The Court of the Gentiles Part 4, Part 4 · Book 2 · Chapter 4

The Court of the Gentiles Part 4 · Part 4 · Book 2 · Chapter 4

p. 257CHAP. IV. Of Gods Immutabilitie, Infinitude, Eternitie, Immenſitie, and Incomprehenſibilitie.

Gods Immutabilitie in Nature, immanent Acts of Knowlege and Wil; as alſo in his Word. Gods Infinitude as to Eſsence, and Perfection. His Eternitie explicated and demonſtrated. Alſo his Immenſitie. Gods Incomprehenſibilitie demonſtrated. How far we may apprehend God: Against poetic Figments of God, Curioſitie in our Inquiries after God. Notices of God natural and ſupernatural.

§. 1. NExt follows the Immutabilitie of God, The Immutabilitie of God.which reſultes from his Simplicitie, whereof we have great notices and demonſtrations both in ſacred and Platonic Philoſophie. As for ſacred Philoſophemes, the ſtile God aſſumes Exod. 3.14. I am, p. 258fully explicates and demonſtrates his Immutabilitie. For this phraſe denotes, that there is no paſſibilitie, dependence, ſucceſſion or variation in God. The ſame may be argued from the name foreign Jehovah, which indigitates and points out to us the neceſſitie, ſimplicitie,Mal. 3.6.Mal 3:6 and immutabilitie of the divine Eſſence. So Mal. 3.6. For I am the Lord, I change not. Which is explicated, Jam. 1.17.Jam. 1.17.Jas 1:17 With whom there is no variableneſſe or ſhadow of turne. Al theſe notions are Aſtronomic: God is here compared to the Sun, as he is the Father of Lights; yet ſo as that he infinitely outſhines and excels the Sun in regard of his immutable Nature and Eſſence. For the Sun, although it be not ſo variable as the Moon, yet, as Plato in his Timaeus wel obſerves, it has its foreign or foreign, Paralaxes and Changes: it appears otherwiſe at riſing, otherwiſe at noon, otherwiſe at ſetting: but now the bleſſed God admits not any of theſe variations. Again, the Sun has its foreign, tropic ſhadow, or ſhadow of turning: it has its annual Tropes, or Turnes and Viciſſitudes, which they cal the Solſtices; whereby it is nearer to, or remoter from us: according to which Receſſes or Acceſſes it caſtes various ſhadows, and cauſeth varietie of ſeaſons, Summer, Winter, Spring, Autumne: ſuch is the foreign, or tropic ſhadow of the Sun. But now the immutable God admits no ſuch tropic ſhadows of variations: he fals under no Eclipſe, defect or diminution of light. Indeed the Sun as to it ſelf is never eclipſed; albeit it be ſometimes hid from our ſight, by the interpoſition of the Moon; yet it then ſhines with as intenſe light as ever, ſomewhere elſe. Yea, if we wil ſpeak properly, the Stars cannot be ſaid to riſe and ſet in regard of themſelves, or the Heavens, but only as to us. So the bleſſed God may varie in his aſpects, regards, or providences as to us, yet in himſelf, yea in regard of his word he admits not the leaſt variation or ſhadow of turning. To expreſſe the ſame more familiarly: when we are in a Ship or Coach that moves, the earth and hils ſeem to us to move: namely, becauſe our viſion or ſight is made by a Pyramid, the baſis of which is in the object ſeen, but the point thereof in our eye: Now our eye being ſwiftly moved by the rapid motion of the Coach or Ship, and the point of the Pyramid moved therewith, hence the baſis, and thence the object it ſelf ſeems to move: Juſt ſo it is as to our knowledge of God; our thoughts and conceptions of God being always in fluxe, ſucceſſion, and motion; we fooliſhly conceit, p. 259that the immutable God moves and varies; whereas al the motion and variation is in us, not in him.

The Immutabilitie of God is greatly explicated and demonſtrated by Plato, God immutable in his Nature.whoſe Philoſophemes on this Theme may be reduced to the following particulars. 1. God is immutable in his Eſſence. Thus Plato, in his Phaedo, pag. 78. foreign, That very Eſſence, which we defined always to exiſte, foreign; namely that which is Equalitie it ſelf, Beautie it ſelf, Singularitie it ſelf, doth it admit any mutation? Or truely can any of thoſe, namely that which is uniforme Being, which exiſtes of it ſelf, and is always the ſame, and never in any degree admits the leaſt alteration? Whereby he ſtrongly proves, that God cannot fal under the leaſt mutation; becauſe he is an equal, uniforme, ſimple, ſelf-exiſtent Being. This Argument he more fully proſecutes, Repub 2. pag. 380. foreign; Doeſt thou thinke, that God is a Prevaricator, and as it were one lying in wait, to appear under different ſhapes? And ſometimes to be this, ſometimes that; and ſo to change himſelf into diverſe formes? or rather oughteſt not thou to judge, that he is most ſimple, and of althings leaſt departes from his own Idea? Then he addes the reaſon, why it is impoſſible for God to be mutable or variable in his Eſſence: foreign; Is it not neceſsary, if any thing depart from its own Idea or forme, that it be changed by it ſelf or by ſome other? (1) That God cannot be changed by any other he thus proves: foreign, Truely ſuch things as have the best conſtitution are not changed by any other. The ſame Principe he repetes, pag. 381. foreign; &c. Whatever is wel conſtituted, either by Nature, or Art, or both ways, doth it admit the least change? On this hand there can no mutation happen to God. Thence (2) he procedes to demonſtrate, that God cannot change himſelf: foreign, But doth he change p. 260and alter himſelf? It is evident he doth, if he be in any ſort altered. Then he demonſtrates, that God cannot change himſelf: foreign; Whether doth he change himſelf for the better and more excellent, or for what is worſe and baſer than himſelf? He replies: foreign, It's neceſsary that he be changed for the worſe, if he be at al changed: For we may not ſay, that God wants pulchritude or virtue in any degree. Then he addes: foreign; Doeſt thou thinke there is any one either of the Gods o men, who wil of his own accord make himſelf worſe in any manner? Thence he concludes: foreign, It is therefore impoſſible, that God ſhould be willing to change himſelf, but, as it is most conſentaneous, ſeing each of them is most excellent and best, that he remains one and the ſame ſimply in the ſome forme. In which excellent explication and demonſtration of the Immutabilitie of God, we have theſe obſervables. (1) He makes mention of Gods in the Plural Number, by reaſon of the ſeveritie of their Laws, and Cuſtomes, but intends thereby one only God, as before in the Unitie of God. (2) He demonſtrates this one God to be immutable; becauſe he cannot be changed either by any other or by himſelf. That he cannot be changed by any other he proves; becauſe al change is for the better: but God cannot be changed for the better; becauſe he is beſt. The ſame argument he uſeth to prove, that God cannot change himſelf. For ſuch a mutation would be either perfective or amiſſive: God is not capable of any perfective mutation; becauſe he is the beſt and moſt perfect Being: neither is it poſſible, that he ſhould affect any amiſſive mutation, becauſe none willingly change for the worſe. Proclus addes, that God is foreign invariable; becauſe al mutation is a ſigne foreign of infirmitie, as it is foreign, which is inconſiſtent with the omnipotent Eſſence. In ſum, this Immutabilitie of the Divine Eſſence is that Attribute, whereby God is ſaid to preſerve his own Being, without the leaſt power of not Being, or converſion into any other Eſſence, or increment and decrement, or alteration and motion.

1.God immutable in his immanent Acts. God is immutable in al his immanent Acts, and Decrees. There is a twofold mutation, phyſic and moral: phyſic mutation is by p. 261Addition or Ablation and Subſtraction of ſome real Entitie. Moral mutation is either of Science and Knowlege: as when a man judgeth that falſe, which he before thought to be true: or elſe of Wil and Purpoſe; when a man wils that, which before he nilled, &c. God is abſolutely immutable in al theſe reſpects: he is neither capable of phyſic nor yet of moral mutation, either as to Knowlege or Wil. For al mutation either of Knowlege or Wil implies inconſtance and imperfection, if not imprudence and infidelitie; which are al inconſiſtent with the Divine Being.1. Knowlege. (1) God cannot be ſaid to change in regard of his Knowlege; becauſe his Knowlege is not diſtinct from his Being: he knows himſelf and althings elſe in and by himſelf: he cannot know any thing that he did not know before; neither can he know any thing otherwiſe than he did before. He knows things ſucceſſive without ſucceſſion, by intuition: alſo things complexe by one ſimple intuitive act. His Knowlege is as neceſſary and eternal as his Eſſence; and therefore moſt perfect and immutable, both extenſively and intenſively. Objects known by God are variable, but his knowlege of them and of their variations invariable. Althings are the ſame to Gods knowlege, as they are in their own Beings: things paſt, preſent, future are preſent to God in al their circumſtances and differences. If Gods Science ſhould be changed, it would be about things future, when they are preſent, and ſo paſſe into preterite or what is paſt: but this cannot be, becauſe thoſe circumſtances of future, preſent, paſt are al determined by the Divine Wil, and ſo preſent to his Science of Viſion. Moreover no objects are the cauſe of the Divine Knowlege; but, on the contrary, the Divine Knowlege and Wil the cauſe of al objects, future, preſent, and paſt. In ſum, God knows al particular objects and circumſtances intrinſecally in the glaſſe of his own Eſſence; and therefore invariably and uniformely. Things both complexe and ſimple may varie; but God knows them al invariably, in the infinite claritie of his own Divine Eſſence and Ideas. Every thing future, if we compare it with the preſcience of God, it is neceſſary, and neceſſarily known by him. This Immutabilitie of the Divine knowlege Plato oft inculcates under his Divine Ideas, by means whereof he makes God to have the moſt accurate, abſolute, infinite, eternal, and immutable knowlege of althings. So in his Timaeus, pag. 28. as in his Parmenides, pag. 134, &c. as before P. 2. B. 3. C. 9. S. 1. §. 4. and in what follows, Chap. 4.

p. 262(2) God is immutable in al the Acts and Decrees of his Wil. 2. Wil.For theſe alſo have one and the ſame Idea with the Divine Eſſence. Again, if Gods Wil were mutable, his Knowlege muſt alſo be ſo: for God cannot know things future, but by the determination of his own Wil, whence they receive their futurition. It's true, God wils al mutations of things, yet his Wil admits no mutation. It's one thing to change a Wil,Deus non mutat voluntatem, ſed vult mutationem rerum. Aquin. and another to wil a change: For God by the ſame immutable Wil decrees that in ſuch a period of time ſuch a thing ſhal be, and in another, the contrary; without any beginning to wil what he willed not before, or ceaſing to wil what he before willed. God begins to wil or nil nothing: al his Wils and Nils are eternal. He hates nothing that he before loved, nor loves any thing that he before hated: neither doth his Wil admit any degrees of ſome or leſſe. No immanent Act or intrinſec denomination can happen de nov… unto God; albeit many, yea infinite externe relative denominations may be attributed to him. Thus the externe relative denomination of Creator is given to God in time, not intrinſecally but extrinſecally: the change of Creation was not in God, but in the Creature: the very act of Creation taken paſſively and extrinſecally is in the Creature, and not really diſtinguiſhed from it: if we conſider it actively as in God, ſo it is the ſame with the Wil and Eſſence of God: in which regard God may be ſaid to be Creator from al Eternitie, as his Wil is the productive cauſe of athings. Thus al other externe relations and denominations attributed to God in time, as Lord, Father, &c. are not becauſe of any new thing in God, but in regard of ſomething new in the Creature from God. There is no new Act in God which was not from eternitie, albeit the effects of thoſe Acts were not from eternitie, but in time. Al mutations are proper to Creatures only, becauſe Creatures: and the mutabilitie of the Creature can have no influence on the immutable God. Thus Damaſcene, Orthodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 18. foreign, Therefore God is altogether immutable and inalterable: for he hath determined althings by his Preſcience; every thing according to its proper and convenient ſeaſon, and place. Wherein note, (1) That by Gods Preſcience, muſt be underſtood the Divine Decree, whence his Preſcience reſultes, and therefore oft put for it: (2) That by this Divine Preſcience and Decree althings p. 263though moſt mutable and variable, as to their proper times and places, are immutably determined.

3. God is alſo immutable in regard of his Word. Gods Immutabilitie in regard of his Word.God being the firſt Intellect and Truth, he cannot but ſpeak truth: The Divine Veracitie is equally immutable in reſpect of future and paſt: God cannot but do what he hath ſaid he wil do; becauſe his Wil is immutable. He is moſt ſimple and true both in his words and workes: as he cannot be deceived, ſo neither can he deceive. Thus Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 381. refels the falſe Ideas and Idols, which the Poets frame of the Gods, as if they ſhould change themſelves into divers ſhapes: foreign, and by certain deluſions ſhould delude us, that they might ſeem various to us. Which he makes to be repugnant to the Nature of God, who is foreign, immutable, invariable, inalterable, and one that cannot lie; becauſe he is Truth it ſelf. Whence he concludes, pag. 382. foreign, &c. Wherefore God is ſimple and true, both in his workes and words: neither is he changed, neither doth he deceive others, either by phantaſtic deluſions, or ſpeeches, or ſignes, or viſions, or dreams. Of which more fully in the Veracitie of God, Chap. 6. §. 2. Only here we are to obviate an objection, which is made from what is mentioned in Scripture of Gods Repentance, Gen. 6.6. 1 Sam. 15.11. This manner of ſpeech is only after the manner of men, when they would have that undone which was formerly done: as to God it ſpeakes no alteration in him, but only in his Diſpenſations and Actions. According to proprietie of ſpeech God cannot be ſaid to repent, as Num. 23.19.

