The Court of the Gentiles Part 4, Part 4 · Book 2 · Chapter 5

The Court of the Gentiles Part 4 · Part 4 · Book 2 · Chapter 5

p. 305CHAP. V. Of Gods Life, Knowlege, Wil, and Power.

The Life of God in the Actualitie of his Eſſence: Gods Life most ſpirituoſe, ſelf-moving, Life it ſelf, immortal, and the Cauſe of al Lafe. Gods Science, its Perfection; Object both complexe and incomplexe; particularly the human Soul: The Mode of Divine Science by the Divine Eſſence and Ideas: Gods Science most ſimple, intuitive, immutable, certain, abſolute, eternal, and perfect. Simple Intelligence, and Science of Viſion: Middle Science what. The Wil of God, its Object, Actualitie; Independence, Immutabilitie, Abſoluteneſſe, Antecedence, Perfection, Libertie, Efficace, Diſtinctions. Gods Power, and its Identitie with his Wil: Its Object things poſſible: Its Infinitude.

§. 1. HItherto we have conſidered the Eſſence of God as exiſtent, The Life of God.we now procede to conſider it as actuoſe, which is uſually termed the Life of God, whereof we find great notices in Sacred and Platonic Philoſophie. In ſacred Philoſophie Life is aſcribed to God on various reaſons: (1) foreign in oppoſition to al falſe Gods, or Idols; and ſo it denotes the Veritie and Truth of his Eſſence and Exiſtence, as Mat. 16.16. foreign,Mat. 16.16.Matt 16:16 of the living God, i. e. of the true very God, in oppoſition to al falſe Gods. So Act. 14.15. 1 Tim. 4.10. as in the O. T. Deut. 32.40. Pſal. 84.23. Jer. 5.2. (2) foreign, by way of Eminence, to diſtinguiſh his Actualitie and manner of acting from that of the Creature: for al life conſiſting in a ſpirituoſe actuoſitie; every thing is ſaid to live, ſo far as it is foreign, a ſelf-moving Principe, as Plato phraſeth it: now God being the moſt pure Act and Spirit, and the prime foreign, ſelf-moving Principe, which moves althings, but is moved by-none, hence Life in the moſt eminent degree belongs to God, as Joh. 1.4. and elſewhere. (3) foreign, effectively, as he gives life to al, either natural, Act. 17.28. Deut. 30.20. or ſpiritual, Hoſ. 1.10. 2 Cor. 4.11. Epheſ. 4.18. or glorioſe, Joh. 14.9. (4) foreign, eſſentially, as the Divine Eſſence is in and of it ſelf actuoſe. For the Life of God is God himſelf: hence when he ſwears by his life, as Deut. 32.40.Deut. 32.40.Deut 32:40 he p. 306ſwears by himſelf. And ſo men, when they would ſwear by God, they ſwear by his life, 1 Sam. 14.39.1 Sam 14:39Ruth 3.13. 1 Sam. 14.39. And becauſe Gods Eſſence is ever actuoſe, therefore he is ſaid to live for ever, Dan. 4.34.Dan. 4.34.Dan 4:34 who liveth for ever. So Rev. 4.9.

This Life of God eſſentially conſidered is wel deſcribed by Plato, in his Phaedo, pag. 106. foreign, But that God, ſaith Socrates, who is (as I take it) the very ſpecies, forme, or idea of life, if any thing elſe be immortal, can never die, is confest by al. In which deſcription of the Life of God we may conſider, (1) the mode of life he aſcribes to God, in that character, foreign, the very ſpecies, forme or idea of life, whereby the Life of God is eſſentially differenced from al other Lifes. For no created life can be ſaid to be the forme or idea of life: The Angelic life is of al created lifes the moſt actuoſe, ſpirituoſe, and noble; yet it cannot be ſaid to be the ſpecies or idea of life; becauſe it contains not the whole of life: for the ſpecies and forme contains the whole eſſence. But now the Life of God is the ſpecies, forme, or idea of life, becauſe it contains in it ſelf eminently and eſſentially al life: whatever Spirituoſitie or Actuoſitie there is in any created life, it is in a tranſcendent eminent degree comprehended in the eſſential Life of God. (2) Plato makes this Life of God to be foreign, immortal. So Ariſtotle, lib. 2. de Coelo, cap. 3. foreign, The Energie or Actuoſitie of God is Immortalitie: and this is life eternal. This Immortalitie of the Divine Life is foreign,1. Tim. 6.16.1 Tim 6:16 natural, abſolute and eſſential, as 1 Tim. 6.16. but the immortalitie of Creatures is only foreign, acquiſite, as Plato in his Timaeus: or in the phraſe of ſacred Philoſophie, foreign, by grace and free donation. Angels and human Spirits are immortal by divine donation, but they poſſeſſe not Immortalitie, as the Divine Life doth.

But to explicate the Life of God more fully,Of Life in its generic notion. according to the Analogie it bears to the Animal and Rational Life, we muſt a little examine what Life in its generic notion importes. And here indeed we can give only ſome poor conjectures; in as much as nothing is more difficult to be underſtood than Life, albeit nothing more commun. This is one of the Myſteries of Nature; which not falling under the perception of ſenſe, farther than by its effects, we can only give ſome probable conjectures of it. But p. 307thus much we find by the effects to be included in the generic notion of Life: (1) a ſpirituoſe Principe, or Spirituoſitie. So among Animals, by how much the more ſpirituoſe they are, by ſo much the more perfect and noble their life is. The animal life is indeed compoſed of vital and animal Spirits in agitation: Hence vigor, health, ſtrength, ſenſe, vegetation, and al the iſſues of life procede. And by how much the more potent and vigorous the Spirits are, by ſo much the more active and perfect is the life. So in the rational Life, the more ſpirituoſe the exercices of Reaſon, and Wil are, the more perfect the life is. (2) Life in its generic notion importes alſo Actuoſitie. Life conſiſtes not in a mere ſpirituoſe principe, but in the agitation of that principe. And the more actuoſe the ſpirituoſe principe is, the more perfect the life is. (3) But the main character that ſeems moſt eſſential to life in the general is foreign, ſelf-motion. This Plato makes commun to al life, as wel create as increate: Brutes they have an animal ſelf-motion, men rational, Angels intellectile, but God abſolute, eſſential, and independent. Thus much being premiſſed of Life in its generic notion, we now procede to explicate how far the Life of God participates hereof.

1. The Life of God carries in it the moſt perfect Spirituoſitie, The Life of God most ſpirituoſe.as he is the moſt ſimple pure Spirit, without the leaſt ſhadow of Mater either phyſic or metaphyſic. The leſſe any thing has of mater, the more ſpirituoſe it is: Angels and human Souls are called Spirits; becauſe they are void of al phyſic mater: but yet they have metaphyſic mater, or paſſive obediential power, and therefore are not pure ſimple Spirits metaphyſically conſidered. Though I cannot without inhuman violence to mine aſſent take in that notion of a Spirit given us by Learned More, in his Divine Dialogues, Dialog. 1. Sect. 24. pag. 94, &c. where he makes extenſion agreable to a Spirit, and ſo not proper and eſſential to Mater ſolely, according to the Carteſian and ancient Hypotheſis. For if a Spirit be capable of extenſion in a ſtrict and phyſic notion, which he ſeems to defend, I cannot imagine how it ſhould be exemt from phyſic mater, and al thoſe laws of phyſic corporeitie, diſſolution, and corruption which attend Mater: yet I can eaſily perſuade my ſelf and grant that learned Author, that al Spirits have, according to the degree of Spiritalitie, an Amplitude of Eſſence, which is not confined to the narrow ſpace of a Needles point, as the Scholes of old dreamed. As for create Spirits p. 308both Angels and human Souls we may juſtly allow them, without injurie offered to their ſpiritalitie, metaphyſic accidental extenſion, according to the ſpace they occupie; as alſo metaphyſic mater, as compoſed of Act and paſſive obediential power, without the leaſt phyſic extenſion or mater. But now God being void, not only of phyſic, but alſo of metaphyſic Mater, or al paſſive Power whatſoever; therefore he is ſaid to be a pure, ſimple Spirit in the moſt eminent tranſcendent degree,Joh. 4.24.John 4:24 as Joh. 4.24. God is a Spirit, i. e. the moſt ſimple ſpirituoſe Being, and therefore the moſt living Being. Hence Chriſt, in regard of his Deitie, is ſtiled a quickening Spirit, Joh. 6.63.John 6:63or Spirit that gives life, Joh. 6.63. foreign, It is the Spirit [i. e. the Deitie which they were ignorant of] that quickeneth, or gives life. Althings give and have life ſo far as they are ſpirituoſe: Chriſt as God being the moſt pure Spirit, he muſt therefore neceſſarily be the moſt living and lifegiving or quickening Spirit.1 Cor. 15.45.1 Cor 15:45 So 1 Cor. 15.45. Chriſt as Mediator is called foreign, a quickening, or life-giving Spirit, as he is the Fountain of al ſpiritual life, and gives out al to his Members. Again,Heb. 9.14.Heb 9:14 Heb. 9.14. it's ſaid, that Chriſt foreign, by the eternal Spirit, [i. e. by the infinite efficacitie of his Deitie] offered up himſelf. So that the Life of God conſiſtes much in his Spiritualitie, or Spirituoſitie.

2.2. The Life of God most actuoſe. The Life of God carries in it the moſt pure and perfect Actuoſitie. This Character of the Divine Life follows on and flows from the former: for by how much the more ſpirituoſe things are, by ſo much the more actuoſe they are: and by how much the more actuoſe they are, by ſo much the more living. Nothing can be ſaid to live farther than it is actuoſe: when it ceaſeth to act, it ceaſeth to live. Life may be conſidered either in actu primo, the first act, or in actu ſecundo, the ſecond act: the firſt Act of life conſiſtes in the ſpirituoſe Principe or Spirituoſitie of the Agent, before mentioned: the ſecond Act of life conſiſtes in the Actuoſitie or Operation, that flows from the firſt Act or Principe. But in the Life of God, which is moſt perfect, the first and ſecond Act are one and the ſame; becauſe he is a pure Act, without the leaſt compoſition of Act and Power, or first and ſecond Act. In al created life the Principe or firſt Act is diſtinct from the Operation or ſecond Act; and both together make an accidental compoſition of Cauſe and Effect, or Act and Power: but in the Life of God there is an Actuation without any true cauſalitie or proper p. 309motion. We muſt conceive therefore of the Life of God as having the moſt perfect Actuoſitie and Actuation, yet ſo as to exclude al real Cauſalitie, Compoſition, and Imperfection, which attendes every create life, by reaſon of the diſtinction between its firſt and ſecond Act, which God admits not; becauſe he is pure Act without al Power, either eſſential or accidental, active or paſſive: his Eſſe and Agere are the ſame: his Act is his Eſſence: which can be ſaid of no create Being: but of God it muſt be affirmed, becauſe he is the firſt, moſt pure, and perfect Act, without al power either objective or receptive. The pure Actualitie of God is demonſtrated by this, that pure Act is more perfect, than Act and Power: but God is moſt perfect, therefore pure Act. Every power is indigent, needing an Act to actuate the ſame: whence it neceſſarily follows, that we muſt either admit a progreſſe into infinite, or grant ſome firſt pure Act, which needs no other Act for its actuation, as Bradwardine acutely demonſtrates, l. 1. c. 2. pag. 163, &c. Whence we conclude, that the Life of God is moſt actuoſe and perfect; becauſe it is a pure Act, without al potentialitie. Hence,

3. The life of God is of al moſt foreign, ſelf-moving. The Life of God ſelf-moving.Plato aboundes much in this Character of Life, which he makes to be moſt eſſential thereto. So in his Phaedrus, pag. 245. foreign, Every bodie that is moved by an externe pulſe is inanimate: but that which is moved by it ſelf from an interne Principe, is animate. Wherein he makes foreign, ſelf motion from an interne Principe the eſſential character of life. And by how much the more perfect this ſelf-motion is, by ſo much the more perfect is the life: Plants are ſaid by ſome kind of Analogie to live, becauſe they have a ſhadow of ſelf-motion, which appears in their Vegetation; yet they cannot be ſaid properly to live; becauſe they rejoice not in any true foreign, ſelf-motion, or ſpontaneitie. Brutes are ſaid properly to live; becauſe they have a true ſelf-motion and ſpontaneitie, ariſing from the actuation of their animal and vital ſpirits: yet their life is much ſhort of the rational life; which conſiſtes in a rational foreign, ſelf-motion or ſpontaneitie of moving towards the laſt end. And yet the Angelic life is higher than the rational, in that the Angels have no dependence at al on phyſic mater. But the foreign, ſelf-motion of the Life of God is of al moſt perfect, in that it is abſolutely independent. The moſt noble Creatures p. 310have but imperfect ſelf-motion: Angels move themſelves, but not primarily, and independently as to God the prime Motor: yea their being moved by God, the firſt Motor, is in order of nature before their own ſelf-motion: ſo that they are but, as man, moved ſelf-movers. But God being independent in his Being, is alſo independent in his ſelf-motion: he moves himſelf and althings elſe, but is moved by nothing. This is excellently illuſtrated by Plato, Leg. 10. pag. 894. where he proves, That God, who is the prime Motor, moving himſelf and althings elſe, doth infinitely excel, of which more largely before, Chap. 2. §. 3. Thus alſo Aquinas, contra Gent. l. 1. c. 97. Life is in this reſpect attributed unto things, as they are ſaid to be moved by themſelves and not by another: hence thoſe things which ſeem to move themſelves are ſaid, by way of analogie, to live, as living Springs, and Quickſilver. But properly thoſe things are ſaid to move themſelves, which are compoſite of mover and moved, as animates. But nothing operates from it ſelf ſo much as God; becauſe he is the firſt Cauſe of althings, &c. Hence,

4.God Life it ſelf. God is Life it ſelf. For Gods Life being his Eſſence as actuoſe and independent, he doth not only live, but is Life in the abſtract. Whence Plato, Phaedo, pag. 106. cals God, foreign, the very ſpecies, forme, or idea of life, as before. Creatures live, but they are not life it ſelf; becauſe they have their life by participation: and every Being by participation muſt be reduced to ſomewhat that is ſuch of it ſelf: therefore the life of the Creature muſt be reduced to God, who is life it ſelf. Thus Aquinas, ſum. part. 1. Quaeſt. 18. Art. 3. God being Eſſence it ſelf and Intelligence it ſelf, therefore life doth chiefly belong unto him. For the clearing whereof we are to conſider, that ſeing things are ſaid to live ſo far as they operate of themſelves, and are not moved by others, therefore by how much the more perfectly this mode of ſelf-operating doth belong to any thing, by ſo much the more perfect its life is— Hence thoſe things that have underſtanding have the moſt perfect mode of living; becauſe they have the moſt perfect mode of ſelf-moving: but albeit our Intellect doth in ſomethings act it ſelf, yet in ſomethings it is acted by others— Therefore that which in its own nature is Intelligence it ſelf, and is not determined or moved by any other, that obtains the higheſt degree of life, and is indeed life it ſelf. Hence,

p. 3115. God is eternal immortal life. Thus Plato, Phaedo, Gods Life immortal.pag. 106. proves, that Gods life is foreign, immortal; becauſe he is the Idea of life. So in his Phaedrus, pag. 245, foreign, That which is ever moved is immortal: but that which moves another and is moved by another, becauſe it hath an end of its motion, it must neceſſarily have an end of its life. His deſigne is to prove, that the Soul being a ſelf-moving principe muſt neceſſarily be an ever-moving principe; and ſo immortal. And his Argument is this: foreign, Whatever is moved by it ſelf, i. e. rationally or intellectually, that is ever moved, and therefore immortal. Thence he addes: foreign, Seing it is manifest, that what moves it ſelf is immortal. So Johan. Grammaticus: foreign, That which is moved of it ſelf (i. e. intellectually) is ever moved: and what is ſo, is immortal. That Gods Life is immortal, is moſt evident; becauſe, (1) it has no beginning; therefore no end. (2) God being the prime Motor, muſt neceſſarily be immobile, without ſucceſſion or mutation. (3) Al death importes diſſolution: and where there is diſſolution, there muſt neceſſarily be compoſition and parts: But God is moſt ſimple.

6. God is Life effectively, God the Cauſe of al Life. Act. 17.28.Acts 17:28as he is the first cauſe of al life to his Creatures. Act. 17.28. In him we live and move and have our being: i. e. we receive al life from him, becauſe we receive al motion from him: and we receive al motion from him; becauſe we receive our being from him. So Damaſcene, Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 19. foreign, And it, [the Deitie] gives to althings Being as their Nature requires: and it is the Being of Beings, and the Life of things living, and the Reaſon of things rational, and the Intelligence of things intellectile. Thus Plato, Phaedr. pag. 245. Therefore that only that moves it ſelf, becauſe it is never deſerted by it ſelf, can never ceaſe to be, foreign, yea to al other things that are moved this is the fountain and principe of motion. The firſt ſelf moving Principe or Cauſe cannot ceaſe to move, becauſe it gives motion to althings, but receives motion from nothing. It is the fountain of al motion, and therefore of al life. Of the Life of God; that it is intellectual, ſelf-ſufficient, moſt bleſſed, &c. ſee p. 312Suarez, Metaphyſ. Diſput. 30. Sect. 14. pag. 116.

§. 2.Gods Science or Knowlege. Having diſcourſed of the Life of God in the general, we paſſe on to explicate the modes and ways, in which this life is ſaid to be actuoſe. For as the Actuoſitie of the Rational life is manifeſted by Acts of Intelligence and Volition, ſo proportionably the Actuoſitie of the Divine Life is explicated by Acts of Divine Intelligence and Volition. We ſhal begin with the divine Intellect, Intelligence, Science, and Sapience; which are one and the ſame in God, and no way diſtinct from his Eſſence. For God being a pure Act, the Intelligent, Intellect, intelligible Species, Act of Intellection, and objective Idea, are but one in him. God is the prime Being, the prime Life, and the prime Self-mover; and therefore the prime Intelligent. His Intellect is that whereby he underſtandes himſelf, and althings without himſelf, which either are, or were, or ſhal be, or may be; together with the various Modes, Orders, and Habitudes of althings; and al theſe, not by any abſtract Ideas, Species, or Images taken from the externe objects; but in the glaſſe of his own Eſſence; not ſucceſſively and by diſcourſe, but intuitively; not in time, but his own Eternitie. Al this wil be evident by what follows.

