The Court of the Gentiles Part 4, Part 4 · Book 2 · Chapter 2

The Court of the Gentiles Part 4 · Part 4 · Book 2 · Chapter 2

p. 215CHAP. II. Of Atheiſme, and the Exiſtence of a Deitie.

The Origine of Atheiſme, (1) from Polytheiſme, (2) from vain Philoſophie and carnal Politie, (3) from the carnal Mind, Pride, &c. Three ſorts of Atheiſme: practic Atheiſme worst. The peſtiferous Influences and puniſhment of Atheiſme. The Exiſtence of the Deitie demonſtrated from, (1) Ʋniverſal Conſent. (2) A first Cauſe: againſt the Eternitie of Mater, &c. (3) A firſt Mover. (4) The Order of the Ʋniverſe. (5) The innate Idea of a Deitie in the Soul. (6) Practic Arguments from [1] Conſcience. [2] Religion. [3] The politic World. [4] The Atheiſts enmitie against a Deitie.

§. 1. HAving given ſome ſummary general Idea of Metaphyſic,That there is a God. we now deſcend to its principal Object, namely God; who may be conſidered either in regard of his Being, or Operations. As for the Being of God, the firſt thing to be undertaken, is the demonſtration, that there is a God. Plato abounds with many pregnant and cogent Arguments to demonſtrate the Exiſtence of God, againſt the Atheiſts of his Age. We ſhal reduce the whole to the following particulars.

Firſt, Plato explicates the original roots of Atheiſme,The Origine of Atheiſme. which began to ſpring up in his days, with its prodigioſe nature, and peſtiferous maligne influences. 1. He expounds to us ſome of the principal roots of Atheiſme. Thus, de Legib. 12. pag. 967. foreign, There are ſome who thinke, that they who are much converſant in the ſtudies of theſe Arts and Sciences, namely Aſtronomie, and other cognate neceſſary Diſciplines, become Atheiſts; from an apprehenſion, that things are made and governed by the neceſſities of certain natural Cauſes, and not by the force and providence of the divine Wil. In which Platonic Philoſopheme there are theſe Propoſitions worthy of our contemplation. (1) That there was an opinion abroad, that the Mathematics and other Sciences made many Atheiſts. (2) That Philoſophie abuſed made men Atheiſts, by reſolving p. 216al the Products, Events, and Phenomena of the natural and politic World into natural Cauſes, not the divine Wil and Providence. (3) That theſe Atheiſtic infuſions and perſuaſions ſprang not really from Philoſophie, but the abuſe thereof. Theſe Platonic notions we ſhal endeavor more fully to explicate in the following Propoſitions.

1.Atheiſme 1. from Polytheiſme. Atheiſme was not the firſt-borne of corrupt Nature, but was uſhered into the World by Polytheiſme, its elder Brother, and nurſed up by vain Philoſophie and carnal Policie. So long as the Deitie maintained an awe and reverence towards it ſelf in the conſciences of men, by a ſenſe of its prodigioſe operations in creating and governing the World, Atheiſme found no place in Nature. We hear little of it til the beginning of the Roman Monarchie: at which time God withdrew the ſenſible experiments and prodigioſe effects of his Omnipotence, which had ſo long preſerved the old World from Atheiſme: But beginning now to governe the World more by wiſdome, without thoſe miraculoſe operations before vouchſafed to the infant-world, the effects of his power were not ſo ſenſible: whence the brutiſh ſenſual World began to cal in queſtion the very exiſtence and providence of God, and that from the many ridiculous Deities which were idoliſed by men. For Polytheiſme gave a great advance to Atheiſme: To multiplie the Divinitie is to deſtroy it: he that has power to believe many Gods, is very capable of falling into Atheiſme, to believe there is no God. The corrupt mind of man obſerving bright impreſſes and characters of the Deitie in the workes of his hands, began very early to worſhip the Creature inſtead of the Creator, Rom. 1.19-23. Hence ſprang up firſt Zabaiſme or planetary Deities, and then Helleniſme or Polytheiſme, a multiplicitie of al manner of Gods; which laid a foundation for Atheiſme: For he that is inclined to believe a pluralitie of Gods, may eaſily be induced to believe there is no God. So intimate is the cognation and connexion between Polytheiſme and Atheiſme: As the Atheiſt believes there is no God, ſo the Polytheist, or ſuperſtitioſe perſon wiſhes there were none: for al ſuperſtition has a legal fear wrapped up in its bowels, which ſtrikes at the very Being of the Deitie. But albeit Polytheiſme opened the dore to Atheiſme, yet it was hatcht, nurſed up and maintained by vain Philoſophie and carnal Policie, as we have at large proved, Court Gent. P. 3. B. 2. C. 1. §. 4.

2.2. From vain Philoſophie and carnal Policie. Philoſophie abuſed makes men Atheists, by reſolving al the Phenomena of Nature, and States into natural Cauſes, excluſively as to the p. 217Divine Wil and Providence. This lies evident in Plato's Philoſopheme before cited. Who makes mention (1) of Astronomie, and other parts of Mathematics, as influential on Atheiſme. For the Pagan Aſtronomers then, as many judicial Aſtrologers now, held, that there was a natural ſubordination of al inferior Cauſes and Effects to the Stars: whence they reduced al natural effects, yea many politic, to abſtract formes and figures: to ſome inſenſible Influences or fatal Neceſſitie. Again, Mathematicians inuring themſelves to ocular ſenſible Demonſtrations, expect the ſame in divine maters: a bare Teſtimonie, though never ſo divine, ſignifies little or nothing with them: whence they disbelieve every divine Myſterie, which fals not under certain rational Demonſtration. Witneſſe the great Leviathan of our Age and Nation, (for ſo he is pleaſed to title his Book) who has not been aſhamed to make public profeſſion of his Atheiſme, and disbelief of althings, which admit not of ſenſible Demonſtration. (2) Phyſiologie or natural Philoſophie, as alſo Medicine has had no ſmal influence on Atheiſme; in that ſome of the principal Maſters in theſe Sciences have endeavored to reduce al natural products and effects, either to the accidental Concurſe of Atomes; or to ſome hidden virtues and ſpirits in Nature; or to the various modifications of mater; or to ſome mundane Spirit, excluſive as to the first Cauſe and divine Providence. Thus we find the firſt appearance of Atheiſme to be among thoſe philoſophic Wits of Grece, Democritus, Epicurus, &c. who did al ways poſſible trie if they could ſalve the Phenomena of Nature without a Deitie. (3) Eristic Logic has had too great influence on Atheiſme, as Plato, Repub. 7. pag. 539. ſeems to intimate, telling us, That young men, by frequent Dialectic litigations and contradictions each of other, at last come to disbelieve every thing. For Scepticiſme naturally tends to Atheiſme: he that diſputes every thing, at length comes to believe nothing, even in things divine. (4) But yet the principal Parent and Nurſe of Atheiſme has been in al Ages carnal Policie. The chief lineaments of Atheiſme were formed at Rome, when it became the Seat of State-policie. For the ſecular Politician aſcribes al the revolutions of States and human Affaires to ſome politic contrivement or defect therein. And what makes the preſent Conclave at Rome and al their adherents ſo much to abound with Atheiſme, but the great confidence they have in their carnal policie? Neither hath this politic Atheiſme infected Rome only, but p. 218alſo diffuſed it ſelf throughout the European World. Hence Machiavel, that great ſecular Politician of Florence, layeth Atheiſme at the foundation of his carnal policie. And it is to be feared there are too many ſuch politic Atheiſts amongſt us: ſome are ſo bold and daring, as that they are not aſhamed openly to profeſſe it: others, by their doutful Scepticiſme give cauſe of ſuſpicion. I wiſh we had not too ſtrong motives to force ſuch a belief, that a great part of thoſe who profeſſe themſelves Chriſtians, had they but the advantages of intereſt and ſuch like ſelfiſh motives, could with as much facilitie turne Atheiſts. It is natural to carnal reaſon and policie to ſtep up into the Throne of God, and take the Sceptre of his Providence out of his hand, as we find it exemplified in Nebuchadnezar, Dan. 4.30.Dan 4:30Dan. 4.30. Is not this great Babylon that I have built? i. e. by my wiſdome and power, &c.

