The Court of the Gentiles Part 4, Part 4 · Book 2 · Chapter 1
CHAP. I. Of Metaphyſic or Prime Philoſophie in general.
A general Idea of Metaphyſic or Prime Philoſophie: Its generic notion, Sapience: Its Object things most excellent, &c. Its difference from Theologie, as a natural Sapience: Its formal Act, Contemplation.
§. 1.Metaphyſic or prime Philoſophie in general. BEfore we enter on the bodie of Metaphyſic or Prime Philoſophie it wil be neceſſary that we give ſome general Notion thereof, thereby to diſabuſe the minds of men, who have been ſo long impoſed on by falſe Ideas, collected out of Ariſtotle's ſuppoſed Metaphyſics. For ſince Ariſtotle's Metaphyſics poſſeſſed the Scholes, al men have endeavored to conforme their metaphyſic Philoſophemes to them, as the original Exemplar, on a ſuppoſition that they were a part of Ariſtotle's genuine Workes. But I conceive it no difficult thing to demonſtrate, what ſome Learned men have undertaken, that thoſe Metaphyſics, which paſſe under Ariſtotle's name, are ſpurious, and not to be reckoned among his genuine Workes. For who can imagine, that ſuch a learned and accurate man as Ariſtotle was, ſhould be guilty of ſo great an abſurditie, as to ſtuffe up a great part of his Metaphyſics, with the ten Predicaments, and other Logic Notions, which he had ſo prolixely handled in his Organ of Logic? May we not take it for granted, that nothing properly belongs to Metaphyſics, but what is ſupernatural, as the name importes? Yea doth not the ſynonymous title, that Ariſtotle is ſaid to give this Science, cut off above the moitie of his Metaphyſics? For Stobaeus tels us, That it was Ariſtotles manner to cal Metaphyſic, Theologie. And this indeed he learned from his Maſter Plato, who ſeems to attribute unto Metaphyſic one and the ſame Idea with natural Theologie; the object whereof is God and things ſupernatural, ſo far as they may be contemplated by natural light. Hence we may define Metaphyſic, or Prime Philoſophic, according to Plato's mind, A natural Sapience or Theologie, for the contemplation of things ſupernatural and divine.
As for the generic Idea or Notion of Metaphyſic the Platoniſts general terme is foreign, Sapience; which is deduced from foreign Sophe, Metaphyſic Sapience.a Speculator or Contemplator; becauſe the ancient wiſe men were Contemplators, ſpecially of things divine. Indeed Cicero, Tuſc. 4. cals al Philoſophie, the ſtudie of Sapience: but the Grecian Philoſophers, Socrates, Plato, and Ariſtotle ſeem to confine Sapience to Metaphyſic: wherefore they define it, the knowlege of things most excellent and divine, ſpecially the firſt Being and Cauſe of althings. Whence they make the Object of this Sapience to be in the general (1) foreign, things most excellent and eximious, as the firſt Being and Cauſe: (2) foreign, things wonderful: i. e. ſuch oriental Traditions as Thales, Pythagoras, and Plato brought from the Barbarics, namely the Hebrews, &c. touching the firſt Origine of Things, the Wonders of Providence, the Worſhip of God, and Myſteries of Religion: which Ariſtotle eſtimed foreign, things inutile; becauſe beyond the ſphere of his confined corrupt Reaſon. Whence he ſtiles thoſe firſt Philoſophers, who traded in ſuch oriental Traditions foreign, Lovers of Fables or Traditions: For, ſaith he, a Fable is compoſed of things wonderful. (3) foreign, things moſt difficult to be known, namely Immaterials. (4) foreign, things divine. It was a general Principe among the Ancients, foreign, Sapience is a Science of things divine. Hence they made Sapience to be the ſame with Theologie. (5) foreign, that which eſſentially is; alſo foreign, that which always exiſtes; again, foreign, Being it ſelf; and laſtly foreign, Being ſimply, or the firſt Being, namely God. For Plato generally by foreign, Ens or Being, underſtandes the firſt independent Being, God, in compariſon of whom althings elſe are ſaid not to be, or to be mere nothings, as hereafter cap. 3. §. 1. Thence Plato makes Sapience to be foreign, the knowlege of Being, i. e. God. Whence alſo among the Egyptians, in the Temple dedicated to Minerva, the Goddeſſe of Wiſdome, there was this Inſcription: I am that which was, which is, which ſhal be. Which is conteined in the Moſaic deſcription of God,Exod. 3.14. Exod. 3.14. and denotes thus much, that God, who is the firſt, yea only independent eſſential Being, is the prime Cauſe and ſupreme Object of al Sapience, of which hereafter more fully. As for the proper act, properties and effects of Sapience in the general, we have fully handled them, in Philoſ. Gen. P. 2. l. 2. c. 4.
