The Court of the Gentiles Part 4, Part 4 · Book 2 · Chapter 3

The Court of the Gentiles Part 4 · Part 4 · Book 2 · Chapter 3

p. 237CHAP. III. Of God, his Names, Nature, Attributes, Unitie, and Simplicitie.

Gods Names. foreign Ens, Being: God only IS in a ſtrict ſenſe. foreign Jehova explicated. foreign Jah. foreign Ehjeh. foreign Elohim. foreign El. foreign Shaddai. foreign Elion. foreign Sabaoth. The Divine Eſſence and Attributes. Gods Ʋnitie, and Simplicitie.

§. 1. THE Exiſtence of a Deitie being demonſtrated,God ſtiled foreign, Ens, or Being. Exod. 3.14.Exod 3:14 we now procede to explicate, ſo far as he has reveled himſelf, his Names, Nature, and Attributes, both according to Sacred and Platonic Philoſophie. As for the Names of God, Plato, in his Parmenides, pag. 142. tels us, that properly, foreign, he has no name. This is wel expreſſed by Damaſcene, Orthodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 15. foreign, &c. The Deitie being incomprehenſible, he thence is altogether without Name. Therefore ſeing we ignore his Eſſence, we may not inquire after the Name of his Eſſence. For names are manifeſtative of things. Yet, addes he, Albeit he be incomprehenſible and without Name, as the Author of althings, he aſſumes Names from althings, even from a contraries, as from Light and Darkeneſſe, &c. Of theſe Names ſome are negative, foreign, ſignifying that ſupereſſential Being; as ineſſential, without time, independent, inviſible: ſome are affirmative, which relate to him as the cauſe of althings: among which thoſe are most proper which are taken from the most excellent things. Whence cap. 12. he ſaith, That the best Name that can be given to God, is that Exod. 3.14. foreign, who is, which denotes plenitude of eſſence, as in what follows.Non nomen Dei quaeras; Deus eſt nomen. Minut. Foelix. Thus Plato generally ſtiles him foreign, Ens, or Being: whence Ariſtotle alſo makes foreign Ens, the object of his Metaphyſics: yet with this difference; p. 238whereas Plato, by his foreign, underſtood God the firſt Being; Ariſtotle by his foreign, meant an univerſal Ens, Being, or rather notion abſtracted from al actual Beings really exiſtent. That Plato by his foreign Ens, or Being underſtood God, is evident to any that is acquainted with his Philoſophemes: whence he makes it to be the ſame with foreign, Being it ſelf, and foreign, that which really is: for, according to his Placits, conformable to ſacred Philoſophie, nothing in a ſtrict and proper ſenſe can be ſaid to be but the first eſſential Being: althings elſe, if compared with God the firſt Being, are ſaid not to be, Eſa. 40.17. Exod. 3.14.Isa 40:17Exod 3:14Eſa. 40.17. That foreign, who is, Exod. 3.14. or foreign Ens is the moſt principal, eſſential, and proper name of God, Damaſcene, Orthodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 12. thus demonſtrates: foreign, Therefore the most principal of al the Names given unto God ſeems to be this foreign, WHO IS, as he anſwered Moſes, Exod. 3.14. Who Is ſent me. And he ſubjoins the reaſon: foreign, For comprehending al in himſelf, he has Being it ſelf, as it were, an infinite boundleſſe Ocean, or which hereafter. Hence Damaſcene, c. 15. tels us, That the best Names we can give God, are ſuch as are compoſed of Affirmatives and Negatives: as, foreign, ſupereſſential Eſſence, and the like. Thus Plato, in his Timaeus, makes foreign, that which always is, namely God, to be the only true and proper Being: whereas althings elſe are in a continual fluxe; and therefore cannot be ſaid, in a ſtrict ſenſe to be exiſtent. This is the reaſon why he appropriates the name foreign Being, to God the firſt Being. And we have an illuſtrious Commentarie hereof given us by Plutarch, on the foreign name foreign, Thou art, engraven on the dores of Apollo's Temple: who tels us, That he ſaw written there in golden Letters two compellations; (1) foreign, Know thy ſelf; thereby the God Apollo ſaluted thoſe that came to worſhip him: who reſaluted their God with this Title of Honor, foreign, Thou art. He tels you that many gave their Comments on this Title; but for his part, his ſenſe thereof was this: That the name foreign ſignified not either order, or number, or any deficient part, as ſome conceited, foreign, but is of it ſelf a perfect compellation of God: whereby thoſe that ſaluted him declared, That Being properly and ſtrictly belongs only to him: foreign, &c. for truely we are not participant of Eſſence; but p. 239al mortal nature, being on the confines, yea in the midſt of corruption, is but a foreign, or emty ſhadow of Being, ſcarce apparent; on which if you fix your thoughts, it wil ſoon flie from you. For, as Heraclitus wel obſerved, No man ever enters a ſecond time into the ſame river; neither can any apprehend the ſame frail eſſence a ſecond time, in the ſame ſtate: becauſe the celeritie of its mutation doth ſoon diſſipate it: Yea aſſoon as it exiſtes it periſheth: it recedes aſſoon as it accedes. Whence that which is made cannot properly be ſaid to be: foreign, nothing of nature is permanent, yea nothing is: becauſe al Creatures participate more of nothing than of ſomething. But then of God he addes: foreign, &c. But God properly IS, and without regard to time, immobile Eternitie: in which there is nothing firſt or laſt: nothing paſt, ancient, or new; but it being one preſent foreign, NOW, it fils up al Duration: in which regard, foreign, that which is ſaid TO BE truly IS, not future, not paſt, not beginning, not ending. Thus God is with the ſtudie of veneration to be ſaluted: unleſſe thou hadſt rather reaſſume the ancient formule, foreign, THOƲ ART ONE, &c. Wherein Plutarch gives us an incomparable explication of Plato's foreign, why this name muſt be appropriated to God.