3.3. From the carnal Mind, Pride, &c. Atheiſme ſprings not from true Philoſophie, but from the abuſe thereof by the carnal mind of man. This Plato has wel obſerved, in the place fore-cited, de Leg. lib. 12. pag. 967. where he ſhews that foreign, Atheiſts, who oppoſed the exiſtence and providence of God, as alſo overthrew the main fundaments of Religion, were but foreign, ſophiſtic, ſpurious Philoſophers. Hence that grand Effate of Sr. Francis Bacon, That a little Philoſophie makes a man an Atheiſt, but a great deal cures him of Atheiſme. And indeed, to ſpeak the truth, it is not Philoſophie ſimply in it ſelf, but the infidelitie, carnal reaſon, and ſpiritual pride of mans heart that makes men Atheiſts.Pſal. 10.4.Ps 10:4 This we are aſſured of by ſacred Philoſophie; as Pſal. 10.4. The wicked through the pride of his countenance. The Particle foreign through is cauſal, denoting the proper interne impulſive cauſe of the wicked's Atheiſme. The countenance here is brought in, not as the formal ſubject or proper ſeat, but as the Index of his pride: that wherein it doth chiefly diſcover it ſelf; though the proper ſubject of it be the heart. Thence the Thargum thus paraphraſeth it: foreign through the pride of his ſpirit. Thence it follows: wil not ſeek after God. This notes his practic Atheiſme, founded in ſpeculative. Whence it follows: al his thoughts are, that there is no God. foreign ſignifies miſchievous thoughts, politic deſigning imaginations. The wicked, through the pride of his heart, is ful of politic Atheiſtic imaginations that there is no God. Thus Pſal. 14.1.Pſal. 14.1.Ps 14:1 The fool hath ſaid in his heart there is no God. The fool here is not ſuch an one as wants reaſon, but he that abuſeth it unto practic Atheiſme. This I am bold to aſſert, that the genuine p. 219and proper cauſe of that overſpreading Atheiſme, which covers the face of this politic World, is the carnal Reaſon, Infidelitie, and ſpiritual Pride of mens hearts, not any defect of evidence in the objects of our Faith. This is very clear; becauſe the moſt of your moderne Atheiſts are as credulous in their way, as any other of the ſimpleſt of men: Why elſe do they ſo greedily aſſent unto any infirme Hypotheſis of thoſe they admire, upon as ſleight and trivious reaſons as may be imagined? Certainly, this ſo great credulitie in things natural or politic, is a ſufficient demonſtration, that it is not ſo much the want of evidence in maters of Faith, that makes men Atheiſts, as the pride and folie of their carnal reaſons, which they idoliſe. It is a thing moſt prodigioſe, that thoſe who abound with ſuch ſoft facile credulous humors and inclinations, to believe, yea idoliſe falſe Deities created by their own luſts, ſhould have their minds prepoſſeſt with an incredulitie ſo obſtinate and unpenetrable by al the impreſſions of the true Deitie.

2. Plato gives us an account not only of the origine of Atheiſme,Threeſorts of Atheiſme. but alſo of its kinds. Thus, de Leg. lib. 10. pag. 888. with mild and ſoft words he endeavors to convince the proud Atheiſts of his Age, under the Symbol of a young man, in theſe words: foreign, &c. My Son, thou art yet young: neither do I dout, but that progreſſe of time wil make thee change thy opinion. Expect therefore, I beſeech thee, that now thou give thy judgement of the higheſt points. foreign, But that which thou now judgest a mater of no moment, is indeed a point of the highest conſequence, namely, that any one, thinking rightly of God, lives wel or il. But first touching this mater, I wil ſignifie to thee one great thing, lest I ſhould ſeem to thee a lyer in this mater, and it is this: foreign, Not thou alone, nor thy friends have been the first who have entertained this [Atheiſtic] ſentiment of God: but from al memorie there have been more or fewer who have labored under this diſeaſe. And I wil tel thee what has happened to them: foreign, namely no one of them, who from their youth entertained this opinion that God is not, hath perſevered therein even unto old age. We find a great inſtance hereof in Bion, (mentioned by Laertius in his p. 220Life) who in his health ſaid: The Gods were nothing: but being worne out by a long diſeaſe, and fearing death, he acknowleged their exiſtence, &c. Plato addes: As for the two other opinions about God, namely (1) that there is a God, but yet he doth not regard human affaires; or (2) if he doth regard them, yet that he is eaſily reconciled by the prayers and ſacrifices of men, there have been ſome, though not many, who have been infected with theſe blaſphemous ſentiments of the Deitie. Plato here, as before in the beginning of this Dialogue, pag. 885. mentions three ſorts of Atheiſts, which in his days diffuſed their venimous blaſphemies againſt the Deitie. (1) Such as denied the Exiſtence of God. (2) Such as held there was a God, but yet denied his Providence and Governement of human affaires. (3) Such as held Gods providence and obſervation of mens good and evil acts, but yet withal denied the Justice of God in puniſhing ſin, affirming that God was eaſily reconciled by Prayers and Sacrifices. Now Plato ſets himſelf to refute each of theſe, of which hereafter. The laſt of theſe three kinds takes in practic Atheiſme, which is indeed of al the moſt peſtiferous and diffuſive. For when men believe there is a God, and that the World is governed by him, yet, then to thinke that he wil be pacified by their hypocritic and imperfect prayers and ſervices, is, in Plato's eſtime, an high piece of Blaſphemie and practic Atheiſme: and therefore he ſpends much force of Argument to prove, That the righteous God cannot be pacified by the ſervices of the wicked. Of which we ſhal diſcourſe more fully, in the Juſtice of God. Plato, Repub. 10. pag. 886. tels us, That thoſe who truely believe the Exiſtence of God, wil not indulge themſelves in ſin. Whence the Stoics, following Socrates, held, foreign, That every wicked man was an Atheiſt. For they held there were two forts of Atheiſts, (1) Such as were contrary to God. (2) Such as deſpiſed God, by diſobeying his Laws, &c. And it was a great Saying of Picus, Earle of Mirandula, That there was but one thing in the World worſe than a ſpeculative Atheiſt, and that was a practic Atheiſt. The roots of practic Atheiſme lie low, as an inſenſible Spring and Principle, which moves and workes al, and yet is not diſcerned. Some of the greateſt Profeſſors of a Deitie, may be the greateſt practic Atheiſts.

