The Interest of These United Provinces, Section 11

The Interest of These United Provinces · Section 11

Sect 11 Conjectures of future affairs. The motions of the enſuing summer likely to be quick and great. As to this Repulick, probably England may get a Bridle to curb us, France the sadle to ride us, Colen a ſupernumerary girth, Munſter a boſs of the Crupper. Our condition deplored and conſolated. A caution for England, and the Orange family. The Authors fears of what will at laſt befal us. The Spaniſh Netherlands a dying. The friendſhip of England and France ſick at heart, and cannot live long. That of Spain and England ſound at heart, and will recover.

ALthough I have ſometimes ſpent almoſt whole nights at gazing on the Stars, and could perhaps erect an Aſtrological Scheme as well as another; yet I never uſed that way, nor never ſhall for gueſſing at faturities; becauſe I know it is vain to think, we cam ſpell Gods providence, by their myſtical hieroglyphick. Yet let me ſay it without vanity, I do believe I have made as many conjectures, concerning Kingdoms, States and particular places, as any man of my quality in Europe: not by any enthuſiaſtick ſpirit of prophecy, or by Aſtrology from the Stars; but reaſons of State, their intereſt, and the fundamental maxims of their Government; ſometimes out of curioſity only, and ſometimes for other ends, but ſuch as are honeſt I aſſure you, for none are either better or worſe by it, but only my brothers and my ſelf. The reaſon why I adventure to do this publickly now, is that I may awaken us out of our ſecurity, and that we may look about us, and ſee if poſſibly we can prevent thoſe things, which it is very probable are coming upon us. Only I deſire to do it modeſtly, as it becomes every Chriſtian; and neither on the one hand to pretend to that certainty, as if we were of Gods Council; no on the other hand to fall under Chriſts rebuke for not diſcerning the ſigns of the times, Matth. 16.Matt 16which are both theological and political, but I am now only treating of the latter, and to that I ſhall confine my diſcourſe.

Now that we may be quickned to defend our ſelves, comply with England, and free the Spaniſh Netherlands from their fears, and our ſelves from the neighbourhood of the French there, (this being one Reaſon of State, why we formerly made peace with Spain, leſt we ſhould be in continual danger of annoyance from France) and alſo render their maintaining their Conqueſts among us more difficult, by their being kept unconnected with that Kingdom: I ſhall now proceed to the Conjectures I have made, not with an Aſtrological confidence, but a Chriſtian allowance of divine providence, which ſtrangely alters times and ſeaſons, puls down one and ſets up another, confounds the wiſdom of the wiſe, brings to nought the counſels of Achitophels, and turns the great deſigns and preparations for War, into a happy compliance, and peace as he pleaſes; and all in infinite wiſdom, though we cannot diſcern it, the knowledge of Gods providence even when paſt or preſent, and much more when future, being to David, and therfore far more to us. Too Wonderfull for us, Pſal. 139.Ps 139ſo high that we cannot attaine unto it, and ſo deepe in the great waters, that the footſteps thereof are not to be traced and knowne. So that we may well ſay, as of old,Pſal. 77.Ps 77 Dei ſapientia, & hominum ſtultitia regunt mundum. Firſt then, if we awake out of our ſecurity, and looke up in the morning of the yeare, we muſt needs conclude of foule weather the enſuing Summer, the skie is ſo red, that we may eaſily perceive it portends blood, and the loweſt region is ſo lowring, that we may eaſily diſcerne that a tempeſtuous ſtorme is a gathering; except we be ſo beſotted, as the fooliſh Jewes of old, with ſecurity, that we cannot diſcerne, as Chriſt tells them, the ſignes of the times. Can all Europe allmoſt be arming, and we a ſleepe in the Bed of Security, dreaming of Peace? Beſides the incredible preparations of France, is not England, Sweadland, and all our Neighbors allmoſt up and at worke; and can we thinke they would be at that coſt for a Comedy of Peace? have we not all the reaſon in the World, to thinke it will be to us, a Tragedy of War? Let others enjoy their opinion, and not take the alarme, till they ſee Hanibal ad portas; for my part, I muſt needs profes, I cannot, from what I obſerve, but conclude, that the affaires of the enſuing Summer, are like to be great, and the motions thereof quick, and ſuch as will highly concerne us in theſe Countreys.