But to run up this Platonic Name to its firſt origine, it is evident,foreign from foreign Jehovah. that it was at firſt derived from ſacred Philoſophie, and the proper eſſential Name of God, foreign Jehovah. For the demonſtration hereof we have both indubitable teſtimonies of the Learned, and alſo invincible reaſons from the thing or name it ſelf. As for teſtimonies, Euſebius, praepar. Evang. lib. 11. cap. 9. pag. 523. aſſures us, that this name foreign, as appropriated to God, was derived from Exod. 3.14. foreign. So Auguſtin, Civ. Dei. l. 8. c. 11. Where Lud. Vives ſhews us the manner how, and reaſon why foreign, was changed by Plato into foreign. The like Steuch. Eugubinus, de peren. Philoſoph. l. 3. c. 7. of which before in Pythagoras's Metaphyſics, P. 2. B. 2. C. 8. §. 4. But to come to the reaſons of the thing, the very name foreign, as the LXX. turne it, or foreign, as Plato, received its origination from foreign Jehovah, and is indeed of the ſame import. For we muſt deduce foreign from the ancient Greek Verbe foreign, I am: and this from foreign the name of Juno; or elſe immediately from foreign, which they derived from Jehovah: otherwiſe we may deduce foreign and foreign from p. 240foreign ho he is, which is a part of the name foreign Jehovah, which coming from the root foreign he was, properly and primarily ſignifies nothing elſe, but HE THAT WAS, the ſame with Plato's foreign, and the LXX. foreign.

But to explicate this more fully,Jehovah the proper eſſential Name of God. we muſt know, that this Name foreign Jehovah is the moſt proper and eſſential name of God, whereby his infinite Eſſence and Perfections are moſt lively ſet forth. The Hebrews ſtile this name Jehovah foreign, the name of Subſtance, or foreign, the name of Eſſence; anſwerably whereto the Greeks ſtile it, foreign, the name of eſſence; becauſe it doth moſt properly deſcribe the Eſſence of God, who, foreign, contains the whole of Being or Eſſence in himſelf, as an infinite immenſe Ocean. That Jehovah is the proper name of God, Critics prove (1) from foreign which being prefixed notes a proper name, as in foreign Iſaac, and foreign Jacob, with others. (2) In that it hath no Plural Number. (3) In that it's never put in ſtate of Regiment. (4) In that it's never found with foreign prefixed. (5) Nor yet with an affixed Pronoun in the end. That foreign Jehovah is a name moſt proper to God, is evident from Exod. 15.3.Exod. 15.3.Exod 15:3 Jehovah is his name. Thence the Hebrews terme it foreign, the proper name: alſo foreign, the ſeparate name; becauſe ſeparate from other names of God, which are attributed to the Creatures. They likewiſe terme it, foreign, the four-lettered Name; becauſe it is compoſed of four Letters. Thence the Greek foreign, and Pythagoras's foreign, of which before, Part 2. B. 2. C. 8. §. 1. pag. 182. Again, they cal it foreign, which the Greeks interpret foreign, the name of Remembrance, Pſal. 30.4.Ps 30:4anſwerably to Pſal. 30.4. Laſtly, they terme it foreign, the glorioſe and terrible Name, from Deut. 28.52.

The force and eſſicace of this name foreign is wel expreſſed by John, The Explication of Jehova. Rev. 1.4, 8. & 11.17. & 16.5.Rev 1:4Rev 1:8Rev 11:17Rev 16:5Rev. 1.4. foreign, He that is, that was, and that is to come, or wil be. So v. 8. & 11.17. & 16.5. In which explication note, that foreign is the ſame with foreign, which Beza placeth, Rev. 16.5. and that according to the Idiome of the Hebrews, who expreſſe the word future, ſometimes by a word that ſignifies to come. And Critics draw al theſe three differences of time from foreign Jehovah. For, ſay they, the letter foreign in the beginning denotes the future, he wil be: p. 241and foreign in the middle, being a Participle of the Preſent Tenſe, He is: and foreign in the end with kametz under-written, what is paſt, He was: which is alſo denoted by the Radix foreign havah. This the Hebrew Doctors acknowledge: for R. Bechai, on Exod. pag. 65. ſaith, that theſe three times, paſt, preſent, and to come are comprhended in this proper name foreign. And they adde, That God reveled to Moſes, Exod. 3.14, 15. thoſe two names foreign and foreign;Exod. 3.14, 15.Exod 3:14Exod 3:15 becauſe out of them may be compoſed thoſe three, foreign I was, foreign I am, and foreign I ſhal be. Hence we may conclude, that this name foreign Jehova is moſt ſacred, eſſential, and proper to God, and deſcriptive of (1) his Eternitie, in that it eminently comprehendeth al differences of time, as john expounds it, Rev. 1.4, 8. (2) His ſimple independent Eſſence, as he is Being it ſelf, pure, abſolute, perfect Being and Act, void of al paſſive power, compoſition, and imperfection. He being indeed and properly foreign,Eſa. 44.6.Isa 44:6 Eſa. 44.6. (3) His Efficacitie and Cauſalitie in giving Being and Exiſtence to al his Creatures. He being not only foreign, the firſt independent Eſſence; but alſo foreign, He that give Eſſence and Being to al his Creatures. (4) His Omnipotence and Veracitie, in giving being and effect to his promiſſes, and word. In which regard God ſaith, Exod. 6.3. that he was not known to Abraham, Exod. 6.3.Exod 6:3Iſaac, and Jacob by the Name Jehovah, i. e. becauſe he had not fulfilled and given effect to his promiſſe made to them, and thence not opened this name. From this name Jehovah, the Greeks framed foreign and the Latins their Jovis, &c.