But to give a more ful Demonſtration of Gods Immutabilitie,The Immutabilitie of God demonstrated. we may conſider the Divine Eſſence and Attributes, which concur al to make good this demonſtration. (1) The Divine Eſſence and its neceſſitie gives us an invict argument of Gods Immutabilitie. For that which has a neceſſitie of Being cannot acquire its Eſſence by any action or mutation: and if it depend not on any other for its Being, it cannot loſe the ſame. Thus Plato, Phileb. foreign, The first one neceſſary Being is not capable of generation and corruption. Thus Jamblichus: God, ſaith he, neceſſarily is, not by an externe neceſſitie, but interne and natural. Now whatever is neceſſarily ſuch, is immutably ſuch. This Argument is wel improved by the Author libri p. 264de Fundamentis, l. 2. c. 5. foreign, &c. Whatever is changed is changed by ſome other: But that which neceſſarily exiſtes of it ſelf hath not any cauſe by which is ſhould be changed: for the ſame thing cannot be the changer and changed: for ſo it ſhould conſiſte of two things, one that changeth, and another that is changed. Al change ariſeth either from ſome externe or interne cauſe: But God hath nothing without that can make any impreſſion on him: neither is there any thing within him, that can give or receive any impreſſion or change. There is no active power, either without or within God, that can make, nor any paſſive power within God to receive any impreſſion or mutation. Thus Damaſcene, Orthedox. Fid. l. 1. c. 3. foreign, &c. Beings therefore create are altogether mutable: it's neceſſary therefore that the Opificer and Framer be increate— and if increate then immutable. So l. 2. c. 3. foreign, for every create Being is mutable: the increate only is immutable. And he gives this reaſon of his Hypotheſis: foreign, for whatever hath beginning may naturally have an end. (2) We may demonſtrate the Immutabilitie of God from his Simplicitie. For al mutation properly conſidered requires ſome Compoſition; becauſe there is required ſome commun ſubject remaining under both termes of the mutation. This Argument is wel managed by Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 381. It is impoſſible that God ſhould be changed; becauſe he remains foreign, always the ſame ſimply in his own forme. So Phaedo, pag. 78. he proves, that God being foreign, a uniforme Being exiſting of himſelf, and always the ſame, cannot admit the least alteration, as before Thence, in his Timaeus, he cals God, foreign, one ſame Being always like himſelf. God being one ſimple Being, without Quantitie, Qualitie, or any Accident, having nothing in himſelf but what is himſelf, it is impoſſible, that he ſhould admit any alteration or mutation.Pſal. 102.26, 27.Ps 102:26Ps 102:27 Thus ſacred Philoſophie, Pſal. 102.26, 27. They [the Heavens] ſhal periſh, but thou ſhalt endure—thou ſhalt change them and they ſhal be changed. But thou art the ſame and thine years ſhal have no end. Where he foundes and bottomes the Immutabilitie of God on the Simplicitie and Identitie of his Eſſence. (3) The Immutabilitie of God may be demonſtrated from his Immobilitie. Thus Plato in his Parmenid…. pag. 138. foreign, p. 265Becauſe if he, [the one God] ſhould be moved, he ſhould be either moved locally, or alterated: for there are only theſe motions. Very good. But now if this one God ſhould be altered, he ſhould not be one: therefore he cannot be moved according to alteration. Thence he procedes to prove, that he cannot be moved locally; becauſe he has no parts. Whence he concludes, pag. 139. foreign, The one God therefore is, as to al kinds of motions, immobile. The force of this Argument lies thus: God being the prime Motor and Principe of al motion and mutation muſt neceſſarily be immobile and immutable: For al grant the firſt Motor to be immobile: and al motion and mutation to be founded in ſome immobile immutable Principe. Thence Ariſtotle held God to be foreign, the first, immobile Being. So Philo Judaeus makes God to be, foreign, the immobile immutable Being, who no way ſtandes in need of any other thing. Again, Plato argues, That whatever is altered or changed, cannot be primarily, ſimply, and abſolutely one, as God is. (4) We may demonſtrate the Immutabilitie of God from his pure Actualitie and Impaſſibilitie. The moſt pure Act cannot be changed, becauſe paſſive power, either phyſic or metaphyſic and obediential, is the root of al mutabilitie and dependence. Thus Jamblichus, a great Platoniſt: God, ſaith he, hath nothing in himſelf paſſible: and this impaſſibilitie he hath not by acquiſition, but by nature. An uniforme Eſſence, of it ſelf incorporeous and permanent admits not any paſſions or diviſions either of alteration or mutation. Where there is perpetual order there can be no paſſion. (5) The Immutabilitie of God may be evinced from his Eternitie. Whatever is eternal muſt neceſfarily be immutable; becauſe without beginning and end. That which was before al time cannot be liable to any changes of time. Thus Plato, in his Parmenides, pag. 141. and in his Phaedrus, p. 245. ſtrongly proves, That the firſt one Being can have neither beginning nor end, and thence no alteration or mutation, as hereafter in the Eternitie of God §. 3. (6) The Perfection of God demonſtrates his Immutabilitie. Thus Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 381. foreign, &c. God, and thoſe things that belong to God are beſt, and moſt perfect; therefore he cannot admit any mutation: for what is beſt is never changed. The force of the Argument lies thus: God, by the neceſſitie of his Being, has a plenitude of Eſſence and Perfection, and therefore admits not of any augmentation p. 266or diminution: for what by neceſſitie of Nature has a plenitude of Being and Perfection, that cannot extend it ſelf any further, but muſt be infinite: and what is infinite cannot be greater, or leſſer; neither can any thing be taken from or added to it. Hence, God being by a neceſſitie of Nature moſt perfect, cannot be more or leſſe perfect: therefore he cannot fal under any mutation either perfective or corruptive, augmentative or diminutive.

§. 2.Gods Infinitude as to Eſſence and Perfection. Hence follows Gods Infinitude as to Eſſence and Perfection. For a Being neceſſarily, ſimply, and immutably ſuch muſt of neceſſitie be infinitely perfect. A Creature ſimply and abſolutely finite may be in ſome limited ſenſe ſaid to be infinite; as the Soul of man is in regard of its capacitie ſaid to be infinite; becauſe capable of an infinite object: but nothing is abſolutely, ſimply, and eſſentially infinite and perfect but God. Infinitie really excludes al negation of Entitie from God, and alſo includes that God is in pure Act, whatever Ens in its moſt extenſive univerſal latitude and notion doth include. For an infinite Eſſence neceſſarily contains, either formally or eminently, whatever is or may be of perfection in al Beings, either actually exiſtent or poſſible. But to treat more philoſophically and diſtinctly of this Attribute, we are to conſider, that infinite is a negative notion, which includes a negation of al termes or bounds: now a thing may be ſaid to be terminated, bounded, or finite in reward (1) of its Eſſence and Perfection, (2) of its Duration, (3) of its Preſence, (4) of its Comprehenſibilitie. In al theſe regards God is ſaid to be infinite. He is infinite (1) in Eſſence, as moſt perfect and independent: (2) in Duration, as eternal: (3) in Preſence, as omnipreſent, or immenſe: (4) as to our Comprehenſion, in being incomprehenſible. We ſhal here treat only of Gods Infinitude as to Eſſence and Perfection; and of the other, as diſtinct Attributes reſulting from this Infinitude of Eſſence.

Gods Infinitude as to Eſſence and Perfection may be various ways explicated and demonſtrated.Gods Infinitude from his Independence. Thus Damaſcene, Orthodox. Fid. l. 2. c. 19. deſcribes God, foreign, The increate, independent, immortal, infinite, eternal, immaterial, chiefest Good—the immutable, impaſſible, incircumſcript, immenſe, indefinible, incorporeous, p. 267inviſible— without indigence, abſolute, moſt free, omnipotent, and infinitely potent. By each of theſe divine Attributes the Infinitude of the Divine Eſſence may be demonſtrated. As 1. By his Independence. The Infinitude of the Divine Eſſence conſiſtes in a negation of al limitation and termes. The termes that limit any Eſſence are its cauſes: therefore that which is foreign and foreign without any cauſe, muſt needs be without termes, and ſo infinite. And is not the Divine Eſſence thus independent, without al cauſal termes and limitation? Muſt not God then be infinite in his Eſſence? This Independence of the Divine Eſſence as to al cauſes and cauſal limitation is wel expreſſed in ſacred Philoſophie, by Gods being the firſt and the laſt: as Eſa. 41.4. I the Lord, Eſa. 41.4.Isa 41:4the firſt, and with the laſt, I am he. So Chap. 44.6. I am the firſt, and I am the laſt: and beſides me there is no God. Thuſe alſo Chap. 48.12. I am he: I am the firſt, I alſo am the laſt. God is ſaid to be the firſt, as having no cauſal principe or efficient that might give limits to his Eſſence: and the laſt, as having no final cauſe, or end, that might give moral limits or bounds to his Wil. This Infinitude and Independence of the Divine ſſence as the first Cauſe and laſt End, is wel illuſtrated, Rev. 1.8, 11. & 21.6. & 22.13.Rev. 1.8, 11. & 21.6. & 22.13.Rev 1:8Rev 1:11Rev 21:6Rev 22:13 I am foreign and foreign, the beginning and the end, the firſt and the laſt: i.e. as foreign is the firſt letter and foreign the laſt of the Greek Alphabet; ſo God is the firſt cauſal Principe or Efficient, and laſt End or final Cauſe, that gives termes and limits to al created Eſſences; but receives limits and termes from none, and therefore is infinite in Eſſence and Perfection. Hence God is ſaid to be foreign, ſelf-Being, or Being of himſelf, not by any poſitive influxe; for that is impoſſible, that any thing ſhould give Being to it ſelf: but negatively, by reaſon of his independence on any other Cauſe. For God as the firſt, has no efficient, and as the laſt, has no final Cauſe; thence by conſequence no cauſal termes or limitation. This Independence and Infinitude of God, as the firſt Efficient and laſt End is wel explicated and demonſtrated by Plato, in his Parmenides, p. 137. foreign, Therefore if he [the one God] hath no part, neither truely ſhal he have any beginning, or end, or middle; for ſuch are the parts of a thing. Where he proves, that God has no beginning nor end, [i. e. he is the firſt and the laſt] from his ſimplicitie, or not having parts. And in what follows he gives us the reaſon of his conſequence: foreign, p. 268But the end and the principe is the terme of every thing: i. e. every thing is terminated and bounded by its cauſal Principle or Efficient, and laſt End: therefore, to ſpeak in the language of ſacred Philoſophie, He who is the firſt and the laſt, without a firſt cauſal principe, or laſt end to terminate his Eſſence, muſt needs be infinite. Thus Plato concludes, in what immediately follows: foreign, The one God therefore is infinite, if he hath neither principe nor end. This Argument, which agrees with that of ſacred Philoſophie, is moſt cogent: for that which has no cauſal termes either of beginning or end, but is the firſt cauſal principe and laſt end of althings, muſt needs be infinite.

2.Gods Infinitude from his Ʋnitie and Simplicitie. The Infinitude of the Divine Eſſence and Perfection procedes from and may be demonſtrated by Gods Ʋnitie, Simplicitie, and pure Actualitie. Thus Plato, in his Philebus, pag. 14. foreign, One [namely God] is as many and infinite: and many are as one only. Plato here deſcribes the firſt infinite Being, under the commun Pythagorean notion of one and many: as being one in regard of the ſimplicitie of his Eſſence, and yet many, in regard of his infinite Perfections and Ideas or Decrees. So pag. 16. foreign, &c. That the one [God] is many and infinite. The force of this Argument lies thus: God being one ſimple pure Act, muſt needs be infinite in Eſſence and Perfection: for that which renders every Creature finite is its eſſential conſtitution and compoſition of Act and paſſive Power, either phyſic or metaphyſic. It's true Angels and human Souls have no phyſic paſſive power, yet they have metaphyſic and obediential, as made out of nothing, and ſo reducible thereto, if their Creator pleaſe. But now the firſt Being God, being one ſimple pure Act, without the leaſt ſhadow of paſſive power, whereby al Creatures are terminated and bounded, it thence neceſſarily follows, that he muſt be infinite in Eſſence and Perfection. God actually and eternally is, whatſoever he may be, and cannot hereafter be, that which now he is not. Al Creatures are ſomewhat in poſſibilitie, which they are not as yet in act: whence they have an inclination to or at leaſt a paſſive power for ſomething which they have not: which being attained unto makes them more perfect. But now where there is one pure Act, al perfection is; becauſe there remains no paſſive power or capacitie of receiving additional perfection. Every Act is by ſo p. 269much the more perfect, by how much the leſſe of paſſive power is mixed therewith: whence the one ſimple pure Act, which has nothing of paſſive power mixed therewith, muſt neceſſarily be without termes of Eſſence and Perfection. Again, every Eſſence is ſo far perfect, as it is in Act: thence the Divine Eſſence being foreign, in a moſt tranſcendent ſingular and infinite degree actual, it muſt needs be infinitely perfect. Thus Aquinas, contra Gent. l. 1. c. 28. Every thing is ſo far perfect, as it is in Act; but imperfect as it is in power, with privation of Act. That therefore which is no way in power, but pure Act, muſt needs be moſt perfect: ſuch is God.

