Authority of Magistrates About Religion, Section 9
Sect. 9.
The other Book is, thoſe papers entituled Liberty of Conſcience, which are of another complexion, and moulded with no leſs ingenuity of matter, then the other in expreſſion. I am very well ſatisfied with the fulneſs, aptneſs, and conviction of the arguments for that Liberty I read there: nevertheleſs I do apprehend the main ſtate of the very point, does require farther ventilation. If I do provoke that Learned and excellingly worthy perſon by this means to write again on this Subject, I ſhall (I think) do the World ſome ſervice, and perhaps bring more light to my own underſtanding.
The ſubſtance of the whole in his ſtating this buſineſs, I take it comes to this; The Magiſtrate is the Officer of God to ſee his will executed, which un…er the Goſpel he muſt do in that manner God hath appointed▪ and therefore he muſt not uſe the Temporal Sword in the concerns of Religion. In this Poſition thus …aid down, I muſt confeſs I judge there are ſome clouds, but not without Truth under them. The clouds are to be removed, the truth maintained, and that liberty which is irrefragable to the conſcience, muſt not be loſt.
In the firſt place therefore, There is a diſtinction among D…vines, which is the foundation this Gentleman goes upon, that he hath drawn beyond the Staple. This diſtinction, if you conſult their common places on that Head De Magiſtratu, you ſhall find made by theſe two queſtions: Whether the Magiſtrate is to take care of Religion? Whether he is to compel his Subjects to it? And when the former generally is granted, the latter is denyed. This ſtudious, perſon, it is like, meeting with this hint in ſome of his Books, hath ſuffered a deception into theſe thoughts, that the Magiſtrate therefore hath indeed ſomething to do about Religion, but he is not to uſe his Sword about it. For the making his conceptions out, after he hath ingenuouſly off…red three opinions as extremes, in ſome that make the Magiſtrate the ſole judge of all matters Spiritual and Temporal: in others that affirm the like power but to be exerciſed in Spirituals, in a perfect ſubſerviency to the Clergy: in a third that make him have nothing to do but in civil matters only, he does endeavour to find himſelf a middle way, wherein the Magiſtrate ſhall have his ſomething to do (a he ſpeaks), and not all to do in theſe matters, & then offering his notion of what has ſomething he hath to do, is, which is to be the great Officer or Miniſter of God upon Earth to ſee his will, which in Religion be accounts onelyonly what he hath revealed to be put in executive, he does put in for the resk…ing that Liberty, which he would aſſert for the Conſcience, that under the Goſpel he muſt do this▪ in the manner alſo that Chriſt hath appointed, and ſo not by the temporal Sword. A great miſtake! The office it ſelf of the Magiſtrate is to bear the Sword, and by that to act or effect what it has to do. Where a perſon hath no power of Coercion, he acts not as a Magiſtrate, but as another man, and to ſay he may not uſe his Sword in the concerns of the Goſpel, is all one as to deny him any Authority any care, any concernment about Religion at all. The Sword ſays Bracton does ſignifie poteſtatem Regni, and this muſt be laid down for a truth undeniable, that unto whatſoever the Power or Government of the Magiſtrate extends, his Sword muſt. What he can command, he may compel: and where he cannot compel he cannot command. It is in vain (I mean) to talk of rule, if he have not power to puniſh when his command is not fulfilled. The meaning then of our Divines by their diſtinction at firſt, is, that Faith indeed cannot be conſtrained, and ſo men are not to be driven into Religion by force, but yet that the care which the Magiſtrate is to have, for maintaining the true Religion being received, is Authoratative, and to be mannaged, not precario, but by his Sword, is with them alſo out of queſtion.