There are other Names given to God in ſacred Philoſophie, whereof we ſind ſome Imitaments in the Grecian Philoſophie. As (2) God is ſtiled foreign jah. This is alſo a proper Name of God,Jah. which ſome of the Hebrews make an abregement and part of the Name foreign Jehova, as R. Moſes Maimonides, de Fundament. Legis, cap. 6. ſect. 4. Hence the LXX. render it by foreign, as they do foreign: and ſo it ſignifies the eternal, independent Eſſence of God, who gives eſſence and exiſtence to al his Creatures, and Wods. It is ſeldome uſed but in Songs and Pſalmes, as Exod. 15.2. Pſal. 68.5. and elſewhere. Whence the Hebr. foreign Halelujah, praiſe ye Jah, is kept by the Greek Rev. 19.1, 3, 4, 6.Rev. 19.1, 3, 4, 6.Rev 19:1Rev 19:3Rev 19:4Rev 19:6 Thus alſo in the Paean, or Song ſung to Apollo, they began and ended it with foreign, Eleleu Je, which is an evident imitamen of Halelujah. From foreign jah alſo, which ſome Greeks pronounced foreign, was derived Jupiter, i. e. Father Jah, Juno, Janus, Diana: foreign, from p. 242foreign the fire of Jah, &c. (3) Another eſſential Name, whereby God deſcribes himſelf,Ehjeh. Exod. 3.12, 14.Exod 3:12Exod 3:14 is foreign Ehjeh, I ſhal be, as Exod. 3.12, 14. which the Hebrews alſo reckon among the ten Names of God. (4) God is likewiſe ſtiled foreign Eloah, and foreign, Elohim, foreign,Elohim. ?Elohe in the Plural Number, which ſome derive from the Arabic foreign to worſhip: others from the Hebr. foreign to ſwear: but the moſt probable origination is that of Marcus Marinus in Arca Noae, Abarbenel, and others; who derive it form foreign El, foreign being added, and ſo it ſignifies most potent and ſoverain Lord. It ſpeakes Gods relation to, Dominion and ſoverain Authoritie over his Creatures;Gen. 1.1.Gen 1:1 therefore Moſes, Gen. 1.1. treating of Gods Creation and Dominion cals him foreign. Whence Abarbenel makes it to be attributed to God, as the omnipotent Effector and Productor of althings; becauſe when God is brought in as Creator the Scripture ſtiles him by this Name. So Nachmanni makes foreign to be q. foreign El hem, their ſtrength, meaning the Creatures; becauſe he is foreign the force of forces, i. e. the ſupreme Virtue and Eſſicace of al Creatures. The Hebrews generally make it to ſignifie properly a Judge or Magiſtrate: Thence it is attributed to Civil Magiſtrates as Gods Vicegerents,Exod. 22.8.Exod 22:8 Exod. 22.8. From foreign Eloah came foreign, as from foreign Elohim. foreign mentioned in the fragments of Sanchoniathon. El.(5) foreign El, another Name of God, is derived from foreign Fortitude, force, or from foreign Fortitude, Virtue, Power, &c. So foreign properly ſignifies the potent powerful God, who contains in himſelf the virtues and efficaces of althings. Thence,Exod. 15.11. Pſal. 89.6.Exod 15:11Ps 89:6 ſaith Moſes, Exod. 15.11. Who like thee, foreign, among the potent, O Lod? So David, Pſal. 89.6. Who among the ſons of foreign Elim, of the mighty can be likened unto thee, O Lord? Whence God is ſtiled,Gen. 14.20.Gen 14:20 Gen. 14.20. foreign the moſt high El, or mighty God: alſo Eſa. 9.5.Eſa. 9.5.Isa 9:5 foreign El Gibbor, the most mighty God. Aquila renders foreign, according to its origination, foreign. Again, God is ſtiled,Dan. 11.36.Dan 11:36 Dan. 11.36. foreign El Elim, the most potent of al potents. From this name foreign El, the Syrians ſtiled their Saturne foreign and foreign, as Damaſcius, in Photius. Hence alſo foreign the Sun received its origination.Shaddai. (6) God is alſo called foreign Schaddai; which is moſt oft joined with foreign El, Gen. 17.1.Gen 17:1as Gen. 17.1. & 35.11. as elſewhere. Some deduce it from foreign to deſtroy: others from foreign ſufficient q. foreign Scheddai, Adonai.who is ſufficient. (7) foreign Adonai is another illuſtrious Name of God, which is firſt in Scripture given to him by Abraham, Gen. 15.2.Gen 15:2Gen. 15.2. foreign and ſignifies primarily p. 243Lord, from foreign Eden, a baſis; becauſe a Lord is the baſis or pillar of a familie: according to the origination of foreign, a King, from foreign, the baſis of the people: So that according to its origination foreign ſignifies my baſes, ſtayes, or pillars: and ſitly applied by Abraham to God, who, as a baſis or pillar, ſuſtained him in al his infirmities. Some thinke it implies a Myſterie of the whole Trinitie. It properly belongs to God as he is Lord of the Univerſe, a great houſe built and founded by him: thence among the Latins Dominus à Domus. From Adonai came the Pagan God Adonis. (8) God is ſtiled alſo foreign Elion, the moſt high; Elion.which is an Adjective frequently added to ſome other name of God, as foreign El Elion, Gen. 14.19, 22.Gen. 14.19, 22.Gen 14:19Gen 14:22 El Elion the Genitor of Heaven and Earth. Which in Sanchoniathon's fragments is thus expreſſed: foreign. Which fully explicates the Hebrew foreign moſt high. (9) The Hebrews reckon alſo foreign Sabaoth, Hoſtes among the Names of God: but,Zebaoth. as it is wel obſerved by Buxtorf, this name put abſolutely is never attributed to God, but only as appendent to ſome other divine Name, foreign, or foreign, or both conjunct, and expreſſed in our Verſion the Lod of Hoſtes. (10) The Greeks cal God foreign, which ſom derive from foreign to run, as it denotes the ſwift motion of the Sun, which was the firſt and principal God among the Grecians: and in this notion foreign may be derived from foreign tha, to come. Others derive foreign from foreign, as it notes to diſpoſe and order the Ʋniverſe, which is proper to God: Others derive foreign from foreign to ſee; becauſe God ſees a'things. Theſe three Originations I find together in Damaſcene, Orthodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 12. Laſtly, others deduce foreign from foreign dai, it ſufficeth; and ſo it anſwers to foreign ſhaddai, the Name of God denoting his Alſufficience. But here we are to take notice, that both Sacred and Ethnic Philoſophie aſcribe unto God various Names, not to make any ſchiſme or breach in his Unitie, but thereby to expreſſe his various Attributes, and Operations, as in what follows of the Unitie of God §. 9.