3. In what follows Plato manifeſts a warme zele and paſſion againſt theſe Atheiſts and their Atheiſtic infuſions, as the peſte of Families, Republics, yea of human Nature. Thus Leg. 10. p. 890. p. 221having mentioned the opinion of ſome Atheiſts, affirming,The monstroſe nature and peſtiſerous influences of Atheiſme. That the aſſertion of a Deitie was not from Nature, but the politic conſtitution of Stateſmen, to keep men in awe, he replies: What a monstroſe thing, O my Hoſte, doest thou relate? foreign; and how great a peſte, which invades the minds of young men, to the ruine and ſubverſion of Republics and private Families? Whereby he demonſtrates, that this prodigioſe peſte of Atheiſme tends to the ſubverſion of States, Families, Perſons, yea human Nature. And we have a good obſervation to this purpoſe in Campanella, Polit. cap. 8. When Sects [of Philoſophers, or others] ſhal turne to Atheiſme, the top of divine wrath, and ruines of people are near: for when th y are come to denie the Providence of God, or the Immortalitie of the Soul, things neceſſarily ſuffer a mutation or reformation: becauſe the bridle is taken off from mens conſciences, and they alſo are deſtroyed by impious Princes. Yea, formal Atheiſme is repugnant to human Nature, not only morally, but phyſically, as hereafter. O! what a ſervile baſe thing is Atheiſme? How doth it bow down the Soul to the baſeſt of conditions! Doth it not expoſe a man to a miſerable venture of al future miſeries, but ſtrip him naked of al hopes of future happineſſe? Is not every Atheiſt divided againſt himſelf? Do not thoſe remains of light in Conſcience, and thoſe ſecret fears of a Deitie war againſt his corrupt atheiſtic Ratiocinations? Have not his irregular paſſions ful libertie to captivate him and tyranniſe over him without check? Yea, doth he not bid farwel to his beſt being, his firſt cauſe and laſt end? Would it not be thought unnatural for the Plant to bid adieu unto its Mother-earth, which bred and nurſed it up? or ſhould the branch renounce and bid defiance to its root, would not al condemne it of unnatural madneſſe and ingratitude? Did the Earth ever diſclaim its dependence on the Sun for warme influences, light, and heat? Was the ſtream ever ſo fooliſh, as to bid farwel to its Fountain? And yet is not this the caſe of every Atheiſt? Doth he not diſclaim his original Fountain, Root, Sun, Parent and firſt Cauſe? Alas! how much doth he depoſe and forfeit his Reaſon, yea human Nature! What are al his atheiſtic Reaſonments but aſſaults againſt himſelf; endeavors to baniſh himſelf from himſelf? O! what venimous poiſon doth Atheiſme drop on human Nature! It doth indeed commit a rape on humanitie, and plunder it of its native glorie, beautie, p. 222dignitie and perfection: it doth unhinge and ſeparate man from his moſt laudable, noble, and beſt ſelf: it makes him a ſlave and vaſſal to Mater and Motion: it robs not only his Creator of the workes of his hands, but himſelf of human felicitie and tranquillitie: yea, it placeth man many degrees below the Brute animal, which enjoys ſome happineſſe in this preſent ſtate; whereas the Atheiſt can enjoy neither preſent contentment, nor yet hopes of future bliſſe. So repugnant is Atheiſme to human Nature.

4.The puniſhment of Atheiſme. Thence Plato procedes, Leg. 10. pag. 890. to ſhew what ſhould be the puniſhment of ſuch Atheiſts. He ſaith: It belongs to the Magiſtrate to endeavor their conviction by reaſon; and if they obstinately perſevere, to puniſh them: foreign, ſome by death, others by ſtripes, others by bonds, others by infamie, others by baniſhment, others by miſerable povertie. And in the concluſion of this Diſcourſe, pag. 907. he ſums up al thus: We affirme therefore that thoſe three things that were propoſed by us, namely, that there is a God: and that he takes care of althings: and that he is not inclined by mens ſervices beyond what is juſt and equal, have been abundantly demonſtrated. And then he addes: foreign, &c. But for the contentions of wicked Atheiſtic men, we have diſcourſed more vehemently and warmely of this mater. Namely for this reaſon, O Clinias, we have uſed greater vehemence, leſt peradventure theſe profligate Atheists, ſhould, by their diſputations, conceit themſelves to have the better of us, and thence to act althings according to the dictates of their luſts, and belch forth their blaſphemous atheiſtic opinions of God. Wherefore to ſilence the madneſſe of thoſe Atheiſts, we have uſed the greater vehemence. And after al he eſtabliſheth this Law, That if any ſpeak or act any thing atheiſtically and impiouſly against God, he be puniſhed by the Magiſtrate. If Plato were ſo zeloſe and warme againſt the Pagan ſemi-Atheiſts of his Age, what vehemence and zele would he expreſſe againſt the bold daring Atheiſts of this Age? O! what an ignoble, baſe, degenerate, uncomfortable thing is Atheiſme? how repugnant both morally and phyſically is it to human Nature? Ought not the Atheiſt ſooner to dout of his own being than God's? For if he be, God who made him, muſt needs be. Thence Padre Paul, that great Venetian Politician, compoſed a Treatiſe, That Atheiſme is repugnant to human Nature, and is not to be found therein: but that they who acknowlege not the p. 223true Deitie, must neceſſarily feigne to themſelves ſome falſe ones, as it is mentioned in his Life, pag. 71. In ſum, Atheiſme is a propoſition ſo diſnatural, monſtroſe, and difficult to be eſtabliſnt in the mind of man, that notwithſtanding the inſolence, vanitie, and pride of Atheiſts, who endeavor by violence to raſe out al notices of a Deitie in their Conſcience, yet ſtil they give us ſome evidences of their fears that there is a Deitie, by liſting up their eyes and hands towards Heaven, or ſuch like Indicia in ſudden and great calamities.