Firſt,Gods Intellect and its Perfection. as for the Intellect of God and its infinite Perfection above al Human or Angelic Intellect, we find great notices thereof both in Sacred and Platonic Philoſophie. We find the perfection of the Divine Intellect lively deſcribed, Pſal. 139.1-16. which we ſhal more fully explicate, when we come to Gods knowlege of the heart.Mic. 6.9.Mic 6:9 So Micah 6.9. The Lords voice crieth unto the citie: and the man of wiſdome ſhal ſee thy name. The laſt clauſe is rendred according to the Hebrew, by Tarnovius and others, For thy name ſhal ſee that which is, i. e. thy moſt ſacred Majeſtie and Eſſence ſees althings as they are. So foreign may be rendred. Plato deſcribes the Perfection of the Divine Intellect, in his Parmenides, pag. 134. where he aſſures us, that foreign, &c. With God there is the higheſt and most exquiſite Domination, and the higheſt and most exquiſite Science: for otherwiſe he could not know human affaires. Then he concludes: Were it not an inſolent and importune diſcourſe, foreign, if any one ſhould ſpoil God of his knowlege? The Perfection of Gods Intellect, beyond al Human and Angelic Intellect, wil appear by a view of its nature, object, and mode of apprehending. The Intellect of God, as to its nature, p. 313has one and the ſame Idea with the Divine Eſſence; neither is it inveſted with any abſtract Species, Formes or Ideas of things, either habitual or actual, diſtinct from the Eſſence of God. It's true, mans Intellect is not, as I conceive, diſtinct from his human Soul; yet it cannot underſtand any object but by ſpecies or ideas actual and habitual diſtinct from its Eſſence. Mans Intellect, as to the Act of Intellection, is paſſive, receiving the intelligible ſpecies from its object: which imperfect mode of Intellection appertains not to God, who ſees althings in the glaſſe of his own Eſſence, as anon. Gods infinite Science admits not any intelligible ſpecies, whereby the object is united to the facultie in us: ſuch intelligible ſpecies belong only to Human and Angelic Intellects, which receive impreſſion and cauſalitie from their objects. But the Intellect of God receives no impreſſion or cauſalitie from its objects, it being the cauſe of althings. In human knowlege the thing underſtood is the meaſure of our underſtanding; but the divine knowlege is the meaſure of althings known. Again, the Divine Intellect underſtandes things complexe incomplexely; but the human Intellect underſtandes things moſt ſimple and incomplexe, complexely. But of theſe things more in what follows.

As for the object of the Divine Knowlege, it is moſt univerſal,The Object of Gods Knowlege. foreign, althings intelligible. But more particularly the object of Divine Science is either primary, or ſecundary: The primary object of Divine Science is God himſelf, the Divine Eſſence, Perſons,1. God himſelf. 1 Cor. 2.11.1 Cor 2:11 and Relations, 1 Cor. 2.11. That God is the prime Intelligible is evident, becauſe he is the prime immaterial Being. For althings are ſo far intelligible, as they are immaterial: therefore God being the firſt immaterial and moſt ſimple Being, he muſt neceſſarily be the firſt Intelligible. And if God be the firſt Intelligible, then there muſt be an Intellect and Science proportionate to him: which can be no other than himſelf; who is both Intelligible, Intellect, Intellection, and intelligible Species. Again, God being a pure Act, of ſupreme Immaterialitie, he cannot but underſtand himſelf by himſelf. For God having nothing of potentialitie, it is abſolutely neceſſary, that the Intellect and intelligible ſpecies be in him the ſame: whence he cannot but underſtand himſelf by himſelf. For in Creatures the thing underſtood being brought into the Intellect by its intelligible ſpecies or idea, hence the perfection of Intellection dependes on theſe two particulars: p. 314(1) That the intelligible Species or Idea be perfectly conforme to the thing underſtood. (2) That it be perfectly united to the Intellect: which is by ſo much the more perfectly accompliſht, by how much the more efficace the Intellect has in underſtanding. But now the Divine Eſſence being both Intellect and intelligible Species, it cannot but underſtand it ſelf, and althings elſe in the moſt perfect manner. Hence it is that God perfectly underſtandes himſelf, ſo far as he is intelligible: he alſo knows himſelf to be of infinite Power, to have a Wil ſoverain, omnipotent, and univerſally efficacious. Whence he knows althings elſe in himſelf, his infinite Eſſence and omnipotent Wil.

The ſecundary Object of the Divine Science is althings elſe beſides God: 2. God knows althings.Althings poſſible and future, complexe and incomplexe; althings paſt and preſent; univerſal and ſingular, neceſſary and contingent, good and evil: with al the Modes, Orders, foreign or relations, which things have among themſelves. That Gods Science is really omniſcient, or univerſally, yea infinitely extenſive to al objects intelligible is poſitively affirmed both in Sacred and Platonic Philoſophie. As for ſacred Philoſophie we find therein illuſtrious notices of Gods Omniſcience: as Pſal. 139.1-16. Heb. 4.13. But to give a more particular demonſtration of Gods knowing althings, we may argue it, (1) from the infinite power of God thus: Gods knowlege is as extenſive as his power: but his power extendes to althings: therefore his knowlege. Thus Job 42.2.Job 42.2.Job 42:2 I know thou canst do every thing: and that no thought can be withholden from thee. Or as ſome render the laſt clauſe, no thought of thine can be hindred. Which-ever way we read the words, the ſenſe wil be much the ſame, namely that Gods Omnipotence is the ground and argument of his Omniſcience. He that can do althings,Pſal. 147.5.Ps 147:5 cannot but underſtand althings, that he can do. The ſame Argument is inſiſted on, Pſal. 147.5. Great is our Lord, and of great power: his underſtanding is infinite. The later is a conſequent of the former: The Power of God being infinite, therefore his Underſtanding is infinite. Heb. foreign, of his underſtanding there is no number. This may be underſtood both extenſively and intenſively: his Underſtanding is moſt perfect in it ſelf, and moſt extenſive as to al objects. (2) The Omniſcience of God may be demonſtrated from his Immenſitie and Omnipreſence: Gods Science muſt neceſſarily extend ſo far as his Eſſence;Jer. 23.23, 24.Jer 23:23Jer 23:24 becauſe his Knowlege is his Eſſence. Thus Jer. 23.23, p. 31524. Am I a God at hand, ſaith the Lord, and not a God afar off? Can any hide himſelf in ſecret places, that I ſhal not ſee him, ſaith the Lord? Do not I not fil Heaven and Earth, ſaith the Lord? Wherein God demonſtrates his Omniſcience from his Omnipreſence. So Heb. 4.13.Heb. 4.13.Heb 4:13 Neither is there any creature that is not manifest in his ſight, becauſe he is preſent with al. Suppoſe there were a bodie, (as they fancied Argus) ful of eyes, or al eye, would it not diſcerne althings round about it, without the leaſt turne or mutation of its poſture? So God being ful of eyes, or al eye, and preſent with al Beings, is it poſſible that any thing ſhould be hid from him? Hence Plato held, foreign, althings are ful of God, and therefore nothing could he hid from him. (3) Gods Omniſcience may be argued from the Divine Ideas, or Decrees. Althings were the object of Gods knowlege before they were in being, by reaſon of his Divine Ideas, which were the original Exemplar of althings. This Plato much inſiſtes on, both in his Timaeus and Parmenides, as hereafter. (4) Gods Omniſcience may be demonſtrated from his univerſal Cauſalitie in giving Being unto althings. So Act. 15.18.Act. 15.18.Acts 15:18 Known unto God are al his workes from the beginning of the world. (5) Gods Omniſcience may be argued from his preſervation of and providence over althings. Plato, Leg. 10. pag. 901, &c. proves, That Gods Providence extendes to the vileſt and least of things, whereof he has an accurate knowlege, being foreign, the most wiſe Opificer and Framer of althings. For every intelligent Worke-man muſt have a ful knowlege of his own worke; in as much as the idea or knowlege of the Worke-man gives forme to the worke: whence God being the moſt intelligent Framer and Diſpoſer of althings, he cannot but have an accurate knowlege of al.

But to deſcend to the particular objects of Gods Science,The Object of Gods Omniſcience. we may diſtribute althings intelligible into complexe, or incomplexe. Complexe Intelligibles are propoſitions and diſcourſes: Incomplexe, 1. Complexe Intelligibles.real things. 1. The Divine Science has a ful comprehenſion of al complexe Intelligibles, or propoſitions and diſcourſes, both divine and human, mental, oral, and ſcriptural. Complexe Intelligibles are either antecedent to the Wil of God, or ſubſequent. (1) Complexe Intelligibles antecedent to the Wil of God, are ſuch as belong to the Divine Eſſence: as that there is a God: That God is eternal, immutable, &c. Theſe God knows by his Eſſence alone, and not by his Wil, becauſe antecedent thereto. Complexe Intelligibles ſubſequent p. 316to the Divine Wil, are al ſuch, whoſe truth is cauſed by, and ſo dependes on the Divine Wil. Theſe God knows not by his Eſſence ſimply conſidered, nor by the things themſelves concerning which they are affirmed or denied, but by his own Wil. For as Gods Wil gives Being to althings, ſo al propoſitions that belong to them depend on, and are known by the ſame Divine Wil. In which regard that commun Saying, The Reaſons of good and evil are eternal, if underſtood as antecedent to the Divine Wil, it is moſt falſe. For there is no natural or moral Veritie belonging to any created object or terme, that can be ſaid to be antecedent to the Divine Wil. That al complexe Intelligibles or Propoſitions ſubſequent to the Divine Wil are known thereby, ſee Bradwardine, de Cauſ. l. 1. c. 18. pag. 200. and Greg. Ariminenſis, Sent. l. 1. Diſt. 38. Quaeſt. 2. pag. 135.

2.2. Incomplexe Intelligibles. Create incomplexe Intelligibles are either things poſſible, or future. (1) Things merely poſſible to God are known in his Divine Eſſence. (2) Things future in his Wil, which gives futurition to althings. Things future as to us are diſtinguiſhed into neceſſary and contingent: but things contingent as to us, are neceſſary in regard of the Divine Wil; and therefore neceſſarily known by God. That things moſt contingent are neceſſary in regard of Gods Wil, and ſo certainly known by him, is moſt evident, becauſe they are al preſent to God. For what makes a thing contingent uncertain as to us, but becauſe it is future? When it is preſent, it is certainly known what it is: wherefore althings being preſent to God by reaſon of his Divine Wil, which gives ſuturition to althings; therefore they muſt be al, even things moſt contingent as to us, certainly known by him. Even among men, thoſe that underſtand the cauſes of things, and their certain coherence with the effects, may have a certain knowlege of an effect long before it is in being: ſo an Aſtrologer foreſees an Eclipſe: and ſhal not the omniſcient God, who gives Being to al Cauſes, and actuates them in al their cauſalities and cauſal influxes, be allowed a perfect knowlege of al effects? Thus Homer, Iliad. foreign, Who knows things preſent, to come, and paſt. There is nothing ſo vile, ſo inconſiderable, but it fals under the omniſcient eye of God,Prov. 15.3.Prov 15:3 as Prov. 15.3. The eyes of God are in every place beholding the evil and the good. God knows whatever is good by his Divine Wil, the productive Cauſe thereof, and whatever is evil, by its oppoſite good, as alſo by the poſitive p. 317Entitie or Act wherein the evil is ſeated, which alſo fals under the determination of the Divine Wil, ſo far as it is a real poſitive Being. For he that perfectly knows a thing, muſt needs know al the accidents, modes, and appendents thereof: now al Evil being but a privation of what is good, it cannot be hid from the divine Omniſcience: otherwiſe he ſhould not perfectly know the good whereof it is a privation. Again, Evil being but a privation cannot exiſt but in ſome poſitive ſubject, neither can it be known but by the forme whereof it is a privation: which being known to God, thence the evil alſo muſt neceſſarily be known to him.

The principal object among incomplexe ſimple Intelligibles is the heart of man: if this be known by God,Gods Omniſcience as to the human Soul. then ſurely nothing can be hid. Now that the human Soul, and al its Principes, Habits, Cogitations, Inclinations, Ends, Deſignes, and Acts are al known to God, is evident both from Sacred and Platonic Philoſophie. As for ſacred Philoſophie, it is in nothing more poſitive and expreſſe. To begin with that great ſeries of Demonſtrations, Pſal. 139.1, &c. O Lord thou hast ſearched me and known me. Pſal. 139.1.Ps 139:1foreign, thou haſt ſearched me narrowly, ſifted me to the bran: thou ſo knoweſt me, and al that is in me, as he who knoweth a thing exactly, after the moſt diligent and accurate inquiſition. So much foreign importes, v. 2. Thou knoweſt my down-ſitting and upriſing, v. 2.thou underſtandeſt my thoughts afar off. The ſenſe is, there is no part of my life hid from thee: whether I ſit or riſe, thou knoweſt it: al mine actions and enterpriſes are known by thee, as 2 Kings 19.27. al my thoughts are preſent to thee, long before they are exiſtent. Lyra interprets afar off of Eternitie: my thoughts were in thy Eternitie apprehended by thee, before they were mine. Thence it follows, v. 3. Thou compaſſeſt my path, v. 3.and my lying down, and art acquainted with al my ways. Thou compaſſeſt, foreign, thou winnoweſt, or hunteſt my paths. And art acquainted with al my ways. foreign, thou haſt been accuſtomed, or, thou ſo knoweſt, as one who by long cuſtome and familiar acquaintance underſtandes a mater. In theſe two verſes he enumerates al the poſtures of the bodie, ſitting, riſing or ſtanding, going and lying, whereby, according to ſacred Philoſophie, al human actions are expreſſed, as Deut. 6.7. Then he addes, v. 4. For there is not a word in my tongue, v. 4.but lo, O Lord thou knoweſt it altogether. The ſenſe is, before my word is formed in my tongue, thou apprehendeſt it in my thought. p. 318v. 5.v. 5. Thou hast beſet me behind and before; and laid thine hand upon me. foreign, thou haſt beſieged me, or taken hold of me with a ſtrong hand, ſo that I can by no artifice flie thy preſence: or, thou hast arreſted me, v. 6.and ſeiſed on me as thy priſoner. v. 6. Such knowlege is too wonderful for me: it is high I cannot attain unto it. foreign, thy knowlege is marvellous above me: i. e. this thy knowlege is ſo admirable and ſo far above my capacitie, as that I can by no means reach unto it: albeit I know thou knoweſt althings, yet I am altogether ignorant of the mode how thou knoweſt althings, by one and the ſame ſimple intuitive act, without diſcourſe or ſucceſſion. Thence. v. 7, 8, 9, 10. he proves the Omniſcience of God from his Omnipreſence. v. 11, 12.And v. 11. addes: If I ſay ſurely the darkeneſſe ſhal cover me: even the night ſhal be light about me. v. 12. Yea the darkeneſſe hideth not from thee, but the night ſhineth as the day: the darkeneſſe and the night are both alike to thee: i. e. the moſt obſcure things are as wel known to thee, as the moſt evident. Whence he addes,v. 13. v. 13. For thou hast poſſeſſed my reines, i. e. my moſt ſecret thoughts and affections: thou hast covered me in my mothers wombe: i. e. thou gaveſt me being, and therefore canſt not but fully underſtand every thought of my heart. How can it poſſibly be, but that thou ſhouldeſt underſtand me fully, ſeing al that I have or am was from thee?Pſal. 7.9.Ps 7:9 So Pſal. 7.9. For the righteous God trieth the hearts and reines: i. e. the moſt abſtruſe and hidden thoughts, affections, inclinations, and movements of the heart.Pſal. 33.13, 15.Ps 33:13Ps 33:15 Thus Pſal. 33.13. The Lord looketh from Heaven: he knoweth al the ſons of men. And he gives the reaſon of this divine Omniſcience, v. 15. He faſhioneth their hearts alike: he conſidereth al their workes. foreign, who formeth, frameth. An excellent reaſon of Gods infinite knowlege and its extent to al the thoughts, inclinations, intentions, and affections of the Soul. As if he had ſaid: Hath not God framed the hearts of al men? Can any thing then in the hearts of men be hid from God, as Pſal. 34.5? The Hebrew foreign which we render alike, properly ſignifies here together, i. e. al of them univerſally, none excepted: neither is it to be referred to the Verbe frameth, but to Hearts; and ſo denotes Gods exact knowlege of al mens hearts, and that upon this account, becauſe he made them. So Pſal. 94.11. and elſewhere. But ſo much for the Object of Gods Science.