§. 2. The various Names of God lead us into the contemplation of his Nature and Attributes whereby he has reveled himſelf.The Divine Eſſence and Attributes. The Divine Eſſence, as in it ſelf, by reaſon of its abſolute Simplicitie and Infinitude, can neither be defined by us, nor yet apprehended under any one adequate conception or notion. Derodone would needs perſuade us, that God may be capable of a definition, as he comprehends himſelf, &c. But how improper yea p. 244abſurd ſuch an Hypotheſis is, wil be evident, if we conſider, either the nature of a Definition, or of God. (1) The nature of a Definition evidently demonſtrates, that God is not capable thereof: Doth not the very notion of a Definition exclude the Deitie from its confines? What is foreign a Definition but the terme of limits of an Eſſence? Do not al Definitions foreign limit things? And may God, who hath no limits to his Eſſence, fal under the limits of a Definition? Whence procede al termes of Definition but from termes of Eſſence? And can what is infinite be limited? Whence, (2) The Nature of God abſolves him from al laws or termes of Definition. As for Derodones replie, That God may be ſaid to define himſelf, becauſe he perfectly underſtands himſelf, it is very jejune, and unworthy of ſo learned a Philoſopher. For (1) God is the object of the Definition, and not the ſubject: al definitions are ſaid to be perfect or imperfect in regard of our minds the ſubjects thereof. (2) May we not as wel ſay, that God can limit and bound himſelf, as define himſelf? for every definition is foreign the terme or Boundary of the Eſſence. Would it not be accounted next to blaſphemie, to ſay God can confine himſelf, or make himſelf finite? and yet ſuch is the import of this Hypotheſis maintained by Derodone. And as God cannot be defined, ſo neither be apprehended by one adequate notion: For how can a compound finite capacitie take in a ſimple infinite object by one ſingle apprehenſion? Hence it has pleaſed the divine Being to revele his infinite ſimple Eſſence under diverſe Names and Attributes, thereby to render his perfections more apprehenſible and intelligible by our finite and compound capacities. Theſe Attributes are identified both among themſelves, and with the divine Eſſence: neither are they many in God, but one moſt ſimple Eſſence. Yet, according to our manner of conſidering things, which is compound, we apprehend them as diverſe: For we conceive God, foreign, according to diverſe conſiderations, not as if there were any real compoſition in God, as Athanaſius. Hence Plato compares God to a Circle: foreign, God always acts as in a circle, or makes a circle. Which Symbol he had from the Egyptians, who defined God, an intelligible Circle, whoſe Centre is everywhere and Circumference no where. A Circle is of al figures moſt ſimple, becauſe without angles; and yet moſt capacious and perfect: wherefore a lively ſymbolic image of the divine Eſſence and Perfections. God is the beginning p. 245of althings as the centre, and the middle of althings as the Diameter, and the end of althings as the circumference. Thence Plato. Leg. 4. pag. 713. ſaith, God is, according to the old Tradition, the beginning, end, and middle of althings. Again, God gives being to althings as the Centre, governs althings as the Diameter, conſerves althings as the Circumference. God as a Centre moves al and yet is immobile; as the Circumference comprehends al. The Centre, as it is one immobile point, indigitates and illuſtrates Gods Ʋnitie, Simplicitie and Immutabilitie: The circumference, being without beginning and end, moſt capacious and perfect, poihnts out Gods Eternitie, Infinitie, Immenſitie, and Perfection. As the divine Attributes are lively diſplayed in the Word of God, ſo alſo in his Workes. The Omnipotence of God ſhone forth with moſt irradiant beams in the Creation of the World, and its infant ſtate by many miraculoſe experiments of divine Providence: The Wiſdome of God has been ever moſt illuſtrious in the counterworking al the politic Contrivements and Undertakements of his Churches enemies: His commun Bountie, in the preſervation and ſupport of Mankind ſince the Fal: His Juſtice, in puniſhing ſinners: and al his Attributes in the Redemtion of ſinners. Such are the various Theatres on which Gods Attributes diſplay themſelves.