As to this Republick, which hath at this time theſe four declared Enimies, England, France, Colen, and Munſter; I ſhall briefly ſpeake my thoughts, with reference to them all.

England probably will get, a bridle to curb us. I have ſhewne in the Preface, what they account the Intreſt of the Kingdome: We ſee notwithſtanding the Prince of Orange his promotion, they ſtill purſue the War; and muſt we not then conclude, that they ſeeke ſome thing further? Whether they will by Sea attacque our Coaſts, or by marching their Armie about over Land, is not for me to determine; much les what particular places below they may fall upon, or what ſucces they may have. Yet I conclude they will have ſome hanke or other upon our Navall power, one way or other, before they make Peace with us; otherwiſe they will continue the War the following Summer, to try their utmoſt to get, that which we will not give them.

France that is allready got into the Sadle, will there ſit and ride us; though we flatter our ſelves, we ſhall by one means or other, ſhake him out of it, and off our backs. Truly I cannot but wonder often times, to heare what vaine hopes men expres and there's no contradicting them; (allthough ſome times I cannot conteine my ſelfe from ſmiling, or ſhakeing my head) that France muſt be content with one or two of our Cities which we can beſt ſpare, and with a confidence allmoſt as large, as if they was ready to run way, or reſolved to march out and quit thoſe Cities they have, at our pleaſure. As if the French were ſuch ſooles, to be at that vaſt expence, great paines, even the King himſelfe perſonally, and have ſuch advantage upon us, and quit the ſame for a thing of nothing? For my part, I am affraid they will rather get more, then loſe that they have gotten already. And I know, their deſigne is, to get all at laſt. It is true, if we comply with England, and ſo ſtrengthen our ſelves by them and Spaine, we may thereby hope either to obteine better conditions by Treaty, or compel them thereunto by Force. But I am ſpeaking of the ſtate of the War, as now it ſtands.

Colen, that pretends to ſome of thoſe Cities which we held about the Rhyne, that are now in the power and poſſeſſion of the French, may poſſibly for his paines, and permiſſion of their paſſage, &c. get ſome ſupernumerary girth, one place or other that may be of no great concernment to France, either for their deſignes upon us or the Empire, and muſt be contented therewith. And perhaps for ſome time his Counſellors may have their Penſions continued from France.

Munſter, that is mercinary and fights for Money, will get a bos off the crupper; French Lewis's made and minted of Dutch Ducats. For elective Princes, as Biſhops, that are onelyonly for life, ſeek more to enrich themſelves, then to enlarge their Territories, as thoſe doe that are hereditary.

And this is likely, ſo far as I can ſee, to prove our condition; except foreign appeare in the Tragedy, or God Almighty by ſome wonderfull providence, make a change in the Scene of this War. Which, I confeſs, is very deplorable, which way ſoever we look; and we are not ſo ſenſible of it now, as we ſhall be hereafter. I had thought here to have ſit downe a little with a lamentation, but I have been ſo large already, that I ſhall wholly wave it for the preſent.

And yet it is a had wind that blows no good, we may make this advantage of our miſeries, ſo long as we remain amidſt our enimies, when a Peace is once concluded; that we may hold them both fair to us, and ſo ſecure our ſelves a little more in quiet, then we perhaps think, by being ready to cloſe with either, to the great prejudice of the other.

And therefore let me freely inſert this important and neceſſary Caution for England, That they take heed they do not overdo their work; and ſo far irritate this Republick, that out of a preſent prejudice and paſſion, and alſo deſperation of their future quietneſs from them, they call in the French, to be revenged of them, though it be to their own ruine.