As for the Mode of Divine Science, God knows althings by his own Eſſence.both Sacred and Platonic Philoſophic informes us, that God knows althings, not by images, p. 319or ſpecies received from externe objects, but in and by himſelf, the eſſential glaſſe of the divine Intelligence. It's true we poor mortals, who have only a compoſite ſucceſſive knowlege of things, cannot apprehend any externe object, but by ſome abſtract idea or image conveighed in and by the ſenſes, and impreſſed on the mind, as the ſtampe of the ſeal on the waxe: but the Divine Eſſence being moſt ſimple, without the leaſt ſhadow of paſſive receptive power, is not capable of ſuch an imperfect ſucceſſive mode of underſtanding things. God being a pure Act contemplates in his own eternal omnipotent Eſſence the Archetype of althings poſſible, and in his own Wil, the efficient of al future evenements. If Gods eternal Knowlege ſhould ariſe from any intelligible ſpecies or repreſentation diſtinct from himſelf, then there muſt be ſomething eternal beſides God; alſo paſſive Power, and Accidents; which to aſſert is a dangerous error. One and the ſame Divine Eſſence is the univerſal Exemplar or Idea of althings. For look as in Nature the more noble and perfect Beings are the exemplars of the leſſe noble and perfect; ſo the Divine Eſſence, being moſt perfect, containing in it, in a moſt eminent manner, the ſeminal Reaſons or Ideas of althings, it thence becomes the moſt perfect exemplar and glaſſe to the Divine Underſtanding, wherein it ſees althings. It's true, al Ideas of things in us, who acquire our ſcience and knowlege by Analyſis, are taken from the objects underſtood, and thence impreſſed firſt on our ſenſes and phantaſie; which is as a glaſſe to the human underſtanding, according to which it formes al its intelligible ideas, formes, or notions of things: but it is not ſo with the Divine Intellect; which underſtandes althings by Geneſis, without analyſing of things, and therefore has althings preexiſting in himſelf, before they exiſte in themſelves. In us the Ideate or thing underſtood is before the Idea, and the original exemplar of al our knowlege; but in God, his Idea is the original Exemplar, and the Ideate in the create but a Parelius and reflexe image or ſimilitude of the Divine Idea. Al perfections in the Creature flowing from the efficacious Wil of God, muſt neceſſarily preexiſte in the Divine Wil and Eſſence, before they exiſte in themſelves: as the effect ever preexiſtes in its cauſe: hence the Divine Intellect comprehendes in the glaſſe of the Divine Eſſence al Creatures, and their proper eſſences, perfections, diſtinctions, reſpects, and operations; and that in a way not of compoſition, but perfect p. 320intuition. Theſe Ideas of althings in the Divine Eſſence conſidered abſolutely are but one; yet if we conſider them in the various foreign and regards they have to the ſeveral Creatures, ſo we may look on them as many: for we may conceive the Idea of a man in the Divine Eſſence, as diſtinct from the Idea of any other Creature, though in truth it be but the ſame eſſence. Hence that famoſe Eſſate among the Pythagorcans and Platoniſtes, mentioned by Plato in his Parmenides, That God foreign, one and many, i. e. one, as to his moſt ſimple Eſſence, and yet many, as to the divine Ideas, conſidered in their relation to the particular Ideates they refer unto. Theſe divine Ideas, as they are the original Exemplar of althings made, and ſo the object of Gods Science, are wel expreſſed,Heb. 11.3.Heb 11:3 Heb. 11.3. foreign, So that we may determine, that thoſe things we ſee, were not made of things apparent: or were made of thoſe things that appear not: i. e. al the viſible things of time were made according to the inviſible Ideas of Eternitie: there is nothing extant in this inferior ſenſible world, but what had its Idea in the ſuperior intelligible world of Divine Ideas. Thus Plato, in his Timaus, pag. 28. treating of the Origine of the Univerſe, ſaith, God in the framing thereof, foreign, had an eye on the eternal Exemplar, or Idea, which as a ſeal impreſſed its ſimilitude on althings made. Whence that commun Saying among the Platoniſtes:Plato Ideas vocar, ex quibus omnia quaecunque videmus fiunt, & ad quas cuncta formantur. Groſſeteſte. This Ʋniverſe is but the imitamen of the Divine Mind. That by Plato's Ideas, we are to underſtand the divine Decrees as the Exemplars of althings future, Robert Groſſeteſte, that great Impugnator of the Papal Tyrannie, in his acute Tractate de Libero Arbitrio, (which is to be found in MSS. in Exeter College Librarie, Oxon.) proves out of Auguſtin ſuper Gen. Auguſtin ſaith, Plato cals Ideas thoſe by which althings we ſee are made, and according to which althings are formed: theſe are immortal, immutable, invariable. Hear what an Idea is: (according to Plato) An Idea is of thoſe things that are neceſſary: it is an eternal Exemplar: ſuch infinite Exemplars the natures of things, of Men, of Trees, of Fiſhes, &c. have, according to which whatever ought to be made is expreſſed. Theſe Exemplars of althings God hath in himſelf, and thereby contains in his mind the numbers and modes of althings that are to be made or done. He is ſul of theſe figures or formes, which Plato cals Ideas, immortal, invariable, infatigable. Theſe Ideas in the Divine p. 321Mind Plato, in his Parmenides, pag. 134, &c. diſcourſeth more fully of, and the ſum of al his Philoſophemes about them is this, That theſe Ideas are most ſimple, immaterial, eternal, infinite, and immutable, &c. as we have more fully explicated and demonſtrated, Court Gent. P. 2. c. 9. §. 4. & Philoſ. Gen. P. 1. l. 1. c. 2. ſect. 5. §. 3. & l. 3. c. 2. ſect. 1. §. 2. & c. 4. ſect. 1. §. 9.

Thus we ſee how God contemplates and knows althings in the glaſſe of his own Divine Eſſence and Ideas;How the divine Ideas repreſent the Creatures. not as if the divine Ideas were to be conſidered as a formal concept, but only as objective: whence they are properly ſtiled by Plato, foreign, an Exemplar, which alwayes importes an objective concept, according to which this or that is framed. Thus alſo Bradwardine, de Cauſ. Dei, l. 1. c. 19. pag. 225. Things underſtood by God move the Divine Intellect, not properly, but only metaphorically, [or objectively,] becauſe the Ideas and ſimilitudes thereof are in God, i. e. his Divine Eſſence, which moſt diſtinctly repreſentes al Inteligibles— And becauſe God hath al theſe Ideas and ſimilitudes from himſelf only, and not from the things underſtood, which are poſterior, he is not ſaid to be moved by them to underſtand, but very metaphorically and leſſe properly. Things future are, according to their proper exiſtence preſent unto God, yet not ſimply but in ſome reſpect only, namely in the Divine Wil and Preſcience. So Aquinas aſſures us, That the Eſſence of God as underſtood by God is the Idea of things. The Eſſence of God albeit it doth not formally contain things create, by a formal convenience and ſimilitude, yet it doth contain them according to their formal repreſentation. The very Eſſence of God is the objective Exemplar of underſtanding himſelf, as alſo of underſtanding the Creatures. The Divine Eſſence repreſentes althings according to their proper reaſons: which reaſons of things in God are the very creatrix Eſſence, which is the exemplary repreſentation of al Eſſences; as the ſufficience of God is of al things poſſible, and the Wil of althings future. The divine Eſſence, which repreſentes althings; as an Exemplar directes the operation of God in producing the Exemplates or things formed according thereunto. For there is ſomething in God that correſpondes to al the perfections of Creatures: not as if there were a formal ſimilitude between the Idea and Ideate; but there is ſomething formally exiſting in God that repreſentes al the perfections of Creatures. Thus al the Creatures are in the Divine p. 322Mind repreſentatively, albeit they are not as to their own formal eſſences really the ſame therewith. Some over and above this Repreſentation, make theſe divine Ideas to be alſo energetic and operative cauſes of things: but this muſt be underſtood (1) either as they are conjunct with the divine Wil, which is the prime Efficient of althings; or (2) not of a proper efficience; but only exemplary. For an Idea in the mind of an Artificer, albeit it worke not as a proper efficient cauſe, yet it doth worke as an exemplary cauſe, which is reduced to the efficient. Thus the divine Ideas may be ſaid to operate, as they are the grand foreign Exemplar, according to which the divine Wiſdome directes it ſelf in the production, conſervation, and diſpoſition of althings. Theſe Ideas, as was hinted, are either of things merely poſſible; and ſo they are repreſented by the divine Sufficience or Eſſence nakedly conſidered, and belong to the ſimple Intelligence of God: or elſe they are of things future; and ſo they are repreſented by the divine Wil, which is the Efficient of althings future. For look as an Artificer has an Idea of his worke; ſo God contemplates in his own Wil the original Exemplar of althings future, as Plato, Timeus, pag. 28. One and the ſame knowlege of God receives diverſe denominations, according to the various ſtate of the things known: For if the things known be only poſſible, then God contemplates them in his divine Eſſence; but if they are future, preſent, or paſt, then he contemplates them in the determination and decree of his Wil. Hence God, by means of theſe his divine Ideas, the original, univerſal, and perfect Exemplars of althings, has the moſt perfect comprehenſion of althings, whether poſſible or future, paſt or preſent, complexe or ſimple, neceſſary or contingent, abſolute or conditionate.

The mode of Gods Science in the general being thus explicated,Particular Characters of Gods Science. we hence may draw ſeveral particular eſſential and proper characters thereof.1. Most ſimple. As 1. hence it follows, That the Divine Science is but one ſimple Act, without the least ſhadow of compoſition or diviſion. Gods Science having one and the ſame Idea with his Eſſence, it thence neceſſarily follows, that in God the Intellect, intelligible Species, Object underſtood, and Act of Intellection be one and the ſame. The divine Eſſence is a ſpiritual light, moſt intelligible, and moſt intelligent of it ſelf and althings elſe, in the moſt ſimple manner. Hence Plato makes his divine Ideas foreign immixed or pure Act, without the leaſt mixture of Act and Power. p. 323Thus Damaſcene, Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 19. Moreover, ſaith he, it belongs to the Deitie, foreign, to know althings by a ſimple knowlege, and ſimply to contemplate althings by its divine, omniſcient, and immaterial eye, both things preſent, paſt, and future, even before they are. Our intellection paſſeth from habit or power into act: but Gods intellection admits not either habit or power, but is pure act. Where there is habitual knowlege, there is compoſition of Act and Power; but the divine Eſſence and Intellection being the ſame, there can be no ſuch compoſition in either. This is wel expreſſed by Maximus Tyrius, that famoſe Platoniſt, Diſſert. 1. where diſcourſing, what God is, according to Plato, he thus deſcribes him, pag. 10. It remains, that we place God, in the principal Intellect as in a ſupreme Tower. But here I ſee a double Intellect: foreign, For one can underſtand, [i. e. it has an habit or power of underſtanding] albeit it doth not underſtand, [i. e. actually:] but the other doth underſtand: [i. e. always, actually: for ſo he explains himſelf in what follows] who is not yet perfect, unleſſe he underſtand always and althings, not one after another. Wherein he aſſertes, [1] that Gods Intellect is always in act, without habit or power. [2] That he underſtandes althings. [3] That he underſtandes althings at once, not by ſucceſſion, and one thing after another. Hence,

2. Gods Science is not diſcurſive but intuitive. 2. Gods Science. 1. Intuitive not diſcurſive.For it being moſt ſimple, and the ſame with the divine Eſſence, it cannot admit of the leaſt ſucceſſion or diſcourſe. Our intellect takes things in, not at once or together, but one after the other by compoſition, diviſion, and ſucceſſion: as when we contemplate a man, we conſider, (1) his Animalitie, then (2) his Rationalitie, and (3) his Riſibilitie. So in complexe notions, we, (1) make a Propoſition, (2) then a Syllogiſme, thence (3) a ſeries or method of diſcourſes: And al this we do by compoſition and diviſion, paſſing from what is more known, to what is leſſe known; and ſo taking in one after another: which argues much imperfection in us. But now the divine Knowlege is free from al theſe imperfections; it admits neither compoſition nor diviſion, nor yet the leaſt ſucceſſion; but takes in al objects by one ſimple intuitive p. 324act. This is very wel illuſtrated by Maximus Tyrius, Diſſert. 1. pag. 10. thus: If it pleaſeth, we wil illuſtrate what we have ſpoken by a ſimilitude: foreign, &c. Compare the Divine Intellect to the ſight, but the human to ſpeech or diſcourſe: for the caſt of the eye is of althings most ſwiſt: which preſently, even in the ſame moment, draws its object to it: but the operation of diſcourſe is like unto a ſoft pace. Or, that we may uſe another compariſon: foreign, Let us compare the Divine Intellect with the irradiation of the Sun, which views one whole Hemiſphere of the Earth at once: but the human Intellect with the motion of the Sun, which viſits one place after another ſucceſſively and gradually. Two lively Metaphors to expreſſe the perfection of the divine Intellect beyond the human. For firſt, as the eye doth in a moment take in the moſt remote objects, ſo doth the divine Intellect: whereas al diſcourſe, whereto he compares the human intellect, is but ſucceſſive and ſlow. Again, as the Sun doth irradiate one whole Hemiſphere of the Earth in a moment, but is many hours in its moving through it: ſo the divine Intellect doth in a moment of Eternitie comprehend al objects; but the human is very ſlow and ſucceſſive in its apprehenſion of things. To theſe Platonic illuſtrations we may adde that of Aquinas, P. 1. Quaeſt. 14. Art. 13. where he compares the Intuition of God to the viſion of ſuch as are on an high Tower or Mountain; who in a moment view a ſeries of objects very remote: but the human ratiocination to ſuch as walke in an high way, who ſee only things nigh and before them. It's true, the mind of Chriſtians hath ſome imperfect intuition of God here by faith, as 2 Cor. 3.18. but it's only reflexe and in a glaſſe: but God comprehendes althings by direct intuition, without the leaſt reflexion. Again, Angels and glorified Souls have ſome kind of direct intuition of God, without thoſe imperfect glaſſes of inſtituted ordinances; but yet their Intuition is only apprehenſive, not comprehenſive and ſimultaneous as the divine Science. Laſtly, Angelic and human intuition, if real, neceſſarily requires the actual exiſtence of the object; but Gods intuition requires only the intentional exiſtence of the object in the divine Wil: for things future are the object of Gods intuition, not as actually exiſtent in Eternitie, as the Dominicans avouch, but only as intentionally exiſtent in the divine Decree or Wil. Of which ſee more fully Twiſſe Scientia Media, pag. 41-58. That Gods Science p. 325is not diſcurſive may be demonſtrated, (1) becauſe it is not ſucceſſive: there is not foreign, as Max. Tyrius. Al diſcurſive ſcience or ratiocination procedes from Principes to Concluſions; but God views althings in his own Eſſence. (2) Al diſcurſive knowlege is compoſed of Act and Power: for the Concluſions are potentially in the Principes, and drawen into act by ratiocination: But Gods Science is pure Act. (3) In our mode of knowing things, the more diſtinctly we can apprehend any thing by its own evidence and light, the more evident and perfect is our knowlege; as in our apprehenſion of firſt Principes: wherefore Gods mode of knowing things being moſt perfect, it muſt neceſſarily be without ratiocination. (4) In al diſcourſe the aſſent is the effect cauſed, and the Argument is the cauſe: but Gods Science is not cauſed. (5) In al diſcourſe there is prioritie and poſterioritie, compoſition and diviſion; which implies much imperfection, and may not therefore be aſcribed to God. (6) In al diſcourſe there is much of ignorance mixed with our knowlege; becauſe it is a progreſſion from that which is more known to that which is leſſe known: But Gods Science hath nothing of ignorance mixed with it. Hence,

3. Gods Science is immutable and neceſſary. 3. Gods Science immutable and neceſſary.This follows on the former Characters: for in as much as the divine Science is not dependent on the objects known, but the ſame with his own Eſſence, hence it muſt be neceſſary and immutable. Al human knowlege, being cauſed by Ideas collected from the objects, is mutable and variable, as the objects are; at leaſt ſo far as it regardes ſingular ſenſible objects: for if the object be contingent and mutable, the Science cannot be neceſſary and immutable: But now the divine Science being no way dependent on the object, it is not obnoxious to thoſe laws of mutation and variation which the object neceſſarily fals under. The Truth of our Underſtanding is mutable, becauſe dependent on externe objects and Mediums; but the Truth of the Divine Underſtanding immutable, and therefore the meaſure of al Truth, as Aquinas wel notes. This is incomparably wel illuſtrated by Bradwardine, l. 1. c. 24. pag. 244. God, ſaith he, by reaſon of his moſt infinite claritie comprehendes althings, and al particles of time, as they are moſt truely in himſelf: for he needs not comparation or relation of things paſt or future to the preſent inſtant, according to the manner of our human infirmitie; but he underſtandes althings together and moſt p. 326clearly by his own Eſſence and Wil, which repreſences althings uniformely and invariably. As if there ſhould be an immobile eye in the Centre of the Heavens, which ſhould ſee by extramiſſion and actively, as God ſeeth, it would then always ſee uniformely without al mutation every part of the Heavens turning round; and the ſame part now in the Eaſt, and anon in the South, and then in the Weſt: Thus God in like manner ſees al variable objects and parts of time, with their diſtinct viciſſitudes and ſucceſſions, without the leaſt variation or ſucceſſion; becauſe he ſees althings, not paſſively, by ſpecies and impreſſions received from the things themſelves, but actively in his own Eſſence, and Wil, the active Principe of al. We poor mortals, by reaſon of our infirmitie, cannot diſtinctly apprehend al the particles of time, always fluent and ſucceding each other, and therefore we take the preſent inſtant, which of al time is moſt actual and beſt known to us, and make it the meaſure of paſt, preſent, and future time: whence our knowlege alſo is ſucceſſive and mutable; but God, who knows althings in his own Eternitie, is not liable to ſuch ſucceſſion and mutation: his Science being a pure neceſſary Act, muſt needs be immutable and invariable, albeit it terminates on objects in themſelves moſt mutable and variable: the mutation of the object makes no mutation in the divine Science; becauſe the mutable object is only the ſecundary object of Gods knowlege: the primary object is the divine Eſſence, which is immutable; and therefore the divine Science ſuch alſo. Should Gods knowlege depend on the objects known, then it would be mutable as they are, but not otherwiſe. God neceſſarily knows every Entitie both actual and potential: wherefore (1) he can never know any thing that he is ever ignorant of. (2) He can never be ignorant of what he ever knows. (3) He cannot know more of fewer things than he knows. (4) He cannot begin to know what he before knew not, or not to know what before he knew, becauſe nothing begins to be future. This immutabilitie of the divine Science, as to things future, ariſing from the determination of his own ſoverain Wil, and not from any thing in the object, is nervoſely demonſtrated by pious and learned Robert Groſſeteſte Biſhop of Lincolne, in his elaborate MSS. De Libero Arbitrio, which lies buried in Exeter College Librarie, Oxon. Wherein he copioſely demonſtrates, That the Cauſes, Origines, and Reaſons of althings future, though in themſelves never ſo inſtable, are most ſtable, p. 327immutable, neceſſary, yea eternal in the divine Decree and Wil: whence alſo the Divine Science is most certain, neceſſary, and immutable. This he confirmes by Plato's Ideas, which are immutable and invariable exemplars of althings future, as before. That the Divine Science is immutable and neceſſary, ſo Greg. Ariminenſ. Sent. l. 1. Diſt. 39. pag. 130, 140. Hence,