§. 2.1. Ʋniverſal conſent for the Existence of God. Plato's zeloſe Philoſophemes againſt Atheiſme having been diſcuſſed, we deſcend to his Demonſtration of the Exiſtence of God. Firſt, That there is a God, he demonſtrates from the univerſal conſent of al Times and Nations. Thus, Leg. 10. pag. 887. foreign, &c. But now giving credit to thoſe Traditions, which together with their milke they ſucked in, and which they heard from their Motkers and Nurſes; who made it their buſineſſe, to implant theſe ſentiments on their minds, &c. Wherein he ſhews, how thoſe that denie the Exiſtence of God contradict the univerſally received Tradition, which they ſucked in with their mothers milke, and that which is indeed engraven on their very Beings, as hereafter. Yea, he makes this Hypotheſis, That there is a God, to be foreign, a ſelf-evidencing firſt Principe, which needs no argument for the confirmation thereof; becauſe Nature it ſelf inſtructes us therein, it being that which the moſt proſtigate men cannot raſe out of their Souls. Thence Damaſcene, Orthod. Fid. l. 1. c. 3. ſaith, That it never came into Controverſie among the most of Grecians, that there was a God. And he gives this reaſon for it: foreign, The knowlege or notion of Gods Exiſtence is naturally inſite and ingenite to us, or engraven on our Natures. We may draw forth the force of this Platonic Argument, in Plato's own dialect thus: Have not al mankind in al times and places given their aſſent and conſent to the exiſtence of a Deitie? Doth not al the Polytheiſme of the Pagan World give evident teſtimonie for the exiſtence of a Deitie? What made the Egyptians, Grecians and Romans ſo fond of their baſe multiplied Deities, but a notion engraven on their Beings, fomented by univerſal Tradition, that there was ſome ſupreme Being they owed Hommage unto? It's true, their Hommage and Worſhip was miſplaced as to its proper object, but doth not the act ſufficiently p. 224argue, that they owned a Deitie, albeit not the true God? Hath not the whole World ſubſcribed to the notion of a Deitie? Was there ever any Nation ſo barbarous, as not to pay Hommage to ſome ſupreme Being? Can we give inſtance of any part of the habitable World, where profeſſed Atheiſme gained place or habitation? Has there not been an univerſal Tradition among the more intelligent of men, that God made the World and governes the ſame? Yea doth not this notion of a Deitie run, not only through al Times, Ages, and Nations; but even through the Principes of human Nature; yea in the venes and bloud of men? Wel then might Plato ſay, That men ſucked it in with their mothers milke. So much for inartificial Argument.

2.2. From the ſubordination of Cauſes to a first Cauſe. Plato demonſtrates the Exiſtence of a Deitie rationally, from the Subordination of ſecond cauſes and effects to a first Cauſe. Thus in his Timaeus, pag. 28. foreign, Whatever is produced, it is neceſſary that it be produced by ſome Cauſe: for it cannot be, that any thing ſhould be produced or made without a Cauſe. Then in what follows … proves the World was made: foreign, The World was made, becauſe it is ſeen and touched, and has a bodie: But it is clear that ſuch things are produced, &c. Whence he concludes, that God was the Parent and firſt Cauſe of the Univerſe. Plato bottomes his demonſtration on theſe two Hypotheſes, (1) That the World was made. (2) That it was made by ſome precedent Cauſe. (1) That the World was made and not eternal, was an Hypotheſis generally maintained by al the Philoſophers before Aristotle; who aſſerted, That the firſt Mater was eternal: and that on a miſtaken Principe, That nothing could be produced out of nothing. But Plato ſtrongly proves the World could not be eternal; becauſe it is ſenſible and corporeous: and therefore the effect of ſome precedent Cauſe. And his argument may, in his own interrogatorie mode, be thus improved: If the World be eternal, muſt it not alſo be immutable and invariable? Can there be any generation and corruption in that which is eternal? For where there are generations and corruptions, there muſt be cauſes and effects, which implie prioritie and poſterioritie: for the cauſe naturally precedes the effect: but can there be any prioritie and poſterioritie in what is eternal? If the World was from al eternitie, muſt not the things that are generated and corrupted eternally have been, and eternally not p. 225have been? Muſt not the preſent way of Generation and Corruption correſpond with the World's Eternitie? Doth not our reaſon, yea commun ſenſe aſſure us, that the Worlds preſent courſe of generation and corruption is inconſiſtent with its Eternitie? Is it not moſt abſurd and irrational to conceive, that one man ſhould beget another ſucceſſively from al Eternitie? Doth not the very conception of ſucceſſion in Eternitie implie a flat contradiction? Moreover doth not generation and corruption ſuppoſe an inequal ſucceſſion of aſcent and deſcent? and is not this incompatible with an eternal Being? Again, if there were an infinite ſucceſſion of generations and corruptions, how is it poſſible there ſhould be any effect or iſſue? for can there be an end, where there is no beginning? Againſt the Eternitie of the World, ſee more largely Derodone, L'Atheiſme convaincu, pag. 5. where he proves from al the principal parts of the World, the Sun, Moon, &c. that it could not be eternal: and thence makes good his Hypotheſis, that it was created by God. See alſo Sr. Charles Wolſeley's Ʋnreaſonableneſſe of Atheiſme, Edit. 3. pag. 47-64. & 177. (2) Plato's next Hypotheſis to prove God to be the firſt Cauſe,The World made by ſome prime Cauſe. is, That the World was made by ſome precedent Cauſe. For, ſaith he, whatever is produced, is produced by ſome Cauſe. We ſee nothing but what is produced by ſomewhat elſe; and therefore muſt rationally conclude, there muſt be ſome firſt Producer. Our reaſon compels us to look out for ſome firſt Cauſe, that gave being to althings we ſee. Doth a man beget a man? and was not this man begotten by ſome other man, and ſo upward, til we come to ſome firſt man? And how came that firſt man to be produced but by ſome firſt Cauſe? In al ſubordinate Efficients, is not the firſt the cauſe of the middle, and the middle, whether many or one, the cauſe of the laſt? If then there be not a firſt, can there be a middle and laſt? So that may not men as wel denie al Effects, yea themſelves to be as denie a firſt Cauſe to be? Surely if God had not a Being, nothing elſe could be: in things ſubordinate one to the other, take away the firſt you take away al the reſt. Therefore it muſt neceſſarily be, that the World was made by ſome precedent firſt Cauſe. This Hypotheſis Plato layes down againſt the Antitheſis of Leucippus and Democritus, which Epicurus afterward eſpouſed, namely, That there was an infinite vacuitie or emty ſpace, in which were innumerous Atomes, or corporeous Particles, of al formes and ſhapes, which by their weight were in continual agitation or p. 226motion; by the various caſual occurſions of which, this whole Ʋniverſe and al the parts thereof were framed into that order and forme they now are in. Againſt this Antitheſis Plato ſeems to have framed his Hypotheſis, laid down in his Timaeus, pag. 28. where he aſſerts, That the Ʋniverſe received its origine, foreign, (as it is in the Autographe) not from any caſual occurſion of Atomes, foreign, but from a prudent potent firſt Cauſe, who framed this Univerſe according to the moſt accurate Exemplar of his own divine Ideas. So in his Sophiſta, pag. 265 he ſaith: Natural things were produced, not foreign from a caſual cauſe without intelligence; but that they were foreign, fruits or workes of God the ſupreme Opificer of althings. We may forme his Argument, according to his own dialectic mode, thus: Is it poſſible that this beautiful welordered Univerſe ſhould emerge out of a caſual concurſe of Atomes in the infinite Vacuitie? What! were theſe corporeous Particles eternally there; or only introduced in time? If eternally, then is not neceſſary that they be invariable and immutable? for doth not al variation and alteration belong to time the meaſure thereof? Can any thing that is in a ſtrict ſenſe eternal varie? are not eternal and variable termes contradictorie, as before? Or wil they ſay, that theſe Atomes were introduced or produced in this vacuous ſpace in time? muſt they not then have ſome cauſe of their production? And wil it not hence follow, that there is a firſt Cauſe or Deitie, as anon? Again, what a world of abſurdities, yea contradictions is this Epicurean Hypotheſis clogged with? Is it poſſible to imagine that ſuch minute corporeous Particles ſhould, in this imaginarie vacuitie, be inveſted with an eternal gravitie, whereby an eternal caſual motion is cauſed here and there, without any tendence to a Centure? Can it alſo be imagined, that theſe poor Corpuſcules ſhould continue in perpetual motion, til by chance they hit one againſt the other, and ſo were conglomerated into this order we find them in the Univerſe? Is it not a fond ſick-brain conceit, that phlegmatic dul mater, and ſtupid motion ſhould by chance produce ſuch an harmonious Univerſe? Alas! what a ſyſteme of contradictions would follow hereon? See Sr. Charles Wolſeley againſt Atheiſme, pag. 87.