I know many are jealous, that this whole War is onelyonly to make the Prince of Orange a Monarch, and the two Crowns will have no more to do with the States; although I profeſs, I am far from thinking, that thoſe two Kings and Kingdoms would be at all this expence of blood and treaſure for that end onelyonly, and doe believe that if that would ſet us in our former condition, it would ſoone be aſſented unto, not onelyonly by the multitude, but the wiſeft men amongſt us, who know the extraordinary abilities and great capacities of his Highneſs. Therefore let me ſay it freely without offence, either of Him or his Enimies, that I perceive many lay this for a fundamental maxim, Better a Prince that hath power to defend us, then one whom we muſt onelyonly defend. And except my eye-ſight fail me, ſome are faſt at work in preparing materials to build thereon. A word is enough to the wiſe, and therefore I will ſay no more.

Nay I will not diſſemble my further fears, That if France keeps thoſe places on the South Sea, and ſhould get others lower, either in Holland or Frieſlands, as may capacitate him to incommodate their Trade, though we ſhould have a peace for ſome time with him, we ſhall fall into his hands at laſt. For the French are already ſo near us on every ſide, that they hover over us, as a Hawk over the grey, watching onelyonly an opportunity, how they may graſp us in their talons.

If any ſhall here aske me, Why may we not then as well now become French?

I alſo ſhall aske ſuch one Queſtion, which when they ſatisfie me in, I alſo ſhall them. You know certainly you muſt die at laſt, (whereas here is onelyonly uncertaine fears) and yet when you are ſick, why do you take phyſick and uſe means for recovery? Is it not becauſe you deſire to live as long as you can? Doe you not account him a mad man, that will caſt away his life, although he muſt loſe it at the laſt? And rightly, becauſe who knows what God may doe, and whether he may not recover him, though the diſeaſe be deſperate?

Having ſpoke our thoughts concerning theſe united, we ſhall now ſpeak of the Spaniſh Provinces. I have as much ſmattering skill in Phyſick, I confeſs, as would ſerve me to make Charon a fraight of old Wives; yet am I far from being arrived at the confidence, which I have obſerved in Ʋrinal-Doctors. And yet for once, I will adventure to try the little skill I have, with thoſe State-Mountebanks, that are ſo ſecure concerning the Spaniſh Netherlands. For my part, I have ſhak't their Water again and again, and can find nothing but ſymptoms of death. I ſhall onelyonly premiſe that I ſhall not with an Emperical confidence tell you the time: Kingdoms and States, as well as private perſons, ſometimes languiſh out rather then live their laſt. But that they are ſo ſick, that I ſee no hopes of their recovery if this War continues. And I will tell you my feares for the enſuing Summer.

1. The incredible preparations that France makes this Winter, both of Men and Money, as if they would ſet all at ſtake for carrying on the following Summers Wars.

2. The Empire's Army is overmatcht with Turens. They know, that we are not in a capacity to recover the Cities we have loſt, and that they cannot conquer thoſe that remaine; ſo that their Armies cannot be deſigned either for ſtrengthning their owne Garriſons, or forcing of ours. Except they will ſpend a Summers Expedition upon ſome inconſiderable out Garriſons, which I cannot imagin.

3. I have looked round about in Europe, where this ſtorme ſhould fall, and can ſee no place it hovers over, except thoſe Provinces, and our ſelves.

4. I conſider the eminent advantage France hath at preſent by their friendſhip with England; which I feare he will take.

5. Allthough I doe not thinke France will prevaile by all his endeavors with England to breake with Spaine; yet I thinke England will either be employed in doing their owne worke, or not ſo quickly breake with France, to ſtop his carriere in over-running thoſe Netherlands.

6 We ſhall either have the Wars continue, or a Peace. If the former as they are, though England helps not therein, (for they profes in their Declaration to maintaine the Treaty at Aken) yea, though they would hinder it, yet I doe not ſee how they can practically, if they have not prevented it beforehand by their Treaty; nor we to be ſure the Wars continuing. If a Peace be concluded, we ſhall be forced to forſake them; this being the main ground of the quarrel. For if we would have helped France to have ruind them, we might have been quiet for ſome time at leaſt; but becauſe we had rather quench, then ſet our neighbors houſe on fire, leſt ours follow in the flames: France hath fallen upon us, and ſhall we not then thinke that he will cudgell us into ſuch conditions? It is true indeed, if England and we come to underſtand one another, and our joynt intreſt better; we may ſuccor them for ſome time; but that's not my ſuppoſal, of the Wars continuing as they are, which in that caſe implies a ſtrange complication of diſeaſes, which to me, who knows not their Treaty, ſeems incurable.

