Vindication of the Doctrine of Predetermination, Pages 1-63

Vindication of the Doctrine of Predetermination · Pages 1-63

p. 1De Cauſa Dei.

IT has been always judged very needful in Polemicks to ſtate the Queſtion, and explain the terms, when they labour under any ambiguity, or however fall not under the apprehenſion of thoſe who are to be inſtructed, for want of skill in that art or ſcience to which they belong, or language from which they are borrowed. In neither of theſe reſpects will it be needleſs in the Controverſie now to be agitated; not as to the firſt, becauſe Mr. Howe gives us his ſenſe in various terms, and ſuch as ſeem repugnant to each other: one while that which he denies is, a Predeterminative concurrence to all actions of the Creatures, Let. p. 32. and Poſtſc. p. 3. and Predeterminative concourſe, Poſt. p. 19. another while 'tis Predetermining Influence, Poſt. p. 19. and a Determinative influence, Let. p. 36. and Efficacious influence, Poſt. p. 52. As for the two former phraſes (which are of the ſame import) they are in effect contradictio in adjecto in their conjunction. I appeal to Strangius, Mr. H.'s friend, but my Adverſary in the main Queſtion under conſideration, Hujuſmodi p. 2Predeterminationem nonnulli confundunt cum concurſu Dei generali quem concurſum praevium appellant, &c. i.e. Some confound this kind of Predetermination with the general concourſe of God. But they ſpeak very improperly who call Predetermination a previous [or Predeterminative] concourſe, or ſay that God does by concourſe determine ſecond cauſes: and he quotes Twiſſe with approbation, ſaying, Concurrere cum agente aliquo modo, &c. i.e. To concur with an agent ſome way to the production of an effect, is not to determine that agent. For the Creature alſo concurs with God to the production of an effect, and yet it does not determine God: therefore nor does God concurring with the Creature determine it to act. Strang. de Vol. Dei, Lib. 2. Cap. 4. p. 161. Strangius does not call the terms a contradiction, I confeſs, but the reaſon out of Twiſſe gave him as juſt ground (as it does me) ſo to call them. As for the latter phraſe, influence, which he makes equipollent with the former concourſe, in theſe words, I here affect not the curioſity to diſtinguiſh theſe two terms as ſome do, Poſt. p. 29. I had rather he ſhould hear Strangius again, than me blaming his not affecting that curioſity of diſtinction: Caeterum nobis operaepretium videtur diſtinguere inter iſta duo vocabula concurſum & influxum, &c. i.e. But it ſeems worth our labour to diſtinguiſh between p. 3thoſe two words Concourſe and Influence, which in this matter are often conjoined and confounded. For firſt, Influence is of a larger extent than Concourſe. For the cauſality of every Cauſe, especially the Efficient, is called Influence. And therefore in many inſtances there may be obſerved an Influence of God, when yet there is no concourſe, as when he acts, not making uſe of any ſecond cauſe. Again, although in the concourſe of two Cauſes each of them are conſidered as having their Influence, yet the word Influence is abſolute, and noting a reſpect to another cauſe; but the word Concourſe is relative to another cauſe. Strang. de Vol. Deil. 1. c. 11. p. 59. As for the term Efficacious, it ſuits us well enough, if Mr. H. intends by it an Infallibility of the event, or the certain production of thoſe actions which God hath an Influence upon. The ambiguity of Mr. H. phraſes removed, and the ſenſe of them brought to a certainty, I aſſert the contradictory to his Propoſition, That God doth not by an Efficacious influence univerſally move and determine men to all their actions, even thoſe that are moſt wicked, Poſt. p. 52. Which if we might be allowed the liberty of our own terms, we would thus lay down, That God does determine, or predetermine, or move all Creatures to all and each of their actions. Strangius fairly enough cites our Theſis, lib. 2. cap. 4. pag. 155. The Queſtion p. 4then to be diſcuſſed is, Whether God does determine or predetermine all Creatures to all and each of their actions? So Strang. fairly, l. 2 c. 4. p. 155. Unleſs it may ſeem meet to add that reduplicative particle, as ſuch, becauſe of Mr. Howe's addition, even thoſe that are moſt wicked, Poſt. p. 52. As to which it is to be noted, that we who aſſert Predetermination of all actions of the Creatures, do limit it to the actions conſidered abſtractly from the moral good or evil adhering to them: as for inſtance, we hold Gods Predetermination of the natural act whereby David begat a child in Adultery, as well as of thoſe whereby he begat children in lawful Matrimony; and of the uſe of his tongue in telling a lie to Abimelech the Prieſt, as well as in praiſing God. Whereas Mr. Howe limits Gods Predetermination only to morally [or ſpiritually] good actions as ſuch, Poſtſ. p. 39. n. 6. Which Predeter nation ſpecial, we grant; but withal aſſert a general, which extends to evil actions. In which we conſider,

1. The ſubject; and as to this we ſay that ſin is in that which is good, the nature of man and his faculties and actions, and theſe God excites and guides efficaciouſly. And this ſubject is called the materiale or ſubſtrate matter of ſin.

