Authority of Magistrates About Religion, Section 3
Sect. 3.
I come then now to the other thing that requires our notice, which is a matter indeed of great moment, and therefore intended by me for the main task of my preſent engagement, and that is his aſſerting an authority in the Magiſtrate over the conſcience of his Subjects in matters of Religion. So he hath expreſſed it, and made it the ſubject of two other Books, and inſiſts upon it ſtill in this Preface. I am willing therefore to enter into a diſſertation with him about the point: for it will be worthy not only of our two labours, but of another learned, pious, ſtudious and worthy Knight, who was the Author of the Papers entituled, Liberty of Conſcience; and whom I ſhall purpoſely engage with the Prefacer, that, if it be poſſible, we may all three together (will we, nill we) beat out the right determination of the buſineſs.
As for the Prefacer, I muſt needs ſay, that I take him to be a man of fewer years and quicker parts, and of a more flouriſhing Pen than to be fit, at leaſt of himſelf, for the undertaking any ſuch point as this is. For either a man muſt be of a patient complexion that can read over all that is written by others about the ſubject, and then give us the Compendium, according to his judgment: or he muſt be able, by fixing long upon one thing, and inculcating the thoughts of it upon the mind, to frame his own notion, in ſuch a fore-caſting of it through the whole train of its conſequences to the end, as to make it hold together, which is not the work unius Diei, or unius liturae, to uſe the expreſſion of the Biſhop offer'd to my hand. I know that the happineſs of the firſt conceit does much, but it is not the nimbleneſs of the Pen, and a torrent of words, does the reſt. Nay rather, it is this volubility of the tongue which is Truth's great Harlot, while the handſomneſs of the expreſſion will be ready ſtill to allure away the judgment from that cloſer attendance to the dry notion, that Controverſal points, or Caſes of Conſcience, do require; which ſhould not therefore be writ in the ſtyle of this age. For the language particularly of this perſon, I cannot but compare methinks to a like preſent faſhion in the Garments of Women, the ſuperfluity of whoſe dimenſions may perhaps make their bodies look more ſtately, but it will trip their heels up, beſides the cumberſomneſs, if they take not heed to themſelves, or ſome other come after to keep them from falling. Well! the buſineſs this notable eloquent Gentleman hath to do in this Preface, is, for ought I ſee really, only to abuſe the Non-Conformiſts, and ſo faſten upon them ſome charge if he could tell what, & againſt whom in reference to their loyalty or duty to the Government. But the charge being founded at the bottom only upon his firſt Book, or the cauſe he hath there managed, the beſt way to anſwer all his parti…ulars, wil be to let them quite alone, without raking the Dunghill up, and to touch only in general upon the foundation.
There are two paſſages then I will cite out of this Preface, for there are no more I count of that nature, which I make my concern. All their exceptions relate either to the Power in it ſelf, or to the matters of the Command. The firſt are directly levell'd againſt the very being of Authority; and Magiſtrates, of what kind ſoever, according to their general pretences, muſt not dare to put any reſtraint upon their ſubjects conſciences, leſt they invade the Divine Prerogative, overthrow the fundamental liberties of human nature, and undo honeſt men for their loyalty to God and their Religion. Now if this right be claimed without limitation, then the conſequence is unavoidable, That ſubjects may, when ever they pleaſe, croſs with the authority of their Governours, upon any pretence that can wear the name of Religion. But this being groſly abſurd, the neceſſity of a Soveraign power in matters of Religion, is granted, and all Arguments that prove it in general neceſſary to Peace and Government, are allowed, or at leaſt are not contradicted: for what ever admits an Eccleſiaſtical Juriſdiction, howſoever bounded and limited, admits it; and that is enough to the firſt aſſertion of a ſupream Authority over the Conſcience in matters of Religion. Again, after eighteen pages farther, And they are exhorted above all things to keep their Conſciences (i.e. themſelves) free from the uſurpation of all human Laws, that is, in effect, they are forbidden to make any conſcience of ſubjection to Princes: for it is only Conſcience that is capable of the obligation of Laws, ſo that if they be exempt, the whole man is at liberty.
By theſe two paſſages it does appear to me, that this Eccleſiaſtical Politician from the beginning of his ſetting out to the end, does run all along in that confuſion, as it will be hard to bring him to ſorts. But it ſhall ſuffice me to offer two diſtinctions, which alone as I hope may ſerve to do this work, both of drawing him out of his darkneſs, and convincing others thereby of the injury of his accuſations. Diſtinguiſh we then firſt between the Authority of the Magiſtrate over his Subjects in matters of Religion, and an Authority over the Conſcience in any matters whatſoever. It is manifeſt in the very expreſſion of his Title, and the cuſtomary language of his firſt Book, and of this Preface, That he does confound Conſcience with the Matters of Religion; whereas there are matters of Religion wherein the Conſcience may not be concerned, and matters wherein the Conſcience may be concerned, & they be no Eccleſiaſtical matters. The ſecond diſtinction then is, between Subjection, which refers to the Authority reſiding in the Magiſtrate himſelf, and which is our duty in oppoſition to reſiſtance or rebellion; and Obedience which lyes in the doing what he commands. It is apparent in the laſt paſſage how he confounds theſe two things, when the making conſcience of ſubjection to Princes, and obligation to the Law, is belike all one with him in his preſent conception. But that there is a difference to be put between theſe two, it does appear undeniably from one conſideration, that we are always bound in conſcience to the one, that is ſubjection: but we are not always ſo bound to the other, to obedience. The things that are commanded may be ſometimes ſinful, or hurtful to the Commonwealth, and then it will be our duty not to obey them: or they may be idle, vain, frivolous, which we may chooſe therefore to do out of prudence, for fear of wrath, and to avoid contempt and ſcandal, when we are not otherwiſe to hold our ſelves bound in conſcience.