7. And where elſe they ſhould have aſſiſtance to ſave them, if France will fall upon them, I ſee not. For the Empire cannot, it is well if they can ſave themſelves. Spaine is at a great diſtance. May make perhaps ſome diverſion in Catalonia, or ſome ſmall from Millan, &c. But whats that to ſave thoſe Provinces?

8. We muſt therefore conſider if they can ſtand on their owne legs, ſo as to withſtand their enimies power, and not to be throwne downe thereby. And here we ſhall find the number of Spaniſh inconſiderable; the Dutch very wavering and uncertaine: Some Popiſh Zealots thinking France can beſt carry on their deſignes; others betwixt hopes and feares, wiſhing they might ſee an iſſue; and others plainely deſpairing of reſiſtance, deſiring they were over. Their Cities great and untenable, ſeverall of them requiring allmoſt as many to man them well, as they have Spaniſh in the Countrey. If they can make good Bruxels, Antwerp, Namur, and Ooſtend, for ſome time, to ſee if the affaires of Europe may not alter, it is all I expect. But what ſhall become of the whole Countrey, and the reſt of the Cities,Deſcriptio Lovani. Bruges, Mechlin, Gant, Lovaine, &c. Some of them as large as moſt Cities in Europe. Three Noblemen An. 1427. (as Guicciardine tells us) with great charges, had five of the greateſt Cities on this ſide the Alpes meaſured, and found but, 18 Rods or Perches difference. Of which Lovaine and Gant, the greateſt; Paris (within the Walls) and Liege alike; Colen the leaſt. But neglecting to mention the juſt meaſure, Guicciardine tells us they are 6 Italian miles within, and above 8 without the walls. And though this be enough, yet I muſt needs thinke them more. For having had the curioſity to meaſure one of them for all, I found it upon a warme walking within the Walls, three full hours by my watch. And beſides this, Paris and Liege are moſt populous, Colen next, but theſe of the Netherlands leaſt, ſo that I leave any rationall man to judge what number of men they require to maintaine them, for I will not now ſtand to make that calculation. Now if he takes theſe two great Cities, he is in the heart of Brabant and Flanders, ſo that all the reſt will fall of themſelves. I conclude therfore, that except the treaty between France and England ſecure them, which is unknowne to me; or that God in his all-wiſe Providence, make ſome wonderfull chang in the ſcene of affairs in Europe, the Spaniſh Netherlands are loſt. Having therefore thus tolled their paſſing bell, we will leave them to Gods mercy, and the King of France's clemency, and haſt us out of them to France and England.

And here many perhaps will thinke me litle better than madd, to croſs the current opinion of Chriſtendom; when I ſay that the Friendſhip of France and England is ſick at heart, and cannot live long; and the contrary of that betwene England and Spaine. But I matter not that, other men have their way of making their meaſures, and I have mine. And indeed I thought to have communicated it, but this worke having allready exceeded my intentions, and that would be a great digreſſion, I would onelyonly tell you my grounds or reaſons for the preſent why I thinke ſo, and may happily make a particular diſcourſe of the other hereafter.

How France and England came to be ſo great friends as to agree to commence, and carry on a War thus far againſt us, is not now mine enquiry; but to ſhew there is no ſuch ground to diſpaire of complianee with England, notwithſtanding their preſent league with France, is my deſigne. And for this end I ſhall firſt ſhew that though this friendſhip is faire outwardly, each for their own ends; yet that it is not ſo cordiall and firme, as many amongſt us feare it is. And to ſay the truth, the conſideration hereof, was the firſt dawning of hopes I had, for the Proteſtant Intreſt, and the good of theſe Countries. Now allthough I could mention ſome more private expoſtulations, and perhaps ſome of their Articles, allthough I could by no means, ever procure from either ſide, the knowledge of them all: yet I thinke it not fit to mention theſe, but ſuch things onelyonly as are publick, and others as well as my ſelf may know, if they uſe their eyeſight, and obſervation.