In the ſecond place, Here is a difference ſeems to be put between the Law and the Goſpel, as to the Magiſtrates ſeeing Gods will executed in the manner he hath appointed: whereas that manner God hath appointed in ſeeing his will performed, is only that his Officer ſhould act agreeably to the light of nature, or right reaſon, in applying ſuch means as are proper to that end, whether under the Law or Goſpel. For magiſtracy it ſelf, and the manner of its actings both, ſo far as concerns Gods appointment, we are to conſider does derive from Nature, and not from Poſitive Inſtitution. By the manner which Chriſt hath appointed under the Goſpel, he muſt either mean ſomething in oppoſition to the uſe of the Sword: or not in oppoſition to it. If ſomething in oppoſition, it muſt be as much as if he had ſaid that the Magiſtrate muſt ſee Chriſts will executed by ſome other way then the uſe of his Sword, whereas there is no other way or manner quâ Migiſtrate, he can ſee any thing done. The uſe of his Sword is nothing but the uſing his Authority or Office, which I have ſaid juſt now, and that he cannot act as a Magiſtrate any otherwiſe. If he mean ſomething not in oppoſition hereunto, then cannot his conſequence be valid, that the Magiſtrate muſt ſee Chriſts will done, onelyonly in the manner he hath appointed, and therefore not by the uſe of his Sword, ſeeing the cauſing it to be done in Chriſt manner, and the uſe of the Sword will ſtand together. And what is it then indeed he means by this manner Chriſt hath appointed? I turn to his Book and apprehend by this manner he underſtands nothing but by the means and Ordinances Chriſt hath appointed. The people are to be brought into Chriſtianity and obey the Goſpel, but it muſt be by preaching, and the uſe of the like means; for Faith comes by hearing, and by force a man cannot be made to believe. Well now the Magiſtrate is to ſ…e the means Chriſt hath appointed to be uſed for the ſetting up the Chriſtian Religion, therefore he muſt not uſe his Sword to the end. I anſwer the direct contrary does follow, therefore he may uſe it, ſeeing by his Sword or Authority it is that he muſt cauſe theſe means to be adminiſtred. It is true the will of Chriſt is that the people believe in him, and obey him, but it is not his will that they ſhould believe in him without the uſe of the means. How can we believe without a Preacher? when the Magiſtrate then here is to ſee his will executed, the meaning is, he is to ſee the means uſed, that the people may be brought to believe and obey him, and to this purpoſe he may and muſt uſe his Sword, if there be occaſion for it. He may and muſt puniſh the Miniſter and others, if they neglect to do their Officer.
In the third place, this poſition ſeems to put a difference between the matter of Religion and other matters, in reference to the conſequence inferred; viz. as if the Magiſtrate acting in ſeeing Gods will executed in no other manner then God does approve, muſt not uſe the Temporal Sword in Religious, when he may in other matters: whereas there is a difference indeed to be put between Things and Things upon this account (for ſome things come not within the Verge hereof, and ſome do), but theſe Things and Things are not rightly ſtated Religious and Civil matters. This cloud doubtleſs ariſes from hence. In regard that in matters of Religion the Conſcience is ſuppoſed to be concerned, when it is not ordinarily in other things, therefore are Religious matters conceived as reciprocal here with the whole matter of conſcience, wherein indeed the diſtinction does lye, which is to be made in oppoſition to other matters.
The fourth cloud is upon the conſequence it ſelf. It follows not from the Magiſtrate acting in no other manner then God approves in the ſeeing his will performed, … …ot uſe his Sword in the concerns of Religion. The King of Ninive Decrees a faſt in honour to the true God, not be neglected we may be ſure without puniſhment by any. Nebuchadnezar Decrees that no body ſpeak amiſs of the Jews God, under the pain of being cut in pieces. Attaxerxes gives Commiſſion to Ezra, that whoſoever would not obey the Law of his God, judgement ſhould be executed, whether unto death, or unto baniſhment, or to confiſcation of goods, or to impriſonment. Indeed theſe Princes being Heathen, who believed more Gods then their own, are not to be conceived to decree any thing hereby againſt their proper Religion, or the conſciences of of the people upon whom this is impoſed: but for the uſe of Sword, in the matter of Religion, as in other matters it is expreſs in theſe inſtances, to paſs by what may be heaped hither from the Kings of Judah.