But to deſcend to the affirmative of Plato's Hypotheſis, That the World was made by ſome precedent firſt Cauſe. This he alſo inculcates p. 227in his Theaetctus: foreign, We must take it for granted, that nothing can make it ſelf. Whence it is neceſſary, that at laſt we come to ſome firſt Cauſe. (1) That in the ſubordination of Cauſes there cannot be a progreſſe into infinite, we are told by Ariſtotle, (or who ever were the Compoſer of that Book) Metaph. l. 1. c. 2. and the reaſon is moſt evident; becauſe what is infinite is incomprehenſible, and impertranſible; as alſo adverſe to al order: for in infinites there is no firſt or laſt. Again, if in the ſubordination of Cauſes there ſhould be an infinite Series, then it would follow hence, that there never was any Cauſe which was not ſubſequent to infinite Cauſes precedent: whence alſo it would follow, that there were infinite Cauſes before any Cauſe. (2) That nothing ever did or can make it ſelf is moſt evident from multitudes of contradictions that follow this Hypotheſis: for then a thing ſhould be ſaid to act phyſically before it had a being: to be ſuperior and inferior, dependent and independent, to exiſt and not to exiſt in the ſame inſtant and in one and the ſame reſpect. (3) That this Univerſe was made by ſome Cauſe precedent to it ſelf is evident; becauſe it hath a poſſibilitie not to be: whence it follows, that once it was not: for whatever has a poſſibilitie not to be, has a paſſive power at leaſt metaphyſic, if not phyſic: and where any paſſive power is, there is ſomething of the original nothing, out of which althings were made, by him who is pure Act and perfect Being. Thus Damaſcene, Orthodox. Fide, l. 1. c. 3. foreign, &c. Al Beings are either create, or increate: truely if create they are altogether mutable: For it's neceſſary, that thoſe things which began by mutation, ſhould be always obnoxious to mutation, either by being corruptible, or alterable, according to pleaſure. But if al Beings be increate, then are they al immutable. Thence he addes: Who therefore wil not conclude, that al Beings ſenſible, yea that the very Angels may be many ways changed and altered? Whence he concludes: foreign; Therefore, ſeing the Opificer of things is increate, he muſt be alſo altogether immutable. And what can this be other than God? (4) That God made althings, is ſtrongly demonſtrated by Aquinas, contra Gent. l. 2. c. 15. of which hereafter. See alſo Mendoza Hurtado, Phyſ. Diſp. 10. Sect. 1.