Let us then omitting all ſecrets and myſteries of State, which yet are the beſt grounds to make a judgement, when certainely knowne; we will onelyonly mention ſuch things as are publickly apparent, but being not conſidered in ſubordination to Reaſons of State, were unuſefull to the moſt, for the end I have obſerved them.

When all Europe ſtood in doubt what England would doe, and all men on their tiptoes with expectation; to ſee whether War or Peace, betwixt that Kingdome and theſe Countries: upon the Smyrna's Fleet returne, the doubts of many were then decided. The Saturday morning early after the fight, the Fiſcale ſent his footman to tell me they had fought, with ſome generalls thereof, and that the Fleet was before the Land: I muſt confes, I ſtood amazed at Holmes's furious folly, who had orders onelyonly to bring them up, not to commence a War, the Declaration thereof being not publiſhed; allthough to thoſe that would not ſubmit to ſuch orders, it was all one in effect, though not in formalities, which are the greateſt plea, that I know of, that the Engliſh have for that Action. Upon this I began to conſider the Reaſons of State as to England, both domeſtick and forreign; For I reaſoned thus, if this friendſhip be ſo firme that England will goe through with France in all their great deſignes, I muſt make other meaſures then I had formerly done. But ſtill finding all Reaſons of State againſt this, and thoſe jealouſies of changing Religion and the Government in thoſe Kingdoms frivolous, (as I have demonſtrated) I found allſo thereby ſtronger grounds of hope for the Proteſtant Religion and the common Intreſt of Europe; and that it was onelyonly a temporary friendſhip, out of ſome particular peake, or deſigne againſt theſe Provinces, which would have an end when ſatisfaction therein was given to that Crowne. Whilſt I am buſy in ballancing all the Reaſons of State for thoſe Kingdoms, and likewiſe for their Intreſt abroad as comprehenſively as I could, the Proteſtants Intreſt, the Triple Alliance, the greatnes of France, the danger of England &c. comes the Engliſh Declaration of War to mine hands, but without a particular date, contrary to practiſe, but wiſely to colour what Holmes had done. Which having diligently peruſed, what I deſired firſt to ſee, I found laſt to my great ſatisfaction, and that is that they would ſupport the peace made at Aix la Chappelle, (or Aken) and notwithſtanding the proſecution of this War, will maintaine the true intent and ſcope of the ſaid Treaty, and that in all their Alliances which they have or ſhall make in the progres of this War, they have and will take care, to preſerve the ends thereof inviolable unles provoked to the contrary. Whereby I was fully confirmed in my former opinion, ſo that I will now proceed to relate ſuch things which have publickly paſt in the management of this War, that are ſufficient I thinke to enduce thoſe that are unprejudiced, though perhaps not to convince the obſtinate, to be of the ſame opinion with my ſelfe, and that the friendſhip of England and France is not ſo firme as they have feared. Premiſing that though all States as Gameſters muſt and will be cautious in their playing their parts, yet there appeared ſtill more then ordinary jealouſies of each others friendſhip all along, in the management of this War.

1. It is obſerveable that though France is the Principall in the War, yet they were ſo diffident of England, that they would have them firſt to begin it, that ſo they might ſee them certainly engaged againſt us.

2. When they are both engaged, they truſt not one another, without great Hoſtages as it were on both ſides; the French Squadron of Ships with the Engliſh and the Duke of Monmouth with the body of an Army with the French.

3. That body of the Engliſh, which doubtles ſhould have remained together under their owne generall Officers conjoyned with the French Armie; we know was not truſted by the French ſo to doe, but were mingled here and there, under the principall command of the French Generalls.