§. 2.Metaphyſic a natural Sapience. We define Metaphyſic a natural Sapience, whereby it is diſtinguiſhed from ſupernatural divine Theologie. It's true, Plato ſeems to make al Sapience divine and ſupernatural. Thus in his Epino. pag. 989. he makes al true knowlege of God to be from God. So Repub. 6. pag. 483. he proves, That the mind of man needs divine illumination for the underſtanding things divine, as much as the eye needs the light of the Sun to ſee things viſible. Hence alſo Plotinus, En. 5. l. 8. c. 5. pag. 546. makes God to be the eſſential Sapience, from whom al the rayes of created Sapience ſtream, as beams from the Sun. But in as much as theſe Gentile Philoſophers came altogether ſhort of al ſupernatural knowlege of God, which ſince the Fal of man is by God appropriated to the ſecond Covenant, it neceſſarily follows, that if we wil make Metaphyſic a Science diſtinct from ſupernatural Chriſtian Theologie, it can be no other than a natural Sapience of objects ſupernatural: ſuch as the wiſer of the Philoſophers, Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato attained unto, partly by the advantage they had from oriental Traditions, and partly from the working of their own inquiſitive minds thereon. So that by Metaphyſic here we underſtand only that natural Sapience, which Plato and other Philoſophers gained by their own inquiſitive thoughts, dwelling on oriental Traditions, and may be further improved by natural contemplation on objects ſupernatural. For we ſee by daily experience what great contemplations of God and things divine the natural mind of man may arrive unto, by means of ſupernatural Revelations, and the workings of his own thoughts thereon, together with ſome more commun illuminations of the Spirit; without any ſupernatural divine knowlege. We find this fully exemplified in multitudes of Platonic myſtic Divines, who have given us many raiſed ſublime ſpiritual notions of ſome of the higheſt Myſteries in Theologie, without any ſupernatural knowlege or ſenſe thereof. The ſame may be ſaid of many Schole-men, their contemplations of God and things divine. Again we cal Metaphyſic a natural Sapience, as it has for its fundament or proper ground rational Arguments, whereby it is diſtinguiſhed from ſupernatural Theologie, which has for its proper ground and foundation divine Teſtimonie and Autoritie. In Metaphyſic, as it is a part of Philoſophie, Reaſon is the higheſt Autoritie; but in Theologie the Autoritie of God is the higheſt Reaſon. Yet in as much as Metaphyſic ought to be ſubordinate to Theologie, we alſo may, yea ought ſometimes to explicate and demonſtrate ſeveral parts thereof by divine Teſtimonies. For as Metaphyſic at firſt borrowed its object from Theologie, ſo ſome of its beſt Arguments, Demonſtrations and Explications are to be fetcht thence.
§. 3. The proper Act of Metaphyſic is Contemplation: The proper act of metaphyſic Contemplation.whereby it is diſtinguiſhed from moral Prudence, which chiefly regards Action. Thence in the Platonic Definitions, Sapience is defined foreign, a contemplative Science. Not that Socrates or Plato excluded Action from Sapience and Metaphyſic, or Contemplation from moral Prudence and Ethics: for no active Science can be wel managed without contemplation, neither is any contemplative Science right, if it end not in Action. So that contemplative and active Sciences, according to Socrates and Plato, are not to be oppoſed, but compoſed, and made ſubordinate each to other; at leaſt the former to the later: Contemplation ought to aſſiſt Action in Morals; and Action ought to crown Contemplation in Metaphyſics. When therefore we make Contemplation the proper Act of Metaphyſic, in diſtinction from Action, which is the proper effect of moral Prudence, it muſt be underſtood, not in Ariſtotle's ſenſe, who makes contemplative or ſpeculative, and active or practic Sciences oppoſite ſpecies, and ſo inconſiſtent each with other; but in Plato's, who, Repub. 2. diſtributes Diſciplines into foreign, Muſic or Contemplative, and Gymnaſtic or Active: the former he makes to reſpect things divine, and the later things human. Whence the object of Metaphyſic being things divine, its proper Act muſt neceſſarily be Contemplation: For the higheſt and moſt noble act of the Soul about things ſupernatural and divine is contemplation; whence al Affections and Actions proportionable thereto follow in their courſe. Hence the formal Beatitude of the rational Soul is generally placed in viſion or contemplation as the principal part thereof.
This Contemplation,Contemplation of God the most excellent. wherein the Platoniſts place the formal Act of Sapience or Metaphyſic, is wel deſcribed by Alcinous, in his Syſteme of Platonic Philoſophie: foreign, Contemplation is a vigorous operation of the Intellect underſtanding things intelligible. The proper object of this Contemplation they make to be Truth, ſpecially the first Truth, whereby the life of the Underſtanding is nouriſhed and maintained. Thence Plato, Repub. 6. pag. 485. tels us, That nothing is more akin to Wiſdome or Metaphyſic than Truth. And in his Timaeus, pag. 90. he makes Contemplation of Truth, principally divine, to be the proper motion of the Soul. And more expreſſely, Repub. 5. pag. 475. he ſaith, Thoſe only are true Philoſophers, who are much converſant foreign, in the contemplation of that which eſſentially is, namely God: alſo, foreign, ſuch as are moſt greedy to contemplate the firſt Truth. So, in his Phaedrus, pag. 247. he aſſures us, That the contemplation of God with a pure mind, furniſheth us with al other convenient cogitations: for the Soul contemplating that which truely is, and acquieſcing in this contemplation, is thereby nouriſhed and recreated with the higheſt pleaſures: and then having acquired the genuine Sapience or Science of that which eſſentially is, and immutably ſuch, being as it were feſted with theſe delices, it again enters into the interior parts of Heaven and returnes home. Wherein he gives us a lively deſcription of thoſe ſatisfactorie pleaſures and delights, which attend the contemplation of God. Thus in the Scholes they uſually determine, That a contemplative life is more excellent than an active: and they ground their determination on the preference that our Lord gives to Marie, Luke 10.42.Luke 10.42. And their reaſons are ſuch as theſe: becauſe a contemplative life is, (1) more tranquille and ſerene: (2) more deſirable for it ſelf: (3) more permanent and laſting: (4) more ſelf-ſufficient and ſatisfactorie: (5) more delicious and ſweet: (6) more agreable to mans more noble part, the Soul: (7) more divine and beatific. Which being underſtood of the contemplation of God, holds moſt true, provided that this contemplation be rightly qualified, namely that it be real, pure, ſpiritual, lively, diſtinct, firme, ſolid, affective, effective and influential on the divine life.