3. We may explicate and demonſtrate the Infinitude of Gods Eſſence and Perfection by his Tranſcendence in Being. Thus Plato, Gods Infinitude from his tranſcendent Eſſence.Repub. 6. pag. 509. foreign, The chiefeſt Good, [God] is not Eſſence, but ſomething greater and more august, and infinitely tranſcending both in dignitie and virtue the nature of althings created. Wherein he makes God to be the Cauſe of al Eſſences, yet not properly Eſſence in that manner as the Creature is, but foreign, ſupereſſential or tranſcendent Eſſence, ſelf-Eſſence, ſelf-Eternitie. This tranſcendent Eſſence and Perfection of God is termed in ſacred Philoſophie Magnitude: as Pſal. 95.3.Pſal. 95.3.Ps 95:3 For the Lord is a great God, and a great King above al Gods: i. e. a tranſcendent Being. This tranſcendent magnitude of the Divine Eſſence and Perfection muſt be underſtood principally intenſively, as God contains in him eminently and tranſcendently al perfections. Thus Pſal. 145.3. Great is the Lord, and greatly to be praiſed; Pſal. 145.3.Ps 145:3and of his magnitude there is no inveſtigation. foreign: i. e. the magnitude of his Eſſence is an infinite Abyſſe or Ocean which no mortal finite capacitie can dive into. So the LXX. foreign, there is no terme or bound to it. This is wel expreſſed by Damaſcene, Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 19. foreign, It [the Deitie] being above Intelligence, and above Reaſon, and above Life, and above Eſſence, &c. Whence the commun title he gives God, according to the Platonic mode, is foreign, ſupereſſential, as before, Chap. 3. §. 1. This infinite tranſcendent Magnitude of the Divine Eſſence is alſo wel expreſſed by Plato, Parmenid. pag. 137. where treating of the one God, without beginning and end, he ſaith: foreign, It is infinite: therefore p. 270alſo without figure: neither doth it partake of a round figure, nor yet of a ſtraight: i. e. God being infinite in Eſſence is not limited by termes of magnitude or figure. This Argument from the Tranſcendence of the Divine Eſſence may be thus improved: That which is tranſcendently Ens or Being, See Suarez, Metaphyſ. Diſput. 30. Sect. 2.is ſuch per eſſentiam, eſſentially: thence it cannot be limited. That which has Being only by participation from a ſuperior Cauſe, may be limited either by the pleaſure of the ſuperior Cauſe, that gives it ſo much perfection, and no more; or elſe from the capacitie of the Recipient, which is capable of receiving ſo much perfection, and no more. But now the Divine Eſſence, being tranſcendently and eſſentially ſuch, without participation, cannot be limited either way; but is inveſted with an infinitude of eſſence and perfection altogether indiviſible; not preciſe and limited to one kind of perfection, as it is with the Creature, but containing, in a moſt eminent tranſcendent manner, whatever is of perfection in the Creature, Whence it is that the divine Infinitude and Perfection admit a reciprocation: For Being ſubſiſting of it ſelf contains in it the whole perfection of eſſence: and the perfections of althings belong to the perfection of eſſence: wherefore God being a pure Act, and Being ſubſiſting of himſelf, nothing of perfection can be wanting to him. Hence God the firſt neceſſary, tranſcendent Being cannot be defined or limited to any certain degree of perfection, but muſt be infinite, as is wel demonſtrated by Suarez, Metaph. Diſp. 29. Sect. 3. Thus alſo the Stoics held, foreign, That God is inveſted with al Eſſence: who alſo is incorruptible, and ingenerable, being the ſupreme Opificer and Creator of the whole ſtructure of the Ʋniverſe, as Laertius, in Zeno. The ſum of al is this: God being foreign, ſelf-Being, and tranſcendent ſupereſſential Eſſence, he muſt needs be univerſally and eminently al-Being, and ſo infinite in eſſence and perfection, of which more fully in the following Argument.

4.Gods Infinitude from the nature of Perfection. The Infinitude of the Divine Eſſence and Perfection may be further explicated and demonſtrated from the formal Idea of Perfection, and its peculiar appropriation to God. Al perfection importes ſome kind of univerſitie: becauſe that is perfect, to which there is nothing wanting: whence the more any thing is contracted to ſome certain mode of perfection, the leſſe perfect it is: and the more the univerſitie of perfection agrees to any p. 271thing, the more it partakes of perfection. Now God having the whole of eſſence in himſelf, muſt neceſſarily have an univerſitie of perfection. God has al kinds, extents, and degrees of perfection in him either formally or eminently: he hath need of nothing becauſe infinitely perfect in his eſſence: there is nothing without or within him that may limit or bound his perfection. The moſt perfect of Creatures have much of imperfection in them; becauſe they are limited in their Beings: one excels in one perfection, another in another: but none in al perfections: they are al negatively imperfect, if not privatively. Again, the Creatures perfection is for the moſt part accidental, and ſeparable; as it appears in fallen Angels and men: But Gods perfection is eſſential, abſolute and univerſal; and therefore infinite. Thus in ſacred Philoſo-, phie, Act. 17.25. Neither is he worſhipped with mens hands, Act. 17.25.Acts 17:25as though he needed any thing; ſeing he giveth to althing life and breath and althings. Paul demonſtrates, to the curioſe Wits of Athens, that God is moſt perfect and wants nothing; becauſe he gives al perfection to the Creature: foreign has a peculiar ſignificance which carries much emphaſe in it. foreign ſignifies ſimply to want: foreign to be totally indigent: but foreign properly ſignifies, to have ſomething, yet to want ſomething belonging to its perfection. Such an indigence the bleſſed God fals not under: he needs nothing as an additament to his felicitie, having in himſelf an univerſitie of perfection; and giving forth to al his Creatures according to their indigence. Hence God is ſtiled by the Hebrews foreign, E… ſhaddai, God A…ſufficient, Gen. 17.1. Thus Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 381. foreign, For we ſhal not ſay, that God in any degree wants either pulchritude, or virtue. Whence elſewhere he makes God to be foreign, ſelf-ſufficient, and therefore most perfect. Thus Ariſtotle, Rhet. l. 1. c. 7. pag. 35. foreign, And that which is leſſe indigent of any other or other things, [is beſt and moſt perfect] becauſe it is most ſelf-ſufficient. So in his Ethl. l. 1. c. 5. he ſaith, foreign, That which is perfect is ſelf-ſufficient and in nothing indigent: ſuch is the Divine Eſſence. Thence Plato, Repub. 6. pag. 509. aſſures us, That God, who is the Idea of al good, his foreign, an infinite and immenſe pulchritude.

But more fully to explicate and demonſtrate the infinite Perfection of God, it is apparent by what has been laid down out of p. 272Platonic as wel as ſacred Philoſophie, That a thing is ſaid to be perfect, when it wants nothing: which may be underſtood either privatively or negatively. That is privatively perfect, which wants nothing due to its integritie: that negatively, which wants nothing of poſſible perfection. God is in both theſe regards perfect, and therefore infinitely ſuch. (1) God wants not any perfection privatively: For as he is God of himſelf; ſo of himſelf he has al perfection due to himſelf: The moſt ſimple independent Being cannot be deprived of any perfection due to him, as Suarez wel demonſtrates, Metaphyſ. Diſput. 30. Sect. 1. pag. 42. (2) God is negatively perfect, as he wants no poſſible perfection. Poſſible perfection is either create or increate. God, as the firſt Cauſe of althings, contains in him al create poſſible perfection: and as the firſt moſt ſimple infinite Being, al increate poſſible perfection: For the firſt Being is ſuch by a neceſſitie of Being; and therefore abſolutely and infinitely perfect; containing in himſelf either eminently or formally al created perfections. (1) God contains in himſelf al created perfections eminently, as he has ſuch a perfection in a ſuperior eminent degree, as virtually contains whatever is in an inferior perfection. Whence al the perfections of Creatures, as they are eminently in God, are nothing elſe but the creatrix Eſſence of God. The Divine creatrix Eſſence is ſaid to be eminently althings, as it can by its own eminent virtue and efficace communicate thoſe perfection to althings. For the firſt ſupreme Cauſe exiſtent of it ſelf, and independent contains al poſſible perfections ſimply and eminently in the fontale Ʋnitie and infinite Abyſſe of his own Eſſence. God dwelling in the Abyſſe of his own Infinitude, which the Hebrews cal foreign, cannot but contain in himſelf al created perfections in a moſt eminent degree. (2) God contains formally in himſelf al perfections ſimply ſimple: i. e. ſuch as in their formal reaſon involve no imperfection, but pure perfection. It's true, no created perfection, according to that adequate reaſon which it hath in the Creature, is formally in God, but eminently only. For there is not in God any created goodneſſe, &c. but he is ſaid formally to contain ſome of thoſe perfections which are in the Creature; becauſe according to them he has a formal convenience with the Creature, by means whereof the ſame perfection is, according to the ſame name and formal reaſon, attributed to God and the Creature, the infinite diſproportion which is between God and the Creature being preſerved, p. 273as Suarez, Metaph. Diſp. 29. Sect. 3. pag. 39. Thus God giving perfection to althings has ſimilitude and diſſimilitude with al: Similitude, in that whatever perfection is in the Creature, is formally or eminently in God: Diſſimilitude, in that al thoſe perfections, which agree to other things according to diverſe formes or modes of participation, agree to God according to the infinite Unitie and Simplicitie of his Eſſence. Albeit God be void of al compoſition, yet he contains in himſelf al perfections ſcattered up and down among the Creatures in the moſt ſimple, united, and eminent degree. In ſum: according to the mode of Eſſence ſuch is the mode of perfection: for every thing has leſſe or more of perfection, as it has more or leſſe of eſſence: Therefore God, who has al Eſſence, muſt neceſſarily have al perfection.

5.The infinite Bonitie and Beatitude of God. The Infinitude of the Divine Eſſence and Perfection may be further explicated and demonſtrated by the infinite Bonitie and Beatitude of God. Sacred Philoſophie every where inſtructes us, That God is infnitely good and bleſſed in himſelf. So Platok, Repub. 6. pag. 508. foreign, the Idea of al good, i. e. ſuch a good as contains al good in him: the good of every good. Whence pag. 509. as elſewhere, he ſtiles God foreign, the Good: according to that of ſacred Philoſophie, There is none good but God, Mat. 19.17.Matt 19:17Mat. 19.17. i. e. there is no original Idea of good but God. Whence Plato cals al created goods, not foreign, ſimply goods, but foreign, certain formes or kinds of goods, ſo far as they participate of the divine good; But, ſaith he, the Idea of good gives eſſence to every thing, yet is in it ſelf ſupereſſential. Thus Damaſcene, a great Platoniſt, Orthodox. Fid. l. 2. c. 2. foreign, Therefore becauſe God is good, yea tranſcendently good, not contented with the contemplation of himſelf, but from the ſuperabundance of his goodneſſe it pleaſed him, that ſomethings ſhould be made to which he might do good, and which might participate of his goodneſſe: and ſo out of nothing he brought them unto Being, and framed althings. Whence we may conclude the infinite perfection of God. So Ariſtot. Eth. l. 1. c. 5. foreign, &c. That which is beſt, is most perfect; and that which is deſired for it ſelf, ſimply perfect: i. e. infinitely perfect. Such a moſt perfect good is God, who is eſſentially good, and therefore infinitely good. Hence alſo ſpringes p. 274the infinite Beatitude of God, which gives us further demonſtration of his infinite Eſſence and Perfection. Thus in the Platonic Definitions God is defined foreign, an immortal living Being, ſelf ſufficient as to happineſſe. The proper good of every intellectile Nature is Beatitude: Therefore God being the firſt Intelligent, Beatitude muſt neceſſarily be his moſt proper good. Now by how much the more noble and excellent any Beatitude is, by ſo much the more perfect is the ſubject to which it appertains. This ſpeakes the infinite perfection of God, in that he is eſſential Bonitie and Beatitude.

6.Gods Infinite Power. Gods infinite Power in the production of althings demonſtrates his Infinitude of Eſſence and Perfection. The magnitude of any virtue or power is meaſured by the magnitude of its Action and Effect: An Action is by ſo much the more perfect, by how much the more efficace and force it has to produce its effect: and what actions ſo efficacious to produce their effects, as the Actions of Divine Omnipotence? Every Agent is by ſo much the more efficacious in acting, by how much the more remote the paſſive power by it reduced into act is: now mere nothing, which is as the paſſive power in Creation, being, as to exiſtence, infinitely diſtant from Act, therefore the power that brings it into act muſt needs be infinite. Are not ſomething and nothing termes, as to exiſtence, infinitely diſtant? Can then any but an infinite power reconcile them, or bring ſomething out of nothing? And is it poſſible that an infinite power ſhould be in any but an infinite Being? Doth not the operation follow the eſſence? is not every thing ſuch in working as it is in Being? May we not then hence conclude, that God, who is of infinite activitie as to working, is alſo infinite in his Eſſence and Perfection? Thence Plato makes God to be the infinite Opificer or Creator, foreign, who by his efformative omnipotent words gave eſſence to althings, as hereafter, in the Cauſalitie of God. It is indeed altogether impoſſible, that a finite power ſhould create ſo many degrees of things, and that out of nothing.