4. The Fleet wherein the Engliſh had the principall ſhare of power and command, onelyonly faced ours at firſt in point of Honour, yet attacqued them not, though they had the wind, whereby they might eaſily have done it at their pleaſure, and alſo to their Advantage; but ſtood over againe to the Engliſh coaſt. Which fooles thought was want of valour, but wiſe men will judge it reaſon of State, that they might ſtay and obſerve what ſucces the French had by Land. And had not we fallen upon them, for Reaſons of State in thoſe circumſtances and Government of theſe Provines, that are well knowne, I thinke they would have done, as litle as they could for France; to have fought us to this day.

5. After that fight, though they knew ſeverall of our Ships were laid up, and ſome thouſands of men called out of the Fleet, yet notwithſtanding all the Summer after for many weeks, they attempted nothing againſt us with their Fleet. Intending doubtles to doe their owne worke, as they then ſaw France did theirs.

6. How the Engliſh were ſtartled, at the French's coming to Ʋtrecht was very apparent, which we have formerly mentioned.

7. Why might not England, as well as the reſt of the World, thinke that Weſel, Rijnberg, Skenker-ſconſe, and the reſt of our ſtrong out Garriſons might give the French ſufficient worke? and the French on the contrary, who had laid their traines before hand, know that when they came to fire them, there was no feare they would mis, and they ſhould faile of having thoſe places? Yea why may they not deſigne by this meanes to breake both our powers ſo by Sea, that they may riſe up to contend with either of us? I am ſure theſe things are very uſuall with Princes and States, and examples of this kind are infinite. Why may we not then thinke that England might hereby deſigne to breake France's power by Land; and France Englands power and ours alſo by Sea? How often theſe two Crowns have played ſuch like games with one another formerly; when England had ſooting in France, is apparent from the Hiſtories of both Nations. But we will ſpeake of that which more nearly concerns our ſelves, and within our own knowledge. In our firſt War with England I obſerved, what influence Don Alonzo, the Reſident for Spaine at London, had, to fomer thoſe jealouſies that that Common-wealth had of this, that it was the Kings cauſe, which this Republick by meanes of the Orange Family had eſpouſes, and what aſſiſtance Spaine, (which firſt publickly acknowledged that Common-weath) would afford them, &c. And when we were both engaged, how the Spaniſh drew their Forces towards our Frontiers, as if they alſo would fall upon us; and when we declined, withdrew them againe, to encourage us both to continue the War. And in our ſecond War, if France had not a great hand both in contriving and continuing it, wiſemen are much deceived, and the French miſrepreſented to the World. By what inducements they perſwaded both ſides to a willingnes to that War, I liſt not mention, nor is there much neceſſity thereof, they being ſo well knowne to ſeverall of both Nations. What a hand they had in its continuation, we may eaſily perceive, if we recollect but what paſſed therein. When the Engliſh in the firſt Battel had bearen us, France being onelyonly a Spectator to ballance England, becomes our Second; and Monſieur, the Kings onelyonly Brother, and his Lady, Englands onelyonly Siſter, were not permitted to uſe any publick expreſſions of joy by Bonefires, or otherwiſe for their Brother the Duke of Yorks Victory over Opdam. Their Fleet under de Duke of Bauford ſhall come to our aſſiſtance, which occaſiond the dividing of the Engliſhe's, by which meanes and Monks precipitancy (who would needs fight contrary to the advice of the cheif and beſt Commanders in the Fleet, as Aſcough told us in the Hague) the Engliſh are beaten by us. And to boye up England againe, a private League is made betweene the two Crownes, as I have formerly declared from an honourable Author. So that theſe tricks of State are uſuall, though not diſcerned by every eye; nor dare I cenſure them allwayes for ſinfull, except I ſee manifeſtly foule play, becauſe I know not the Reaſons of State, which are the Grounds of their proceedings.

Having thus ſhewne, and I thinke ſufficiently, that the friendſhip of England and France is ſick at heart; I ſhall now proceed to ſhew, that it cannot live long; but if France goes on, will and muſt die quickly.

