Authority of Magistrates About Religion, Section 11
SECT. 11.
There is one thing yet ſeems wanting: I do ſpeak here to one branch of the main poſition as falſe, while in things Religious, though they could not be known but by Revelation, and the world could be governed without them, I affirm the Magiſtrate hath authority, and may uſe his Sword, as he may in other matters; that is, provided they be not againſt mens Conſciences. But as to the other branch, in things Civil and and Moral, which men may know by natural light, and in which the Government is more concern'd, I have not ſaid whether it be true or falſe. I will proceed therefore and declare, that as the Poſition laid down at firſt, or the worthy maintainer of it, goes too low in denying the Magiſtrate the uſe of his ſword in Religious things, which is to be granted (I count) herein as in other matters, to wit, upon ſuppoſition of both to be not againſt, but according to their Conſciences: So does he go too high in yielding it in Civils, without the ſame limitation, whereof we muſt be ſtill as tender as of our Eye, or of our Salvation. I do think alſo, of the two, the laſt is the more dangerous extremity.
I argue then, If the Magiſtrate may not uſe force, or the temporal Sword in Religious affairs, becauſe ſuch things are of that nature as the Conſcience is like to be concer'd in them; and if it be againſt their Conſcience it is unlawful: then when the Conſcience likewiſe is concern'd in Civil things, he may not uſe the Sword neither. For if the ground be good in the one, it muſt be good in the other; if it will not hold in both, it may be denied in either. Again, the things perhaps are Civil things, but the man, or men, makes a Conſcience of them, and ſo the caſe muſt be the ſame to them, as if it were in Religion. To make a conſcience of a thing is to look upon it as commanded or forbidden of God, and to go about to perform or avoid it upon that account. But to do or leave a thing undone upon the account of the command or prohibition of God, is an act of Religion. Conſequently though the thing be Civil, yet ſo long as a perſon, or perſons, make a conſciſcience of it, it is all one to them, I ſay, as if the things were religious, and the authority of the Magiſtrate can be no more in the one than the other.
I will propoſe ſome inſtances. Doeg accuſes the Prieſts to Saul. He hears their cauſe, condemns them as Traytors; commands his Servants to do execution upon them, they refuſe the execution; It is againſt their Conſciences. Saul here hath no authority over thoſe Servants in this caſe either to command them to act, or to puniſh them for not acting againſt their Conſciences. If they obey him they ſin againſt God. Saul might urge here the thing was of Civil concern, and if all ſhould do as they did, that is, queſtion the Judges ſentence, and refuſe to execute it upon pretence of conſcience, the Government could not ſtand; yet this wont ſerve, they muſt not act againſt their Conſciences for all that. If he falls upon them for it, they muſt bear it; but it will be tyranny over them, and injury to Heaven; the ſuperiority of whoſe authority over his, being the thing in effect they aſſerted, by that refuſal. You may ſay, this is an inſtance indeed in Civil things, wherein the Magiſtrate had not authority; and conſequently when Civil things are impoſed againſt a mans Conſcience, the caſe is the ſame as in Religious. But you will add, the Conſciences of theſe men was in the right, and you would have ſome inſtance in Civil things where the Conſcience is erroneous. I will offer you therefore other inſtances. A Garriſon under Scanderbeg is beſieged by the Turks, it has but one Well in it, a Traytor throws in a dead Carrion. The Soldiers are under a ſuperſtition that the water hereupon is unclean, and that they cannot drink it without ſin. Rather than do ſo they yield the place, otherwiſe impregnable. This inſtance I once uſed elſewhere on another occaſion. let me offer you one more authentick out of the Machabees. The Jews are of the general perſwaſion that they may not fight on the Sabbath. Their enemies come upon them on that day on purpoſe; rather than act againſt their Conſciences they ſuffer themſelves all to be ſlain. I will ask now upon this perſwaſion of theſe men that the doing theſe neceſſary things, as drinking that water, and defending themſelves was ſin, whether the Captains of thoſe Soldiers could command them to drink, or to fight and force them to it? Nothing can be pleaded of more moment in any caſe. The whole Government and their lives depend on it, and the light of nature might teach them that neceſſity ſhould take place of their ſuperſtition. Nevertheleſs until they had conſulted the thing and their Conſciences were ſatisfied of the lawfulneſs of it; that is until they came to find out the ſubſtance of what Chriſt afterward revealed, That man was not made for the Sabbath, but the Sabbath for man, There was no Captain or Governour (I ſuppoſe) could have power to command them, or force them in the caſe. I will deſcend to an inſtance frequent in the preſent Nation. It is a Civil thing for any of the King's Courts to grant a Writ for a man to come, and give his teſtimony by Oath to any Cauſe that is before them. I will ſuppoſe now that ſome, and that many, have received the impreſſion, that it is unlawful for them to Swear at all, and thereupon they refuſe to Swear. It may be urged in this caſe, what a civilly evil opinion this is, which is both deſtructive to the Government (in the Adminiſtration), and injurious to particular perſons, who may be undone in their Eſtates for want of ſuch an Oath. Nevertheleſs there are many of the Quakers ready to go to priſon themſelves, and loſe all their own Eſtates; and we may ſuppoſe their Lives, rather than they will be induced to ſwear. I ask, What will you ſay now to this caſe? Hath the Magiſtrate power over theſe mens Conſciences? If he hath, he may command them to judg, otherwiſe than they do, and puniſh them that they act according to this judgment. And if he can command and uſe his Sword upon them, to make them ſwear, he may, to make them come to Church; and if he was a Papiſt Magiſtrate, to come to Maſs; and if a heathen Magiſtrate, to ſacrifice to Idols. If he have not power over their Conſciences, and to command them to have other judgments, then muſt he let them alone (as generally our Juſtices have done), or challenge an authority to make men act againſt their Conſciences, which is to uſe the power which he hath from God, againſt him. If you think there is here ſome difference between ſuch caſes as theſe, and that of the Machabees before, it matters little: But if you make none between them, but ſay the Commanders of thoſe Jews, and thoſe Soldiers, might have compelled them in thoſe caſes; I ſay, if any of them could, they ought; and they ſhould not have been ſaid then to dye in their innocency. I ſay again, if they might, then can a Magiſtrate command and force a man to act againſt his conſcience; then can he command him to ſin; then can he command what God has forbidden; then muſt man be above God. The earth it ſelf methinks can as ſoon be moved, as this foundation.