§. 3.Gods Etenritie. From the Infinitude of Gods Eſſence and Perfection reſultes his Infinitude in Duration, or Eternitie. For as things are in Being, ſuch likewiſe are they in Duration: as a finite Being cannot have an infinite Duration; ſo neither can an infinite Being have a finite Duration. Hence the Eternitie of God neceſſarily follows from the Infinitude of his Being. The Eternitie of God p. 275is lively ſet forth in ſacred Philoſophie.Pſal. 90.2, 3, 4Ps 90:2Ps 90:3Ps 90:4 So Pſal. 90.2. Even from everlaſting to everlaſting thou art God. Being to treat of the frailtie of human life, he briefly toucheth on the Eternitie of God, that thereby it might appear, how frail mans life is. God is ſaid to be, from everlaſting to everlaſting, thereby to denote his abſolute Eternitie without beginning and end. The Souls of men and Angels are to everlaſting, becauſe immortal: but they are not from everlaſting; and therefore not eternal. Every eternal is immortal; but every immortal is not eternal. Thence it follows: v. 3. Thou turneſt man to deſtruction, and ſayeſt, Returne ye children of men, He alludes to that Gen. 3.19. Thou art duſt, and to duſt thou ſhalt returne. Then the Pſalmiſt addes, v. 4. For a thouſand years in thy ſight are but as yeſterday, when it is paſt; and as a watch in the night. The Particle foreign ſome interpret not as a rational conjunction, but as an Adverbe of confirmation, Truely: ſo that the ſenſe is: Truely, O God, thou art immortal and eternal: ſo that a thouſand years of human life, being compared with thy Eternitie, are but as yeſterday, or as a watch of the night, which is very ſhort and ful of difficulties and miſeries. The Hebrews divided their nights into four watches, which denote brevitie and danger. So Pſal. 55.19. God is ſaid to be, he that abideth of old, Pſal. 55.19.Ps 55:19or in al eternitie. foreign abideth, or is permanent. Which denotes Gods permanent eſſence and exiſtence without al ſucceſſion, in Eternitie. Indeed Gods Eternitie is but as one permanent fixed foreign, or inſtant, without al ſucceſſion. I am not ignorant, that ſome learned men endeavor to baffle this Hypotheſis, That Gods Eternitie is one fixed inſtant, whoſe reaſons we ſhal examine more fully anon, when we come to treat of the Nature of Eternitie, 5. Prop. At preſent we paſſe on to confirme it by Scripture. So Pſal. 93.2.Pſal. 93.2.Ps 93:2 Thy Throne is eſtabliſhed of old: thou art from everlaſting. Of old. Hebr. foreign ante tunc, before then, i. e. before any certain finite time, expreſſed by that Particle tunc. The prefixe foreign denoting time ſignifies before. The ſenſe is, that Gods Throne was eſtabliſhed from al Eternitie, before al moments of time. The like Prov. 8.22,Prov. 8.22, 23.Prov 8:22Prov 8:2323. The Lord poſſeſſed me in the beginning of his way, before his workes of old. foreign before al time. It's ſpoken by Chriſt as a declaration of his Eternitie with God the Father. So Eſa. 43.13. Yea, Eſa 43.13.Isa 43:13even before the day was, I am he. foreign, before there was any day, [or time] I am he, i. e. Jehovah the eternal Being.Mic. 5.2.Mic 5:2 The like Micah 5.2, Whoſe goings forth have been from of old, from everlaſting. It p. 276is ſpoken of the eternal generation of the Son of God. From of old. Hebr. foreign before any principe or beginning. Thence it follows: from everlaſting. Hebr. foreign, before the days of time, not of Eternitie: for foreign, day of Age, doth not properly ſignifie days of Eternitie, as our Margine renders it, but time long before, as Micah 7.14, 20. Amos 9.11. Malach. 3.4. The Eternitie of God is wel deſcribed by Moſes, Deut. 33.27. The God of Antiquitie: i. e. the eternal God. So David, Pſal. 55.20. God that ſitteth from Antiquitie: and Aſaph, Pſal. 74.12. God is my King from Antiquitie: i. e. Eternitie. But the Eternitie of God is more expreſſely declared, Eſa. 57.15. Who inhabiteth Eternitie. So 1 Tim. 1.17.

As for Plato's Philoſophemes touching the Eternitie of God, they are indeed great and illuſtrious, yea very far conforme to ſacred Philoſophie. So in his Timaeus, pag. 37. foreign, &c. But al theſe are parts of time: but we truely do not rightly attribute to the eternal Eſſence thoſe diſtinctions of time, namely HE WAS, and HE SHAL BE. For we ſay: IT WAS, IT IS, and IT SHAL BE. But truely to that Eternitie IT IS properly only agrees. IT WAS, and IT SHAL BE belongs to the articles of time, which is produced: for they are motions, or ſucceſſions. But what is always and immutably the ſame, is not more ancient or young, &c. Wherein we have theſe particulars very obſervable. (1) That the diſtinctions of time, Was, Is, and Shal Be, are proper only to things ſenſible and created, which fal under the duration and ſucceſſion of Time. (2) That thence they cannot properly be attributed to God, who is an Eternal Eſſence, without beginning or ſucceſſion. (3) That HE IS is only properly aſcribed to God, according to ſacred Philoſophie, Exod. 3.14. foreign, as Eſa. 43.13. I am he. So the Inſcription on the Delphic Temple, foreign, THOƲ ART. Al which illuſtrations of Gods permanent Eternitie are included in the Name Jehovah, as before, Chap. 3. §. 1. Thus alſo the Eternitie of God is lively explicated and illuſtrated by Plato, in his Parmenides, p. 140. p. 277foreign; But what?: doth the one God ſeem to have elder or younger, or the ſame Age, that ſo he may be? The ſame pag. 141. Therefore the one God is neither younger, nor elder, nor of the ſame age, either in regard of himſelf or any other thing. foreign, &c. Therefore the one God, if ſuch, can never be in time: For that which is in time, is it no neceſſarily elder than it ſelf? And is not that which is elder, always elder in regard of ſome junior? Therefore that which is always elder than it ſelf, muſt be always younger than it ſelf, which is a contradiction. He deſigne is to prove, that God being always the ſame, is not ſenior or junior in regard of himſelf, or any thing elſe: for then he ſhould be always ſenior, and yet always junior in regard of himſelf. Which Argument is indeed demonſtrative and cogent. Then he concludes: foreign, If therefore the one God no way participate of time, truely he was not ever made, or hath been, neither is he now made, neither ſhal he ever be made, or be. He here proves the Eternitie of the one God from his Independence, of which more hereafter.

But the more fully to demonſtrate and explicate the mind of Plato, and ſacred Philoſophie touching the Eternitie of God,The Eternitle of God demonstrated. we ſhal endeavor, (1) to demonſtate, that God is eternal; and then, (20 to explicae what this Eternitie of God importes. Firſt that God is eternal may be various ways demonſtrated: As (1) from the Infinitude of the Divine Eſſence. The mode of exiſtence always follows the mode of eſſence: becauſe exiſtence, according to the confeſſion of the Scholes, addes nothing to eſſence but Actualitie; neither is it indeed really diſtinct from eſſence: Now duration is nothing elſe but continued existence: whence it neceſſarily follows, that if Gods Eſſence be infinite, his Exiſtence and Duration muſt be alſo infinite. The Divine Eſſence neceſſarily exiſtes of it ſelf, and therefore is always in act, never in power to be: whence it muſt neceſſarily be eternal. That which is abſolutely infinite as to eſſence, can have no principe of its eſſence; and therefore it muſt be abſolutely eternal as to Duration. What is infinite cannot give Being to it ſelf: for then it ſhould be before and after it ſelf; the cauſe and thing cauſe; independent and dependent in one and the ſame regard. Neither can p. 278what is infinite receive Being from another: for that other muſt be finite, or infinite: it cannot be finite; becauſe it is impoſſible, that a finite Principe ſhould give an infinite Being: neither can that other be infinite; becauſe this would lead us into the labyrinth of a progreſſe into infinite. Hence we may conclude with Plato, that God is foreign, an eternal Eſſence. (2) We may demonſtrate the Eternitie of God from his Independence. Thus Plato, in his Parmenides, pag. 141. foreign, &c. The one God doth not participate of Eſſence, i. e. is not Ens by participation, as he explicates himſelf, therefore he is eternal. So in his I hadrus, pag. 245. foreign, &c. A Principe has no origine: for althings ariſe from a Principe, but the first Principe ariſeth from nothing: neither were it a first Principe, if it were originated by ſome other. And if it hath no beginning, it can have no end. The Argument lies thus: That which is independent as to any firſt Cauſe or Principe, muſt needs be abſolutely eternal: Now that God dependes not on any precedent Cauſe or Principe has been ſufficiently demonſtrated in what precedes. (3) Gods Eternitie may be demonſtrated from his Immobilitie and Immutabilitie. Thus Plato, Tim. pag. 37. What is always and immutably the ſame, is not elder or younger, &c. as before. Whatever begins or ceaſeth to be muſt ſal under motion and mutation: for what has beginning hath Being after not-being: and whatever has end hath not-being after Being; and this in a way of ſucceſſion and motion. But now the immutable God admits not ſuch a ſucceſſion of Not-being and Being. We may not ſay, that ever he was not, or that ever he ſhal not be: he never began to be, neither ſhal he ever ceaſe to be; but is always the ſame immutable indiviſible Eſſence. Thus Plato, in his Philebus, pag. 15. foreign, He determines, that the one God is not of thoſe things that have beginning and end. And he gives the reaſon of his Hypotheſis: namely becauſe it is, foreign, always one and the ſame immutable Being, which receives not generation nor deſtruction; but is one Firmitie and Conſtance: ie. The one God, having a Firmitude, Conſtance, and Immutabilitie of Being, cannot be obnoxious to the Laws of Mutation, Generation, or Corruption; but muſt be eternal. Thus Plato, in his Timaeus, pag. 27, &c. proves, foreign, That the first Being, who is always the ſame, can have neither beginning p. 279nor end. Thus Plutarch on Gods Name foreign emgraven on Apollo's Temple: foreign, Therefore that which truely is one and the ſame is eternal, without beginning or end. (4) The Eternitie of God may be demonſtrated from his Perfection. The moſt perfect Being can never begin to be; becauſe that which gives Being is more perfect, than that which receives the Being conferred. Again, the moſt perfect Being muſt neceſſarily have the moſt perfect mode of Duration, which is eternal. Laſtly, the moſt perfect Being cannot depend on any other for any degree of perfection, and therefore it cannot begin to be.

Having demonſtrated the Eternitie of God,What Eternitie is. we now procede to explicate the ſame, ſo far as ſacred Philoſophie gives us light and evidence: For indeed without divine light it is impoſſible for mortal man, who is confined by Time, to contemplate immortal Eternitie. Have not many great errors had either origine from proud mens confining the Eternitie of God to the Laws of Time? This is incomparably wel expreſſed by great Bradwardine, de Cauſa Dei, l. 2. c. 52. Theſe things, ſaith he, of Eternitie I have more copioſely diſcuſſed; becauſe I repute it the moſt difficult thing for temporal man, who is always accuſtomed to meaſure things by the differences and laws of fluent Time, to mount up, above the differences of Time, to the contemplation of Eternitie;which is without mutabilitie of ſucceſſion. And then he gives us an ingenuous confeſſion, that this was his great error, when young and infected wih Pelagian infuſions: I, ſaith he, when I was young and ignorant of the Scriptures, and the power of God, being blinded with this ignorance, or rather borne blind, and deceived with a falſe imagination, I conceited, that the Divine Knowlege and Wil was changed and otherwiſe diſpoſed by the viciſſitudes of Times, as human Knowlege and Wil. As to ſuch as ſuperſicially read the Scriptures it may ſeem, that God is this or that way variouſly affected, as men are. And this ignorance I judge to be the cauſe, why ſome others like to me, thinke that God is otherwiſe and otherwiſe diſpoſed intrinſecally, &c. Therefore to cure theſe ignorances and errors about Eternitie we may conſider the following Propoſitions.

1.Eternitie not to be meaſured by Time. Prop. Eternitie cannot be meaſured by any differences or Laws of Time. This Propoſition is laid down in expreſſe termes by Plato, Tim. pag. 37. where he largely demonſtrates, That no differences p. 280of Time, either future or paſt can be attributed to Eternitie, as before. It's true, he tels us, That God made time foreign, a certain mobile Image of immobile Eternitie; yet ſo as that none of its differences can properly be aſcribed thereto. So Parmen. pag. 141. foreign, The one God no way participates of time, as before. So Philo Judaeus, de Mundo: foreign, lo Eternitie there is nothing past, nothing future, &c. Thus Damaſcene, Orthod. Fid. l. 2. c. 3. foreign, Whatever hath beginning may naturally have an end: but God only is ever exiſtent, yea rather about ever: for he is not under time, but above time. And whereas it is ſaid, That the Eternitie of God is oft in Scripture deſcribed by differences of time, we anſwer, That theſe are but metaphoric modes of ſpeech, wherein the Spirit of God, condeſcending to our narrow capacities, deſcribes the eternal infinite duration of God by the differences of time, yet ſo, as that he expreſſely declares, that they do not properly agree to God, but are only aſſumed as ſymbolic Images of Gods Eternitie, which is Plato's own phraſe. And Bradwardine, l. 2. c. 51. gives us the reaſon of this Tranſlation: The cauſe of this Tranſumtion is, becauſe we have not a word which properly ſignifies the ſtable manſion of Eternitie: wherefore we are forced to transfer, by way of ſimilitude, our temporal words, according to certain temporal differences, to Eternitie, and Gods coeternal intrinſec Acts. That neither God, nor any intrinſec Act of God can be properly meaſured by time, or any difference thereof is evident; becauſe Time and al its differences are a variable, mutable, and diviſible meaſure; but the Eternal God and al his immanent Acts invariable, immutable, and indiviſible. In Eternitie there is no diviſibilitie; no majoritie, or minoritie; no prioritie, or poſterioritie; no acceſſion, receſſion, or ſucceſſion; no ſucceſſive difference of time; but one indiviſible, ſimple, permanent inſtant. Thus Suarez, Metaph. Diſp. 50. Sect. 3. pag. 639. proves, That what is eternal cannot, as to its own nature, admit the differences of paſt and future, albeit, by reaſon of our imperfection, we ſo ſpeak of it ſometimes. How far time and its differences may be comprehended by Eternitie we ſhal explicate in what follows, 4. Prop.

p. 2812. Prop. Eternitie is an interminable Duration, Eternitie without beginning or end.without beginning or end. In Eternitie and al eternal Acts neither firſt or laſt can be properly aſſigned. This interminable duration of Eternitie is lively illuſtrated in ſacred Philoſophie by al thoſe deſcriptions of God, which make him to be the firſt and the laſt, as Eſa. 41 4. & 44.6. & 48.12. Rev. 1.8, 11. He being the First Being, and ſo without beginning; and the Last, as having no end. Thus the Stoics held, that foreign, God is incorruptible and ingenerable, i. e. without beginning and end, as Lacertius, in Zeno. (1) That the Eternitie of God is without Beginning, is evident by many Philoſophemes of Plato. As Phaedrus, pag. 245. foreign, A first Principe has no beginning, but it gives beginning to althings. So in his Parmenides, pag. 141. he proves, That the one God had no beginning, &c. as before. Thus Thales, in Laertius: foreign, God is the most ancient of Beings; becauſe without beginning. (2) That the Eternitie of God ſhal have no end, Plato aſſertes in his Phaedo, pag. 106. foreign, But God, ſaith Socrates, the very Idea or Eſſence of life, (as I judge) and if any thing be immortal, it is evident to al, that he cannot ceaſe to be. He makes the Soul to be immortal alſo; but the Immortalitie of God, who is the original Idea and Eſſence of life, to be of a more tranſcendent Nature. Thus in his Timaeus, he diſtinguiſheth between the Eternitie or Immortalitie of Angels and the human Soul, which have no end; and the Eternitie of God, which is abſolute, without beginning and end: The Eternitie of God he makes to be, foreign, primary, abſolute, and independent as to al cauſalitie, and therefore not communicable to the Creature: but the Eternitie that belongs to the Creature is, foreign, according to a participation of Being, i. e. dependent on the pleaſure of God foreign, as that of Angels and the human Soul, which ſhal have no end, albeit they had beginning. The beſt of Creatures have but an half-Eternitie: albeit they have no end, yet they had a beginning: They may be to everlaſting, but are not from everlaſting, as God is, Pſal. 90.2. Beſides, the Eternitie of Creatures is not intrinſecal from a neceſſitie of Being, but dependent on the pleaſure of God.