4. The Divine Science is moſt certain and infallible. 4. Divine Science most certain.Thus Plato, Repub. 2. pag. 382. foreign, &c. I judge no mortal would be really willing both to deceive, and be deceived, or to be ignorant of ſupreme Beings, much leſſe God. The Science of God being neceſſary ad immutable, it cannot but be moſt certain and infallible. To know things certainly, is to know them in their cauſes: now Gods Wil being the Cauſe of althings, he thence knows them perfectly. Gods Science is as certain as the future events: for where there is a determinate effect, there muſt be a determinate cauſe: and where the cauſe is determinate, there the ſcience alſo may be determinate. The knowlege of things future in God is as certain, as the knowlege of things preſent: for every future, compared to God the firſt Cauſe and his Science, is neceſſary and neceſſarily future; albeit as compared to the ſecond cauſes, ſome effects may be contingent, or contingently future. The primary object of the divine Science being infinitely perfect, namely the divine Eſſence, it cannot but be moſt certain and infallible: if there be any certaintie and infallibilitie in human Science, how much more in divine Science, which penetrates al Eſſences and Truths with the moſt perfect light, and moſt ſimple intuition, contemplating every Being and Truth, as it is in it ſelf, in the glaſſe of the divine Eſſence? The divine Intellect ſees althings as exiſtent in themſelves, by the infinite light of the divine Eſſence, and therefore moſt certainly and infallibly, as Eſa. 40.13, 14. Hence,

5. The D…e Science is abſolute and independent, not conditionate and dependent on any create Object. Thus Plato, 5. Gods Science abſolute and in dependent.in his Parmenides, pag. 134, &c. makes his divine Ideas to be foreign, ſelf-ſubſiſtent, and independent, as to al externe objects and condition: For otherwiſe, ſaith he, God ſhould not have a certain knowlege of and ſoverain dominion over human affaires. It's impoſſible, that any effect ſhould be, or be underſtood as future in any caſe, but dependently on its efficient cauſe: Now what is the firſt and p. 328univerſal Eſſicient of al effects, but the Decree of the divine Wil, on which every effect dependes, more than on its proxime cauſe? Therefore as nothing is antecedent to the divine Wil, ſo no Hypotheſis or condition is cognoſcible or knowable antecedently thereto. Gods knowlege as it dependes not on the exiſtence of created objects, ſo neither on any Hypotheſes or conditions that are appendent unto ſuch objects, placed in ſuch circumſtances. For al futures, whether abſolute or conditionate, are known by God, not from the determination of ſecond cauſes, but from the determinatin of the divine Wil, which is the firſt Cauſe. For whence ſprings the futurition of things, but from the determination of the divine Wil? And muſt not then the determination of the divine Wil be precedent to the determination of the ſecond CAuſe? And if ſo, may we not then hence conclude, that Gods Science ariſing from the determination of his own Wil dependes not on the exiſtence of, or any conditions that belong to future objects? If the divine Eſſence be foreign and independent, muſt not the divine Science, which is identified therewith, be alſo foreign and independent? Or if the divine Science ſhould depend on the mutable conditions of its object, can it be any other than conjectural? Where any science dependes on its object, it cannot be more certain than the object is: whatever contingence belongs to the object, wil alſo influence the Science and make it contingent: whence if the divine Science be certain, as without al diſpute it is, then it cannot depend on its mutable contingent object, but muſt be abſolute and independent. Is it leſſe than blaſphemie to conceive, that the infinite Science of God ſhould depend on any finite object, or finite mutable conditions appendent thereto? Yea, is not ſuch a conditionate Science altogether impoſſible as to God? For muſt not the object as ſuch be before the act? And may we ſuppoſe any created object or condition appertaining thereto in any regard to be before the divine Wil and Science? Is not the futurition of althing… both objects and conditions, the effect of the divine Decree, …refore in order of Nature ſubſequent to the divine Wil? And if ſo, then are not al objects and the conditions appendent thereto foreſeen by God, in his divine Decrees, without the leaſt dependence on the things themſelves or their contingent conditions? Indeed a conditionate Science, to ſpeak properly, is that which as yet never exiſted, but wil follow on the poſition of the condition: whence p. 329truely ſuch a Science cannot exiſte even in men, before the condition be performed: and therefore where the condition is never performed, it can never exiſte. How impoſſible then is it, that ſuch a Science ſhould be found in God, who no way dependes on externe objects for his Science? We muſt therefore conclude, that God, in the abſolute and efficacious Decree of his own Wil, hath predetermined al futures both contingent, free, and neceſſary in particular, and thence certainly and infallibly knows them to be future, both as to their ſubſtance and circumſtances. As for ſins future God certainly and infallibly knows them both as future and preſent, in the determination and permiſſion of his own Wil, whereby the create Wil is determined to the entitie of the ſinful act, as a real act, and permitted as to the moral pravitie of the act, as before, in the object of Divine Preſcience. Hence,

6. The Divine Science is eternal. Thus Plato, 6. Divine Science eternal.both in his Timaeus and Parmenides, makes his Divine Ideas to be, foreign, eternal and ſempiterne. And the reaſon is moſt evident; becauſe the Divine Science is the ſame with the Divine Eſſence. If God ſhould begin to know any thing that he knew not before, his Intellection ſhould depend on the object known, which is impoſſible. Again, if God ſhould begin to know what he knew not before, then he ſhould be compoſite or compounded of Act and Power, and ſo not a pure Act: then alſo he ſhould not be moſt perfect, and moſt bleſſed: for every Act addes to the perfection of the habit or power. Al the ſucceſſions and viciſſitudes of time or things in time are foreſeen by God in his Eternitie, by one ſimple intuitive Act. Thus Maximus Tyrius, Diſſertat. 1. pag. 10. The Divine Intellect is not perfect, unleſſe it be added to it, foreign, always to underſtand. Thus alſo Aquinas, Part. 1. Quaeſt. 14. Art. 13. God knows al contingents not only as they are in their own cauſes, but as they are each of them actually in themſelves. And albeit contingents are brought into act and exiſtence ſucceſſively, yet God doth not know them ſucceſſively as they are in their own Being, as we do, but al at once; becauſe his knowlege is meaſured by Eternitie, as alſo his Being: but now Eternitie being exiſtent al at once, doth compaſſe about al time: whence althings that are in time are preſent to God from al Eternitie, not only as the reaſons of althings are preſent with him, but becauſe his intuition is from Eternitie caſt on althings as they are in their preſentialitie. This preſentialitie p. 330muſt be limited to the Divine Wil, which gives futurition to althings, and ſo makes them preſent to the Divine Underſtanding. Hence,

7. The Divine Science is infinitely perfect. 7. Divine Science infinitely perfect.Thus Plato aſcribes to God, Parmenid. 134. foreign, the moſt exquiſite perfect Science: otherwiſe he could not be Rector of the Univerſe. So Maximus Tyrius, Diſſert. 1. pag. 10. foreign, That he be moſt perfect who underſtandes both at al times, and althings, and at once. Pſal. 147.5.Ps 147:5God knows althings, always, and at once; therefore moſt perfectly. Thus Pſal. 147.5. Great is our Lord and of great power: his underſtanding is infinite: or of his underſtanding there is no number: i. e. his Underſtanding is every may perfect: he knows althings, and that in the moſt perfect manner. And it is obſervable, that the Pſalmiſt grounds the Infinitude of Gods knowlege on the Magnitude or Infinitude of hsi Eſſence and Power: whereby we are informed, that Gods knowlege dependes not on the objects known, but ariſeth from his own omnipotent Wil and Eſſence. The perfection of the Divine Science may be conſidered eſſentially, intenſively, extenſively. (1) Eſſentially, as Gods knows himſelf perfectly, in himſelf and by himſelf; and althings elſe in himſelf. God knows althings diſtinctly in the claritie of his own Eſſence: thoſe things that are diverſe and multiplied in the Creatures, are moſt ſimply and unitely in God: Man according to the diverſitie of objects, has diverſe notices or apprehenſions of things. As he underſtandes firſt principes, ſo his knowlege is ſtiled Intelligence; as Concluſions flowing from firſt Principes, ſo his knowlege is called Science; as the higheſt Cauſe, ſo Sapience; as things practic and moral, ſo Prudence: But al theſe God comprehendes by one ſimple Act of Intuition in his own Eſſence. (2) Gods knowlege is moſt perfect intenſively. For every Intelligent is ſo far perfect as to degrees of knowlege, as he partakes of Immaterialitie. Brutes have ſome degree of apprehenſion, as they have ſpirituoſe Souls; but theſe their animal Spirits being but the purer parts of mater, therefore their apprehenſion is moſt imperfect, and not reckoned among the ſpecies of true knowlege. Mans apprehenſion depending very far upon his ſenſes and material objects, it's therefore more imperfect than that of Angels: yea, the Angelic Intelligence being made up of act and power, which is a kind of metaphyſic mater, hence there is much of imperfection mixed therewith, p. 331if compared with Gods Intelligence; which being pure Act and exemt from al mater, as wel metaphyſic as phyſic, hence it is moſt perfect intenſively as to al degrees of knowlege. (3) Gods Science is moſt perfect extenſively; not as to kinds or parts of Science, (for it is moſt indiviſible and ſimple, without al extenſion of parts) but as to objects; becauſe it extendeth unto al objects. God, by reaſon of his moſt infinite claritie, comprehendes al particular things, with al the particles of time in and by himſelf. God being in the higheſt degree immaterial, it neceſſarily follows, that his Science is moſt ample and extenſive as to its object: for every facultie is by ſo much the more extenſive, by how the more immaterial it is: hence the human Intellect by its act of underſtanding is ſaid to become althings: how much more true is this of the Divine Intellect, which is in the higheſt degree ſpiritual? The Divine Science albeit it be one moſt ſimple Act in it ſelf, yet it is moſt univerſal and infinite as to its object. Thus Aquinas, contra Gent. l. 1. c. 78. proves that Gods knowlege extendes to an infinitie of things; becauſe God perfectly knows his own Virtue and Power, which is infinite. Again, by how much the more efficacious and clear any Intellect is in knowing, by ſo much the more able it is from one to gather many things: But now the Divine Intellect being infinitely efficacious, it muſt therefore neceſſarily extend to an infinitude of objects. So Bradwardine, l. 1. c. 1. pag. 7. proves, That the Scientivitie of God and his Intellect is never ſatisfied with any finite or infinite number of exiſtent ſingulars, of any one ſpecies, or al; but infinitely excedes each of them, yea, a whole multitude of al, if they could be congregated together. That the Science of God is moſt perfect eſſentially, intenſively, and extenſively, ſee Suarez, Metaph. Diſp. 30. Sect. 15. pag. 121.

Having largely diſcuſſed the eſſential Modes or Characters of the Divine Science, we now procede to its diſtinctions,Gods ſimple Ditelligence. with relation to its objects. For albeit the Divine Science be in it ſelf one ſimple Act, identified with the Divine Eſſence, yet this hinders not but that we may, by ſome inadequate conception of reaſon, diſtinguiſh this Science, by reaſon of its object, into different kinds. The commun diſtribution of Gods Science is into ſimple Intellience, and Science of Viſion. 1. Gods Science of ſimple Intelligence is of althings poſſible; which he contemplates in the Alſufficience of his Eſſence. For God being in the higheſt degree p. 332Intelligent, he muſt neceſſarily underſtand althings that are intelligible: but now whatever may be, may alſo be known: whereever there is a poſſibilitie of exiſtence, there is ſome intelligibilitie. Again, God perfectly knows his own Eſſence and Power: therefore he perfectly knows not only what is future, but alſo whatever is poſſible. Not that the exiſtence of things poſſible is known by God, but only their Eſſence, which he contemplates in his own EſſEnce. Hence this Science of ſimple Intelligence is called by ſome Abſtractive; becauſe it abſtractes from the actual exiſtence of its object.

2. Gods Science of Viſion, Gods Science of Viſion as to things future.is that whereby he knows things as future, in and upon the Decree of his Wil. Here we muſt premit, that when we ſay, Gods Science of Viſion terminates on things as future, the conjunctive Particle As, muſt be taken not formally, as if it denoted any reaſon of the Divine Cognition taken from the futurition of the thing, but only materially; and ſo it denotes only thus much, that Gods knows things future to be future, and that by the determination of his own Wil. Bradwardine, de Cauſ. Dei, l. 1. c. 18. pag. 220, &c. largely demonſtrates theſe Propoſitions. (1) That God doth not know things future merely by his Eſſence, without the determination of his Wil; becauſe nothing is in its own nature future, but by the Decree of the Divine Wil. (2) That God doth not know things future by the Divine Intellect only: becauſe the Divine Intellect conſidered in it ſelf is not practic, but only as ſubſequent to the Divine Wil. (3) That God doth not know things future by the Infinitie of the Divine Science: becauſe the Infinitie of the Divine Science being ſuppoſed, it doth not thence neceſſarily follow, that this or that thing be future. (4) That God doth not know things future by the knowlege of their ſecond Cauſes: For ſuch a knowlege implies diſcourſe from the cauſe to the effect: again, ſuch a knowlege would be contingent when the ſecond cauſes are ſuch. (5) That God doth not know things future by the Infinitie or Immenſitie of his own Scibilitie or Scientivitie. (6) That god doth not know things future by the ſole permiſſion of his own Wil: becauſe then Gods knowlege ſhould not be certain. Hence he poſitively concludes,God knows things future by his Wil. (7) That God knows things future by that which gives them their futurition, namely by his Divine Wil. For, as Ariſtotle 1. Poſt. 2. inſtructes us, To know a thing is to know it by its cauſe: and is not the Wil of God the firſt Cauſe that gives futurition to althings? Again, how can God certainly know future contingents, p. 333ſuch as al human acts are, but in and by ſome neceſſary certain cauſe? And what certain neceſſary cauſe can there be of future contingents but the Divine Wil? We may not then ſearch for the cauſes of Divine Preſcience in things future, but in the cauſe of their futurition, the determination of the Divine Wil. Not as if the decree or determination of the Divine Wil, whereby things become future, did in any moment of Nature precede the Divine Preſcience; but in one and the ſame moment of Nature God decrees what ſhal be future, and foreſees it future. Thence he takes the reaſon of his knowing things future, not ſimply from his Eſſence, or ſufficience; nor yet from their preſentialitie to God, as the Dominicans perſuade us, but from the determination of his own Wil. Certainly Gods Wil is moſt efficacious, omnipotent, immutable, and moſt known to himſelf: and therefore it is neceſſary, that whatever he wils ſhould be future, be ſo, and known to him to be ſo: for he wils not only the things themſelves, but alſo al their modes and conditions of contingence, neceſſitie, libertie, &c. Whatever gives any thing its futurition muſt neceſſarily alſo give it its cognoſcibilitie or intelligibilitie as future: wherefore the Divine Wil giving the former, it cannot alſo but give the later. Damaſcene, Orthodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 12. tels us, that foreign God may be deduced from foreign to ſee: foreign, for nothing can be hid from God, yea he is the Inſpector of althings. And then he gives us the mode how God comes to know althings: foreign, For he beholdeth althings before they are produced, eternally underſtanding every thing, according to his voluntary eternal Intelligence: i. e. his eternal Intelligence grounded on his own Wil. Thus Bradwardine, de Cauſ. Dei. l. 1. c. 19. pag. 226. But here we muſt know, that a thing as future in the Divine Wil and Predeſtination cauſally, and not extrinſecally in its own proper nature, is the cauſe [or object] of the Divine Science or Preſcience: For God no way needs extrinſec things as objects of his knowlege; but he hath althings future with himſelf intrinſecally cognitivè, cauſativè, intuitivè, ſeu ſcientificè, cognitively, cauſatively, intuitively, or ſcientificly from himſelf only; and ſo he knows althings, &c. So alſo Cap. 18. pag. 223. God, ſaith he, knows things future, by that whereby they are future, namely by his Divine Wil. And he urgeth for this that Principe of Ariſtotle, p. 3341. Poſt. 2. To know a thing certainly is to know it by its cauſe: But now God knows al futures certainly, therefore by their moſt true cauſe, even that which virtually contains al other cauſes and cauſations; and this is no other than his own wil. That God knows althings future in the determination of his own Wil was the commun Hypotheſis of the ancient Scholaſtic Theologues, as of Auguſtin before them. So Robert Groſſeteſte in his M. SS. De Libero Arbitrio.

Thus Scotus aſſures us, That the Root of the Divine Science as to future Contingents is the determination of the Divine Wil: which determination is not only neceſſary to cooperate with the free Creature, but alſo to determine the Wil of the Creature to act freely. This Hypotheſis is alſo excellently well explicated and demonſtrated by Alvarez, de Anxil. Grat. l. 2. Diſp. 7. p. 106. God, ſaith he, in the abſolute efficacious Decree of his own Wil, predetermining in particular al future Contingents, as alſo free acts, knows certainly and infallibly thoſe to be future, as to al circumſtances, as wel as to their ſubſtance. Therefore from this Decree there may be aſſigned a ſufficient Reaſon of the certitude of Divine Science as to al futurs, which are not morally evil. And he thus proves his Hypotheſis; A determinate cauſe, which is ſo efficacious as that it cannot be hindred by any other cauſe, muſt needs infallibly produce its effect: but ſuch is the Divine Decree. Ergo. Then p. 108. he explicates how God knows ſin: God certainly and infallibly knows al future ſins in that Decree, whereby he decrees to predetermine the create Wil to the entitie of the act of ſin, ſo far as the act is ens, and to permit the moral evil of ſin as ſin, &c. as before.

