Authority of Magistrates About Religion, Section 10
SECT. 10.
Suppoſe we now then a Magiſtrate deſirous to bring his People to a Religion, or to a Uniformity in that way of worſhip he himſelf beſt approves; What may he do therein? The firſt thing he may and is to do, is doubtleſs to take care that the people have Inſtruction; that the Word be preached, and ſuch means uſed which are proper to convince their underſtandings, and ſatisfie their conſciences, that they may ſubmit to it. This is the chief I count he is to do. In the next place he may and is to cauſe all thoſe impediments to be removed, which may obſtruct them in the reception of this Religion. So Cyrus by his authority repreſſed the Jews enemies, and made the way open for their return, and rebuilding Jeruſalem. In the laſt place, the Magiſtrate may tender all the encouragements and advantages (with a reſtraint of the ſame to the refuſers) that he can poſſible, to win them over to the way he conceives good for them. When he hath gone thus far he muſt make a ſtand, and conſider in good earneſt whether that which he would impoſe, be againſt their Conſciences or no. If it be not he may proceed to lay his Injunctions upon them; whereby an obligation does fall upon the conſcience (ſuppoſing the thing reaſonable, and for the common good) to do what his will is; and if they do it not hereupon, he may by the infliction of puniſhment (that is by his Temporal Sword) enforce them to a due obedience: In ſumm, He may do all and the very ſame in the concerns of Religion, as he may do in the other concerns of his Kingdom, upon that ſuppoſition.
But if it be againſt their Conſciences, he can proceed no farther. He cannot lay any obligation on the Conſcience, which is contrary to that wherein it ſtands bound already; and where he can lay no obligation on the conſcience, he cannot ex imperio command; and where he cannot command and oblige the Conſcience (as human law does bind it, which how, and how far it does, is ſtated in my other book), he cannot juſtly puniſh the man for not doing that which he was not bound to do. So that we ſee here where the Magiſtrate muſt not uſe his Sword, even while he is uſing it, and acts not as a Magiſtrate but by it. He acts by his authority or ſword, in ſeeing the means uſed, helps adminiſtred, obſtacles removed. He can, and may force others (whoſe duty it is) not to be wanting in this, when he cannot then enforce the end to which he cauſes theſe means to be uſed. He cannot (I mean, he ought not) puniſh any man only becauſe his Conſcience is not wrought upon by the means which he has uſed, and ſo does not what he would have him. In this caſe, it is not he, or the man either can help it, and he may as well beat his Dog for not whiſtling.
Upon this account, there is very good reaſon that regard be had ſo much the more to things that are not attainable without ſupernatural help, that they be not enforced as other things. So that we are to underſtand well after this, that the diſtinctions between the Religious and Secullar things, in reference to the Magiſtrates Authority, or uſing his Sword, is for all what is before ſaid, to be held ſo far as it will reach: but that is only to a majus & minus of his Care, not to the ſpecification of the ſtate of our buſineſs. My meaning is, that in things not Religious, but Moral only, or Civil, the Magiſtrate is more free as to his commands, and uſing his Sword than in matters of Religion; or he is to take more care of what he impoſes in the one, than he need to do in the other: but that will not advance to the ſtating the point hereupon, that he hath Authority, and may uſe his Sword in Civil and not in Sacred concerments. The King under the Law was to have the Book of God by him to this end, that he might govern the people according to it, and conſequently uſe his Authority in the things of Religion: And ſo Jehoſhaphat (to name no other) appoints his Officers for the doing juſtice in the matters of God, as in the Kings matters.
This Propoſition, The Magiſtrate may uſe his Sword in Civil, but not in Religious affairs, is not a true Propoſition, and therefore can determine nothing. And this Propoſition, The Magiſtrate is to take more heed how he uſes his Sword in ſupernatural, than in natural or civil concerns, is a true Propoſition, but not a ſufficient determination. The main Queſtion ſtill remains. What are thoſe things wherein the Magiſtrate indeed hath no power, or may not uſe his Sword? Upon the knowledg of this muſt the ſtating the buſineſs depend; for when we know in what things he may, and in what he may not uſe his Authority, the matter is at an end. Here are we now therefore to think upon it, what are thoſe reaſons, why the Magiſtrate is to be more careful in the uſe of his power in Religious than in other matters, and if it be any where, it is like to be there that we ſhall find a bottom to determine the main iſſue. To know theſe reaſons, look whatſoever difference there are to be made between Religious and Civil matters in reſpect to the Magiſtrates uſing his Sword about them, and they muſt be theſe reaſons.
The firſt difference then between Religious and Civil things, that may be offerred as a reaſon why the Magiſtrate is to take more care of uſing his Sword in the one than the other, is, That Religious things are ſuppoſed to be of ſupernatural Revelation, which cannot therefore be known and done without Gods grace, and it is not fit the Magiſtrate ſhould puniſh a man for the want of that which God does not give him: When in Moral and Civil things he hath the knowledg of them only by Nature, and the practiſe of the Realm. Now then if this will ſerve to determine the Queſtion, the Propoſition drawn from it muſt be this: That in all matters that are of ſupernatural Revelation, the Magiſtrate may not uſe his Sword, but in all other he may uſe it. But this Propoſition is alike falſe with the firſt, That in all Religious he may not, and in all Civil he may. The Law given by Moſes was by Revelation, but the Magiſtrates might puniſh the breakers of that Law. The Goſpel is by Revelation, but the Magiſtrate may puniſh thoſe that keep from Church out of Irreligion. The example of the man that was put to death for gathering Sticks on the Sabbath, is a preſident uncontroulable, that a man may be puniſhed for his Preſumption, when he may not for his Conſcience, in the matters of Religion.
The ſecond difference between Sacred and Civil affairs, which may be another reaſon why the Magiſtrate is to take more heed as to the one than to the other, is, That the World cannot be governed without the exerciſe of his Authority in Civils, when if the world were without all that which is of ſupernatural Revelation (and conſequently, if he meddles not at all with thoſe things) it might. It appears then reaſonable, that in what the government of the World can be without, the Magiſtrate ſhould not be ſo preſſing, when in that which it cannot ſubſiſt without, he muſt. Let us then again draw out what is here, and try if it will do. In matters which the world may be governed without, the Magiſtrate muſt not uſe his Sword; but in matters without which it cannot be governed, he may. This Propoſition labours with the ſame failing: for, the Magiſtrate may uſe his Authority in things which the world may be governed if it were without, becauſe he can uſe it in religious matters, as hath been inſtanced already from Scripture.
A third difference between Sacred and Civil things; and which is a reaſon, why the Magiſtrate is to be more careful of his injunctions, and uſing his Sword in the one above the other, is, Becauſe it is more like that the things he impoſes in Religious concerns ſhould be againſt mens conſciences, than in Civil or Moral matters, and the Magiſtrate hath no Authority over the Conſcience of any. It is the commandment of the moſt High, that no man ſhould ever do any thing againſt his Conſcience, and the Magiſtrate cannot uſe his Authority, but for God. Now let us ſee if this at laſt will ſerve for the determining the queſtion, and if it will, then muſt this propoſition be true. That in all matters that are againſt mens Conſciences the Magiſtrate hath no authority, and cannot uſe his Sword; but in all matters that are not againſt their Conſciences, or that are according to them, he may uſe it. And this propoſition I count is true and certain, and to be maintained even in Religious and Civil matters; and ſo is the foundation concluded upon by me to eſtabliſh our Determination.