p. 2823.Eternitie most ſimple and uniforme. Prop. Eternitie is a meaſure most ſimple, uniforme, abſolutely indiviſible, without the least compoſition or ſucceſſion. (1) When we cal Eternitie a Meaſure, it muſt not be underſtood formally, either as to God, or the Creature; becauſe every meaſure formally conſidered ſpeakes relation to the thing meaſured: but if the Creature never had been, God had been eternal. Neither can a meaſure formally conſidered be applied to God; becauſe a meaſure is ever diſtinguiſhed from the thing meaſured; but Eternitie is not diſtinguiſhed from God. Therefore when we cal Eternitie a Meaſure, it muſt be underſtood metaphorically, and according to our manner of ſpeech. (2) We ſay Eternitie is a ſimple uniforme meaſure: i. e. without al parts, diviſibilitie, or ſucceſſion. The Antitheſis to this Theſis is maintained by Vorſtius and the Socinians, contrary to the Dictates both of ſacred and Platonic Philoſophie. Thus Plato, Tim. pag. 37. aſſures us, That the parts of time IT WAS, and IT IS agree not to Eternitie; becauſe theſe implie motion and ſucceſſion; but Eternitie is always immutably the ſame, as before. The like Ariſtotle, Metaph. l. 11. c. 4. where al ſucceſſion is denied of Eternitie. Succeſſion is either privative or poſitive: Privative ſucceſſion is between Being and not-being; as mutation, corruption, or annihilation attendes the eſſence of things, which al Creatures are liable unto. Poſitive ſucceſſion is when things remain not in their Being, without ſome mutation. The Eternitie of God is in neither of theſe regards ſucceſſive: Heraclitus's PHiloſopheme, That althings are in fluxe or ſucceſſion, and nothing permanent, is true of althings but God, who by reaſon of his Eternitie admits not of the leaſt ſucceſſion. This is implied in his Name I am, Exod. 3.14. aſſumed by our Lord, Joh. 8.58. Vorſtins makes the Eternitie of God no other than an everlaſting duration, conſiſting of temporal parts and ſucceſſion, as time. And the Socinians follow him herein. But this blaſphemous Antitheſis is generally impugned by the Orthodoxe, and that with invincible Arguments. As, (1) Eternitie was before al Time, and therefore cannot be compoſed of parts of time. (2) If Eternitie were a diviſible ſucceſſive meaſure, then the parts of which it is compoſed are either finite or infinite: They cannot be finite; becauſe no infinite can be compoſed of finite parts: They cannot be infinite; becauſe then every part is as great as the whole: for things infinite admit no degrees. (3) Eternitie is the ſame with God himſelf, and therefore admits of no parts, compoſition, or ſucceſſion, as hereafter, 5. Prop.

p. 2834. Prop. Albeit Eternitie be in it ſelf a ſimple, How Eternitie coexistes to the parts of Time.and indiviſible Duvation, yet it may be ſaid to coexiſte unto and comprehend al parts of time and things. Eternitie in it ſelf has neither ſucceſſion nor extenſion; yet it has a permanence, according to which it is ſaid to coexiſte to althings, that fal under daily ſucceſſion. In this regard Plato cals Time, an Image of Eternitie, as al its parts and ſucceſſions are comprehended thereby. For our Divines acknowlege, that Time is contained in the meaſure of Eternitie, as the permanent fixed foreign, Inſtant of Eternitie coexſiſtes to al the differences of time, and althings ſucceding in time, not as together, but ſucceſſively as they exiſte. Thus the whole of Eternitie coexiſtes to this day, as alſo to the next day, &c. Yet we may not ſay that Eternitie doth attemper it ſelf to the nature of things temporal, whiles it comprehendes and meaſures the ſame: For by meaſuring and comprehending things temporal, we only mean, that Eternitie doth coexiſte to them: whereby Eternitie is not more attempered to the nature of time, than time, by coexiſting to Eternitie, is attempered to the nature of Eternitie. Eternitie may be ſaid to contain ſucceſſive quantitie or the parts of Time, in the ſame manner as the Immenſitie of God contains the permanent quantitie of things. Now it is wel known, that the Immenſitie of God is not otherwiſe ſaid to contain permanent quantitie or Bodies, but as it coexiſtes or may coexiſte unto, yea infinitely excede al bodies, although moſt ſpatioſe: ſo in like manner the Eternitie of God cannot otherwiſe be ſaid to contain the ſucceſſive quantitie or duration of things, than as it is coexiſtent to althings as they exiſte, and tranſcendes al their durations. Not only things temporarie in their viciſſitudes coexiſte to God and his Eternitie; but alſo God and his Eternitie coexiſtes to them: which denomination implies no viciſſitude in God, or in his Eternitie; but only a viciſſitude of the things temporary, and their gradual ſucceſſion. It's true, as we have before proved, the differences of time past and future are repugnant to Eternitie, as to al intrinſee denomination: for in Eternitie there is nothing past or future, firſt or last: yet theſe differences are not repugnant to Eternitie in regard of extrinſec denomination. For in the coexiſtence of God with things fluent and ſucceſſive, there is prioritie and poſterioritie, not in God, but in the things temporary. The coexiſtence of things with God is other and other, or ſucceſſive, according to the viciſſitude of the things; and ſo p. 284by conſequence the coexiſtence of God with the Creatures admits of ſome kind of ſucceſſion as to externe denomination; not as if there were any new exiſtence of God with the Creatures, but only by reaſon of the new exiſtence of the Creatures with God. Hence Chriſt,Heb. 13.8.Heb 13:8 in regard of his Eternitie, is ſaid to be, Heb. 13.8. The ſame yeſterday, and to day and for ever: i. e. in regard of extrinſec denomination, as he coexiſtes in one and the ſame uniforme indiviſible Eternitie with things and differences of time, of ſucceſſive and diviſible duration. Thus the Eternitie of God is ſaid to comprehend and meaſure al differences and ſucceſſions of times and things.

5.Eternitie a fixed Instant. Prop. The Eternitie of God conſidered in its genuine Idea, is but one immutable, permanent, fixed Inſtant. This in ſacred Philoſophie the name foreign, Jehovah, and I am, Exod. 3.14. fully indicate. Thus alſo foreign, according to its origination, primarily denotes, being derived from foreign, ever-being, or exiſting. Whence God, who is Eternitie, is ſtiled by Plato and his Sectators, foreign, ever-being. So alſo the Poets ſtile their fictitious Gods foreign, ever-Beings, in imitation of ſacred Philoſophie, which ſtiles God, Jehovah, and foreign, Who Am, thereby denoting, that he is a fixed, permanent, eternal Being, or an ever-ſtanding Now: For I AM, or HE IS, the ſacred Characters of God, primarily belong to Eternitie. Nothing can be ſaid It Is in a ſtrict ſenſe as having, foreign, a ſtanding permanent Being, as Plotinus phraſeth it, but what is eternal. So Plato, Tim. pag. 37. ſaith, foreign, It is, only belongs to Eternitie: i. e. Eternitie is only one permanent foreign or Now. Thus Plotinus (a great Sectator of Plato) Ennead. 3. l. 7. num. 2. pag. 327. He that contemplates al theſe things contemplates Eternitie, foreign, contemplating life permanent in the ſame ſtate, having the whole a ways preſent: but not now this, and anon that, but al together: neither now ſome one part, and afterward ſome other, but an indiviſible end. Wherein he declares, that the Eternitie of God is one and the ſame indiviſible, interminable ſtate or fixed inſtant, without ſucceſſion. Whence he immediately ſubjoins: foreign, &c. Where, as in a point, althings are together, without falling under any fluxe, but remaining there in the ſame inſtant, i. e. in itſelf, without permutation or ſucceſſion of past and future. And then he p. 285concludes with this deſcription of Eternitie: foreign, That therefore which neither was, nor ſhal be, but only IS, having a fixed permanent Being, becauſe it is neither changed for the future; neither by what is past, that is Eternitie. It is therefore about Being in it ſelf, a life together total and ful, and every where altogether without diſtance. This is the Eternitie we inquire about. In theſe Platonic Philoſophemes about Eternitie we find theſe obſervables. (1) That Eternitie has no differences of time or ſucceſſion of parts, either paſt or future. (2) That it is but one only fixed permanent Is or Inſtant. (3) That it is in it ſelf total and ful, without diſtance of parts. Whence Eternitie is defined by Boethius, an interminable poſſeſſion of life total, perfect, and al at once. It is total, not in regard of parts, but as it includes the moſt perfect negation of ſucceſſion. It is al at once, as it is but one fixed inſtant. Thus Juſtin Martyr, in Paraen, cals it, foreign, The eternal and infinite Now, or Inſtant. But here we muſt diſtinguiſh foreign, an Inſtant, foreign, Nunc, aliud eſt ſtans, aliud eſt fluens.into that which is permanent or fixed, and that which is fluent: Eternitie is not a fluent Inſtant, ſuch as they make to be in time, but nunc or inſtans ſtans, a ſtanding fixed permanent Inſtant; or, as Plotinus ſtiles it, foreign, a ſtanding Being, without paſt or future, poſſeſſing althings at once, totally and perfectly, without the leaſt viciſſitude. Thus Bradwardine, de Cauſa Dei, l. 2. c. 50. pag. 830. Hence it evidently follows, that there is but one and the ſame immutable Inſtant thoroughout al Eternitie; and that the whole of Eternitie is not more or greater than its Inſtant; nor the Inſtant of Eternitie more ſimple or leſſe than it; but that Eternitie and its Inſtant are really one and the ſame.

But here, before we procede farther, we cannot, without violence offered to the Laws of Philoſophic Diſquiſition, let paſſe unexamined the aſſaults, which learned More, in his Divine Dialogues, Dial. 1. S. 15. pag. 58. makes againſt this commun notion of Eternitie, That it is a permanent foreign or Inſtant at once. This Idea of Gods Eternitie he clogges with theſe Contradictions: (1) That althings ſhould have been really and eſſentially with God from al Eternitie at once, and yet be borne in time and ſucceſſion. This Objection is, as I conceive, fully anſwered in what precedes, p. 2864. Prop. To which we may adde, that althings were preſent with God even before their exiſtence, not in the Dominicans notion, by reaſon of any real preſentialitie or coexiſtence to Gods Eternitie, but only by their intentional coexiſtence in the Divine Decree, as Twiſſe has wel demonſtrated againſt the Dominicans, Scientiae Med. lib. 2. pag. 377, 400. (2) Learned More addes: That eternal Duration ſhould be at once, is alſo to me utterly unconceivable, and that one permanent inſtant ſhould be commenſurate or rather equal to al ſucceſſions of Ages. To which we anſwer, [1] as before, That Eternitie is not a fluent, ſucceſſive Inſtant, but foreign, a ſtanding Instant. [2] That it is not a temporary, finite create Inſtant, but an eternal, infinite and increate Inſtant, and therefore every way commenſurate to al the ſucceſſions of Ages. But (3) he addes: Beſides, if the Duration of God be al at once, ſith no Agent actes but within the compaſſe of its own Duration, God must both create and deſtroy the World at once. Whence it ſeems impoſſible, that eternal Duration ſhould be indiſtant to it ſelf, or without continuation of Intervals. To which it's anſwered, [1] That this conſequence ſeems very inconſequent, and unworthy of ſo learned a man, becauſe not ad idem: for Gods Eternitie, which he makes to be a ſucceſſive Duration, is really the ſame with his Eſſence; but his Creation and Deſtruction of the World, as Acts ad extra, and in regard of their paſsive attingence, coincident with the Creature, fal under ſucceſsive Duration, and ſo cannot be ſimultaneous, or at once. [2] His Concluſion, That Gods eternal Duration cannot be without continuation of Intervals, ſeems to me of very dangerous conſequence, and that which both Plato and Plotinus, whom he values, abhor, to ſay no worſe. But [3] to conclude, I grant, that the notion Inſtant, as applied to Gods Eternitie, is but metaphoric, and rather negative than poſitive, to exclude al manner of ſucceſsion, or duration by intervals from God, as before. Hence,

6.Eternitie the ſame with the Divine Eſſence. Prop. Eternitie has one and the ſame Idea with the Divine Eſſence. Eternitie is nothing elſe but the increate Duration of God, or God himſelf. Whence the Platoniſts ſtile God foreign, ſupereternal, and foreign, tranſcendent Eternitie. And Plato's mind herein is incomparable wel explicated by Plotinus, Ennead. 3. l. 7. num. 1. pag. 325. What therefore must we cal Eternitie? foreign, the very intelligible Divine Eſſence. For ſeing we conceive of Eternitie as moſt venerand, there is p. 287nothing more venerand than the intelligible Divine Eſſence. So pag. 326. foreign, &c. Again the intelligible World and Eternitie comprehend in themſelves the ſame things. By the intelligible World he means, according to Plato, the ideal World, i. e. God as decreeing althings. So num. 6. foreign; What therefore principally ſhal that be, by which we ſay the whole divine World is eternal and everlaſting? Where he makes Eternitie to be the firſt Divine Eſſence, as it connotes an interminable ſtate of Identitie and Life. For to perſevere in an Identitie of Eſſence, with an abſolute and intrinſec neceſſitie, is the moſt noble and perfect mode of Duration, which differs more than generically from al other modes of Duration, and therefore moſt proper to God, whoſe Eternitie is a permanent increated Duration. Vorſtius and his Sectators make the Eternitie of God to be an Accident, and diviſible ſucceſſive Duration: but this Plotinus refutes, num. 3. pag. 327. foreign, &c. Neither truely may we imagine, that Eternitie happens to that Divine Nature extrinſecally and as an Accident, but that it is in it, and of it, and together with it. For it is conſidered as intimately united to and eſſentially one with the Divine Nature. Wherein he clearly proves, that Eternitie is not an Accident, but the ſame with the Divine Eſſence. Which argument may be thus improved. (1) If Eternitie in God be an Accident, either it is cauſed by God, or not: if it be cauſed, then it has a beginning, and ſo not Eternitie. If it be an Accident not cauſed by God, then it was cauſed by it ſelf, or without cauſe: which are both abſurd. (2) If the Eternitie of God be an Accident, then finite or infinite: It cannot be a finite Accident; becauſe a finite duration cannot be commenſurate to an infinite Being. It cannot be an infinite Accident, becauſe then there would be ſomewhat infinite beſides God. (3) It is apparent, that Eternitie cannot be an Accident, if we conſider the very nature of Duration, which is not really diſtinct from the ſubject whereunto it belongs. For what is Duration, but the perſevering of a thing in its exiſtence? And in like manner Eternitie is nothing elſe but the increate, permanent, adequate eſſential duration of God; which eſſentially includes al perfection of Eſſence, and conſequently al interne Acts of God, either as to Knowlege or Wil. In ſum, Eternitie is the perfect duration of the Eſſence, Perfection, p. 288and Operations of God, as Suarez has wel demonſtrated, Metaph. Diſp. 50. Sect. 3. pag. 638, 639.