3. The Jeſuites ſuperadde to the two former Sciences of ſimple Intelligence and Viſion, Scientia media.Scientia Media, a middle Science, whereby God is ſuppoſed to foreſee ſuch or ſuch events to be future, on condition that ſuch or ſuch cauſes he ſo or ſo conſtituted. This Middle Science (1.) ſuppoſeth that ſome events are certainly future independently as to the Wil of God; which is altogether impoſſibly: for a thing merely poſſible cannot paſs from its ſtate of poſſibilitie to a ſtate of Futurition, without ſome cauſe of that tranſmutation: now there can be no cauſe of futurition but the Divine Wil, as we ſhall prove hereafter. Nothing can be future either abſolutely or conditionately, but what the Divine Will has decreed ſhal be future: therefore the p. 335object of this Middle Science cannot be things future, but only poſſible. Doth not this Middle Science, by feigning that future which is only poſſible, overthrow the very foundation of the Divine Science as to things future? Is it not impoſſible, that the preſcience of a thing future ſhould precede the decree of its futurition? So Avarez, de Auxil. l. 2. cap. 7. Nothing can make a thing cognoſcible as future, but what gives futurition thereto: And what gives futurition to any thing, but the decree and determination of the Divine Wil? (2) It ſuppoſeth Gods Science to depend upon its object, which alſo is impoſſible; becauſe then it ſhould be variable and mutable as the object is. Yea, to ſpeak properly, the object of this Middle Science is not at al cognoſcible or knowable: For nothing is knowable farther than it is clothed with ſome degree of neceſſitie, at leaſt as to eſſence or exiſtence: what is not either neceſſarily exiſtent or future, cannot be known: now the object of this Middle Science is not either exiſtent or future: therefore not cognoſcible. Again, God takes not the reaſon or idea of his cognition from the things themſelves or any Hypotheſes they fal under, which are al variable, but from the invariable determination of his own Wil, as before. It's true, our Intuition and Cognition is formed by a paſſive reception of ſpecies from its object;Noſtra intuitio fit patiendo abobjectis, non ſic intuitio divina. and therefore it is murable and variable, according to the variations of the object: but can we imagine, that this imperfect mode may attend the Divine Intuition and Cognition? Should the principe and reaſon of the Divine Cognition procede from and depend on its finite object, muſt not God alſo be finite, paſſive, and dependent? Is not the Divine Idea before its Ideate, yea eternal? How then can it depend thereon? (3) This Middle Science ſuppoſeth the Divine Science to be only conjectural and uncertain. For ſuch as the object is, ſuch is the Science thereof: a contingent object cannot give a neceſſary certain Science: al Logic ſcientific neceſſitie is founded in phyſic neceſſitie: That which may otherwiſe be, cannot be neceſſarily known: as Gods knowlege would be falſe, if he knew thoſe things to be future which ſhal never be; ſo would it be incertain, if the object be not certainly future: if the object be certainly future, it muſt have a certain cauſe of its futurition, which can be no other than the Wil of God. But now, according to this hypothetic Middle Science, God cannot divine which way mans Free-wil wil incline it ſelf, before it hath inclined to p. 336this or that object. and doth not this render the knowlege of God only conjectural, yea no knowlege at al? For how can a thing be certainly known to be future, without ſome cauſe determining it to be ſuch? That Gods knows althings future, though never ſo contingent in themſelves, moſt certainly in the determination of his own Wil, ſee Greg. Ariminenſ. Sent. l. 1. Diſt. 38. Quaeſt. 2. alſo Groſſeteſte, de Libero Arbitrio. Wherefore if God has a certain preſcience of future contingents, as without al peradventure he has, we muſt ſearch for the cauſes of this Divine Preſcience, not in the extrinſec objects, which can never give it, but in God himſelf, and in the determination of his own Wil, in regard of which al future contingents are neceſſary; not abſolutely, but hypothetically, on ſuppoſition of the ſaid determination. (4) This Middle Science enervates and deſtroyeth the Grace of God. [1] It deſtroyes the Grace of Election; in that it ſuppoſeth, that Peter could from his own free-wil, conſent to the Cal of God, provided he were put under ſuch circumſtances, and inveſted with ſuch commun aides, even antecedently to his Election to Grace and Glorie; which they make to follow the previſion of his Faith by this Middle Science. And thus the whole of Election dependes on the improvement of Free-wil, and the previſion thereof by this Middle Science. [2] It enervates and diſpirits the whole of Chriſts Redemtion; in that it makes al the efficace of Chriſts Death dependent on the previſion of mans aſſent and conſent to him as Lord. It ſuppoſeth that Chriſt died for no man abſolutely, but only on condition that men by their corrupt Wil embrace him. [3] It overthrows efficacious Grace in the vocation and converſion of ſinners; in that it reſolves al into a moral capacitie or power in corrupt Nature to convert it ſelf. [4] It ſubvertes the Covenant of Grace; in reſolving the whole of it into a Covenant of Workes. [5] It deſtroyes the Grace of Perſeverance; in that it makes the perſeverance of the Saints dependent on their own mutable Free-wil.

§. 3. As for the Wil of God,The Wil of God. although it be not really different from his Ʋnderſtanding and Eſſence, yet we may, in regard of its effects, conceive of it as in ſome manner diſtinct. The Wil of God is taken either properly, for the Divine Volition, Intention, or Decree, whereby althings receive their Futurition and Exiſtence; or elſe improperly, for the legiſlative, declarative, ſignificative Wil of God; which is the meaſure of our dutie. The p. 337former is that which we are firſt to diſcourſe of, whereof we find lively notices in Sacred Philoſophie; and ſomething alſo in Plato, Phileb. p. 16. where being about to Philoſophiſe of the Divine Wil, as the original Exemplar or Idea of althings future, he makes this Preface: foreign, For althings that ever were invented, being joined together by a certain affinitie and cognation with Art, by means hereof are declared. His meaning ſeems to be this, that look as althings made by Art have their Idea in the mind of the Artificer, according to which they are framed; ſo althings of Nature have their Idea in the Divine Mind and Wil, according to which they are accurately formed. Thence he addes: And truly the Ancients, who were better than we, and lived nearer to God, delivered to us this report or Tradition, foreign, That althings conſiſt of ONE and MANY, which are ſaid ever to be. (1) That by theſe Ancients, whence this Oriental Tradition came, we muſt underſtand primarily the Hebrews, has been ſufficiently demonſtrated, P. 2. B. 3. C. 2. and elſewhere. (2) That by this ancient tradition of One and Many, we muſt underſtand the Divine Eſſence and Ideas or Decrees of the Divine Wil ſeems alſo manifeſt. Whence he ſubjoins; foreign, That we ought, things being thus conſtituted, alwaies to inquire after one Idea of every thing in particular, and accurately to obſerve the ſame, &c. That by this ONE IDEA, which we are to inquire after, muſt neceſſarily be underſtood the Decree of the Divine Wil, I think wil be evident to any, that ſeriouſly conſiders Plato's Philoſophemes of the Divine Ideas, delivered in his Timaus, and Parmenides, of which before, P. 2. B. 3. c. 9. §. 4. And indeed he ſeems poſitively to aſſert, Parmenid. p. 134. That the Origine of theſe Ideas cannot be in the object, but muſt be in the Divine Eſſence and Wil. We ſhall reduce the whole of our Philoſophemes about the Divine Wil to the following Propoſitions.

1. Prop. God primarily Wils himſelf, and althings elſe in ſubordination to himſelf. The Object of the Divine Wil.(1.) That the Divine Eſſence is the primary object of the Divine Wil. is moſt evident; [1.] becauſe the principal thing willed is to every one the cauſe of willing: if therefore God ſhould have any other principal object of his Wil beſides himſelf, he ſhould have ſomething beſides himſelf as the cauſe of his willing; p. 338which is impoſſible: for nothing can move the Divine Wil but his own Bonitie. [2] The Divine Eſſence is moſt amabile and appetible for it ſelf, therefore the primary object of the Divine Wil. [3] The primary object of the Wil ought to be equally proportionable thereto: for the virtue and efficace of a facultie is meaſured by its commenſuration and Adequation to its primary object: and what is equally proportionable to the Divine Wil, but the Divine Eſſence? Hence, (2) God by willing himſelf, wils althings elſe in ſubordination to himſelf. For he that wils an end, wils althings elſe in order thereto. God wils althings in order to his own Bonitie: The Wil of God terminates on other things ſo far as they relate to the Divine Bonitie, and participate thereof: God wils himſelf Neceſſarily, but althings elſe ſo far as they relate to himſelf. Hence (1) God wils al ſingular Goods, ſo far as they partake of goodneſs. For God willing himſelf as his laſt end, wils althings ſo far as they conduce to himſelf: but every thing ſo far as it is good participates of, and tends to the Divine goodneſs: therefore as ſuch it is willed by God. Hence,

2. Prop. The Wil of God conſidered in it ſelf is but one, ſimple, indiviſible, pure Act. The Divine Wil one pure Act.Thus Plato, Phileb. 16. ſaith, we ought always to inquire after, foreign, one idea of althings. Whereby he notes, that the Divine Wil, as the origine of all things, is but one. The multitude of objects willed is no way repuguant with the Unitie and Simplicitie of the Divine Wil: for God by one ſimple act wils himſelf and althings elſe. Althings are one in the Divine Wil and Bonitie; in as much as the Divine Bonitie is the exemplar of al Bonitie; and the Divine Wil by one and the ſame act wils both the Divine Bonitie and al other Bonitie. It is otherwiſe with the Humane Wil, which by one act wils the end, and by another, the means conducing to the end: whence the willing the end is the cauſe of willing the means: but in the Divine Wil there is no ſuch cauſalitie of end and means to be found; in as much as by one and the ſame ſimple act it wils both end and means: and al grant, that the ſame thing cannot be the cauſe of it ſelf. Thence Suaxez Metaple. Diſput. 30. §. 16. p. 127, &c. proves, That Gods Wil is not a real power, but the laſt pure Act: for there is no receptive power in God: althings that are in God are as actual as his effence, and as pure from all Potentialitie. Hence,

p. 3393. Prop. The Divine Wil is moſt Soverain and Independent. The Divine Wil Independent.Thus the Platoniſtes generally aſſert, that the Divine Wil is foreign, without cauſe, and Independent: and Plato makes his Divine Ideas to be foreign, Self-ſubſiſtent and Independent; becauſe althings elſe depend on them, but they on nothing elſe. This Independence and Self-ſubſiſtence of the Divine Wil is ſet forth in Sacred Philoſophie under the notion of a Foundation, 2 Tim. 2.19.2 Tim. 2.19.2 Tim 2:19 The foundation of the Lord ſtandeth ſure, the Lord knoweth who are his. foreign notes the firm purpoſe of the Divine Wil: As thoſe that build great Palaces lay a firm foundation, which dependes not on any part of the Structure, but the whole Structure dependes on it; ſo God being to build a Celeſtial Houſe, layes the eternal purpoſe of his own Wil as a ſelf-ſubſiſtent independent foundation, on which the whole dependes. This Soveraintie and Independence of the Divine Wil the Hebrews expreſſed by the name foreign Adonai, which denotes Gods Soverain Dominion over the Creature, from foreign a pillar or baſis, on which the whole Fabric dependes, but it dependes not on the Fabric: ſo althings depend on the Soverain Wil of God, but it on nothing. Thus Plato, Epiſt. p. 312. foreign, About the King of althings, althings are: and althings are for his ſake … and he is the cauſe of althings beautiful. Wherein note, (1) th…e ſtiles God foreign, The Soveraign King or Lord of al, i. e. according to the origination of the word, foreign the baſis of al anſwerably to the import of Adonai, Lord. (2) He ſaith althings are for God, i. e. to be diſpoſed of according to his Soverain Wil and pleaſure. And (3) he addes the Reaſon, becauſe he is the cauſe of althings. i. e. God, by virtue of his prime cauſalitie and efficience, has an univerſal Dominion over al things, to diſpoſe of them as he pleaſeth for his Glorie. The light of Nature teacheth, that every one ought to be the ſupreme moderator of his own work: Hence what ever God wils is juſt, becauſe he wils it. This Soveraintie and Independence of the Divine Wil is lively expreſſed, Pſal. 135.5.Pſal. 135.5, 6.Ps 135:5Ps 135:6 For I know that Jehova is Great, and that our Lord is ſuperior to al Gods, Jehovah, i. e. the firſt Supreme Being, who gives being to althings, but receives nothing from any Creature. Is Great, i. e. Infinite in being, and therefore moſt Soverain and Independent in his Wil and Pleaſure. Whence it follows: and ſuperior to al Gods: i. e. infinitely above Angels and Men, though never ſo potent; p. 340who al depend on his ſoverain independent Wil. Thence he addes, v. 6. Whatſoever the Lord pleaſed, that did he in Heaven and in Earth. foreign, whatſoever the Lord willeth: which notes the Soveraintie, Independence, and Omnipotence of his Wil.Jonah 1.14.Jonah 1:14 So Jonah 1.14. For thou O Lord hast done as it pleaſed thee foreign, according to thy ſoverain independent Wil. The greateſt Notions or Attributes that our ſhallow judgements can invent, are infinitely too ſhort to expreſſe the Soveraintie of the Divine Wil.

But the more fully to explicate and demonſtrate the Soveraintie and Independence of the Divine Wil,God independent phyſically and morally. we are to conſider that as cauſes, ſo dependence on thoſe cauſes is twofold; phyſic, or moral: Phyſic Dependence is that whereby an inferior dependes on a ſuperior Cauſe for real efficience: Moral Dependence is that whereby an inferior dependes on its ſuperior for moral influence. And there is this commun to both: as in Naturals inferior cauſes dependent on ſuperiors in acting, have no power to act contrary to the efficace of their ſuperiors; ſo in Morals. But now God is neither phyſically nor morally dependent on any ſuperior cauſe. (1) He has no phyſic dependence on any ſuperior cauſe; becauſe he is the firſt in the order of phyſic Cauſes: Again, he is ſuperior to al Gods, as Pſal. 135.5. and therefore cannot be influenced by any. So Plato, Repub. aſſur… …, foreign, That an hypocrite is neither able to hide himſelf from God, nor yet to force him. The Divine Wil receives no real efficience or influence from the human Wil, but the human Wil is really influenced by the Divine Wil: God wils not things, becauſe we wil them; but we wil things, becauſe God wils them. (2) Neither is God morally dependent on any other. Moral dependence is founded in natural: where there is natural independence in an abſolute degree, there cannot be moral dependence in any degree: The rational Creature having a twofold relation to God, as a Creature, and as rational, hence he has a twofold dependence on God, one natural, the other moral: but God being independent as to his Eſſence, muſt neceſſarily alſo be independent as to Morals. Moral dependence is either Legal, or Final: Legal dependence is, when an inferior dependes on the Laws, Remunerations, or Diſtributions of any Superior. Final Dependence is, when an inferior dependes on ſome ſupreme laſt end. The Divine Wil is in neither regard dependent. [1] It is not legally p. 341dependent; becauſe not ſubject to the law of any. The Divine Wil gives Laws to al Creatures, but receives Laws from none: yea, it hath no legal dependence on any meritorious acts of the Creature: God willeth nothing without himſelf, becauſe it is juſt; but it is therefore juſt, becauſe he wils it: The reaſons of good and evil extrinſec to the Divine Eſſence are al dependent on the Divine Wil either decernent or legiſlative. [2] The Divine Wil has no final dependence on any ſuperior end; becauſe its own Bonitie is its only end. The End is the Cauſe, Reaſon, or Motive of willing althings that conduce to the End: but now nothing can move the Wil of God, but his own Bonitie; which indeed is the ſame with his Wil and Eſſence: wherefore it cannot be properly ſaid to be the cauſe of his Wil; becauſe nothing is ſaid to be the cauſe of it ſelf. When Theologues affirme, That God wils one thing for another, they mean not, that the other thing is the cauſe or motive of the Divine Wil; but that God wils there ſhould be a cauſal connexion between the things willed. As God willed the Sun, Moon, and Stars ſhould be for the production of fruits, and theſe for the uſe of man, &c. Gods willing one thing for another notes a cauſal connexion between the things willed, but no cauſal influence on the Divine Wil:Deus vult hoc propter hoc: non autem propter hoc vult hoc. Epheſ. 1.4, 5.Eph 1:4Eph 1:5 God wils this for that, yet for this he doth not wil that: i. e. God wils effects and cauſes; and that the effects are for the cauſes; yet he doth not wil the effects for the cauſes, as if the cauſes were the motives of his Wil. Thus we muſt underſtand that Text, Eph. 1.4. According as he has choſen us in him before the foundation of the world, that we ſhould be holy and without blame before him in love. How are the Elect choſen in Chriſt? (1) Negatively, they are not choſen in Chriſt, as the meritorious Cauſe of Election; nor from a previſion of their Faith in Chriſt, as the motive of Divine Election, according to the Pelagian Hypotheſis. But (2) They are ſaid to be choſen in Chriſt, as their commun Head, that by him they might be made new Creatures, and ſo partakers both of Grace and Glorie. Chriſt and Faith have no cauſal influence on the Divine Wil; but the Divine Wil decrees, that Chriſt and Faith ſhould have a cauſal influence on Salvation. Thence it follows, v. 5. Having predeſtinated us unto the Adoption of Children by Jeſus Chriſt unto himſelf, according to the good pleaſure of his Wil. Here Chriſt is brought in as the meritorious, antecedent Cauſe of our Adoption, but as an effect and conſequent of Election: For ſo p. 342much the Particle foreign by denotes, namely that Chriſt as Mediator is the effect of Predeſtination or Election, but the cauſe of our Adoption. This is ſtrongly argued by Auguſtin in his Book, De Praedeſtinatione Sanctorum. And ſurely if the Merits of Chriſt have no cauſal influence on the Wil of God, much leſſe can mans Faith or Merits influence the ſame. Thence he addes: according to the good pleaſure of his Wil: which argues the Independence of his Wil. Thus we ſee how God wils Chriſt and Faith for the Salvation of the Elect, and yet doth not wil the Salvation of the Elect for Chriſt and Faith as the moving cauſes of his Wil, which is moſt independent. So God wils both the means and the end; and the means for the end; yet he doth not for the end wil the means, as if the end did move him to wil the means. For in God the volition of one thing is not the cauſe of his willing another; becauſe there can no efficience of cauſe on effect, or dependence of effect on the cauſe be affirmed of the Divine Wil, which is but one ſimple indiviſible act both as to end and means; and therefore neither one nor t'other can be ſaid to move or influence the Divine Wil; albeit the ſame Divine Wil doth wil a cauſal connexion between the things willed: in which regard Scholaſtic Theologues aſſigne reaſons of the Divine Wil, affirming, That the paſſive attingence of the Divine Wil in reſpect of one thing, is the cauſe of its paſſive attingence in regard of another thing, albeit neither the cauſe of the Divine Wil: i. e. to ſpeak natively and properly, God wils that one thing ſhal depend on another, yet the Divine Wil neither dependes on nor is moved by either Gods ſoverain independent Wil is ful of reaſons, as to the admirable dependence of the things willed, according to their ſubordinations, yet there may not be the leaſt reaſon or ſhadow of reaſon aſſigned as the cauſe or motive of the Divine Wil. Thus Epheſ. 1.11.Epheſ. 1.9, 11.Eph 1:9Eph 1:11 Who worketh althings according to the counſel of his Wil. foreign. There is the higheſt counſel and wiſdome in the Divine Wil, and yet no reaſon or cauſe can be aſſigned of it. So v. 9. Having made known to us the myſterie of his Wil, according to his good pleaſure, which he hath purpoſed in himſelf. The Divine Wil is here ſaid to be (1) ful of myſterious wiſdome, whereof no reaſon can be aſſigned without it ſelf. Thence, (2) it is ſtiled good pleaſure, which denotes its Soveraintie and Independence. Hence (3) it is ſaid to be in it ſelf: i. e. no reaſon or cauſe extrinſec to it ſelf can be aſſigned thereof: though it be ful of myſterious p. 343wiſdome and ſublime reaſons, yet they are al within it ſelf. That there can no cauſe either phyſic or moral, legal or final be aſſigned of the Divine Wil is evident; (1) becauſe the Divine Wil is one ſimple, pure Act; and therefore not capable of any Paſſion, Impreſſion, and Cauſalitie from any extrinſec object. (2) Becauſe althings elſe are the effects of the Divine Wil, and therefore cannot be the cauſe thereof: becauſe the ſame thing cannot be the cauſe of it ſelf. (3) Becauſe the Divine Wil is eternal; but althings elſe of finite duration: and is it poſſible, that what is temporal and finite ſhould influence what is eternal and infinite? That there can be no cauſe of the Divine Wil, ſee Aquinas, Part. 1. Quaeſt. 19. Art. 5. & contra Gent. lib. 1. cap. 87. Hence,