The laſt cloud or clouds then follow, that having had difference made there where it needs not, we have indeed no difference made there where it needs. For beſides that when the Magiſtrate is ſaid to be Gods Miniſter to ſee his will in general to be executed, it ought to be laid down with reſtriction to mens outward acts only, and a ſalvo to his power conſtitutive of duty in indifferent things, there are moreover theſe two Diſtinctions mainly lacking for the determining this matter; and which are the groundwork of the whole Exercitation.
The one is, that whether things be Religious or Secular, under the Goſpel or under the Law, we muſt diſtinguiſh between thoſe outward acts which are againſt mens conſciences, and thoſe that are not againſt them. This is the chief thing to be held faſt. In ſuch acts which are againſt mens conſciences, it is true, and a vehement truth, the Magiſtrate acting in that manner, God hath appointed cannot uſe his Temporal Sword. It is not agreeable to the Law of Nature, or rule of human reaſon, to work upon the conſcience with outward force, and the manner God hath appointed the Magiſtrate to act in (as was ſaid e'en now) is no other but to act agreeable hereunto. Yet is not the reaſon for this, upon on which I chooſe to ſtand here, ſo much, from the manner wherein the Magiſtrate is to act (leaſt that alone be to infirm to bear the ſtreſs is laid upon it): as from the matter he is to ſee done. That which he is to ſee performed is Gods will, and I ſay that thoſe acts; (theſe outward acts he were otherwiſe to ſee done) which are againſt mens conſciences, are the matter of his forbidden will; and ſo muſt he let them alone; But as for all other outward acts of men, which are not againſt their conſciences, Let the Magiſtrate ſee that what he requires be for the good of his people, either for their Spiritual or Temporal good, (as whatſoever he requires, which is not againſt Gods Law, we may conceive like to be), and whether they be Religious or Civil, he is under the Goſpel as well as under the Law, Gods Miniſter, and beareth not the Sword in vaine.
The other, diſtinction which muſt not be forgotten does lye in the difference, I put between a forcing men to that which is againſt their conſciences: and reſtraining them ſometimes from that which they think they are bound to do. The one of theſe may be lawful, fit, reaſonable, and without which the Government it ſelf can hardly be ſecured: when the other is never to be held ſo, upon that one reaſon mentioned, and is irrefragable. Here then are two Queſtions in thoſe ingenuous Papers, propoſed to the life, as the ſum of what could be deſired if they had but been directly anſwered when propoſed: The one is, How far men muſt be ſuffered to do thoſe things which they ſay they are in conſcience obliged to do? The other …, How far they may be commanded and enforced to do ſuch things, which they indeed believe and ſay they are in conſcience obliged not to do? The ſubſtance of th…ſe Queſtions the Gentleman I perceive took to be one, and ſo paſſes them off. But as the putting a diff…rence (I account before) as to ſome things which (in relation to what is aſſerted) admits none: ſo muſt the confounding that here, wherein the difference bring put is ſo much to purpoſe, needs lead him into darkneſs. To theſe two queſtions therefore I anſwer, inſtead of thoſe Papers.
As to the former, which is the caſe only of reſtraint, I doubt not but men may and ought to be reſtrained often times in many things, unto which they think themſelves to be obliged, and that for this reaſon: Becauſe that although God does require every man to act in whatſoever he does according to his conſcience, yet he requires not in every thing that is according to his conſcience, he ſhould act. His conſcience may be Erroneous, or the thing not expedient, if lawful to be done. Again, the Magiſtrates conſcience and his are two; He may think he is bound in conſcience to act (ſuppoſe in preaching ſeditious Doctrine), yet if upon reſtraint he acts not, his conſcience cannot accuſe him of ſin, becauſe he cannot help it, and the Magiſtrates reſtraining him is good, and thereupon the does it, for avoiding the evil that would follow if he ſhould ſuffer him.