§. 4.Gods Immenſitie and Omnipreſence what. Next to Gods Eternitie follows his Immenſitie, or Omnipreſence; which denotes his preſence in althings, and al ſpaces; whereof we have lively notices both in Sacred and Platonic Philoſophie. As for ſacred Philoſophie it gives us great illuſtrations of Gods Immenſitie and Omnipreſence. 1 Kings 8.27. Pſal. 139.7, 8, 9, 10.1 Kgs 8:27Ps 139:7Ps 139:8Ps 139:9Ps 139:10Thus, 1 Kings 8.27. Behold the Heaven of Heavens cannot contain thee. So Pſal. 139.7. Where ſhal I go from thy Spirit, or whither ſhal I flee from thy preſence? v. 8. If I aſcend up into Heaven, thou art there: if I make my bed in Hel, behold thou art there. foreign, thou art there, i. e. by thy immenſe omnipreſent Eſſence. Thence he addes: v. 9. If I take the wings of the morning, and dwel in the utmoſt parts of the Sea: v. 10. Even there ſhal thy hand lead me, and thy right hand hold me. This is coherent with what precedes, and the ſenſe of the whole is this: If I ſhould endeavor to flie from the preſence even unto the utmoſt part of the World, yet muſt not thy hand of Providence conduct me thither? and cannot then the ſame hand apprehend me there, and correct my fooliſh infidelitie for conceiting that I could hide my ſelf from thy preſence? The like Jer. 23.23, 24.Jer. 23.23, 24.Jer 23:23Jer 23:24 Am I a God at hand, ſaith the Lord, and not a God afar off? Can any hide himſelf in ſecret places, that I ſhal not ſee him, ſaith the Lord? do I not fil Heaven and Earth? God is ſaid to fil Heaven and Earth, by reaſon of the Immenſitie of his Eſſence. For God being infinite as to his Eſſence and Perfection, muſt neceſſarily alſo be infinite as to his Preſence; ſo that his Eſſence cannot be limited by any finite ſpace. Thus Damaſcene, Orthod. fid. l. 1. c. 17. foreign, Therefore the Deitie only is free from circumſcription, exiſtent without principe, without end, comprehending althings, and yet comprehended by nothing. In that he ſaith, The Deitie only is free from circumſcription, he hath diſcovered a truth, which the Ariſtotelean Scholes are unacquainted with: for albeit Angels and the human Soul are not circumſcribed by corporeous place, yet they are by their Ʋbi, or definitive ſpace, as Damaſcene demonſtrates. Thence c. 19. he ſaith: foreign, Moreover it belongs to the Deitie to diffuſe it ſelf through althing impermixtly, but nothing through it. This degree of Infinitie they cal Immenſitie; which is prperly eſtimed by the regard it has p. 289not only to finite ſpace, but to al imaginarie ſpace. So that by Gods Immenſitie we underſtand the intimate preſence of his infinite, indiviſible Eſſence in al ſpace, both real and imaginarie, actual and poſſible. Not that Gods Immenſitie is the ſame with ſpace, as Derodone in his Phyſics, and others would fain perſuade us; who make Gods Immenſitie no other than an infinite ſpace: and thence they ſuppoſe althings to be in ſpace, as they are in Gods Immenſitie. But what dangerous conſequences attend this Hypotheſis may appear from this, That it ſuppoſeth either that Gods Immenſitie is only an Accident or Mode diſtinct from God; or, which is worſe, that althings formally and eſſentially exiſte in God, as in their proper ſpace or place, and ſo are not really diſtinct from God; which is little ſhort of blaſphemie. Some diſtinguiſh between the Immenſitie of God, and his Divine Preſence; making his Immenſitie to be an abſolute proprietie, but his Preſence relative, as it relates to the Creature. But I ſee no neceſſitie of reſtraining Gods Preſence to the relation he has to his Creatures; ſeing it is as infinite as his Eſſence, and ſo has reſpect not only to finite, but alſo to infinite imaginarie ſpace, whether actual or poſſible. Neither doth Gods infinite Preſence ſpeak any actual or real habitude to any thing without himſelf: therefore we may eſtime it as abſolute as his Immenſitie, and not to be diſtinguiſhed therefrom. It's true, God is ſaid in ſacred Philoſophie to have his Throne in Heaven, as alſo in his Churches; but this muſt be underſtood only of his glorioſe manifeſtation of himſelf, and gratioſe operations. So Damaſcene, Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 16. foreign, God is ſaid to be in a place, and a place is ſaid to be of God, where his operation is manifeſt. For he diffuſeth himſelf thorough althings parely and without the leaſt commixtion with them; and makes althings to participate of his operation, according to their indigence and receptive capacitie. Whence he addes: foreign, &c. Therefore that is ſaid to be the place of God, which most participates of his operation and Grace. Wherefore Heaven is ſaid to be his Throne; becauſe in it the Angels do his wil— And the Church is ſaid to be the place of God; becauſe it is his Temple, &c.

p. 290The Immenſitie and infinite Preſence of God may be explicated and demonſtrated by the Infinitude of the Divine Eſſence.Gods Immenſitie demonstrated and explicated. For that which is infinite in its Being, muſt neceſſarily be infinite in its Preſence: al termes and bounds as to place or ſpace ariſe from the termes of Eſſence: that therefore which hath no termes of Eſſence, can have no termes of Preſence, but muſt be immenſe. Thus Plato, Leg. 10. pag. 899. having proved, that there is one infinite Being, by whom althings are diſpoſed and governed, he concludes, foreign, that althings were ful of God that immenſe Being. So Diogenes the Cynic held: foreign, For althings are ful of God; therefore men ſhould be reverent.

2. The Immenſitie and infinite Preſence of God may be explicated and demonſtrated by his abſolute Simplicitie. Thus Plato, in his Parmenides, pag. 138. foreign, But that which neither hath any parts, neither is a whole, much leſſe can it be, that it ſhould be confined to any place to ſpace, either in regard of parts or whole. Therefore it neither changeth its place by going into any place, or by remaining in the ſame place; or by being carried thither, neither by being altered. Wherein he proves, That the one God is immenſe and infinite in his Preſence, becauſe he is preſent in al places and ſpaces, not by parts, or as an whole compound Being; but by his ſimple indiviſible Eſſence. So Damaſcene, l. 1. de Fide, c. 16. foreign, God therefore being immaterial and not circumſcribed, is not in a place; for he is place to himſelf, filling althings, and yet above al, and containing al. Whence he concludes: foreign, We muſt know that the Deitie is indiviſible, the whole totally exiſting every where, and not part in part corporally diſtracted, but the whole in al, and the whole above al. Thence Chryſippus the Stoic ſaid, That the moſt ſimple and pure Reing, foreign, which alſo they firſt cal God, doth diffuſe himſelf throughout al bodies in the Air, and al living Creatures, and al Plants, and throughout the Earth it ſelf. God is eſſentially and indiviſibly in al Beings and p. 291ſpace; albeit al Beings are not in God as in their proper ſpace; as Derodone and others too boldly aſſert: For if althings are in God, as in their proper ſpace, how can we poſſibly avoid that blaſphemous conſequence of the Familiſtes, who make althings but particles of God? Is it poſſible that any thing is or can be in God, which is not God? If Gods Immenſitie be the ſame with his Eſſence, as undoubtedly it is, wil it not neceſſarily follow, that althings, by exiſting in Gods Immenſitie, exiſte alſo in God? I greatly value Derodone's acumen in many philoſophic Contemplations; but yet I find dangerous conſequences attending ſome of his Philoſophemes bordering on Theologie; and therefore cannot but conceive my ſelf under an eſſential obligation to premoniſh young Students thereof.

3. The Immenſitie and infinite Preſence of God may be explicated and demonſtrated by the infinite power, and operations of God both actual and poſſible. This Argument Plato much inſiſtes on, proving, that God is an univerſal Spirit, who diffuſeth himſelf throughout the whole Univerſe, conſerving, ſomenting, animating and actuating althings. So Leg. 10. pag. 895. foreign, Therefore the principe of al motions, and the first motion, which is in thoſe things that are permanent, and thoſe things that move, is, as we must neceſſarily confeſſe, he that moves himſelf, and therefore the mast ancient and excellent. Whence pag. 896. he concludes: foreign, &c. God is a Soul univerſally ruling and dwelling in althings that are moved. Thus Damaſcene, Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 17. having demonſtrated, that Angels are confined to ſome ſpace, he addes: foreign, For it is proper ſolely to God, to be preſent every where, according to the ſame operation. And he explicates the mode of this divine Ubiquitie thus: foreign. But God exiſting every where and above every thing, workes differently every where and according to the ſame, by one ſimple operation. To draw forth the force of this Argument; Gods infinite Preſence and Immenſitie in althings actual and poſſible may be demonſtrated, (1) From his infinite Power in creating althings, that are or may be. For God being able to create 100000 Worlds, 100000 times greater than this World, his Preſence p. 292muſt be infinite; becauſe God workes by the Preſence of his Eſſence:Deus immediatè agitimmediatione non ſolùm virtutis, ſed & ſuppoſiti. neither can he worke where he is not preſent. God workes al immediately, not only by the Immediation of his Virtue, but alſo by the Immediation of his Eſſence. Ariſtotle, Phyſ. lib. 7. tels us, that the mover and moved muſt be together: and look as a particular cauſe is preſent with its particular effect, ſo the univerſal cauſe with his univerſal effect. Now God, the univerſal Cauſe of althings, hath no other way of Preſence with al effects, but by his Eſſence: Hence that of Damaſcene, Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 18. foreign, Althings are diſtant from God, not as to place, but nature: i. e. God, who is infinitely diſtant from his Creature as to Nature, is yet ever preſent with it in regard of the Omnipreſence of his Eſſence. (2) Gods infinite Preſence is manifeſted in the Confervation of althings: as the creatrix Eſſence was immediately preſent in making althings, ſo the conſervatrix Eſſence is immediately preſent in the ſupporting althings. (3) Gods infinite Preſence may be demonſtrated from his immediate actuating al ſecond Cauſes, as Suarez, Metaph. Diſput. 30. Sect. 7.

§. 5.Gods Incomprehenſibilitie. The Infinitude of the Divine Eſſence, Duration, and Preſence being diſcuſſed, we now are to procede to God Infinitude as to our Comprehenſion, or his Incomprehenſibilitie, whereof we find bright notices both in Sacred and Platonic Philoſophie. Thus Job 11.7, 8, 9.Job 11.7, 8, 9.Job 11:7Job 11:8Job 11:9 Cauſt thou by ſearching find out God? Canſt thou find out the Almighty to perfection? This Rhetoric interrogation implies a vehement Logic negation. Thence it follows: It is as high as Heaven, what canſt thou do? deeper than Hel, what canſt thou know? The meaſure thereof is longer than the Earth, and broader than the Sea. Pſal. 145.3.Ps 145:3So Pſal. 145.3. Great is the Lord and greatly to be praiſed, and his greatneſſe is unſearchable. Where he makes the infinite magnitude of Gods Eſſence the cauſe of his Incomprehenſibilitie.Comprehendere propriè eſt arringere rem ſecundùm omnem modum & omnem rationem quâ res eſt cognoſcibilis, &c. Aquinas. For to comprehend an object is to apprehend it according to every mode and reaſon as it is intelligible, thereby to define it, or give termes and bounds to it: For a definition is but the boundary of an Eſſence: he that perfectly comprehends and defines a thing gives limits and bounds to that thing in his intellect. Now that which has no bounds or termes of Eſſence, can have no bounds or termes as to our comprehenſion or definition. Hence properly and ſtrictly God cannot be ſaid poſitively to comprehend himſelf, though negatively this Attribute p. 293may be given to him, as he knows himſelf perfectly. Whence that Hypotheſis of Derodone and ſome others, who aſſert, That God may be defined by himſelf, is too preſumtuous and during; ſeing al definitions give termes and limits to the eſſences of things: whence if God cannot be limited, he cannot be defined: for terms of definition follow termes of eſſence. Much leſſe can God be defined by a created intellect unto which al definitions refer, as before, Chap. 3. §. 2. Thence it is ſaid of God,1 Tim. 6.16.1 Tim 6:16 1 Tim. 6.16. That he dwels in the light, which no man can approche unto. The Divine Eſſence, by reaſon of its Immenſitie and Infinitude, is infinitely elevated in Splendor and Glorie, beyond the capacitie of our finite intellect. Thus Plato held, God to be foreign, a celeſtial light ineffable, &c. So in his Timaeus, pag. 28 foreign, and truely it is very difficult to find out that Parent of the Ʋniverſe: and when he is found out, to declare what he is unto al, is a thing impoſſible. So in his Parmenides, pag. 134. foreign, Therefore Beautie it ſelf and Bonitie it ſelf is unknown as to us, and al theſe things which we eſtime Ideas. And more fully, pag. 142. he thus ſpeakes: foreign, Wherefore he [God] is neither named, nor declared, nor conceived, nor knowen, neither perceived by any of thoſe things that are. Which indeed are lively illuſtrations of the Incomprehenſibilitie of God. And that Parmenides himſelf, (whoſe name Plato affixeth to this his metaphyſic Dialogue) had the like notices of Gods Incomprehenſibilitie, ſeems probable, by what Lacrtius relates of Meliſſus his Scholar, who ſaid, foreign, That men ſhould not attent to deſcribe God; becauſe there is no comprehenſive knowlege of him. This is wel expreſt by Damaſcene, de Fide, l. 1. c. 4. foreign, The Divinitie therefore is infinite and incomprehenſible; and this only of him is comprehenſible, that he is infinite and incomprehenſible. So again, c. 13. he ſaith, That God hath given us a participation of his Bonitie, by producing us out of nothing, and inveſting us with a facultie of knowledge, yet foreign, as he has not made p. 294us participant of his Eſſence, ſo neither has he given to us the knowlege of his Eſſence. For it is impoſſible that Nature [human] ſhould perfectly know that Nature which is infinitely above it. Whence he concludes: foreign; How can that which is ſupereſſential be knowen? The like he addes, c. 17. God, ſaith he, comprehendes althings, but is comprehended by nothing: foreign, for he ſolely is incomprehenſible and infinite, known by none; but he ſolely is the Contemplator of himſelf.