4. Prop. The Divine Wil it immutable. The Divine Wil immutable.This Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil ariſeth from the Independence, Simplicitie, and Immutabilitie of the Divine Eſſence, with which it has an eſſential connexion, yea identitie. Plato diſcourſeth accurately of the Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil, both in his Philoſophemes of Divine Ideas, as alſo in his Phaedo, pag. 78. where he proves, that the Divine Eſſence and Wil is foreign, &c. one uniforme Being, which exiſtes of it ſelf, and is alwayes the ſame, without the least degree of mutation, &c. of which more fully before, in Gods Immutabilitie, cap. 4. §. 5. But this Immutabilitie of the divine Wil is more clearly illuſtrated and demonſtrated in ſacred Philoſophie. Thus Pſal. 33.10.Pſal. 33.10, 11.Ps 33:10Ps 33:11 The Lord bringeth the counſel of the Heathen to nought. foreign, he hath infringed, diſſipated, made void: from foreign to break. Thence it follows: He maketh the devices of the people of none effect. foreign, he hath broken: from foreign to break, properly the mind or purpoſe. The divine Wil delights to break and daſh in pieces the ſtrongeſt reſolutions and moſt fixed purpoſes of proud men. But then follows the Immutabilitie of the divine Wil, v. 11. The counſel of the Lord ſtandeth for ever; the thoughts of his heart to al generations. foreign, the fixed counſel, or determinate purpoſe of Jehovah. Standeth for ever: i. e. is inviolable and immutable. This verſe contains the Antitheſe of the precedent; whereby David teacheth us, that the divine Wil makes void the proud wil of man, but no human wil can fruſtrate or alter the divine Wil, as Job 12.13, 14. Thus Pſal. 119.89. For ever O Lord thy word is ſetled in Heaven. Pſal. 119.89.Ps 119:89foreign is fixed, eſtabliſhed. R. Ezora underſtandes this of the decrees or p. 344purpoſes of the Divine Wil, which are firme, ſtabliſhed, and immutable. So Malach. 3.6. I am the Lord, I change not; therefore the Sons of Jacob are not conſumed. I change not: This regards the Wil of God, as wel as his eſſence; ſo much the ſubſequent inference importes: for the reaſon why the Sons of Jacob are not conſumed, muſt be reſolved into the immutable Wil of God, as the original cauſe. It's true, the things willed by God are oft under mutations; and God wils thoſe mutations; but with an immutable wil: the mutation reacheth not the wil of God, but only the things willed by God; who wils this thing ſhal be now, and the contrary afterward, without the leaſt alteration in his wil. A wil is then ſaid to be changed, when any begins to wil that, which he before nilled; or to nil that, which he before willed: which cannot be ſuppoſed to happen, but in caſe of ſome mutation in knowlege, or diſpoſition: but neither of theſe can be affirmed of God. (1) God is infinitely wiſe, and foreſees al contingences, circumſtances, and accidents that may happen; and therefore cannot alter his thoughts or purpoſes for want of wiſdome, as we poor mortals frequently do. (2) Gods diſpoſition towards al objects is ever the ſame. (3) The human wil is obnexious to mutations, from impotence and want of power to accompliſh what we wil: but the Divine Wil is omnipotent and irreſiſtible, as Eſa. 46.10. (4) If the Divine Wil were mutable, God could not have a certain previſion of future contingents: becauſe the certaintie of Gods previſion ſuppoſeth a certaintie of Divine Ideas and Decrees in the will of God: for Gods Science of Viſion or foreſight of things future ariſeth from his Wil, which gives althings their futurition. But it is objected from Scripture, That God is ſaid ſometimes to repent: and al repentance denotes a change of the wil. The Reſponſe is ſacile: when Scripture aſcribes repentance to God it is only improperly and in condeſcendence to our fragile capacitie, thereby to denote a change, not in the Wil of God, but in his diſpenſation towards the Creature, upon ſome change in the Creature: So upon the repentance of the Ninevites God repented, i. e. changed his diſpenſation towards them. Otherwiſe, when the Scripture ſpeaks properly of Repentance, it ſaith expreſſely, That God is not as man, that he ſhould repent, Num. 23.19. 1 Sam. 15.29.

5.Gods Wil Abſolute, not conditionate. Prop. Gods Wil is Abſolute, not conditionate. The Divine Wil receives no conditions from the human Wil, but gives al to it. p. 345So Jam. 4.15. For that ye ought to ſay, If the Lord wil. Jam. 4.15.Jas 4:15This was an ancient ſaying mentioned by Benſyra, Sent. Moral. xi. Let man never ſay, he wil do any thing, before he hath prefaced this, If the Lord Wil. And we find ſomething anſwerable hereto, in Plato, Alcibiad. p. 135. where Socrates inſtructs Alcibiades, that he must ſay, he wil do ſo and ſo, foreign. If God wil. So in his Laches: foreign, But I will do this, and come to thee to morrow, if God will. By which it is evident both from Sacred and Platonic Philoſophie, that our Wil muſt expect and receive al conditions from the Divine Wil, but impoſe or aſcribe none to it. There are ſeveral Textes of Scripture which ſome urge to prove a conditionate Wil in God: as Pſal. 81.13, 14. Ezech. 33.11. Mat. 23.37. Joh. 3.16. (1) As for the two firſt Textes, Pſal. 81.13, 14. and Ezech. 33.11.Ezech. 33.11.Ezek 33:11 it ſeems moſt probable, that they refer primarily to temporal deliverance and deſtruction, ſpecially that of Ezech. 33.11. as it appears by v. 2, 3. (2) If we underſtand theſe Scriptures as referring to maters of Salvation, then they note only Gods Wil foreign of complacence, not his Wil foreign of Beneplacite. So foreign which Ezechiel uſeth, ſignifies not ſimply to wil, but to acquieſce in a thing. And then the ſenſe is, that Gods foreign or complacence is not in the Death of ſinners ſimply as ſuch, but in this, that men turne from their ſins and live. But (3) our principal reſponſe is this: God declares by theſe and ſuch like Scriptures his gratioſe propenſions and inclinations towards penitent ſinners: [1] Hereby to demonſtrate that intime and indiſſoluble connexion, which he has, according to his Evangelic Conſtitution, eſtabliſhed between ſincere Reppentance and Salvation. [2] That ſo theſe general Declarations and Invitations of Sinners to repent might prove an efficacious inſtrument of particular vocation and converſion to the Elect. For Gods Free Grace albeit it be in it ſelf abſolute and particular; yet it is propoſed to ſinners in Indefinite and Univerſal Propoſitions, thereby the more efficaciouſly to allure and draw their hearts to the embracement thereof. [3] Hereby impenitent Sinners are left without al excuſe; in as much as God has ſo freely and cordially offered MercieMercy to them, would they but embrace the ſame. Al this implies no proper conditionate Wil in God, but only ſome conditions in the externe propoſitions and offers of his Grace; which God confers on the Elect. There are many Scriptures that ſpeak Gods p. 346Wil to be Abſolute.Rom. 9.11.Rom 9:11 So Rom. 9.11. That the purpoſe of God according to Election might ſtand, not of Workes, &c. Where foreign notes Gods free abſolute purpoſe or Decree, no way dependent on any merits or conditions in the Creature: which Rom. 11.5. he termes, foreign, according to the election of Grace: i. e. Gods free abſolute Wil. The like, 1 Theſ. 1.4. and 3.5.

That God wils nothing conditionally is evident (1) from the impoſſibilitie of ſuch a Wil in God. For if God wils any thing conditionally, he wils that condition alſo, or not: if he doth not wil the condition, then it is impoſſible that it ſhould be; and ſo God is ſaid to wil things on impoſſible conditions; and then by conſequence to wil things impoſſible; which is too great a reproche to be caſt on the Deitie: If God wils the condition, then he wils it either abſolutely or conditionally: if abſolutely, then his wil is abſolute: for to wil a thing conditionally, and yet to wil the condition abſolutely, is to wil the thing it ſelf abſolutely. If God wils the condition conditionally, then the condition of this later condition, conditionally: which opens the dore for a progreſſe into infinite. (2) If Gods Wil ſhould be conditionate, then it would hang in ſuſpenſe, and depend on the humane wil; and ſo it ſhould be in the power of the human wil to make void and fruſtrate the Divine Wil: yea the Divine Wil ſhould be more in the power of mans wil, than the wil of the moſt miſerable ſlave is in the power of his Lords wil. This deſtroys the Soveraintie and Independence of the Divine Wil. (3) To ſuppoſe the Divine Wil to be conditionate takes away the futurition of that thing it wils: for nothing can be future of it ſelf, without ſome cauſe of its futurition: and there can be no cauſe aſſigned why a thing ſhould paſſe from being only poſſible to future, but the Divine Wil. (4) To ſuppoſe a conditionate wil in God deſtroys the certaintie of Divine preſcience: for if the condition hang in ſuſpenſe, and be not willed by God, the thing willed cannot be certainly known. (5) A conditionate wil aſcribes to God imperfection, in that it ſuppoſeth his wil to be incomplete, inefficacious, paſſive, dependent, mutable, &c. But yet take notice, that albeit we exclude al conditions from the Divine Wil, yet we do not exclude them from the things willed: The things willed may be conditionate, and yet the Divine Wil abſolute. Hence,

p. 3476. Prop. Gods Wil is Antecedent not Conſequent. Gods Wil antecedent, not conſequent.The diſtinction of Gods Wil into Antecedent and Conſequent, albeit it were by ſome of the ancient Scholaſtic Theologues made uſe of as to the things willed, yet as it is now generally uſed by the Jeſuites and their Sectators, and applied to the immanent wil of God, it is moſt injurious to him. That Gods Wil is ever Antecedent, is plainly evident from Sacred Philoſophie. So Act. 13.48.Act. 13.48.Acts 13:48 And as many as were ordained to eternal life believed. foreign ordained here cannot ſignifie diſpoſed or prepared, as the Remonſtrants and their Sectators would perſwade us: for foreign differs much from foreign, neither is it any where in Scripture or any Greek Author, as I can learne, uſed to ſignifie an interne Qualitie or Diſpoſition; but it generally ſignifies to Ordain, primarily in military affaires; and thence in any other maters. So Act. 22.10. foreign. And that foreign cannot be here taken nominally, but muſt ſignifie Ordained, is moſt evident from the ſenſe: For it's ſaid, they were ordained to eternal life, as the terme; not unto faith only, as the means: wherefore if foreign ſhould ſignifie diſpoſed, the ſenſe muſt be, they were diſpoſed to eternal life, as many as were diſpoſed: for what is faith but a diſpoſition to eternal life? It's moſt evident therefore, that foreign muſt ſignifie not nominally, but participally ſuch as were ordained unto eternal life as the terme, and unto faith as the means, by the abſolute and antecedent wil of God. That Gods Wil properly ſo termed is ever Antecedent and never Conſequent may be demonſtrated, (1) From the Eternitie of Gods wil. According to Plato, the Idea or Decree of the Divine Wil is ever foreign, eternal and ſempiterne: Now if the wil of God and its Ideas be al eternal; then not any one of them can be conſequent to any act of the Creature, which is in time. (2) From the Simplicitie, Independence, and Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil. A conſequent wil in God ſuppoſeth his Divine Wil to hang in ſuſpenſe, and dependent on the mutable ambulatorie wil of man: and is it poſſible, that the prime cauſe ſhould depend on, or be influenced by the inferior ſecond cauſe? What? muſt the Supreme Soverain Wil attend, yea ſubſerve the nods and becks of human created wil? The act of willing in God cannot depend on any act of the creature as ſomething conſequent thereto; becauſe then as oft as the act of the creature is changed, the wil of God muſt be changed. (3) From the perfection of the Divine Wil. A conſequent wil in p. 348God, as ſtated by the Jeſuites and their Followers, ſuppoſeth an Antecedent imperfect wil, conſiſting only in a natural Velleitie or imperfect inclination, which is unworthy of the moſt perfect wil. (4) From the Omnipotence of God. If God wils a thing antecedently to the act of the creature, which ſhal never be, then the wil of God is not Omnipotent; but in the power of the Creature, either to fulfil or fruſtrate the ſame. And Oh! how incongruous are ſuch Sentiments to the Divine Omnipotent Wil? If Gods Wil be in the power of the Creature and dependent thereon, then it may be wholly fruſtrated as to al its counſels and decrees touching the rational world. (5) This diſtinction of the Divine Wil into Antecedent and Conſequent is contumelious to the Beatitude of God. For every one is ſo far bleſſed, as he has his wil fulfilled: To have our wils croſſed or fruſtrated is accounted by al no ſmal portion of miſerie: may we then imagine; that the Divine Wil properly ſo termed is ever fruſtrated? (6) This diſtinction of Gods wil into antecedent and conſequent is alſo injurious to his Bountie and goodneſſe. Sacred Philoſophie compareth God to a liberal Prince, who deviſeth liberal things,Eſa. 32.8.Isa 32:8 and thereby eſtabliſheth his Throne, Eſa. 32.8. But the liberal deviſeth liberal things, and by liberal things he ſhal stand. It's ſpoken of Chriſt as Mediator, or the great King of Sion, as appears, verſ. 1. who deviſeth al manner of liberal things, and thereby ſtands, or is eſtabliſhed on his Throne, as the word denotes in the Hebrew. Did not Chriſt keep open houſe and diſtribute al his gifts and good things liberally and freely, his Throne would not be eſtabliſhed; he would have no Subjects to fil up his Kingdome. But now the diſtinction of the Divine Wil into Antecedent and Conſequent cuts aſunder al the nerves and ligaments of Chriſts Liberalitie, in that it makes him to have an imperfect Antecedent wil towards al, but a Conſequent Wil towards none, but thoſe who can by their good merits purchaſe his favor. This diſtinction of Gods Wil into Antecedent and Conſequent is excellently wel refuted by Gregor. Ariminenſis, Sent. 1. Diſtinct. 46, 47. where he concludes thus: Al the good things that we have are given us by God out of his Bountie and Grace: and this ſpeakes, that God wills them to us by an Antecedent Wil; becauſe no cauſe antecedes in us, but al our good things flow from his Bonitie.

7.The Divine Wil moſt perfect. Prop. The Divine Wil is moſt perfect. This Adjunct of the p. 349Divine Wil is but the reſult of the former, and that which makes way to what follows. The perfection of the Divine Wil may be conſidered intenſively, extenſively, or effectively. 1. Intenſively.(1) The perfection of the Divine Wil conſidered intenſively conſiſtes in its not admitting any intenſion and remiſſion, or latitude of degrees; but being alwaies intenſe in the higheſt degree. For the Divine Wil having one and the ſame Idea with the Divine Eſſence, it is one ſimple pure Act, without the leaſt gradual remiſſion, or intenſion. Hence it is ſtiled by Plato, foreign, the perfect Idea of good, which admits no latitude of degrees, no velleitie or incomplete wil. That Gods Wil is always perfect and complete, without the leaſt velleitie or conditionate volition may be demonſtrated, [1] from the Simplicitie and pure Actualitie of God. For al compoſition and latitude of degrees is inconſiſtent with a pure Act. [2] From the Identitie of the Divine Wil with the Divine Eſſence, which admits not the leaſt latitude of degrees. [3] From the Immutabilitie of the Divine Wil. For al Velleitie being but an imperfect wil denotes a progreſſion to a more perfect, and ſo mutation. [4] From the Wiſdome of God. For al Velleitie implies ignorance: and ſuppoſeth that God underſtandes not fully what the iſſues and events of the human wil may be. [5] From the Omnipotence of God. Al Velleitie notes impotence to accompliſh what we wil. We may not therefore imagine, that Gods Wil is capable of any Velleitie, or conditionate incomplete volition, either formally or eminently; but that it is ever moſt perfect as to degrees; becauſe it is the ſame with the Divine Eſſence. (2) The Divine Wil is moſt perfect extenſively, 2. Extenſively.as to Objects, in that it extendes it ſelf to al objects. So in ſacred Philoſophie, Act. 17.26.Acts 17.26.Acts 17:26 And hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation. It is ſaid, that God hath determined, foreign, i. e. by his ſoverain, perfect Wil given termes, bounds, meaſures, and limits to althings: the Divine Wil is infinite and unlimited; it receives limits and termes from nothing, but gives bounds and termes to althings. Hence God is ſaid by Plato always foreign, to play the Geometer, i. e. to meaſure out to althings their juſt eſſences, virtues, perfections, and limits: for Geometrie, according to its primary notation and uſe among the Egyptians, (from whom Plato borrowed the notion) ſignifies to meaſure the bounds and termes of land. And it is moſt appoſitely applied by Plato to the divine Wil, as it gives p. 350meaſures and termes to althings. (3) The divine Wil is moſt perfect effectively, 3. Effectively.as it is the efficacious Efficient of al effects; of which hereafter in the divine Cauſalitie, where we hope fully to demonſtrate, That the Divine Wil is the prime Efficient and efficacious Cauſe of al effects. The perfection of the divine Wil may be demonſtrated either abſolutely or comparatively, as compared with the human wil. (1) If we conſider the divine Wil abſolutely, ſo its perfection may be demonſtrated, from its Simplicitie, pure Actualitie, Eternitie, Immutabilitie, Omnipotence, &c. as before. (2) If we conſider the divine Wil relatively, or comparatively, as compared with a create human or Angelic wil, ſo its perfection appears, (1) in this, that the divine Wil gives al Bonitie and goodneſſe to things; whereas every create wil preſuppoſeth goodneſſe in things that it wils: every create wil dependes on, becauſe it's moved by, the goodneſſe of its object; but every create good dependes on the goodneſſe of the divine Wil. Hence there can be aſſigned no cauſe of the divine Wil, but what is in it ſelf: whereas every create wil has a formal reaſon, cauſe and motive without it ſelf, whereby it is moved and influenced. (2) In the human wil the volition of the end is the cauſe of its willing the means: but in the divine Wil, both end and means are willed by one ſimple indiviſible pure Act. (3) In mans wil, Volition and Nolition are diſtinct Acts: not to wil in man implies a negation or ſuſpenſion of the wils act: but in God, by reaſon of the pure actualitie of his Nature, Nolition and Volition are the ſame. We may not imagine, that the divine Wil is capable of any ſuſpenſion or negation of Act; but whatever he wils not that it be, that he wils that it be not: alſo whatever he wils not that it be not, that he wils that it be. (4) Mans wil is circumſcribed and limited by juſtice: he may not wil but what is juſt; but Gods Wil is not circumſcribed by any Laws of Juſtice: he doth not wil things, becauſe juſt; but they are therefore juſt, becauſe he wils them.Quicquid Deus non vult ut fiat, illud etiam vult ut non fiat: item quicquid non vult ut non fiat, id ipſum etiam vult ut fiat. (5) Mans wil is limited as to the ſphere of its Activitie: he wils what he doth, but he cannot do al that he wils: termes of eſſence ſuppoſe termes of power and activitie. But God doth not only wil what he doth, but alſo do what he wils: his power is as extenſive as his wil: he can do what he wil: his Wil is omnipotent; becauſe the ſame with his Eſſence, as Pſal. 115.3.