Firſt, God is an abſolute independent ſelf Being or Eſſence. God an abſolute independent Eſſence.This Hypotheſis Platonic as wel as ſacred Philoſophie maintains. Thus much al the fore-mentioned eſſential Names of God, foreign Jehovah, foreign, and Ehjeh demonſtrate. So likewiſe the deſcription of God, Exod. 3.14. foreign, &c. whereto Plato's , and foreign concord, as it has been fully demonſtrated in what precedes §. 1. Thus Damaſcemus, de Fide Orthodoxa, lib. 1. cap. 12. foreign, &c. foreign, WHO IS ſeems to be the moſt principal and proper of the divine Names: fo it contains in it the whole of Eſſence, as it were an infinite Ocean. Thus Author Lib. de Fundamentis, l. 2. c. 27. Therefore it is manifeſt, ſaith he, foreign, &c. That the name Ens cannot be properly attributed to any Being, but God. For of other Beings it cannot be ſaid, that they alwayes are, but only whiles they exiſt, not before, or after. But the bleſſed God, becauſe he alwayes remains in the ſame ſtate, therefore his Eſſence is truely Ens. The notion of Ens is properly aſcribed to him, whoſe Being depends not on any but himſelf. For in that his Being depends on p. 246his own Eſſence, he is no way contingent— No Creature can be ſaid abſolutely to BE; becauſe it depends on another: neither is Being due to it, but with relation to its Cauſe. The like Eulogus, in Photius: foreign, &c. Eſſence it ſelf is one thing in the ſuperprincipal Trinitie, and another thing in us: for there it is ſupereſſential, but here it is not properly Ens. For how can that be properly Ens, which is produced out of Nothing, and of its own nature returnes to nothing? Al Creatures have a tincture of their primitive Nothing, yea more of Nothing than Something; and therefore deſerve not the name of Being if compared with God the firſt, abſolute, independent Being, as Eſa. 40.17.Eſa. 40.17.Isa 40:17 Hence God is ſtiled by Damaſcene, foreign, ſupereſſential Eſſence. And the Egyptians generally, in imitation of the Moſaic Philoſophie, ſtiled God foreign, Ens. Thus Plutarch, in his Iſis and Oſiris, informes us, That at Sai, in Egypt, there was a Temple dedicated to Minerva, whom they ſuppoſe to be the ſame with Iſis, which had this Inſcription on it: foreign, I AM AL THAT EXISTES, AND IS, AND SHAL BE: AND MY VEIL NO MORTAL YET UNCOVERED. This Inſcription is but a Periphraſe of Exod. 3.14. And by her Veil, with which ſhe was pictured, is meant the incomprehenſibilitie of the divine Eſſence, which no mortal yet unveiled, as hereafter. Yea, Ariſtotle, Metaph. l. 1. acknowlegeth, that Meliſſus thought, foreign the one God, to be neceſſarily foreign, Being it ſelf. But ſacred Philoſophie gives us the moſt lively notices of the divine Eſſence. Thus Moſes inquiring after Gods Name,Exod. 3.14.Exod 3:14 he deſcribes himſelf thus: Exod. 3.14. I am that I am: i. e. abſolute, neceſſarie, ſimple, independent Being, yea as it were al Being.Eſa. 44.6. Rev. 1.8, 11.Isa 44:6Rev 1:8Rev 1:11 So Eſa. 44.6. I am the first and the laſt, beſides me there is no God. Which ſtile Chriſt aſſumes, Rev. 1.8. I am foreign and foreign, i. e. I am the beginning and the end, the firſt and the laſt, as v. 11. The ſame c. 21.6. & 22.13. which deſcriptions of the divine Eſſence implie theſe particulars. (1) That God is the firſt Being. Thus Eſa. 44.48.Eſa. 44.48.Isa 44:48 I am he, I am the firſt, I alſo am the laſt. Thus alſo in Platonic Philoſophic God is ſtiled foreign, the first Being. Hence, (2) God is Ens foreign, an independent Being. Thence Plato ſtiles him foreign, ſelf-Being: i. e. neither from any other, nor of any other, nor by any other, nor for any other. That muſt needs exiſt of, and in and for, and from it ſelf, whoſe Eſſence p. 247is the adequate reaſon and cauſe why it exiſtes. Eſſence and Exiſtence have one and the ſame formal Idea in God; becauſe he exiſtes in and by his own Eſſence. It is not ſo in Creatures: they cannot be ſaid to exiſt in and by the force of their own eſſence, but by the force of their cauſes, ſpecially the firſt: whence it follows, that they are Beings not by eſſence, but by participation and reception of eſſence and exiſtence from the firſt Cauſe. Hence, (3) God is a Being abſolutely and ſimply neceſſary. For God exiſting in and by his own Eſſence, it is impoſſible for him not to exiſt: his Eſſence is ſo infinitely and abſolutely perfect, as that it includes exiſtence, yea an impoſſibilitie of not exiſting. Exiſtence agrees not eſſentially and neceſſarily to any Creature, but contingently: whatever Creature exiſtes, might not have exiſted, and may yet not exiſt, if it ſeems good to the firſt Being. But the firſt independent Being has Exiſtence abſolutely and ſimply neceſſary: he is ſo much in Act, as Ens in its moſt univerſal notion is in power: his Eſſence being infinite, neceſſarily and eminently contains whatever is or may be of perfection in al Being, either exiſtent or poſſible. Whatever is once eſſentially, ſimply and abſolutely ſuch, is always ſuch; yea neceſſarily ſuch: if a thing be once ſimply and abſolutely poſſible, it is always poſſible: and if it be once ſimply and abſolutely neceſſary, it is always neceſſary; becauſe what doth not once implie a contradiction, never doth. We ſee in the World ſome things are poſſible, and yet not ac tually exiſtent: now al things that are poſſible muſt be reduced to ſome firſt neceſſary Being, that gave them their poſſibilitie, and muſt give them their actual exiſtence, or they wil never attain to it. Hence it follows, that the Eſſence and Exiſtence of the firſt Being is ſimply and abſolutely neceſſary. Whence (4) God is in a ſenſe Al Being; becauſe he is the firſt independent ſelf-Being, ſimply and abſolutely neceſſary, containing in himſelf al Being, and imparting to althings al poſſible eſſence and exiſtence. Al Beings by participation do eſſentially and neceſſarily depend on the firſt neceſſary ſelf Being. This the ſpurious Dionyſius, according to the Pythagorean and Platonic mode, expreſſeth by Unitie. foreign, Ʋnitie, ſaith he, hath al number in it ſingularly and unitely: ſo the divine Being, al Beings and Perfections. The ſame he illuſtrates by the Centre of a Circle, in which al the lines unite and ſubſiſt. Indeed created Beings conſidered in themſelves, without relation to the firſt Being, deſerve not p. 248the name of Eſsence, but Privation: for what are they, it abſtracted from the firſt neceſſary Being, but mere painted or rather poſſible ſhadows of Being? Hence, (5) Nothing is univocally commun to, or predicated of the firſt independent Being, and created dependent Beings. It's true we cal the Creature Ens, as wel as God; but it muſt be underſtood not univocally, but analogically; ſo as the notion Ens primarily, eminently, and moſt properly belongs to the firſt Being; and to the Creatures only analogically, or as ſome equivocally. So alſo Divines make mention of communicable Attributes, commun to God and the Creatures: yet ſo, as that they primarily belong to God, and to the Creatures only ſecundarily: albeit they are transferred from the Creatures to God, and ſo in their formal Idea are primarily attributed to the Creature. That nothing can predicate univocally of God and the Creature is moſt evident; becauſe an efficient, cannot receive a name, taken from that nature, according to an univocal denomination or predication: Now nothing made by God can arrive to the ſame kind of perfection with God; and therefore nothing can be univocally affirmed of God and the Creature. And this ſeems to be the genuine reaſon why Plato appropriated the name foreign to God; (though Ariſtotle gives it to other things) becauſe it originally, primarily, and moſt properly belongs to him, in compariſon of whom althings elſe are deſervedly ſaid not to be, as in Job and Eſaias. (6) The divine Attributes are ſaid to be diſtinguiſhed from the Eſſence, as alſo among themſelves, not only ratione ratiocinante, but alſo ratione ratiocinata, ſo as the fundament of the diſtinction be in God himſelf, as Ameſius. (7) Laſtly, we find the divine Eſſence and Attributes wel deſcribed by Damaſcene, Orthodox. Fic. lib. 1. cap. 2. out of the primitive Greek Theologie thus: foreign, &c. But that God is without cauſe, without end, ſempiterne and e4ternal, increate, immutable, inalterable, ſimple, incompoſite, incorporeous, inviſible, intangible, incircumſcripte, infinite, incomprehenſible, good, juſt, ommipotent, the Opificer of al Creatures, comprehenſive of althings, provident of althings, the ſupreme p. 249Soverain and Judge, we both acknowledge and confeſſe. Alſo that God is one, namely in Ʋnitie of Eſſence; which is known in three Perſons, Father, Son, and holy SPirit, &c.