As to the latter queſtion, which is the caſe of conſtraint, viz. the conſtraining of men to do any thing which is againſt their conſcience, I ſay the Magiſtrate hath in that caſe no Authority, and that for this one reaſon, which is to be inſiſted on to the laſt breach of theſe Papers, viz becauſe, this is manifeſtly againſt his Office or work, who being to ſee Gods Will performed, does hereby directly endeavour the contrary. His will is the man ſhould never act againſt his conſcience whatſoever comes of it, & he is forcing him hereunto. Let me add, Either the conſcience of a man is in an error: or it is in the right; If it erre not, a mans conſcience is as God to him, who can ſay a word againſt it? If it be erroneous, I ſay Gods will lyes in both theſe things: that a man ſhould not do againſt his conſcience, becauſe it is his conſcience: and that he ſhould not do according to his conſcience, becauſe it erres, but that he ſhould lay down his error, and ſo act. And this is the meaning of that which Divines do ſay, that ſuch a conſcience does ligare not obligare. The Magiſtrate accordingly may not compel him to that which is poſitive to act againſt his conſcience: but to that which is negative, viz. not to act according to it: and if he do, and do wickedly, no doubt but he may puniſh him for it. And ſo having offered you my Determination, I am glad I can confirm it and that with two teſtimonies likewiſe, moſt of ſufficient credit. The one is St. Auſtin in his ſecond Book, and Chapter 83. againſt Petilian, who pleading the unlawfulneſs of compelling them to Religion, Auſtin anſwers: Ad fidem quidem nullus est cogendus invitus, ſed per ſeveritatem ſolet perfidia caſtigari: Si quae erga vos leges conſtitutae ſunt, non eis benefacere cogimini, ſed malefacere prohibemini; nam benefacere nemo poteſt niſi elegerit. The other is Grotius, who letting nothing almoſt eſcape him, which is momen… us in any Author, hath fallen in upon this very quotation. Suſpenſo pede hic incedendum, ut illi qui Divinae Humanaeque ordinationi reſiſtant, non tam cegantur benefacere, quam malefacere prohibeantur; Quae duo in hoc ipſo argumento Auguſtinus olim provide diſtinxit. De Imperio ſummarum poteſtatum circa Sacra. C. 6. S. 10.
There are two Notes I muſt leave farther; The one is that when I have laid down my two diſtinctions for the determining this point, you muſt take beed of going away with one of them. I know S. Auguſtins ſeventeenth Chapter in his ſecond Book againſt the ſecond Epiſtle of Gaudentius, hath this Title, quod ad veritatem cogendi ſint etiam inviti, which he makes good with theſe two inſtances, of the King of Ninives commanding his people to repent: and the Servants compelling them to come in to the Feaſt under the Goſpel. But neither of theſe Commands I hope (and as I have ſaid) are to be ſuppoſed againſt the conſciences of the one or the other, but only they were unwilling and negligent, and ſo had need of importunity and enforcement. I deny not therefore but the Magiſtrate hath power (N.B.) of Conſtraint and Reſtraint in the matters of Religion: but I ſay he hath not power of Constraint in matters Religious (or other matters) which are againſt a mans conſcience. The other Note is, that when I have diſtinguiſhed between Reſtraint and Conſtraint in the matter of Conſcience▪ (not in the general matters only of Religion), it does not ſeem to me ſafe to deſcend to particulars, what is, and what is not to be reſtrained: but in general the Magiſtrate may uſe a due reſtraint when he hath reaſon, and it is not fit he ſhould reſtrain any when he hath none. There is reaſon the Magiſtrate ſhould reſtrain a John of Leyden, and Knipperdoling, when he hath indeed none againſt a peaceable Owen, and honeſt Kiffin. The Roman Emperour may have cauſe in general to take heed of innovation, and yet have no cauſe to diſturb the Chriſtian, of whom Pliny wrot to Traian. By this means ſhall it not follow either that Chriſtianity ſhould be ever kept out of the World, or that when Religion is eſtabliſhed, it muſt be overturned again by faction: but that ſuch a liberty only be allowed to conſcience, as is conſiſtent with the Articles of Faith, a good Life, and the Government of the Nation.