p. 3518. Prop. The divine Wil is most free. The Divine Wil most free.Libertie being one of the ſupreme perfections that belong to an intelligent rational Creature, it may not be denied to the divine Wil. Yea nothing elſe could be free, if the divine Wil were not free; becauſe this is the firſt Principe of al Libertie: as take away the firſt Cauſe, you alſo deſtroy al ſecond Cauſes; ſo take away libertie from the divine Wil, you take it away alſo from al create wils. Libertie in the divine Wil is abſolute, precedent, and regulant; libertie in the human wil is conditionate, ſubſequent, and regulated. The firſt in every kind is the meaſure of al in that kind: now the divine Libertie is the firſt in that kind, and therefore the grand Exemplar of al create Libertie. The moſt perfect Cauſe muſt neceſſarily have the moſt perfect mode of acting: but now God is the moſt perfect Cauſe: therefore he muſt have the moſt perfect mode of acting: which is to act freely. Yea, the divine Wil is ſo infinitely free, as that it is moved by nothing without it ſelf: it has not ſo much as an end extrinſec to its own Bonitie, whereby it is moved: which kind of independent libertie no create wil may challenge. For every create wil, as it has a firſt Cauſe, whereby it is moved phyſically; ſo a laſt end, whereby it is moved morally: but the Libertie of the divine Wil is independent in both theſe regards; and therefore moſt ſupreme and perfect. The Libertie of the divine Wil may be conſidered as relating to the operations ad intra, or to thoſe ad extra. (1) The Libertie of the divine Wil as relating to the operations ad intra is only concomitant; not antecedent: for al the operations of God ad intra, i. e. ſuch as terminate on himſelf, namely loving himſelf, &c. they are al from a neceſſitie of Nature, not from election and choice. God cannot but love himſelf: he neceſſarily adheres to his own Bonitie and enjoys himſelf, without the leaſt indifference either of Specification, or Exercice. And yet even in theſe Acts ad intra, which terminate on the divine Eſſence, and are attended with a natural neceſſitie, the divine Wil has a concomitant Libertie or divine Spontaneitie; which is ſufficient to denominate thoſe Acts free. For as the human wil adheres to its laſt end by a kind of natural neceſſitie, which yet is attended with a rational ſpontaneitie; ſo in like manner the divine Wil adheres to and enjoys it ſelf by a natural neceſſitie, and yet with a concomitant libertie or divine ſpontaneitie. This is wel expreſſed by Jamblichus, a Sectator of Plato, de Myſter. Aegypt. It p. 352is, ſaith he, neceſſary, that God be as he is, not by an extrinſec violent neceſſitie, but by a natural and moſt voluntary; ſeing he never would be other than he is. Here we ſee the higheſt neceſſitie conſpiring and according with the higheſt libertie. (2) If we conſider the Libertie of the Divine Wil as relating to its operations ad extra, ſuch as terminate on the Creature, ſo it is not only concomitant, but alſo antecedent: i.e. the Divine Wil terminates on the Creature, not from any neceſſitie of Nature, but by election and choice. For al Creatures, as referred to the Divine Bonitie, are but means: wherefore the Divine Wil has an antecedent libertie either for the electing or refuſing of them. This ſome cal Libertie of Election; becauſe al election properly regards the means. Again, God in willing his own Bonitie neceſſarily, wils althings ſo far as they participate of his own Bonitie: Now the divine Bonitie being infinite, there are infinite ways whereby the Creatures are participable thereof; but al dependent on the election and determination of the Divine Wil. Laſtly, if the divine Wil ſhould terminate on the Creatures from a neceſſitie of Nature, and not from free election, there could nothing be contingent, as Suarez and others prove.

But here occurs a knotty objection,What indifference may be aſcribed to the Wil of God. which is thus urged: How can the Divine Decrees admit of an antecedent libertie of election, when as they are the ſame with the Divine Eſſence, and ſo attended with the ſame natural neceſſitie? This objection has greatly perplexed the acuteſt Wits among Scholaſtic Theologues. Bradwardine, de Cauſ. Dei, l. 1. c. 14. pag. 212. anſwers thus: That between the ſtate of poſſibilitie and the futurition of things in the divine Decree there is a prioritie of origination; not of time, but of nature. But more fully lib. 2. cap. 52. pag. 834. he explicates, in what ſenſe it may be ſaid, that God could before nil, what he now wils: It is manifeſt, ſaith he, that God could not, either in regard of Time or Eternitie, before nil privatively or poſitively what he now wils; but only by a prioritie of Nature or Cauſe, namely by a prioritie of the volutive power in relation to its act. By the volutive power we muſt underſtand Gods Wil as the effective Principe, not that it is really a power in God. So Gregor. Ariminenſis, Sent. l. 1. Diſt. 45. pag. 161. anſwers ſundry objections relating to this Hypotheſis, and at laſt concludes, That the Wil of God, as the firſt Cauſe of things, may be ſaid to be both neceſſary and contingent: neceſſary, as the ſame p. 353with the divine Eſſence; and yet contingent, as it might not have willed the futurition and exiſtence of things. Alvarez, de Auxil. l. 2. Diſp. 7. pag. 114. ſaith, That we may conceive ſignum rationis, a moment of reaſon before the Decree of the divine Wil determing what ſhould be future. And Diſput. 116. pag. 913. he diſtinguiſheth indifference into privative and negative: Negative Indifference he makes to be that, which in it ſelf is not more determined to this object than to that; or to act than not to act: and in this regard, addes he, the divine Wil was, before it determined to create the world, in that [ſigno rationis] moment of reaſon indifferent to create or not create the world, &c. which negative indifference importes no privation of perfection in God. Al theſe ſolutions are much of the ſame import, and may be reſolved into this: That the divine Decrees may be conſidered as they are in themſelves and with reſpect to the divine Eſſence; and ſo they are neceſſary: or as they terminate on the Creatures, and are the cauſe both of their futurition and exiſtence, and ſo we may aſcribe to them a moment of reaſon, nature, or cauſalitie, in which they might not have been. And this we ſtile Antecedent Libertie, or Libertie of Election, which importes no mutabilitie in the divine Wil, but only a prioritie of Cauſalitie, which very wel accordes with the neceſſitie of the divine Wil. To conclude this Adjunct touching the Libertie of the divine Wil, Suarez, Metaph. Diſp. 30. S. 16. pag. 134. grantes, That a neceſſitie of Immutabilitie agrees to the Divine Wil, and no way prejudiceth the perfection of its Libertie.

9. Prop. Gods Wil is moſt efficacious and irreſiſtible. Gods Wil irreſistible.This Adjunct of the divine Wil is expreſſely laid down in ſacred Philoſophie. So Eſa. 46.10. My counſel ſhal ſtand, Eſa. 46.10.Isa 46:10and I wil do al my pleaſure. The like we find in Homer, Iliad. foreign, The counſel of Jupiter was fulfilled. Thus alſo, Rom. 9.19. Who hath reſiſted his Wil? By which the Apoſtle excludes al manner of reſiſtence, not only actual, but alſo poſſible. That the divine Wil is moſt efficacious and irreſiſtible may be demonſtrated (1) from Gods prime univerſal Cauſalitie: God, according to Plato, is foreign, the most ſoverain Cauſe; and foreign, the Cauſe of al ſecond Cauſes; which are but foreign, miniſterial inſtrumental Cauſes of God, foreign, who gives eſſence to althings. Now the firſt univerſal Cauſe of althings cannot be reſiſted by any ſecond particular cauſe. For herein lies the difference p. 354between the firſt univerſal cauſe and ſecond cauſes: theſe may fail of their effect by reaſon of ſome other cauſe impeding; but the firſt univerſal cauſe can never fail of his effect; becauſe he contains under his Juriſdiction and Soverain Power al other cauſes: he that gives Being and Power to althings can be reſiſted by nothing. Now how is God the firſt univerſal cauſe of althings? Is it not by his Divine Wil? We may not conceive any other cauſal executive Power in God but his Divine Wil: he effectes and operates immediately by his wil, without any diſtinct executive power, as we ſhal prove anon. (2) From the Omnipotence of the Divine wil. The Pſalmiſt informes us, Pſal. 115.3.Pſal. 115.3. and 135.5, 6.Ps 115:3Ps 135:5Ps 135:6 That God doth whatſoever he pleaſeth. So Pſal. 135.5, 6. Gods Soverain wil backt with Omnipotence is invincible. The Pſalmiſt ſhews the tranſcendent univerſalitie and efficace of the Divine wil above the human: men wil what they can do, but God can do what he wil; becauſe his wil is omnipotent. If Gods wil were not Omnipotent, he could not do whatever is poſſible: for he workes althings by his wil: neither is he on any other account ſtiled in the Creed, Omnipotent or Almighty; but becauſe he can do what he wil. The Divine Omnipotent wil alwaies obtains its effect, becauſe its volition is its operation: its fiat, is its factum eſſe, its word, its deed. Thence that of Auguſtin: Gods wil is moſt certain, becauſe most potent. Of which ſee more fully Ariminenſis, Sent. 1. Diſt. 46, 47. and Bradwardine, l. 2. c. 29. I wil not, ſaith he, have him for my God, who is not Omnipotent in Acting; who has not a moſt Omnipotent Dominion over my infirme wil; who cannot in the moſt Omnipotent manner make me to wil and do, what he wils; who hath not a wil univerſally efficacious, infruſtrable, indefectible, and neceſſary in cauſing; yea, whoſe wil is not to me neceſſitie. (3) From the Beatitude of God. Ariſtotle, as reaſon, aſſures us, that al men do what they wil, if they can; becauſe herein their Beatitude ſeems to conſiſt. So Rhet. l. 2. c. 20. p. 138. foreign, &c. And if he could, and would, he hath alſo done it: for al, when they can and wil, act; for there is no impediment. Beatitude is the ſupreme end of al rational Appetition: therefore what men deſire, they do, if they can, as Ariſtotle ſubnectes. Hence the Divine wil, if it could not do what it would, it ſhould not be bleſſed; becauſe Beatitude is the ultimate terme of al volition. So Bradwardine, l. 2. c. 27. p. 355Yea, I conſtantly and freely avouch, I wil not have him for my God, whoſe moſt bleſſed wil poor, miſerable, ſinful I can, when I pleaſe, pul down from the Throne of his Dignitie, and ſubjugate, &c. (4) From the Infinitude of God. An Infinite Agent can neither be hindred from doing what he would, nor forced to do what he would not: a Paſſive Subject cannot reſiſt an Active Principe or Agent, unleſs it has at leaſt equal power: How then is it poſſible, that a poor, infirme, impotent Creature ſhould reſiſt the Divine Wil? Thus Bradwardine, l. 1. c. 10. Now it remains to ſhew, that the Divine Wil is univerſally efficacious, inſuperable, and neceſſary in cauſing; being not to be hindred or fruſtrated any manner of way. For who knows not, that it altogether follows, if God can do any thing, and wil do it, he doth it, &c. But of this more when we come to the Cauſalitie of God, C 7. §. 4.

Having explicated the Adjuncts of the Divine Wil,Gods Wil 1. Decernent or preceptive. we now deſcend to treat briefly of its Diſtinctions: and to omit that ſpurious Jeſuitic diſtribution of the Divine Wil into Antecedent and Conſequent, which is moſt injurious and repugnant to the perfection of the Divine Wil, as has been demonſtrated, we may diſtribute the Wil of God in regard of its object and our apprehenſions, 1. into Decernent or Decretive, and Legiſlative or Preceptive. Gods Decernent or Decretive Wil is uſually termed in the Scholes his Voluntas Beneplaciti: and his Legiſlative Preceptive Wil, Voluntas Signi. This diſtribution has its foundation in Sacred Philoſophie: for God is oft ſaid in Scripture to wil things that are never offected, as the ſalvation of Reprobates, or the like, which cannot be underſtood of his decernent decretive Wil, but may very wel, of his preceptive Wil. But to clear up this diſtinction, we are to conſider, (1) That Gods decernent or decretive Wil is univocally and properly ſaid to be his Wil; but his voluntas ſigni or preceptive Wil is only equivocally, or analogically, and figuratively ſuch. Gods decretive Wil is the Divine eſſence decreeing althings, and ſo properly and univocally ſtiled his Wil; but his preceptive Wil is only analogically or figuratively termed his Wil, [1] Metaphorically, as Princes ſignifie their interne wil, by their externe commands, which are thence termed their Wil. [2] Metonymically, as Gods Precepts are effects or adjuncts which partly revele his interne wil and pleaſure. Yet they are not in a ſtrict proper univocal ſenſe the wil of God, as Sanderſon, De Obligat. p. 356Conſcient. p. 132. Davenant againſt Hoard, p. 392. and Ruiz prove. Hence (2) Gods Decretive and Preceptive Wil are diſparate or diverſe, but not oppoſite: The things decreed by God and the things commanded by him may oppoſe each other, but the wil decreeing, and the wil commanding do not oppoſe each other; becauſe they are not ad idem: the Decretive Wil of God is as it were his Law, or the meaſure of his operation and permiſſion; but the preceptive Wil of God is our Law, or the Rule of our operation and offices. The Decree of God determines what he wil do, or not do; the Precept what we ought to do or not to do. Gods Decernent Wil or good pleaſure is the ſole Rule and Reaſon of al his actings towards the Creature; but his Reveled Wil is the ſole Rule, Reaſon, and Meaſure of al the Creatures actings towards him. (3) The Decretive Wil of God is ever Abſolute, efficacious, and particular; but the preceptive wil of God is ſometimes abſolute, ſometimes conditionate; ſometimes univerſal, ſometimes particular; ſometimes efficacious and ſometimes not. (4) Gods decretive wil is interne and immanent, called in Scripture his foreign good pleaſure, which is the meaſure of his own Affects, and Effects: But Gods preceptive wil is externe, and therefore not the meaſure of Gods Affects or Effects, but only of our Dutie.

2.Gods ſecret and reveled Wil. Deut. 29.29.Deut 29:29 Hence follows another diſtinction of the Divine Wil into Secret and Reveled; which is much the ſame with the precedent, mentioned, Deut. 29.29. The ſecret things belong unto the Lord our God, but things which are reveled, unto us. i. e. Gods ſecret Wil is the meaſure of his operation, but his reveled wil of ours. So Prov. 25.2. It's the Glorie of God to concele a thing. Gods wil is ſtiled ſecret (1) as the things he wils are unknown to us: (2) as the cauſes and reaſons of his Wil cannot be penetrated by us: (3) as it is as it were the Law, Rule, or meaſure of his Divine operations. Gods reveled wil is ſo termed; becauſe it is his pleaſure reveled either in his Word, or Workes: every act of Gods Providence ſhews ſomewhat of his Wil, as wel as his Word. (1) Gods Wil reveled in his Word is either promiſſive or preceptive: Reveled promiſſes are the meaſure of Gods Benefices towards us: Reveled precepts are the meaſure of our Offices or Duties towards God. (2) Gods reveled providential Wil is either directive or afflictive. There is a conformitie, which the rational Creature owes to each of theſe reveled wils of God: To p. 357the wil of God reveled in his word there is an active conformitie or obedience due; to the promiſſive reveled wil there is an obedience of faith due, to the preceptive an obedience of love and ſubjection. To the providential wil of God both directive and afflictive there is a paſſive obedience of Submiſſion, Reſignation and Dependence due. Laſtly, this reveled wil of God is never oppoſite to, albeit it be oft diverſe from, his ſecret wil; and the reaſon is, becauſe they are not about the ſame object: Gods ſecret wil regards the events of things, his reveled wil the duty of man, either active or paſſive.

3. Aquinas and others diſtinguiſh Gods Wil into Complacential, Gods Wil Complacential, Providential and Beneplacite.Providential, and Beneplacite. (1) Gods Complacential Wil, is his ſimple complacence in al the good Actions, Habits, and Events of men; yea it extendes not only to moral, but to natural goods, as Gen. 1.31. There is a perpetual neceſſary volition in God, which taketh pleaſure in al good, whether create or increate. Such is the infinite Bonitie and Puritie of the Divine Nature, as that it cannot but take infinite complacence in al good. This they cal Gods Love of ſimple complacence, of which ſee Ruiz, de Volunt. Dei Diſp. 6. §. 2. p. 38. and Diſp. 19. p. 214. (2) Gods Providential Wil is that, whereby he is ſaid to wil and intend an end, when he in his providence, either gracioſe or commun, affords ſuch means which have an aptitude to produce it. As where God ſends his Goſpel, he may be ſaid really to intend the ſalvation of thoſe to whom it is ſent, albeit they are not al ſaved; becauſe he vouchſafeth them thoſe means which have a real aptitude to produce the ſame, were they but really embraced and improved. In this regard Davenant and others affirme, that Chriſts death is, foreign, an univerſal remedie applicable to al, and that God, by his Voluntas Providentiae (as Aquinas ſtiles it) intended it as ſuch. This intention or wil of God is meaſured by the nature of the means, and therefore reducible to Gods Legiſlative Wil, which gives conſtitution and meaſure to al the means of mans ſalvation. (3) There is Gods Beneplacite or Decretive Wil, which is only ſtrictly and properly ſtiled the wil of God, as before: So Ruiz de Volunt. Dei, Diſp. 18. §. 4. p. 185.