But the more diſtinctly to explicate and demonſtrate the Incomprehenſibilitie of God, we muſt conſider, that a thing is then ſaid to be comprehended, when it is perfectly knowen ſo far as it is cognoſcible or intelligible. For comprehenſive knowledge is that whereby the whole of an object, ſo far as it is intelligible, is knowen either intuitively or diſcurſively. This manner of ſpeech is taken from the dimenſion of bodies, which are ſaid to be comprehended, when their whole quantitie and extenſion is ſo contained in another, as that nothing of their quantitie is beyond the comprehenſion of the continent. Hence Zeno and the Stoics his ſectators called firſt Principes foreign, Comprehenſions; becauſe they fully and perfectly comprehend al concluſions. Now that God is, as to al finite capacitie, incomprehenſible is evident, (1) from the nature of Comprehenſion, which denotes an adequate perfect penetration and definition of a thing, as to al its eſſential Differences, Predicates, Proprieties and Parts: But now God having no Genus or eſſential Difference cannot be defined, neither can his Eſſence be penetrated by any finite capacitie. (2) From the infinite diſproportion between a finite capacitie and the infinite Eſſence of God. An object is comprehended when it is underſtood by the intellect ſo far as it is intelligible: now God being infinitely intelligible, is alſo infinitely diſtant from, and ſo not to be comprehended by a finite intellect. God, as he is of infinite Eſſence, ſo alſo of infinite cognoſcibilitie and truth: whence he is not comprehenſible by any but himſelf. (3) From the comparation of things intelligible. The more abſtract things are from mater, and remote from ſenſe, the more difficult to be underſtood. Thence Ariſtot. Metaph. 2. ſaith, That our Intellect is diſpoſed, foreign, towards firſt Beings moſt manifeſt by Nature, as Bats towards the light: i. e things by how much the more pure and ſpirital they are, by ſo much the more difficult to be underſtood. Thus Bradwardine, p. 295lib. 1. cap. 1. pag. 27. If there be ſomething difficult to be fully underſtood, and ſomething more difficult, and ſomething yet more difficult, and ſo forward; muſt there not be ſomething moſt difficult to be underſtood, which is God? For as in Mathematic Concluſions, ſo in the Creatures, the later is more difficult than the precedent, but nothing moſt difficult to be underſtood, but God: which his Immenſitie and Infinitie both extenſive and intenſive clearly demonſtrate. (4) From the Operations and Providence of God. How little doth the moſt ſagacious Philoſopher underſtand, much leſſe comprehend of the Workes and Providence of God? How impoſſible then is it for poor mortals to comprehend the Eſſence of God? Paul cries out, Rom. 11.33.Rom. 11.33.Rom 11:33 How unſearchable are his judgements, and his wayes paſt finding out! And if Gods workes, which are finite and ſo bear ſome proportion to our underſtanding, are ſo unſearchable, how unſearchable then is his Eſſence? (5) From our ignorance and incomprehenſion of the least things in Nature. Alas! how little do we know of the leaſt of Beings? Is not our ignorance much more than our knowlege in the commun products of Nature? How little then muſt we needs know of the God of Nature? This Argument is incomparably wel improved by Bradwardine, l. 1. c. 1. pag. 27. againſt the prond Philoſophers of his Age, preſuming they could by their reaſon give an exact model of the divine Decrees and Operations; whom he thus ſeriouſly derides: Prethee, O Philoſopher, tel me, what doeſt thou fully know? I ſuppoſe thou dareſt not ſay the leaſt Creature. I know, thou doeſt not perfectly know the leaſt Atome in the Sun, the leaſt duſt of the Earth, nor the leaſt drop of water. For in every corpuſcule there are infinite figures linear, ſuperficial, and corporal, &c. Thence he concludes thus: If therefore thou knoweſt not the leaſt things, yea thou art infinitely ignorant of more than thou knoweſt, how cauſt thou fully know the greateſt Being? Preſume not, but acknowlege thy ſelf to be a man, and that thou art infinitely ignorant of more of God than thou knoweſt. So Aquinas contra Gent. lib. 1. cap. 3. proves from our ignorance of things ſenſible, how ignorant we are of the ſupreme Being. (6) From the mutable variable nature of human Knowlege. In thoſe things whereof we conceive we know moſt, how much are we contradicted by others, who are as confident of their Antitheſis, as we are of our Hypotheſis? Yea, how oft do we contradict our ſelves, and that in thoſe p. 296very things, wherein we thought our knowlege wel grounded? And if our comprehenſion in things natural be ſo ſuperficial, variable, and contradictory, how much more is it ſuch in the comprehenſion of God? That God is incomprehenſible as to any created intellect, albeit ſupernaturally elevated, ſee Suarez, Metaph. Diſput. 30. Sect. 12. pag. 118.

Although man cannot attain to a comprehenſive Knowlege of the incomprehenſible God,How for we may apprehend God. yet an apprehenſive Knowlege he is capable of. For the Infinitude and Incomprehenſibilitie of God hinders not, but that he may be apprehended by a finite underſtanding, ſo far as he reveles himſelf in his word or workes. It's true, al knowlege implies ſome proportion between the object knowen and the apprehenſive facultie: and to ſpeak ſtrictly there is no proper proportion between an infinite object and a finite ſubject; yet ſuch is the condeſcendence of the infinite God, as that he has not left us without ſome means, both natural and ſupernatural, which have an illative proportion to himſelf, whereby we are enabled, as by ſo many gradations, to aſcend up to the knowlege of himſelf. And we find not only in ſacred Philoſophie, but alſo in Plato many good rules to conduct us in our inquiries after and contemplations of the incomprehenſible God.

1.Against Poetic figments of God. Plato ſeverely prohibits al his Sectators the entertaining any fabuloſe Poetic figments of God, whereby he is transformed into various ſhapes and formes, according to the proud daring conceits of men. Thus Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 377. condemnes Heſiod and Homer for thoſe Fables they coined touching the Gods: and then tels us what thoſe Fables were: foreign, &c. When any one doth importunely and wickedly forge and repreſent the nature of the Gods, and Heroes; neither doth duely deſcribe them as they are: just as a Painter, who without the least reſſemblance paintes thoſe things which he intendes to imitate. Thence he procedes to aggravate the crime of thoſe, who coin ſuch unworthy Fables of God: foreign, &c. Firſt truely, the greateſt lie is in the greateſt maters: whereof Heſiod is the Author, who feignes ſuch falſe ſtories of Heaven, &c. He makes Heſiod's Fables about the Gods to be of the blackeſt guilt; becauſe in the greateſt maters. Thence he concludes, in the end of this lib. 2. pag. 383. thus: Albeit therefore we may commend many things of Homer, yet this we do not commend, that he feigned ſuch things of p. 297Jupiter— When therefore ſuch things are ſpoken of the Gods, let us be filled with indignation, and baniſh the Poets: foreign, Neither let us permit the Profeſſors of Learning to make uſe of ſuch fabuloſe Poets for the inſtructing of Youth: If truely the Magistrates of the Citie be religioſe and divine, they wil, ſo far as men may, take care hereof for us. An excellent Law for the expelling al fabuloſe Poets. Thus in the 12 Tables it's reckoned as one of Romulus's Laws: That men believe not the Fables of the Gods. Laertius relates of Pythagoras, That deſcending down to Hel, he ſaw Heſiod's Soul bound to a brazen Pillar making a lamentable noiſe; and Homer's Soul hanging on a Tree, with Serpents about it, for thoſe things which they feigned of the Gods. And Zenophanes Colophonius writ againſt Homer and Heſiod, deriding them for their Fables of the Gods. So much did the wiſer Heathens abominate thoſe fabuloſe narrations of God. It was a great Saying of Bias, mentioned by Laertius, foreign, Speak of God as he is.

2. Plato forbids al curioſitie in our inquiries about God. Against Curioſitie in our inquiries after God.Thus Repub. 6. pag. 506. having undertaken to diſcourſe of God, under the notion of the chiefest Good, he gives a caution, that we be not too curioſe in prying into the incomprehenſible things of God. Doeſt thou, ſaith he, conceive it conſentaneous, that any diſcourſe of a thing whereof he is ignorant? No ſurely, ſo far as he is ignorant. Doeſt thou not know, that opinions without ſcience are baſe; of which opinions the best are truly blind? Doeſt thou judge, that they who opine, or meaſure things by their own opinions, without underſtanding, differ any thing from thoſe who being blind yet conceit they go in a right path? no ſurely. foreign; Wilt thou therefore contemplate baſe, blind, and oblique opinions (of God) when thou mayſt hear clear and excellent diſcourſe from others? An excellent rule for the confinement of our notions and contemplations touching God to ſacred Revelations. Then he addes in Socrates's name: But truely, as for me, I am no way fit for this ſo great an affair; [namely to diſcourſe of the chiefeſt Good] and therefore lest going beyond my capacitie I ſhould come ſhort of what I aime at, and make my ſelf rediculous, I again and again tremble at my taske. But, bleſſed Sirs, what that chiefeſt Good is, let us now let paſſe: for the Majeſtie hereof, p. 298believe me, greatly tranſcendes the termes of our knowlege: but let us now conſider what are the effects of this chiefest Good, which have most ſimilitude to his nature. Wherein Socrates windes off his Auditors from the curioſe prying into the Nature of God, and exhortes them rather to contemplate God in his effects, ſpecially ſuch as partake moſt of the Divine Nature. Thence he addes: foreign, And I wiſh I were capable of unfolding, and you of receiving ſo great a Myſterie, that ye might perceive not only ſome effects and iſſues, but alſo the nature of the Parent: i. e. God himſelf. What an excellent remedie doth Plato here afford us againſt al preſumptuoſe and daring inquiſition into the Nature and Secrets of God?Magnitudinem Dei qui ſe putat noſſe minuit: qui non vult minuere non novit. Minut. Foelix. Indeed he that attemts to comprehend the Divine Eſſence and its magnitude, doth but diminiſh it, and confound himſelf: no one conceives aright of God, but he that conceives him to be incomprehenſible. Plato gives us good advice, that the Nature and Secrets of God ought to be held in a Myſterie, farther than he reveles himſelf. How ſoon are volatile and curioſe Wits unhinged by the wingy Myſteries of the Divine Eſſence? He that indulgeth his curioſitle herein, doth but thruſt himſelf into a Labyrinth, out of which he can never extricate himſelf. The Socratic modeſtie is very becoming Chriſtians, not to dive into the Myſeries of the Deitie, farther than he hath diſcovered himſelf in his workes or word. He that affectes to be a curioſe Scrutator of the Divine Majeſtie ſhal ſoon be ſwallowed up by his Glorie. And how many have loſt their Religion and Devotion, by a ſeeming religioſe and devote prying into the Secrets of God? It was opportunely ſaid of that ſerious Chriſtian, who, being by a curioſe Wit in way of deriſion, demanded, What God did before the World was made? replied, He made Heks for curioſe Wits, who buſie themſelves about ſuch vain queſtions. And indeed ſuch as now indulge their curioſitie in ſuch frigid jejune ſpeculations about God, ſhal one day, to their dreadful torment, feel and know how much better it had been for them, with a learned pious ignorance, to paſſe by the incomprehenſible Secrets of God, than by a proud blaſphemous ignorant curioſitie to dive into them. Laſtly, what profit is it to uſe curioſe conjectures in thoſe things, which tranſcend al human conjectures? To conclude, as for our contemplations about the Divine Perfections of God, we have a good caution given us by Naxianzen, foreign, Be not curioſily inquiſitive about p. 299the mode. To which we may adde that of Pluto, foreign, to be modeſely and temperately wife, is to be greatly wife. Which agrees with ſacred Philoſophie, Rom. 12.3. foreign.Rom. 12.3.Rom 12:3