§. 3. The firſt Attribute that occurs for explication of the divine Being is Ʋnitie, The Divine Ʋ nitie.whereof we find great and lively notices both in ſacred and Platonic Philoſophie. Thus Moſes, Deut. 6.4.Deut. 6.4.Deut 6:4 Hear O Iſrael, the Lord our God is one Lord. Moſe here firſt cals for their ſolemne attention, and then laies down his aſſertion touching the Unitie of the divine Eſſence; which he ſeems to bottome on the very name foreign ſubjoined as a part of the predicate, denoting, that he who is the firſt independent Eſſence and Eſſentiator of althings can be but one. Thus frequently in the N. T. Mar. 12.32. Rom. 3.29, 30. 1 Tim. 2.5, &c. And we find much in Platonic Philoſophie of the ſame import. Thus Plato, in his Parmenides, (where he lays down his prime metaphyſic Philoſophemes) pag. 142. foreign, &c. If there be One, can it poſſibly be, but that it ſhould part ake of Eſſence? Where he ſeems to make foreign and foreign, Ens & unum convertible, namely that Ens is one, and one Ens. So he concludes: foreign, For ONE always embraceth ENS, and ENS ONE with mutual embraces. His plain naked mind is, that the firſt Being and One admit of reciprocation, i. e. God the firſt Being is the prime Unitie. Ariſtotle alſo and his ſectators make Ens and Ʋnum convertible; but in a far different manner from Plato, who underſtood both of God. Thus alſo Pythagoras held, foreign, That Ʋnitie is the first principe of althings. It's true Plato, as others, makes mention of many Gods; yet he tels us, That it was from the Autoritie of their Anceſtors, and by reaſon of the ſeveritie of Laws, foreign, without Demonſtration or Oriental Tradition: yea he confeſſeth that foreign, Polytheiſme was repugnant to right reaſon. And this he learned from his Maſter Socrates, who was ſo zeloſe and warme in this particular, that he was content to ſuffer a Pagan Martyrdome for the avouching the Ʋnitie of God, againſt the Laws and Cuſtomes of the Athenians. Plutarch, on the INſcription foreign E 1, Thou art, engraven on the dores of the Delphic Temple, aſſures us, that the ancient name given unto God was foreign E 1 foreign EN THOƲ ART ONE. For there cannot be many Gods but one: foreign, One ought to be Being, as Being one. For foreign, Diverſitie or Alteritie is placed with the difference of Being: p. 250but One is ſincere, and without mixture: for by the mixture of another with another a thing is made compound and impure. Wherein he ſtrongly proves, that God can be but one, becauſe a pure, neceſſary, abſolute Being, or Act, without mixture and compoſition. Plutarch alſo, in the Life of Numa Pompilius, aſſures us, That ſome learned Romans, and that not without cauſe, do attribute the order of the beginning and end of mans life to one ſelf-God and Power divine. So Laertius, in the Life of Zeno, informes us, That the Stoics held, foreign, that there was one God called by diverſe names, according to his Proprieties, or Attributes and Operations. Thus Seneca: There are ſo many Names of God, as there are Offices. Hence they ſtiled their Jupiter, foreign, &c. not that they intended to aſſert many Deities; but one and the ſame Deitie, with regard to his various opertions. So Ariſtotle, in his Book de Mundo, confeſſeth, There was but one God, called by diverſe names from his effects, Thus alſo Auguſtin, de Civit. l. 7. c. 11. Al theſe names they impoſed on the one God, by reaſon of his diverſe powers and cauſalities: not that from the diverſitie of effects they aſſerted diverſe Gods. And that almoſt al the learned Philoſopher aſſerted one God is maintained by Suarez, Metaph. Diſp. 30. ſect. 10. pag. 97.

As for rational Arguments, the Ʋnitie of God may be thus demonſtrated. (1) That there is a God, who is a neceſſary independent Being, has been already proved: hence it is evident, that he can be but one: For a Being abſolutely neceſſary, and from it ſelf, has a neceſſitie of Being ſo far as it is ſingular: therefore it is not multiplicable or more than one. For if a ſingular is not multiplicable; then whatever agrees to any thing as ſingular, admits not of multiplicabilitie. That a Being abſolutely neceſſary and independent has its neceſſitie of Being as ſingular is evident; becauſe ſingularitie is eſſential and neceſſary to a Being abſolutely neceſſary as ſuch: for a Being abſolutely neceſſary is ſuch ſo far as in act: and it is in act as ſingular: whence ſingularitie intrinſecally and eſſentially belongs thereto, as Suarez, Metaph. Diſp. 30. ſect. 10. Thus the Author of the Book de Fundament. l. 2. c. 6. foreign, &c. There is therefore in the World a Being neceſſarily exiſting of it ſelf, which hath no cauſe nor equal; ſeing it is the Cauſe of althings; from which their ſubſtance and exiſtence is, but his exiſtence dependes not on any thing without himſelf. This is the bleſſed God: who is therefore one; becauſe an Ens neceſſarily p. 251exiſting. (2) Again, if there be two or more Gods; then they are al infinite, independent, and ſelf-Beings; or ſome produced and finite: The firſt implies a coutradiction; becauſe there cannot be many infinites: the later alſo; becauſe ſuch Beings ſhould be produced by real efficience and yet eternal; alſo eſſentially diverſe from the firſt Being that produced them, and yet equal, becauſe God. (3) That which is moſt ſingularly perfect, ſelf-ſufficient and infinite can be but one. For if there were two things or more ſingularly perfect and infinite; then they would differ really, or be the ſame. If the ſame, then they are not two: if they really differ, then one has ſomewhat which the other has not: if ſo, then neither is moſt ſingularly perfect and infinite. For infinite comprehendes al perfection. Thus Damaſcene, Orthodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 5. foreign, &c. The Divinitie is perfect and indeficient every way— If then we aſsert many Gods, they muſt be different: but if there be a difference among them, where is their perfection? For if one be different either in Bonitie, Wiſdome, Virtue, &c. he ſo far comes ſhort of perfection: See more of Gods Unitie, Aquinas contra Gent. l. 1. c. 42.