p. 228§. 3.3. The Existence of God from a first Motor. Another Argument whereby Plato proves the exiſtence of a Deitie is taken from the dependence of al motions on a prime Motor, or firſt Mover. Thus Leg. 10. pag. 893. being about to demonſtrate the exiſtence of a Deitie againſt the Atheiſts of his Age, he makes this Preface: Let us make this Preface to our Diſcourſe; ſithat it is our purpoſe to prove there is a God, we ought with greater ſtudie and diligence to cal upon him for his aide now, than at other times. Wherefore being as it were confirmed by theſe bonds, let us begin our Diſcourſe— Therefore if any ſhal demand of me: foreign, whether or no therefore do althings ſtand ſtil, and is nothing moved? or, on the contrary, are althings, or ſomethings moved, and doth nothing ſtand ſtil? foreign, I wil anſwer, that ſomethings are moved, and ſomethings ſtand ſtil, &c. In which diſcourſe, to prove his Theſis touching the exiſtence of a Deitie, he layes down this Hypotheſis: That God was the foreign the primary and principal Mover in Nature, (as the Soul in the bodie) who moves himſelf and althings that are, were, or ſhal be in the Ʋniverſe. This Hypotheſis he cals foreign, and as it were the bonds of the whole diſputation. Thence he procedes, pag. 894. thus: Let there then be one motion, [i. e. Motor] which moves it ſelf, but cannot move other things; being always uniforme: another which always moves both it ſelf and other things, by conjoining and disjoining, augmenting and diminiſhing, generating and corrupting, which motion is diſtinct from al the reſt. By the former motion he underſtands that of things natural; by the later that of the firſt Motor, who moves himſelf and althings elſe; which he thus explicates: foreign, It is neceſſary, that he, who can move both himſelf and other things, do infinitely excel, and that the other Motors are much poſterior and inferior thereto. Whereby he gives an infinite preference and prioritie to the first Motor, or Mover in compariſon of al other ſecond Movers. And then that there muſt be one prime Motor he demonſtrates in what follows thus: When one thing is moved by another, and that other by another whom muſt we acknowlege to be the firſt Motor of al theſe? foreign, &c. Him truely that moves himſelf: for he cannot be changed by any before, ſeing there can be no mutation before him. Whence he concludes: foreign, &c. Therefore we muſt acknowlege, that the principe of al motions is be that moves himſelf, and is the most ancient p. 229and excellent cauſe of al mutations. Wherein he demonſtrates (1) That there is one prime, Motor, which is not obnoxious to the motion or mutation of any precedent Motor. (2) That this prime Motor is the principe and cauſe of al other motions and mutations. Thus alſo in his Phaedrus, pag. 245 foreign, &c. Only therefore that which moves it ſelf, and is the cauſe of motion to other things, foreign, This is the fountain and principe of moving, but a principe has no origine: for from it althings ariſe; but it from nothing elſe: neither indeed were it a principe, if it were produced by any thing elſe. Whereby he proves, that God is the firſt Motor and Principe of al motion, who moves althings, but is moved by nothing. This Demonſtration of Plato ſeems ſo ſtrong and binding, that Ariſtotle his Scholar was not only ſatisfied therein, but improved the ſame very much, Phyſicor. 8. where he thus argues: Whatever is moved is moved by ſome other: whence there is ſome firſt Mover, which is immobile; or there muſt be a progreſſe into infinite, from which nature abhors: now the firſt immobile Mover is ſimply the firſt cauſe of al motions; as the firſt Mover in every kind of inferior motions, is the cauſe of al motions in that kind. This Platonic and Ariſtotelic Demonſtration may be thus drawen forth: Doth not al motion procede either from ſome prime Motor, or elſe from an innate and ſelf-originated principe of motion? If from an innate ſelf-originated principe of motion, then muſt not ſuch a motion neceſſarily be eternal? and if eternal, then can a thing that ſo moves ever ceaſe to move? Can any thing move, that was not at firſt moved by ſome prime Motor, or that doth not infinitely and eternally move it ſelf? Can we imagine any thing not to have a beginning, but what is infinite and eternal? And need we a better argument to prove that al motion had a beginning, than this, that we ſee it has an end? Do not the ſeveral periods, which al motions as wel natural as artificial fal under, clearly evince, that they are not ſelf-originated, but had ſome beginning and prime Motor? This Demonſtration R. Moſes Maimonides, in ſumma Talmud. lib. de fund. Leg. c. 1. thus expreſſeth: The Heaven is always moved: but it cannot be moved without a Motor: and the Motor is God bleſſed without hand or bodie. This Argument from a prime Motor is wel improved by Aquinas contra Gent. l. 1. c. 13. & l. 2. c. 6.

p. 230§. 4.4. The exiſtence of God from the Order of the Ʋ niverſe. Plato demonſtrates the Exiſtence of a Deitie from the admirable Order, Harmonie, Beautie, and Perfection of the Macrocoſme or Ʋniverſe. Thus, Leg. 12. pag. 966. foreign, The admirable order of the Ʋniverſe, namely the reguiar motion of the Stars and other celeſtial Bodies ordered by the Divine Mind, demonſtrate a Deitie. For he that ſhal look into theſe things with a diligent inquiſitive eye, foreign, no ſuch one among mortals can be ſo far an Atheiſt, as not to acknowlege the exiſtence of a Deitie. So pag. 967. foreign, affirming that the Divine Mind made and orderly diſpoſeth althings. This Argument of Plato may, according to his own dialectic mode, be thus improved: Is there not an accurate innate order and rectitude in the World? Do not althings ſweetly conſpire and tend to one commun end? Lo! what an exact ſubordination of things one to another, and to the whole is there? Can it be imagined, that the Sun, Moon, and Stars ſhould have ſuch regular motions, courſe, order, and influences, without ſome infinitely wiſe Director and Diſpoſer? Is it not a moſt abſurd conceit, that al the regular ſubordinations of natural Cauſes and Effects in their proper dependences and uſes ſhould be produced by mere Chance? Is there not a moſt beautiful concent and concatenation of al parts in the Univerſe? And whence comes it, but from infinite Wiſdome and Providence? It's true, confuſion is a genuine product of Chance, to uſe the Atheiſts phraſe; but is not al order the effect of Wiſdome and Art? In a curioſe Machine or piece of Art doth not the Order, Beautie, and Harmonie of different parts ſpeak the skil of the Artificer? And can we ſuppoſe, that the infinite Order and Beautie which is in the Univerſe ſhould procede by Chance, and not from an infinitely wiſe Agent? Conſider the Sun, that Eye of the Univerſe; in its own glorioſe ſtructure, ſituation, conjunctions, regular motions, efficacious influences, and orderly diſpoſition of ſeaſons, according to the indigence and neceſſities of this inferior Word, and can we imagine that al this ſhould be the reſult and product of Chance, and not of an infinitely wiſe divine Mind, as Pſal. 19.1, 2, 3? Might we not alſo deſcend from thoſe celeſtial Bodies, to the Regions of the Air and the Meteors loged therein, both ignite and aqueous, their admirable order, perfection and influences? Likewiſe as to this inferior World, if we examine p. 231the origine of Fountains, dive into the Ocean and obſerve its regular Fluxes and Refluxes, &c. if we rake into the bowels of the Earth, and inquire into the origine of Stones both precioſe and commun, mineral Juices, and Metals: Laſtly, if we deſtil Plants, or anatomiſe Animals, what an incomparable Harmonie, Order and Perfection ſhal we find in each of theſe, both in reference each to other, and to the whole Univerſe? This is wel done by Plato, in his Timaus, pag. 28, &c. whence he concludes, That there must be an infinitely wiſe Mind, who frames al theſe things into ſuch an admirable order, agreable to his own eternal Ideas. Thus alſo Joan. Damaſcenus, Orthodox. Fid. l. 1. c. 18. foreign, But that God, who in his own nature is inviſible, is made viſible by his operations, we know by the admirable conſtitution and gubernation of the Ʋniverſe. Wherein he demonſtrates the inviſible Eſſence and Exiſtence of God from his viſible operations and workes, as Rom. 1.20.