3. Plato inſtructes us,The leaſt notice of God of great moment. That the least notices of God and his Divine Perfections ought to be of great moment and eſtime with us. So in his Critieas, pag. 107. by an alluſion taken from Painters he illuſtrates this Hypotheſis thus: When Painters draw the Pictures of the Gods, &c. we thinke it ſufficient if they give us but any darke repreſentation of them, neither do we being unskilful animadvert with a cenſorious eye on their worke; but rest abundantly ſatisfied in what repreſentation they give us. But when they come to draw our own picture, or the picture of any that belong to us, we more ſeverely animadvert and cenſure them, if they erre in the least point. The ſame is to be obſerved in the explication of theſe things, foreign, &c. When we diſcourſe of things celeſtial and divine, we thinke our ſelves abundantly ſatisfied, if there be the least evidence brought for the explication of their nature; but on the contrary in our examens of things mortal and human, we are wont to uſe greater diligence. Wherefore if thoſe things, which we are now about to diſcourſe of, be not ſo exactly, as their dignitie requires, repreſented by us, you'l pardon us. An excellent preface to a diſcourſe of things divine touching God, which Plato is here entering on. Hence,

4.Al notices of God by Divine Revelation. Plato adviſeth us not to expect or deſire farther diſcoveries of God, than his own revelation and illumination ſhal afford to us. So in his Timaeus, pag. 29. foreign, It must be remembred both by me that ſpeak, and by you who are Judges of my diſcourſes, that we have but human Nature, and therefore if we can but attain unto ſome Oriental Tradition or probable relation of theſe things, [touching God, &c.] we may not inquire farther about them. That by his foreign we muſt underſtand ſome Oriental Judaic Tradition originally of divine revelation, I thinke, wil appear evident to any that conſiders the uſe of this phraſe in Plato. Indeed in our contemplations and diſcourſes of God it is neither profitable nor ſafe to procede further than divine Revelation and Illumination ſhal conduct us. Neither need we be aſhamed to be ignorant of ſuch Secrets of God, the humble ignorance of which argues more ſolid knowlege, p. 300than curioſe and vain ſpeculations thereof. Theſe are the beſt bounds for our inquiries about God, not only to follow God learning, but alſo to leave off inquiring when and where God leaves off to teach: as we may not neglect what God has reveled of himſelf, ſo we may not ſearch into what God has kept ſecret: for as the former argues too much ſloth and ingratitude, ſo the later too much pride and curioſitie. It was a great Saying of Auguſtin: We may ſafely follow Scripture, which as an indulgent mother goes ſoftly, that ſhe may not go beyond our infirmitie. A believing ignorance in things not reveled about God is much better than a raſh ſcience. Al natural reaſon and inveſtigation about God, ought to follow not precede faith. Hence,

5.The Gradation of our aſcent to God. Plato informes us, That our aſcent in the contemplation of God musk be by the ſame degrees, by which he deſcendes to us, either in his workes or words. Thus Repub. 6. pag. 509, &c. he informes us, That it is above al human capacitie to comprehend the Majeſtie of the chiefeſt Good, as it is in its inacceſſible ſplendor, yet we may aſcend thereto by certain foreign or foreign, Gra es or degrees: which Grades of Aſcent muſt be taken from Gods Grades or degrees of Deſcent unto us; that ſo we may, by a certain Analogie and ſimilitude, aſcend up to the knowlege of God, ſo far as it is poſſible for man. Yet he gives us this needful caution, That we must ſpeake ſoberly of theſe ſo great Myſteries, and take heed that we aſcribe not foreign a ſpurious birth to the Parent of the Ʋniverſe. The grades or degrees whereby God deſcendes to us, and we aſcend to him are either natural or ſupernatural. 1.Natural Grades of knowing God. The natural Grades or Degrees, whereby God deſcendes down to us, and we aſcend up to him, are al the Effects, Products and Workes of God, with al their Virtues, Efficaces, Orders, Varieties, and al manner of Perfections. So Plato, Repub. 6. treating largely of Gods Cauſalitie, he ſaith, Al natural Cauſes and Effects are but foreign, and foreign, Workes, Artifices, and Children of God the great Parent of the Ʋniverſe, whereby we may aſcend up to the knowlege of God. This is more natively and clearly laid down in ſacred Philoſophie,Rom. 1.19, 20.Rom 1:19Rom 1:20 as Rom. 1.19, 20. where he ſaith, the viſible workes of God, as ſo many aſcents, lead us up to the contemplation of the inviſible perfections of God, ſpecially his eternal power and Godhead. That there is a natural knowlege of God gained by the Book of Nature is moſt evident, albeit the Socinians, to ſerve their Hypotheſis, denie it. p. 301This natural knowlege of God is either inſite or acquiſite. So Dion Pruſaeenſis ſaid, that our foreign, perſuaſion of God was either innate, or foreign, acquiſite. Our inſite and innate knowlege of God conſiſtes in thoſe commun notices of God, both ſpeculative and practic, which are impreſſed on the Conſcience. Our acquiſite natural knowlege of God is that which is gained by actual comparation and diſcourſe from the workes of God. This acquiſite knowlege may, according to the diſtribution of that ſpurious Dionyſius, (who was indeed a great Platoniſt) cap. 2. de Myſt. Theolog. be acquired and promoved three ways: by way of Cauſalitie, by way of Eminence, by way of Negation.

(1) By way of Cauſalitie, when by the Effects of God,1. By way of Cauſalitie. which are either little Images, or at leaſt Veſtigia, Footſteps of God, we mount up to the knowlege and contemplation of God, the original Parent or firſt Cauſe of al. For indeed the effect carries with it the ſignature, impreſſe, and reſſemblance of its Cauſe; as you frequently ſee the Parents complexion or conditions in the Child. Thus Plato, Repub. 6. pag. 507. having laid down this preface, that it was impoſſible to comprehend, yea to apprehend any thing of the Divine Majeſtie in himſelf, he tels us, That he would inquire after him in his off-ſpring or effects: and then he addes: foreign, but take heed lest I ſhould against my wil give you a ſpurious Idea of the Child of this great Parent. He ſpeakes in the language of Aratus, cited by Paul, Act. 17.28. we are al his off-ſpring; Act. 17.28.Acts 17:28and applies this notion to al lower goods, which he makes to be the off-ſpring or iſſue of the chiefeſt Good; and therefore by them we aſcend up to the contemplation of their Parent. So Damaſcene, Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 15. foreign, But thoſe things that are ſpoken [of God] affirmatively, are predicated of him as the cauſe of althings. And he addes: foreign, But he ſhal be more properly named from things more excellent and more akin to himſelf: now things immaterial are more excellent. Wherein he inſtructes us, (1) That our affirmative notices of God are chiefly drawen from his effects. (2) That among his effects thoſe give us the moſt lively Ideas of God, which are moſt excellent and akin to him; namely things immaterial, as the human Soul, &c. God ſo manifeſtes p. 302himſelf in the whole opifice of the Univerſe, that we can no ſooner open our eyes, but may behold the glorioſe Ideas of his Divine Wiſdome, Power, and Goodneſſe: which ever way we turne our eye, there ſhines forth ſome ray of the Divinitie. What is the whole Univerſe, but a viſible Map or Picture of the inviſible Deitie? Is not the Creators Name written in golden Characters on every page of the Book of Nature? It's true, ſome want eyes to ſee and read their Creators Name in the Book of Nature, but it follows not hence, that there is no natural knowlege of God, as the Socinians would needs perſuade us: For that a thing be called natural, it is not neceſſary, that it be actually in al men; but it ſufficeth if it may be derived from a natural principe: becauſe ſome men are blind, we may not thence conclude, that ſight is not natural to a man.

(2) Another natural grade or way of knowing God is by way of Eminence. 2. By way of Eminence.Theſe Notices of God by way of Eminence are beſt when compoſed both of Affirmatives and Negatives, as alſo of termes moſt ſimple. Thus Damaſcene, Orthodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 15. foreign, The ſweeteſt notion of God is that complexion of both [Affirmatives and Negatives] as ſupereſſential Eſſence, ſuperdivine Divinitie, ſupercauſal Cauſe, and the like. When we ſee any perfection in the Creature, we attribute the ſame to God in a more eminent degree and manner. And here we are to remember, that the more general notions of created perfections, albeit they are more imperfect as belonging to the Creature, yet they are more properly attributed to God, than more ſpecial notions; becauſe the former are more abſtract and ſimple, the later more concrete and compoſite: For by how much the higher we aſcend to the generic notions of things, by ſo much the more ſimple our notions are. Hence it is, that Knowlege is more properly aſcribed to God, than Senſe or Reaſon; becauſe it is more generic and ſimple: ſo Life, than Vegetation; Spirit, than Soul: hence alſo foreign, Being, as Jehovah which denotes the ſame, are the moſt proper Names we can give God; becauſe the moſt generic and ſimple notions. And the reaſon of the whole is this: Seing the Divine Eſſence is more aptly and familiarly expreſſed by Abnegation or Remotion, than by Affirmation, hence it follows, that by how much the more concrete and ſpecial our notions are, by ſo much the leſſe they agree to God; and on the contrary, p. 303by how much the more ſimple and general they are, by ſo much the more they agree to God; becauſe they are by ſo much the more remote from the imperfections of the Creature, as Twiſſe, Scient. med. pag. 309. Hence,

(3) The beſt natural way or degree of knowing God is by Negation or Remotion: for the Divine Eſſence,3. By way of Remotion. by reaſon of its Immenſitie and Infinitude, exceding al the Ideas or notions our Intellect can forme of it, cannot better be apprehended, than by removing al imperfections from it. So Aquinas, Sum. 1. Quaeſt. 10. Art. 1. Things ſimple are beſt defined by Negation; not as if negation were eſſential to them, but becauſe our Intellect, which firſt apprehendes things compoſite, cannot arrive to the cognition of things ſimple, but by the remotion of al compoſition. The ſame he more fully explicates, contra Gent. l. 1. c. 14. In the conſideration of the Divine Eſſence the way of Remotion is chiefly to be uſed: for the Divine Eſſence, by reaſon of its Immenſitie, excedes al forme that our Intellect can attain unto; wherefore we cannot apprehend it, by knowing what it is; but we have ſome notices thereof, by knowing what it is not. For we by ſo much the more draw near to the knowlege of God, by how much the more we can by our Intellect remove imperfections from God: for we by ſo much the more perfectly know every thing, by how much the more fully we contemplate its differences from other things: for every thing has in it ſelf its proper eſſence, whereby it is diſtinguiſhed from al other things. But becauſe in the conſideration of the Divine Eſſence we cannot conceive what it is, or its Genus, nor its diſtinction from other things by affirmative differences, it is therefore neceſſary, that we conceive of it by negative differences. Indeed the moſt ſimple, ſpirital, divine, and excellent things are beſt ſet forth by negatives. Hence God himſelf is beſt expreſſed and apprehended by way of negation. We know rather what he is not, than what he is.

2. The ſupernatural grades or degrees whereby God deſcendes to us, and we aſcend to him are either Gracioſe or Glorious. The ſupernatural Grades whereby we aſcend up to God.(1) The grades of Grace whereby we aſcend up to God are either objective or ſubjective. [1] The ſupernatural objective grades of Grace are either ſimple or complexe. 1. Christ.(1) The ſimple objective grade of Grace, whereby we aſcend up to God and the contemplation of him, is Chriſt, the Mediator, who is the eſſential Glaſſe, wherein p. 304al the Glorie of the Deitie is moſt reſplendent, as 2 Cor. 3.18. He is the image of God, 2 Cor. 4.4.2 Cor 4:42 Cor. 4.4. foreign an image is an expreſſe reſſemblance or imitamen of an exemplar, according to its forme or kind; and ſo it differs from Veſ…igium, or a Footſtep, which gives only ſome darke notices of a thing, by its cauſalitie. There are ſome veſtigia or footſteps of God impreſſed on the ſenſible world; yea an accidental Image of God on the renewed Soul; but Chriſt is an eſſential Image of God, in whom al the inviſibile perfections of God become viſible to an eye of faith. Thence he is ſaid to be,Col. 1.15.Col 1:15 Col. 1.15. the image of the inviſible God: i. e. God who is inviſible in himſelf becomes viſible in his Son. Whence alſo he is ſtiled,Heb. 1.3.Heb 1:3 Heb. 1.3. the effulgence of his glorie, and character of his perſon. foreign, is foreign, the ſplendor or effulgence of the Sun communicated in and by its rayes, ſpecially as they fal on a cloud, and ſo make foreign, Parelius, or a reflexe image of the Sun, which ſeems to be another Sun: ſo Chriſt he is the Parelius or reflexe Image of God, who is in himſelf a Light inacceſſible and ful of Glorie, as 1 Tim. 6.16. Thence it is added: and the character of his perſon: foreign notes an Effigies or expreſſe figure engraven, or impreſſed: Al the Divine Attributes and Perfections of God are impreſſed or engraven on Chriſt's human Nature, in legible and golden Characters: whence he is ſtiled Emmanuel God with us. He is indeed the golden Arke wherein the Deitie lies couched; a viſible Image of the inviſible Deitie: whoſe mediatorie Offices and Relations ſeem imperfectly expreſſed in Plato's Demons, of which before.2. The Scripture. (2) The complexe objective grades of our aſcent up to God are al divine Words or Revelations, both preceptive and promiſſive, whereby the Divine Nature and Wil is reveled to us, as 1 Cor. 13.12.1 Cor. 13.12.1 Cor 13:12 For we now ſee thorough a glaſſe darkely. We ſee the face of God in the glaſſe of divine Words and Ordinances, yet only enigmatically and obſcurely. And Plato makes mention of foreign, a Divine Word, whereby things divine are reveled to us: which,3. The light of Grace. if I miſtake him not, alludes to the ſacred Scriptures. [2] The ſubjective grades whereby we aſcend up to the knowlege of God are al Divine Illuminations, whereof we find great notices and Philoſophemes in Plato, 4. The light of Glorie.as hereafter Chap. 10. §. 1. (2) There are alſo Grades of Glorie, whereby glorified Spirits aſcend up to the beatific Viſion of God, of which elſewhere. Theſe are the various deſcents of God to man, and the aſcents of man to God, whereby his incomprehenſible Being is in ſome degrees apprehended, though never comprehended by poor mortals.