§. 4. Next to the Unitie of God follows his Simplicitie, The Simplicitie of God explicated.which is moſt abſolute, as both Sacred and Platonic Philoſophie teacheth. Sacred Philoſophie expreſſeth the abſolute Simplicitie of God under the name foreign Jehovah, as alſo by the Paraphraſe thereon, Exod. 3.14. I am that I am, i. e. a ſimple pure Act;Exod. 3.14.Exod 3:14 a Being neceſſarily exiſtent in Act, and therefore moſt ſimple, without the leaſt ſhadow of Power, either objective, or receptive. So Pſal. 102.27.Pſal. 102.27.Ps 102:27 but thou art the ſame, i. e. a uniforme ſimple Being. Plato in imitation of ſacred Philoſophie, expreſſeth the ſame by foreign, the firſt, entire, perfect, uniforme, most ſimple Being, without the leaſt compoſition. Thence, in his Conv. p. 211. he ſtiles God, foreign, the ſincere and uniforme Beautie; becauſe without al mixture and compoſition: The Simplicitie of God is deſcribed by our Lord under the notion of a Spirit, Joh. 4.24. God is a Spirit, Joh. 4.24.John 4:24i. e. (1) As he is a pure Act, void of al paſſive power, either phyſic or metaphyſic. Althings are ſo far ſpirital, as they partake of Act: and by how much the more ſpirital things are, by ſo much the more ſimple. Among the Elements, the Wind and Fire are moſt ſimple, becauſe moſt ſpirital; Angels and human Souls are in an higher degree ſpirital and ſimple; becauſe exemted from al Laws of phyſic Mater: yet they are in ſome reſpect compoſite p. 252of Act and Power, Subſtance and Accidents; becauſe they are under the laws of metaphyſic obediential paſſive power, as Creatures. But God is ſo pure a Spirit and Act, as that al metaphyſic as wel as phyſic power is denied of him. (2) God is ſaid to be a Spirit, as moſt vigorous and active. Our Lord aſſures us, that the Wind being of a ſpirital nature, Joh. 3.8. bloweth whitherſoever it liſteth. Yet Angels and human Spirits are much more active and potent: But God infinitely tranſcendes al other Spirits in point of activitie and efficacitie: which alſo ſpeakes the ſimplicitie of his Being. For by how much the more ſimple any thing is, by ſo much the more active and vigorous: Al mater is dul and phlegmatic.

Plato philoſophiſeth much of the Simplicitie of God. So Repub. 2. pag. 380. he ſaith: God doth not varie his forme or ſhape, but that he is, foreign, a most ſimple Being; and of althings least varies from his own Idea or Eſſence. So pag. 381. he ſaith: God remains always, foreign, ſimply one, and in the ſame forme. Of which more in what follows, of Gods Immutabilitie. But he treats more fully of the Simplicitie of God in his Metaphyſics, Parmenid. pag. 137. If one [i. e. God] be any thing, it cannot truely be many, i. e. compound: and he gives this reaſon of his Hypotheſis: foreign, Neither can there be any part thereof, neither can it be a whole: for a part is the part of a whole: and that is a whole to which no part is wanting. Whence he concludes: foreign, Wherefore neither wil it be a whole, neither wil it have parts, if one ſhal be one. His meaning is, that God, who is one ſimple Being, is neither whole, nor has he parts. This Argument he more fully improves pag. 138. Simplicitie doth not adde any real entitie or mode to that which is thereby denominated ſimple; but only a negation of compoſition: For ſimplicitie is the ſame with perfect and indiviſible Unitie. This Simplicitie of God is moſt abſolute: For (1) he is not compoſed of Logic parts, as of Genus and Differentia; becauſe there is nothing before God, nor yet a Species contradiſtinct to him. (2) God is not compoſed of phyſic parts, either eſſential or integral; becauſe he is a Spirit. Thus Damaſcene, Orthodox. Fid. lib. 1. cap. 14. foreign, &c. Whatever things are ſpoken of God corporally, are ſpoken ſymbolically; but they have an higher mind: p. 253for the Deitie is ſimple, and has no figure. (3) Neither is he compoſed of metaphyſic parts, namely Act and Power; becauſe he is pure Act. (4) He is not compoſed of Ens and Eſſence; or of Eſſence and Exiſtence; becauſe he is Being in the abſtract, Exod. 3.14. He ſo lives, as that he is life it ſelf, Joh. 5.26. & 14.6. (5) He is not compoſed of Subject and Accident; becauſe whatever is in God is God. Moreover, God being the moſt perfect Being, he can neither admit nor need any accidental perfection. So Damaſcene, Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 18. In us habits come and go; but not in God: for in him nothing comes or goes: foreign, for he is inalterable and immutable; neither is it lawful to aſcribe any accident unto him: for goodneſſe in God is coincident with his Eſſence. The ſame he addes: foreign, Neither may we ſay that there is a Qualitie in God, or that he is compounded of Eſſence and Qualitie. (6) He is not compoſed of Attributes; becauſe they are the ſame with his Eſſence. Thus Damaſcene, Orthodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 13. having ſpoken of the divine Attributes and Relations, he addes: foreign, Therefore al theſe must be conſidered in the whole Deitie in commun, and as the ſame, and indiſtinctly, and unitely. (7) Neither is he compoſed of Decrees; becauſe they differ not from his Nature. (8) He is not compoſed of Eſſence and Relation, or Nature and Perſonalitie; becauſe the perſonal relations, albeit they admit ſome kind of diſtinction, yet they give no compoſition; ſeing each Perſon is the very divine Eſſence, though with ſome incomprehenſible modification. Thus Damaſcene, Orthodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 15. foreign, For the Deitie is not a compoſite; but in three perfect, [Perſons] one perfect, indiviſible, and incompoſite, [Eſſence.] So cap. 8. God is both Father always exiſting, and ingenite: God is alſo the Son, who always, eternally, influxibly, impaſſibly is begotten of the Father: God alſo is the holy Spirit, &c. The Eſſence and Perſonalitie are included in the Perſon of the Father, Son, and Spirit, in a way not of compoſition, but of ineffable conjunction and union. (9) Neither is the Deitie compoſed of Eſſence and Operation. It's true, the operations of God, conſidered in their paſſive Attingence, and as they terminate on create effects, are the ſame with or at leaſt only modally diſtinct from p. 254the effect, and therefore really diſtinct from God; but if we conſider them in regard of their active Attingence, as relating to God the Principe, ſo they are the ſame with the Divine Wil, and therefore not really diſtinct from the Divine Eſſence, as in what follows, Chap. 7. §. 3. Thus Damaſcene, Orthod. Fid. lib. 1. cap. 13. foreign, &c. The true word teacheth, that God is ſimple, and hath one ſimple operation. So Chap. 18. foreign, &c. The divine effulgence and operation is one Eſſence, both ſimple, and impartible, and boniforme in things partible variate [as to operation] and diſtributing whatever is conſtitutive of proper Nature, it remains ſimple: i. e. albeit it acts variouſly, according to the indigence of its ſubject, yet it remains invariable and ſimple. Hence (10) we muſt, with Plato, denie, that God, the moſt ſimple Being, may be ſtiled a whole; becauſe he can in no regard be ſaid to have parts.

