon theſe reaſons. What will this Author judge now in this caſe? muſt he indeed forſake his own judgment and apprehenſions, and acquieſce in the determination of his Governour? I know this Author ſpeaks after this rate in his firſt Book: but I am out of doubt that he may never forſake his conſcience (which is that preſent judgement) for any fear, command, or advantage in the World. Again, ſuppoſe a thing be really indifferent in its nature, and it is ſo to me in my Abſolute judgement: yet there are caſes in regard of the circumſtances or accidents, that make it in my Hypothetical judgement to be ſinful, what will he have us to do now? For inſtance, There are things to me indifferent, which yet are hainous in others, and I may ſcandalize them in my doing them by my example. It was indifferent to the ſtrong Chriſtian to eat of meats offered to Idols, who knew that an Idol was nothing, but to him that made conſcience of the Idol, it was Idolatry: now for a man to whom this thing was lawful, to eat before him to whom it was Idolatry, becomes unlawful, and he may not do it for conſcience ſake: Conſcience I ſay, not thy own, but of that other. God commands, thou ſhalt not do that thing, whereby thy ſelf or others will be lead to ſin if it be done. The Magiſtrate commands thou ſhalt do ſuch a thing: Who muſt be obeyed God or Man? When a thing is evil by accident, and not intrinſecally evil, if we can ſeperate the accident from the thing, we muſt do it: But if we cannot remove if from the accident, that accident makes it evil, and we cannot be obliged unto ſin, by the commandment of man. In the laſt place, And why muſt a man be allowed conſcience in no other caſe? is it becauſe he hath, or is to have no conſcience in any caſes but ſuch? Does not the Apoſtle require of every one in the caſe of indifferent things, that they be perſwaded fully in their own minds, that they act not but in Faith? Does he not tell us that if they eat before they are ſo perſwaded they are damned, and that to him who eſteemeth the thing unclean, it is unclean? Does not the Apoſtle ſpeak directly and purpoſely about things here that are not intrinſecally and apparently evil, but matters of that nature, which are good and evil, according to the diverſities of mens perſwaſions? How bold is this man then to offer us ſuch a rule, which is directly to lead us if we follow it, againſt theſe plain Texts of Scripture, upon the hazard of damnation?
The juſt and lawful bounds (ſays he) of this power, have been already deſcribed (viz. in his former Books) as to the moſt material caſes that can occurre in human life, which may be ſummed up in this general Rule, before mentioned. If this Rule then be the ſum of what he hath offered in his former Books, it follows, that he being out in this rule, the ſubſtance of his Books muſt fall with it. But if this then be not the rule, you may ask what is? It is eaſie to throw down, but the difficulty is to build. I anſwer, it is this is the work and buſineſs of my diſcourſe that enſues, and to be preſented beſt by degrees upon the occaſion of what is offered alſo by another: yet ſeeing the Gentleman hath engaged me with this ſum of his thoughts (which is I count ingenuouſly done, though he be out), I will requite him with the like, though I do ſome thing prevent my own intentions. I ſay then that this Author is ſo far miſtaken in propoſing this rule to the Magiſtrates power over mens conſciences, that it is Conſcience it ſelf is the Rule, even the conſcience which is in every particular ſubject, is the bounds and rule to him of what he muſt, and muſt not do, (how far and no farther he muſt go), in all the commands of Man whatſoever. One would wonder to ſee what obſcurity is caſt upon Truth by words and Diſputes. There are no Divines but will tell us that it is the will of God, or the Word of God that is the rule of conſcience and the adaequate rule of it, as Dr Sanderſon upon this ſubject; That it is Gods Seat, with the like expreſſions. And what is the meaning of this, but that Conſcience is not, and cannot be under any authority that is human, but is ſubject to God only? and yet when we come to this point, and ask how far the Magiſtrates Authority does reach in the matters of Religion, they are not able to ſay, Thus far, as far as Conſcience, even to theſe Confines, and it muſt go no farther. It is Gods Authority muſt be firſt, That of the Conſcience next, and then the Magiſtrates. So long as the Magiſtrates commands treſpaſs not upon conſcience, they are within his proper Territories, but if they require any thing againſt that, they are gone beyond their bounds, and their Authority ceaſes. The truth is, there is but Gods Authority and Mans in all, and the conſcience hath Gods Authority, which muſt therefore be over mans. There is no Determination almoſt in any point which hath been held of difficulty, which in the vertical turn is ſo plain, clear, and perfect as this. The Magiſtrate I ſay hath power over his Subject in all things, (N.B.) even in all things whatſoever in the Earth, that he can do (as to the external acts I have ſaid), and the Subject may, or is to obey him in them, ſo far as his conſcience will let him. Lo, here the true rule or bounds of Gods own ſetting in this buſineſs. In ſhort, The Magiſtrate ſhall command me in any thing, but my conſcience. And who will not be ready to ſay now that this is indeed that which they knew, and muſt wonder that they themſelves did not make the Determination. Indeed how ſhall a man be ſubject to the Magiſtrate for conſcience ſake, if the command of conſcience had not in it a Superiour and more prevalent Power than his? it would be for his own ſake, and not for conſcience ſake, if his authority was greater than it. I know I have ſomething here anticipated what is to follow, in giving my notion ſo ſoon, and at once, but I do it for this reaſon, becauſe I know alſo it is the dry light at laſt, and that alone, that muſt be of force for conviction of thoſe that will receive any, by controverſie.