§. 5.5. Gods Existence from the connate Idea of God in the Soul. Plato demonſtrates the Exiſtence of a Deitie from the Microcoſme or Man, ſpecially his Soul, and thoſe innate Ideas of a Deitie loged there. Thus Leg. 12. pag. 966. Do we not know that there are two things which make us believe that there is a God? one which we before mentioned, touching the Soul, foreign, that it is the most ancient and divine of althings made: I ſay, of thoſe things, whoſe motion admits generation, but ſo as that it hath obtained an everlaſting eſſence for it ſelf. There are two parts in this Argument which demonſtrate the exiſtence of a Deitie. (1) The divine origine and nature of the Soul. (2) Its Immortalitie. (1) The divine origine and nature of the human Soul fully evinceth the exiſtence of God. Thus Plato, Leg. 10. pag. 899. Let him, who formerly denied there was a God, prove that we ſpeak not truth, in giving the Soul the firſt place; or let him believe us, and ſo for the future order his life, foreign, that he dout not of a Deitie. But let us conſider whether to thoſe that thinke there is no God, we have not abundantly proved there is a God. So in his Phaedo, p. 81. Doth not the mind thus affected go, foreign, to the divine Being whereunto it is like? This Platonic Argument may be thus improved: Is there not a connate Idea of a Deitie impreſſed and ſtamped on the very nature of the Soul? Doth not its immaterial, ſpirital, impaſſible nature ſpeak its phyſic cognation p. 232with ſome ſupreme Spirit, that firſt conferred that ſpirital Being on it? Has not the Soul a phyſic Amplitude, yea infinite Capacitie, albeit only remote and paſſive of contemplating ſome firſt Truth, and loving ſome chiefeſt good? Has not the mind an univerſal empire and dominion over al objects, to compound things moſt oppoſite, and divide things moſt intimately conjoined; to deſcend from the higheſt cauſe to the loweſt effect, and then to aſcend from the loweſt effect to the higheſt cauſe? Has not the Wil an infinite thirſt after good, yea is never ſatisfied without the fruition of ſome ſupreme infinite good? And do not theſe infinite capacities, albeit only natural, remote and paſſive, implie ſome infinite object adequate thereto? Was there ever a facultie or power in Nature without an object ſuited thereto? Cicero tels us, de Nat. Deor. lib. 1. That Nature her ſelf has impreſſed a notion of a Deitie on the minds of al. As if he had ſaid, according to Plato's mind, Has not God ſtamped an Idea of himſelf on human Nature? May we not as wel abandon our very Beings, our ſelves, as abandon the notices and characters of a Deitie engraven on our Beings? Doth not every human Soul carrie the ſignature and marque of his Creator impreſſed on it ſelf? Is there not an impreſſe and Idea of a Deitie incorporated and contempered in the very complexion and conſtitution of the Soul? And albeit man by ſin runs away as a fugitive from his Lord and Maker, yet has he not ſecured his claim to man, by his marque and phyſic Idea ſtamped on the Soul of man? The Ideas and Characters of a Deitie are more clearly and lively ſtamped on the Souls of men, than upon any part of the ſenſible World. (2) As for the Immortalitie of the Soul, doth not this alſo implie an eternal object anſwerable thereto? Thus Plato, in his Sympoſium, pag. 207. informes us, That man, who is mortal as to his terrene part, ſeekes to be immortal as to his more noble part. And if the Soul ſeekes to be immortal, muſt there not be an immortal, eternal, infinite good, in the fruition of which it ſeeks immortal Beatitude? Of this ſee more fully, Philoſ. Gen. P. 1. lib. 3. cap. 2. ſect. 10. §. 5.

§. 6.The Existence of God demonstrated by practic Arguments. 1. From Conſcience. Plato has given us ſome practic and moral Demonſtrations of a Deitie. As (1) ſome moral though imperfect notices of good and evil impreſſed on Conſcience, with affections of fear and ſhame on the commiſſion of ſin. Plato, in his Minos, pag. 317. makes mention of a foreign, a royal Law of Nature, ſome p. 233notices whereof remain on degenerate human Nature. Theſe notions the Stoics terme, foreign: the Ariſtotelians, foreign, commun and innate notions. Among which they reckon up ſuch as theſe: That there is a God: that this God was the Maker, and is the Conſervator, and Rector of the Ʋniverſe: that he is infinitely wiſe, juſt, good, &c. That he is to be worſhipped: that virtue is to be embraced, vice avoided, &c. Theſe commun notices they make to be connate and engraven on the Soul. And indeed ſacred Philoſophie aſſures us, that there are ſuch commun notices of good and evil naturally engraven on mens conſciences, as Rom. 2.14, 15. which yet are improved by the workes of Providence, as Act. 14.17. where rain and fruitful ſeaſons are ſaid to be Gods witneſſe. Now al Notions of good and evil clearly demonſtrate the exiſtence of a Deitie: for the diſtinction of good and evil, as to man, refers to ſome principe above him: were there no ſupreme Rector and Judge to reward good and puniſh evil, the very notions of good and evil would vaniſh into ſmoke and vapor. What can be good, if there be not ſome Being originally and infinitely good, to which it refers, and by whole Law it is meaſured? Can we imagine how the notions of good and evil ſhould exiſt in mens minds, if there were not a ſupreme Rector to give Laws for the meaſure thereof? If man had not ſome ſupreme Lord to give Laws to him, how could he be guilty of any moral tranſgreſſion? Can he that is his own Law be guilty of an offence? Who can charge any man with doing il, unleſſe he break the Law of ſome Superior? What could be juſt or unjuſt, if there were not a ſupreme Rector to meaſure and regulate the ſame? And could there likewiſe be any puniſhments or rewards, if there were not an infinitely wiſe and righteous Judge to diſtribute the ſame? Again, we may with facilitie evince the exiſtence of a Deitie from the Accuſations, Tremblements, and Fears of a guilty Conſcience. The Atheiſt may diſpute againſt a Deitie, but doth he not ſometimes fear and tremble at a ſecret apprehenſion of that Deitie he diſputes againſt? When the Sergeants of Death come to arreſt him, what pannic fears, what convulſions are in his Conſcience? Doth he not quake and tremble before that Deitie he formerly derided? Thus it was with Bion the Philoſopher, who when he lay under the pangs and terrors of death acknowleged that Deitie he before diſclaimed. And would the Atheiſt be but true to himſelf, and ſo ingenuous as to lay p. 234open his breaſt, would not his own tremblements and fears of Conſcience at times baſſie his own infidelitie and disbelief of a Deitie? Have not al Nations in al Ages more or leſſe fallen down before the Notion of a Deitie? O! what ſtings and remorſes have there been on the Conſciences even of thoſe who have been exemted from the puniſhment of human Laws? Have not many Tyrants trembled on the Throne, as Felix, when the condemned innocent rejoyced, as Paul? Aske Tiberius and Nero, thoſe potent Emperors, what made them to tremble and fear? Were theſe fears the product of falſe imagination, and not rather of a guilty Conſcience?