1. Englands intreſt will perſwade them to this, which they cannot but diſcerne clearly prompts them to put a ſtop to France's progres. If any think that they are ſo blinded with Paſſion, That to be revenged of us, they will ruin themſelves: I am not of their opinion, for many Reaſons, which I think I am cleare in; allthough I ſhall not mention them now, but onelyonly appeale to the iſſue, whether they or I be in the darke and deceived.

2. The many tricks that France playes them, ſome whereof I have hinted, and ſeverall others might be mentioned, That I know they have attempted, but been diſappointed in; cannot but alienate the Engliſh from them.

3. A Treaty being the game (as I have ſaid) we ſhall play at, (which the ſooner and better for us) I foreſee plainly, that ſuch Cards will be played, as will make it apparent, that the Pack was neither fairly ſhuffled nor delt, and that the French meane to play at la bete with us both; and if we continue to play, ſhall come to loſ…ing loadam at laſt: So that though the French have more of Clubs and Spades in their hands, by which they hope to win the Diamonds, we ſhall have more of the Hearts between us; and ſo perhaps ſave ſome of our ſtock at the ſtake.

4. If England come to receive ſatisfaction, the ſpirit of the Nation will turne the ſcales. For ſuppoſe that ſhould be now,Lib. 6. c. 2. that Comines tells us was heretofore, (which yet is ſooner ſaid than proved) yet we muſt needs thinke that if France deales unfairely with them; they will not onelyonly have a faire occaſion to deſert them, but the King and his Court, the Parliament and People will be more irritated againſt them, then they are now againſt us, (as is uſuall in ſuch caſes) and be readier to joyne with us and fall upon them, then they were to joyne with them againſt us, for the conſervation both of their Religious and Civil Concernements.

5. The Neceſſity of keeping up the ballance between France and Spaine, will neceſſitate England to breake with France, or at leaſt hold them to keepe more within their bounds, as we ſhall more fully ſhew hereafter.

6. Nay the very defence of theſe Countries, which we thinke they ſeeke to ruine, will cauſe them either to bring France to a peace with us, or themſelves to help to defend us againſt them. For they will never ſuffer France to have them all, no nor the greateſt part of theſe maritime Provinces, nor the ſtrongeſt as Holland, if they can poſſibly hinder it, though they may permit them ſome part of the Superior, for having themſelves a ſhare of the Inferior, as I have formerly ſhewne. So that our intreſt is ſo far Englands, and is the greateſt ſecurity we have, next to Gods protection, and our owne ſtrength, that we ſhall not be wholly overrun and brought under the French. Yea, this is ſo highly their concernement, that I perſwade my ſelfe, if all the ſtrength of the 3 Kingdoms under the Crowne of England, and all the power of Spaine with them, can hinder it, France ſhall never gaine them; or if he doe, never quietly poſſes them.

And theſe things I thinke are ſufficient, to free us from our fooliſh feares of England; and to perſwade us to a compliance with them, ſeeing we are both ſo greatly concerned to comply.

We ſhall now proceed to ſhew the quite contrary of the friendſhip between Spaine and England, that it is ſound at heart, and will recover. Wherein we need not be ſo large, becauſe that which ſhews that the friendſhip of France and England muſt die, proves that of England and Spaine will live.

That this friendſhip is ſound on the ſide of Spaine, none queſtions; this being the great motive, (though not the onelyonly I confeſs) that hath kept them from breaking with France.

And that it is allſo ſo on the ſide of England, I thinke is as cleare to thoſe that conſiders.

1. Their declared intention of maintaining the Treaty at Aix la Chapelle (or Aken) in their Declaration of this War.

2. Allthough a proviſionall clauſe, unles provoked to the contrary, in the cloſe thereof, gives them a latitude of breaking with Spaine; yet notwithſtanding they have been provoked ſeverall wayes by them, as all know that have obſerved the War, yet they will not breake with them we ſee; which is a cleare demonſtration their friendſhip is firmer then we imagine.