§. 4. Next to the Wil of God we are to treat of his Power, Gods Power.w^ch as executive and effective has one and the ſame formal Idea with his Wil, as will appear by what follows. The Divine Power is in Sacred Philoſophie illuſtrated by ſeveral names of God, ſpecially by p. 358foreign el, and its derivatives, foreign & foreign, which ſignifie moſt potent and ſoverain Lord. Therefore Moſes being about to treat of Gods infinite Power in creating althings, ſtiles him Gen. 1.1. foreign. which Nachmanni makes to be derived from foreign el hem, their ſtrength, noting the Creatures: and Abarbenel makes this name to be given to God, as the omnipotent Effector and Productor of althings, as before. foreign, from foreign, or foreign, properly ſignifies the potent, powerful God, who contains in himſelf infinite force, energie and power. Whence God is ſtiled, Gen. 14.20. foreign the most high potent. And Eſa. 9.5. foreign, el gibbor, the most mighty potent. And Dan. 14.20. foreign, the most potent of al potents. In the N.T. God is ſtiled foreign, omnipotent, 2 Cor. 6.18. Rev. 1.8. & 4.8. & foreign, the ſole potentate, 1 Tim. 6.15. which termes ſignifie both his Legal Power and Autoritie, as alſo his energetic efficacious power. The Power of God is elſewhere frequently inculcated in Scripture: as Job 26.14.Job 26.14.Job 26:14 But the thunder of his power who can underſtand? Gods power is compared to Thunder, becauſe nothing more terrible and potent in this inferior World. Pſal. 65.6. Which by his ſtrength ſetteth faſt the mountains being girded with power. So Pſal. 77.14. Thou art God that doest wonders, thou hast declared thy ſtrength among the people. And Pſal. 93.1. The Lord is clothed with ſtrength, wherewith he hath girded himſelf: the world alſo is eſtabliſhed, that it cannot be moved. And Pſal. 62.11. Twice have I heard this, that power belongeth unto God. Twice: i. e. frequently. That Gods power doth infinitely tranſcend al create power may be deduced from that of Plato, Leg. 5. foreign whereby he proves, that Gods power is above al create force.

But to diſcourſe more diſtinctly of the Power of God,Gods Power his Eſſence. we muſt remember, that God being a pure Act, active Power cannot in a proper ſtrict notion be aſcribed to God, as it denotes a first Act, or Principe of operation, diſtinct from the ſecond Act, or Operation it ſelf; but only as it reſpectes the Creature, which is properly ſaid to receive the impreſſions and influences of Gods Power. God is ſaid to have an active Power, in regard of the effects produced by him, as Suarez, Metaph. Diſput. 30. Sect. 17. pag. 144. Thus Aquinas, Part. 1. Quaeſt. 25. Seing God is moſt in act, and ſimply perfect, it's moſt agreable to him, that he be the Principe of Acts, and active Power, but not paſſive. And more fully, contra p. 359Gent. l. 2. c. 10. he informes us, That power in God is not as a Principe of Action, but only as a Principe of Fact. And becauſe al power importes reſpect to another as a Principe, it is manifeſt, that al power is affirmed of God with reſpect to Facts or things made, according to truth; and with reſpect to Action, only according to our manner of underſtanding; as our Intellect doth, by diverſe conceptions, conſider both, namely the Divine Power, and its action. Whence if any actions agree to God, which paſſe not into ſome fact or effect, but remain in the Agent; there can no power be affirmed as to ſuch actions; more than according to our manner of underſtanding, not in truth. Such as are the actions of Underſtanding and Willing, which implie no power in God. The Power therefore of God, to ſpeak properly, reſpectes not ſuch actions, but only effects. And the reaſon is evident; becauſe power in God is the ſame with his Eſſence, and therefore a pure Act, not diſtinct from the ſecond Act, but only from the Effect.

Albeit the Power of God be in it ſelf one and the ſame,Gods abſolute Power. yet for our more diſtinct conception of it we may diſtinguiſh it into abſolute, and ordinate or actual. (1) Gods abſolute Power is that whereby he is conſidered as ſimply potent to effect althings poſſible, although they never ſhal be: as Mat. 3.9. & 26.53. Mar. 10.27. Epheſ. 3.20. This has one and the ſame idea with the Sufficience and Eſſence of God; and is looked on by us as antecedent to the Science of Viſion and Wil of God: whence it is ſtiled by Bradwardine Gods precedent Power. Gods ordinate Power the ſame with his Wil.(2) The ordinate and actual Power of God, is that whereby God is ſaid to execute what he wils or decrees: which ſome terme Gods Volutive Power, partly becauſe it is executive of Gods wil, but principally, becauſe it has the ſame formal idea with the Divine Wil. For that the executive Power of God admits not the least formal difference from his Divine efficacious Wil, is an Hypotheſis which both ſacred Philoſophie and the greateſt Scholaſtic Wits greatly perſuade us. As for ſacred Philoſophie it aſſures us, that Gods executive Power is the ſame with his effective Wil. So Gen. 1.3,Gen. 1.3.Gen 1:3 &c. Moſes makes Gods fiat, or Wil the prolific Principe of al productions. Thence Pſal. 33.9. Gods Word or Wil is ſaid to give exiſtence to althings. So Pſal. 115.3.Pſal. 115.3.Ps 115:3 He hath done whatſoever he pleaſed foreign whatſoever he willed. The like Pſal. 135.6.Pſal. 135.6.Ps 135:6 The Lord doth foreign, whatſoever he pleaſeth, or willeth. Rom. 9.19.Rom. 9.19.Rom 9:19 Who p. 360hath reſiſted his wil? which denotes the wil of God to be irreſiſtible, omnipotent, and the ſame with his executive Power. And more particularly,Rev. 4.11.Rev 4:11 Rev. 4.11. foreign, And by thy wil they are, and were created. Our Verſion renders foreign for, which is true, but not primarily intended here: yea, therefore althings are For Gods pleaſure, becauſe By it, as the firſt effective executive Principe. By which it's evident, that Gods executive Power is the ſame with his actual wil; he actually doth what he wils: and his mere Wil is the effective Principe of his doing. Hence we find, that thoſe who came to our Lord for any effect of his power, drew an argument from his wil to his power,Mat. 8.2.Matt 8:2 as Mat. 8.2. Lord, if thou wilt thou canſt make me clean: as elſewhere: whereby not only the Deitie of Chriſt is acknowleged, but alſo the Identitie of his power with his wil; that his power is as extenſive as his wil: or, that his wil is omnipotent. This Hypotheſis, touching the Identitie of Gods executive Power with his Wil, has been avouched and defended by the moſt acute Scholaſtic Theologues. Thus Bradwardine, de Cauſ. Dei, l. 1. c. 10. pag. 197. where he proves, That Gods Wil is of it ſelf operative; neither may we place in God any other executive power. And his reaſons are cogent. For (1) if there were any thing more required, to the production of an effect, than the Divine Wil, it would thence follow, that the Divine Wil is not of it ſelf ſufficient to act, contrary to the forecited Textes. (2) It's evident, that the Wil of God is in ſome manner operative of it ſelf, even as our wils are in moving our own bodies. And if the Divine Wil be in one degree operative, why not in every degree? Doth it need any executive virtue for the ſupplie of its deficience? Is it not omnipotent? (3) If any ſuch executive power be placed in God, it muſt naturally mediate between the Divine Wil and effect: but this cannot be, becauſe the effect neceſſarily follows upon the Divine Volition. The ſame Hypotheſis is defended by Alvarez, de Auxil. l. 2. p. 129. concluſ. 1. We may not place in God, beſides his Intellect and Wil, any third executive power eminently or formally diſtinct for the production of things. But of this more in Gods Efficience, Sect. 4. §. 3. Prop. 2. & §. 5. Prop. 4.

The object of Gods Power is every thing poſſible: The object of Gods Power every thing poſſible.For every power muſt have ſome object adequate thereto: and by how much the higher and more univerſal the power is, by ſo much the more univerſal is the object: and is not the active power of God p. 361the firſt Cauſe moſt ſupreme and univerſal? Muſt it not then comprehend under its object al poſſible Entitie? And the more fully to underſtand this, we are to underſtand, that a thing may be ſaid to be poſſible two ways: (1) Poſitively: and ſo that is poſſible, which may be produced by a power. Things poſſible are not ſaid in this ſenſe to be the object of Gods power: for then the ſame thing would be explicated by it ſelf: for to ſay the power of God is extended to althings poſitively poſſible, is the ſame as if we ſhould ſay, it is extended to al ſuch things as are by it denominated poſſible. Wherefore (2) a thing may be ſaid to be poſſible negatively, in a way of non-repugnance, as it implies not any repugnance of exiſting: and ſo althings are poſſible which implie not a contradiction. And in this ſenſe things poſſible are ſaid to be the object of Gods infinite Power;What things are impoſſible. which extendes it ſelf to whatever implies not a contradiction or repugnance of exiſting. For, in as much as nothing is more repugnant to Ens than non Ens, Ens and non Ens being contradictories, it thence follows, that whatever involves a contradiction cannot come within the comprehenſion of Ens poſſible, poſſible Being, but muſt be ſimply and of it ſelf impoſſible. God cannot verifie contradictions; becauſe they have not a paſſive power or poſſibilitie of being verified: for the affirming of the one is the denying of the other: they cannot be both true; becauſe they ſhould not be contradictions, if the truth of the one did not neceſſarily make the other falſe. That what involves a contradiction comes not within the latitude of the object of Gods power, is not from any defect of power in God; but becauſe the thing has not in it ſelf any poſſibilitie of exiſting, or of being reduced into act: for no power can be denominated ſuch in relation to a terme or effect, which implies an impoſſibilitie of exiſting; as what is contradictorie doth. Al power extendes it ſelf to that which can be actuated thereby: as al ſenſitive power is converſant about ſenſible objects, ſo far as they may be actuated thereby: ſo the power of God is converſant about al poſſible things, ſo far as they are capable of being actuated thereby. Whence it appears, that the impoſſibilitie of contradictions ariſeth from the incapacitie of the mater, not from any defect in the power of God.

Now the impoſſibles which implie a repugnance of being done by God, are either ſuch as regard God himſelf, or the Creature, or both. 1. The Impoſſibles that regard God himſelf are either p. 362abſolutely ſuch, or only in ſome limited ſenſe. (1) The Impoſſibles, which regard God himſelf abſolutely, are al ſuch as are ſimply repugnant to the Divine Eſſence. As God cannot deceive or be deceived: he cannot ſin, or be the moral cauſe of ſin: he cannot condemne or puniſh, (though he may afflict yea torment) the innocent, or juſtifie the wicked without a ſatisfaction. (2) The Impoſſibles that regard God in a limited ſenſe, are ſuch as implie a certain mode of acting, or a certain Hypotheſis repugnant to the Divine Eſſence. [1] Such as implie a certain mode of acting; as God cannot exert the natural or vital acts of an animal bodie: he cannot eat, drinke, ſpeak, &c. in that mode we do, &c. [2] The Impoſſibles under a certain Hypotheſis repugnant to the Divine Eſſence, are ſuch as theſe: not to do what he has decreed, or promiſed. 2. The Impoſſibles which regard the Creature, or the externe object of Gods power, are ſuch as deſtroy the eſſence of the object. Thus God cannot make a Creature independent, or not to depend on himſelf, both as to Being and Operation. For dependence is eſſential to a Creature: and therefore to ſuppoſe a Creature not to depend on God as wel in Operation as Being, is to ſuppoſe a Creature not to be a Creature, as Suarez ſtrongly demonſtrates againſt the Hypotheſis of Durandus, who denies Gods concurſe to the material act of ſin. Again, to ſuppoſe that God in the Euchariſt ſhould Tranſubſtantiate or commute the Bread into the Bodie of Chriſt, and yet the Quantitie and viſible Accidents of the Bread ſtil remain, implies a contradiction; becauſe Quantitie or Extenſion is eſſential to a bodie. Beſides, this Popiſh Hypotheſis of Tranſubſtantiation implies other contradictions, in that it ſuppoſeth two bodies to be in the ſame place or ſpace, and the ſame bodie of Chriſt to be in two places at once, &c. In like manner we ſay God cannot, according to the Lutheran Conſubstantiation, make the bodie of Chriſt to be at the ſame time in the Heavens, and circumſcribed thereby, and yet in and with, and under the Bread. 3. Things impoſſible both in regand of God and the Creature are ſuch as are repugnant to the Eſſence of both. Thus God cannot, by his infinite Power, produce an effect equal to himſelf, infinite in Eſſence: For by making an effect infinite, he ſhould make his own Eſſence finite: it is as eſſential to al products of God to be finite, as it is to God to be infinite, as Suarez, Metaph, Diſput. 30. Sect. 17. pag. 147. That, notwithſtanding al theſe impoſſibilities, ariſing from the p. 363incapacitie of the thing, the Power of God extendes univerſally to althings poſſible, ſee Suarez Metaph. Diſput. 29.

Hence the Power of God is, in regard of its object and its extent,Divine Power Omnipotence. Gen. 18.14.Gen 18:14 ſaid to be, as really it is Omnipotence. This is frequently inculcated in Sacred Philoſophie, as Gen. 18.14. Is any thing impoſſible for Jehovah? Heb. foreign, Is any thing, or word [i. e. whatever can be ſpoken of, or whatever God has promiſed] Impoſſible, or Marvellous for Jehovah: i. e. above or beyond his power. It is ſpoken by the Angel, upon Sarah's unbelieving ſmile, and conceit that it was impoſſible for God to give her a Son, in her old age. Again, the manner of the ſpeech being in a way of Rhetoric Interrogation implies in it a moſt vehement Logic Negation. We find the very ſame character of Gods Omnipotence given by the Angel to Marie, the Mother of our Lord, in relation to her miraculoſe conception,Luke 1.37.Luke 1:37 Luk. 1.37. For with God nothing ſhal be impoſſible. foreign, which we tranſlate thing, primarily notes a word; and ſo it anſwers exactly to foreign, Gen. 18.14. which ſignifies primarily Word, and then Thing, ſpecially as applied to God; becauſe al his Words are omnipotent and ſo equivalent to things. Mark 10.27. With God althings are poſſible. Hence God is ſtiled in Scripture foreign, Omnipotent, he being indeed foreign, as elſewhere. The Omnipotence of God was generally recogniſed by the moſt ſage Pagans. So Homer, foreign, This to thee O God is but a ſmal thing, albeit to me it be great. i. e. Thy omnipotence can with the greateſt facilitie atchieve it. So in his Il. ſpeaking of God, he ſaith—foreign, his power is the greatest, or omnipotent. This omnipotence of God, or the extenſion of his Divine Power to althings poſſible, may be thus demonſtrated: (1) Every perfect Virtue doth extend it ſelf to thoſe things, unto which its proper effect can extend it ſelf: but now the effect of Gods Power extends it ſelf to whatever is poſſible: therefore the Power of God muſt be as extenſive. (2) Every Paſſive Power has ſome Active Power adequate and commenſurate thereto: for every Power is for its act; as the mater is for the forme, according to the Ariſtoteleans. Whatever therefore is in the paſſive or obediential power of a create Being, al that God can by his active power actuate, and accompliſh. (3) The mode of Virtue or Power in every Agent, is according to the perfection of its nature or eſſence: But now Gods eſſence being the moſt perfect p. 364pure Act containing in it al perfection, hence it neceſſarily follows, that his active virtue muſt extend it ſelf to althings capable of any perfection, i. e. which implie not a contradiction or repugnance of exiſting. See Aquinas, Contra Gent. l. 2. c. 22.

Hence it follows,Gods Power infinite. that Gods Power is Infinite. (1) The magnitude of power anſwers in proportion to the magnitude of eſſence: whence, where there are no termes of eſſence, there can be no termes of power. Eſſence and Power in God are the ſame: wherefore his Eſſence being infinite, his Power alſo muſt be ſo. Crea tures are limited in their Eſſence, and therefore in their Power: but the great God having no termes to his Eſſence can admit none as to his power. What can be too difficult for the Divine Power, which brought al things out of nothing? When the Sadducees douted of the Reſurrection, our Lord reſolves their Error into an ignorance of the Power of God,Mat. 22.29.Matt 22:29 Mat. 22.29. intimating thereby, that the Power of God was Infinite, and could extend it ſelf to al effects. Thus Aquinas, Part. 1. Q. 25. a. 2. It's neceſſary that the Active Power of God be Inſinite: for by how much the more perfect the forme of any Agent is, by ſo much the greater is his power in acting: whence the Divine Eſſence (whereby God acts) being Infinite, his Power alſo muſt be Infinite. The like he addes, Contra Gent. l. 1. c. 43. Every thing acts according to its forme, which is its Eſſence, or a part thereof. Whence Gods Eſſence being Infinite, his Power alſo is ſuch. (2) The Infinitude of Gods Power may be demonſtrated from the manner of his working in creating things: where the paſſive Power is infinitely low, the active Power muſt be infinitely high: but now in Creation the paſſive Power is in a laxe ſenſe infinitely low, in that it is purely nothing; thence Gods active Power muſt be infinitely high. (3) It muſt, according to Natural Reaſon, be granted, that there is in the Univerſitie of Beings a power, than which nothing can be conceived greater: and to whom doth this Prerogative belong but to God? And if we can conceive nothing greater than God, muſt we not alſo conceive him to be Infinite in Power? for may we not conceive ſomething greater than al finite Power? (4) Reaſon alſo inſtructes us, that there are ſomethings ſimply poſſible, which cannot be produced, but by a power intenſively inſinite, &c. That Gods Power is ſimply infinite, ſee Suarez, Metaph. Diſp. 30. Sect. 17. p. 144. Greg. Ariminenſ. Sent. l. 1. Diſtinct. 42. p. 152.