(2) Another practic moral Demonſtration of a Deitie is taken from that ſenſe of Religion,2. From the ſenſe of Religion. which the moſt barbarous Nations have more or leſſe been poſſeſſed with. Thus Plato, Leg. 10. pag. 887. It is not poſſible, but that they believe there is a God, whiles they ſee their parents with the greatest care ſacrifice for themſelves and their children; and addreſſe themſelves to God, with earneſt prayers in their behalf. Yea, he addes, That al mankind, both Greeks and Barbarians, when they are preſſed with adverſitie, or enjoy proſperitie, fal down to the ground and adore ſome Deitie, foreign, neither do they give the leaſt ſuſpicion, but that there is a God. We may draw forth Plato's mind thus: Was there ever any People or Nation ſo barbarous, as not to fal down before and worſhip ſome Deitie? It's true we hear of ſome that live without human Laws, yea without clothes and other neceſſaries, to ſecure them from the injuries each of other, and of ſeaſons, &c. but did we ever hear of any that lived without ſome ſupreme object of Devotion? May you not aſſoon find a Nation without men, as without ſome Deitie? Nay, are not ſome ſo ſuperſtitioſe, as where-ever they ſee any created impreſſe of a Deitie, to worſhip that as God? Are not the Plants in the Garden, the Birds that flie, the Fiſhes in the Sea, the Brutes that ſerve men, worſhipped by ſome as Gods? And leſt men ſhould after al miſſe of the true God, have they not alſo framed an Altar to ſome unknown God, as Act. 17.23? Have not al men naturally recourſe to ſome ſupreme Being in their extremities? When they find themſelves paſt their own protection, do they not caſt their eye upward to ſome omnipotent Being for relief? Wil the Atheiſt object, that al theſe religioſe Rites and Actions are but the politic contrivement of Politicians, to keep men in p. 235awe and under ſubjection? Plato, Leg. 10. pag. 889, &c. gives a ful anſwer to this Objection, aſſuring us, That it is void of al reaſon to imagine, that Religion and al ſenſe of a Deitie is the mere comment or figment of men, inſtituted as an Artifice, to keep men in their Dutie, by overawing them with the conceit of ſome ſupreme Power: than which there cannot be a more capital crime, becauſe the notion of a Deitie is moſt naturel.

(3) Hence we may deduce another moral Demonſtration of a Deitie from the politic World, 3. From the politic World.and the neceſſitie it has of ſome ſupreme Rector to keep it in order. This Argument is wel managed by Plato, Leg. 4. pag. 713. The primigenious Truth teacheth us, that there is no ceſſation of evils in thoſe Cities, in which, foreign, not God but ſome mere mortal preſides, &c. In which he makes Religion the foundation of a Republic, which ought in the firſt place to be provided for: and he gives us this deſcription of Religion, That we believe there is a God, who is the Beginning, Middle, and End of althings; and whoſe Providence runs through al parts of the Ʋniverſe. Thus alſo, Leg. 10. pag. 800. he aſſures us, That to denie the exiſtence of a Deitie is the ſubverſion of al politic Societies, as before, §. 1. The force of this Argument lies in this, That the Conſtitution of al Republics, Nations, and politic Societies is ſuch, that the notices of a ſupreme Rector and Deitie are abſolutely neceſſarie for the preſervation of them. Is it poſſible, that there ſhould be any politic civil Societie, unleſſe there be ſome bond of Confederation and Conſociation? And can there be any Confederation without ſome fidelitie and confidence each in other? Who wil aſſociate with others, unleſſe they can confide in them, at leaſt be ſecure, that they ſhal not be ruined by them? Who wil care to live and converſe with ſuch, as they look on as their enemies, and by whom they expect to be deſtroyed? And what ground can there be of confidence and truſt in any, if the notions of a ſupreme Rector and Deitie be baniſht out of the world? Who wil make conſcience of keeping his word, or not violating al bonds and obligations, if he be not overawed by a ſenſe of ſome ſupreme Rector that can puniſh and reward him? Let us ſuppoſe a Citie or Republic of Atheiſts incorporated under ſome commun Laws, and conſider what confuſion, diſorders, and inevitable ruine would follow on ſuch an Hypotheſis. Would there be any regard or conſcience made of words or actions? Doth not. the Atheiſt, who denies any God above him, deſtroy p. 236al conſcience within him? And he that knows he makes conſcience of nothing, wil alſo believe, that al his Companions, who are acted by the ſame atheiſtic principes, make no conſcience of word or deed towards him: and then what diffidences, jealouſies, and treacheries neceſſarily follow hereon? Surely nothing gives men greater confidence and ſecuritie from inhuman violences than a conſcience and ſenſe of ſome ſupreme Deitie, who is juſt to puniſh offenders. Would not every man without this be as a Leviathan, ready to devour his neighbor? Wel indeed might that daring Atheiſt title his Book of Politics Leviathan, ſeing every Atheiſt is or would be ſuch, if he follow his own principes? Are not Diſſimulation and Violence the two Cardinal Pillars of the Atheiſts Republic? O! what Schiſmes, Seditions, Tyrannie, Anarchie and univerſal Diſſolution muſt inevitably attend a Republic of Atheiſts? Who wil ever make conſcience or mind Juſtice, Order or Subjection to men, who are not overawed with a ſenſe of a ſupreme Deitie? When every mans Wil is his Law, who wil mind commun juſtice and equitie? How can the Atheiſt give cordial ſubjection to any Superior, who owns no ſupreme Rector to puniſh, and reward him? Thus we ſee miſerable confuſions and diſſolutions in States and Republics follow on the denying a Deitie and ſupreme Rector of the politic World. Doth not then the Atheiſt in denying the Being of a Deitie, deny the wel-being, yea ſubvert the very Being of the politic World, and al civil Societie?

(4) Laſtly,4. From the Atheists Cavils and Enmitie. al the Atheiſts Cavils and Enmitie againſt a Deitie, do clearly evince the exiſtence thereof. Were there not indeed a God, the Atheiſt would not be ſo ſedulous, induſtrious, indefatigable, and implacable in his aſſaults and attemts againſt him. We have a good inſtance hereof given us by Diogenes the Cynic, cited by Laertius in his Life, thus: Lyſia the Apothecarie asking Diogenes, Whether he believed there were any Gods? Diogenes replied: foreign; How can I but believe it, when I conſider what an enemie thou art to the Gods? May we not make the ſame replie to the moſt ſubtile and proud Atheiſts? Can we imagine that Atheiſtic Spirits would ſpend their moſt ſubtile Ratiocinations, the vigor of their Spirits and malice to ſubvert the belief of a Deitie, were there not indeed a God, whom they hate, and therefore would fain pul off his Throne? If the exiſtence of a Deitie were a poor emty ſhadow, a p. 237mere figment or nothing, would proud Atheiſts perſue it with ſuch violent paſſion and vehemence as they do? No; their enmitie againſt a Deitie ſtrongly proves his Exiſtence.