The abſolute Simplicitie of God may be demonſtrated (1) From the Perfection of God.The Simplicitie of God demonſtrated. Al parts as parts are finite, incomplete and imperfect. Again, every whole is dependent both on its cauſe and on the parts whereof it is compoſed: but there is nothing incomplete or dependent in God; becauſe he is moſt perfect. Moreover al parts are in order of nature before the whole, and therefore need ſome bond of union to knit them together: but God is foreign, without al cauſe, prioritie, or poſterioritie. Laſtly, in every kind things are by ſo much the more noble and perfect, by how much the more ſimple they are: wherefore God being the moſt perfect Being muſt needs be moſt ſimple. (2) From the Ʋnitie of God. This Argument Plato uſeth, as before. So Parmenid. pag. 144. We did not therefore ſpeak truely even now, when we ſaid, foreign, that Eſſence, [i. e. God] was divided into many parts: for he cannot be divided into more than one: for unto him al (as it is moſt conſentaneous) are equal. Neither is Being wanting to Ʋnitie, neither Ʋnitie to Being [i. e. God] but theſe two are altogether equal. Wherein he proves the Simplicitie of God from his Ʋnitie: and it may be thus improved. Unitie is generally deſcribed negatively by indiviſion p. 255in regard of it ſelf, and diviſion from other things. Now the divine Eſſence is moſt indiviſible as to it ſelf, but moſt divided and diſtant from althings elſe: therefore it is most one: and if most one, then alſo moſt ſimple. Thus Ariſtot. Metaph. l. 4. c. 6. foreign, &c. Thoſe things, whoſe eſſential notion is indiviſe and inſeparable, ſuch are most one and ſimple. And is not the firſt Being ſuch? May we conceive the leaſt diviſibilitie in his Eſſence? This Argument is wel urged by Simplicius, in Epict. cap. 1. pag. 9. foreign, One Bonitie produceth many Bonities; and one Simplicitie and Ʋnitie, which excels al others, many Ʋnities; and one Principe many Principes: For One, Principe, Good, and God are the ſame. Where he proves the Simplicitie of God from his Unitie. Thus alſo the Author of the Book de Fundamentis, l. 2. c. 10. foreign, &c. The name ONE is truely ſaid of that, which is indiviſe in it ſelf and diviſe as to althings elſe. And by how much the more proper it is to any thing tobe diſtinguiſhed from other things, by ſo much the more it may be ſaid to be one. Thence he concludes, That nothing in the world can be ſaid to be ſo one, as to be truely diſtinct from althings elſe, but God, who is therefore most ſimple. So Damaſcene, Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 19. foreign, The Deitie [or Divine Unitie] is multiplied in things partible impartibly, drawing and converting things partible, to his own Simplicitie: i. e. The Deitie, being in it ſelf the moſt ſimple Unitie, is multiplied as to operations in althings according to their indigence, yet without the leaſt multiplicitie in it ſelf; but it convertes althings multiplied to its own ſimple Unitie. (3) From the nature of Compoſition. What is Compoſition, but the union of things diſtinct? And doth not imperfection always attend diſtinction? Take the moſt ſubtile and refined compoſition, which they make to be of Ens and Eſſence, or of Eſſence and Exiſtence, and doth there not ſome imperfection attend the ſame? Doth not al Compoſition import ſome efficience, and thence dependence? Can that which is compounded be eternal? Doth it not implie a beginning, and that ſomething was before it? Is it not a flat contradiction to ſay, ſomething was compounded from Eternitie? Laſtly, where Compoſition is, there diviſion may be; p. 256and ſo by conſequence diſſolution, which to affirme of God is blaſphemous. This Argument is wel improved by Damaſcene, Orthodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 12. foreign, &c. The Deitie is ſimple and incompoſite: but that which doth coaleſce out of many differences is compoſite. If therefore we ſhal ſay, that increate, independent, incorporeous, immortal, eternal, good, Creator, and the like, are ſubſtantial differences, and different ſubſtances in God, being compoſed of ſo many things, he wil not be ſimple, but compoſite: which truely to affirme is extreme impietie. It's meet therefore to conceive, that each of theſe, as affirmed of God, do ſignifie, not what he is in Eſsence, but either what he is not, or a certain foreign, habitude which he hath to thoſe things that are diſtinguiſht from him, or that participate nature and operation from him. Wherein he gives us the genuine reaſon, why the divine Eſſence, which is in it ſelf moſt ſimple, is expreſſed under various Names, and Attributes; namely thereby to remove al imperfection from him, or to illuſtrate ſome perfection that is in him, by the habitude which he has to things made by him. (4) From Gods prime Cauſalitie and Efficience. That God is the friſt Cauſe of althings is clearly evident from what has been before laid down of his Exiſtence. Hence it neceſſarily follows, that he is moſt ſimple: For whatever is compoſite, is ſuch by ſome preexiſtent cauſe, which framed its compoſition. This Argument is wel managed by Simplicius, in Epict. c. 1 p. 9. foreign, For God is the first Being and Cauſe of althings: But now what is first, is neceſsarily most ſimple. For whatever is compoſite, as it is compoſite and multiplied, it is poſterior to one. (5) From Gods Actualitie. That there is one pure Act, which is actuated by nothing elſe, but actuates althings elſe, is moſt evident to any, that dare not grant a progreſſe into infinitie, as to Acts. Now what partakes of pure Act, but the firſt Being, who was never in poſſibilitie to be, but always a pure Act as to his Eſſence? God the firſt Being is actually and eternally whatever he may be; neither can he ever be what actually he is not. Every Creature had a poſſibilitie not to be before it was; and it ſtil retains the ſame poſſibilitie: but God is ſuch a pure p. 257Act, as that not the leaſt poſſibilitie, or potentialitie can be affirmed of him. He is ſuch a pure ſubſiſtent Act, as excludes al ſtate exiſting in power or potentialitie, either paſſive or objective; which ſpeakes the higheſt ſimplicitie. (6) From the Immutabilitie of God. Whatever is compoſite is mutable: for where there is compoſition, there may be diviſion, which implies mutabilitie. But God is moſt immutable, as we ſhal, in what immediately follows, demonſtrate. This Argument is wel managed by Plato, in his Phaedo, pag. 78. foreign, Therefore it is most agreable, that thoſe things which are always and equally the ſame, be incompoſite: but things that are otherwiſe, and not the ſame, that thoſe are compoſite. (7) From the Infinitie of God. Whatever is compound has parts: If God has parts, they muſt be finite or infinite: finite they cannot be; becauſe infinite cannot be compoſed of finites: alſo, there is nothing in God, but what is God. Neither can God be compoſed of infinite parts; becauſe there ſhould then be ſomething greater than infinite; for the whole is ever greater than ſome one part: alſo there would be many infinites, which implies a contradiction.