3. The importunities of France, which we know have been great, that England would engage with them againſt Spaine allſo, hitherto we ſee, have prevailed nothing therein.

4. The aſſurance we know England hath given the Court of Spaine, both there and at Bruxels, concerning the Spaniſh Netherlands, makes us not doubt of their intentions; allthough we doe of France's, by reaſon both of their preparations and opportunities, as we have formerly ſhewne. But if France ſhould fall upon them, as we have reaſon to feare; that will prove both our Aſſertions the ſtronglier, making the friendſhip of England and France die immediately, and that of Spaine and England quickly recover. And if this ſave not thoſe Provinces for the preſent, there's nothing (ſo far as I ſee) under Heaven that can, as I have formerly ſaid.

We perceive then the pulſe of this friendſhip beates both ſtrong and orderly enough, to ſecure us from all feares of its dying; lets viſit the patient once more, and we ſhall find no further need of ſuch Phyſitians adviſe, as the Author of la France Politique, in his Avis important à l'Angleterre, pag. 471. and that the diſtemper was onelyonly a fit or two of an Ague the laſt Spring, and therefore ſo far from being dangerous, that it may prove rather phyſicall according to the Proverb, An Ague in the Spring, is Phyſick for a King: And that the Body Politick of Spaine in their friendſhip with England is recovering, as well as the King of Spaine perſonally is recovered.

1. If we conſider the Common intreſt of Europe wherein the Engliſh not onelyonly are, but allſo profes themſelves concerned. And for this I need not any other proofe, but the Triple Alliance **Jan. 23. 1668., and the Declaration of this War, both which whoſoever reads, muſt needs acknowledge this for truth.

2. The great Intreſt of Trade which the Engliſh have in the Spaniſh Dominions. The very effects the Merchants had ſtanding out there, were computed at the beginning of this War, at ſixteen Millions. And can we thinke the King will eaſily forgoe his Cuſtoms, and the Kingdome their Commerce with thoſe Dominions? Which in my calculation, is equall with that they have with all Europe beſides.

3. We know that they have lately made a peace in the Weſt Indies, and how peremptory they are in the obſervance thereof; ſo that the Governor of Jamaica upon complaints of him, was ſent priſoner to London, clapt up in the Tower, &c. And ſhall we thinke then, that they will breake into War at home?

4. England cannot but be ſenſible of the greatnes of France, and cannot be ſo ſenſeles, but they muſt needs thinke, that it is their concernement that he grow not ſo great, that he become their Maſter allſo at laſt? And the whole World knowes that Spaine not onelyonly hath been now for many yeares the ballance for them; but ſtill muſt be ſo upon the Continent, or none: The Princes of the Empire being now ſo divided between the Imperiall and French Crowne. What wiſe man therefore can thinke now that Spaine declines, but that the Empire and England are highly concernd to ſupport them? And ſhall we thinke then that in ſtead of this, either ſhould help forwards their downfall? For my part, were there no other reaſon of ſtate, but this, I ſhould not fear Englands breaking with Spaine; and eſpecially now that they ſee what progres France hath made amongſt us.

5. This hath been a fundamental Maxim in the Governement of England, to keep the ballance even betwixt the two Crownes of Spaine and France, ever ſince Lewis the Elevenths time, who ſeiſed on Burgundy, which was formerly the uſual Confederate with England againſt France. In place whereof Auſtria firſt, and after Spaine obteining the reſt of the Provinces that were under Charles, laſt Duke of Burgundy, by marriage of his daughter; England after ſtill had an eye to them in reference to France. And when the Civil Wars in theſe Provinces broke out, and England was jealous of France's being our Protector: Q Eliſabeth would not permit it, ſtill having reſpect to the Houſe of Burgundy, as Thuanus and Cambd…n in the forecited places ſhew.

And thus you have my Conjectures, with ſuch Reaſons of State whereon they are grounded as are publick, and may therefore be publ…ſhed: I having induſtriouſly declined, all reflections on private Tranſactions, Treaties, and Articles whatſoever, that ſo no ſide may have any juſt occaſion of being offended with my writing.