2. The end; and thus though not the nature, p. 5yet the exiſtence of ſin is good, or it is good that ſin ſhould be, becauſe God draws good out of it; and hence God predetermines to the natural actions, though he knows ſin will adhere to them. The grand term then to be explained is Predetermination, or (as ſome Divines and Metaphyſicians ſometimes call it) Praecurſe and Praemotion, of which terms the former which ſignifies a fore appointment, is either from eternity, or in time. The latter two, only in time. The former (viz.) Predetermination, is either from eternity, and ſo is an immanent act of Gods, that is, of his will to produce in time all the actions of his Creatures; or in time, which is the actual production of all thoſe actions which he had decreed to produce. And of this latter only is the Queſtion to be diſcuſſed underſtood; and this act of Gods is called Predetermination, becauſe it limits the creature to this action rather than to that; and 'tis called a Precourſe, or Premotion, i.e. a running before, or fore motion, (as I may ſo ſpeak), becauſe in order of nature it is before the action of the creature. Again, Predetermination [or Precourſe, or Premotion], is diſtinguiſhed into Phyſical or Moral. The latter, I grant may be aſcribed to God with reference to good actions as ſuch, but not with reſpect to evil actions, unleſs the propoſing objects p. 6and occaſions of ſin may (as ſome learned men judg) be reduced to the actions of a moral cauſe. But whether the moral acts of God in commanding, threatning, promiſing, &c. may be juſtly denominated Predetermination, will remain dubitable till another doubt be reſolved, (viz.) Whether the will do always follow the laſt practical dictate of the underſtanding. Againſt the affirmative of which Queſtion (to note that obiter) the moſt acute and learned Wallis ſeems to oppoſe an irrefragable Argument, viz. that the Will then is not diſabled by the fall more than the will of the confirmed Angels and Saints in Heaven. Wallis Truth tried againſt the Lord Brook, p. 55. But let Predetermination Moral fall or ſtand, our Queſtion is not of that, but of Phyſical Predetermination, as appears in that we make it common to all creatures, ſome whereof are not capable of a Moral Predetermination, (ſuppoſing that to be) which yet is not intended to be agitated at preſent, but only that which is exerciſed about free agents, that is, rational creatures. Which that it may be done with more clearneſs, and may in part obviate ſome of our learned Antagoniſt's objections, we ſhall endeavour, with as much accuracy as is needful to a diſcourſe that will fall into other than learned mens hands, to p. 7conſider Predetermination as contradiſtinguiſhed, or oppoſed rather to two things, which are acknowledged by him as Gods Acts reſpecting the actions of free agents, (not excluding natural), (viz.) Conſervation and immediate Concourſe, or Concurrence; the conceſſion of the former of which two, will not be ſound ſufficient to entitle God to the honour of the firſt cauſe of his creatures actions; and of the latter will (unleſs we take our meaſures amiſs) inforce him to grant that Predetermination which now he denies. Firſt as to Conſervation, we muſt obſerve, that as Creation ſtands oppoſed to nothing; ſo Conſervatition to Annihilation, i. e. making that ceaſe to be ſomething which was ſo; and it differs from Creation only in this, that it notes a continuation of that being, and its powers and faculties, which were given by creation, as being a continuation of that action by which it was produced; and therefore is commonly ſtiled continua creatio, and not unfitly termed by the School-men manutenentia Dei, i. e. Gods hand-hold, becauſe by it God holds up all things, as it were, with an hand from falling into nothing; by the withdrawing of which, Divines generally think the world would be annihilated.

Secondly, As to concourſe or concurrence, p. 8it may be thus defined; It is an extrinſickaction of God, by which he does with ſecond cauſes, [or the creatures] immediately produce all their natural actions and effects. 1. It is an action of God to diſtinguiſh it from the power communicated and conſerved to ſecond cauſes, (by which they perform their ſeveral operations) by creation and conſervation. 2. Extrinſick to diſtinguiſh it from his Decree of this action called concourſe, which decree is an intrinſick action. 3. With ſecond cauſes, or the creatures, becauſe it is ſuch an action as joins with the creature; as when the Writing-Maſter and the Scholar ſhape the ſame letter by the Maſters guiding the Scholars hand. 4. I add, all their actions, and what is produced by action or the effects, as when the Maſter and Scholar write, not only is the action the ſame, but the effect; the letters are the ſame which are done by both together. 5. Natural actions and effects, to exclude what by accident adheres to the actions and effects; which ſeeing they are defects, cannot be produced by a proper efficiency, and ſo nor God concur to the production of them by ſuch efficiency. 6. Immediately produce, to note the intimacy of the conjunction of God with the creature in the production of natural actions; which is ſuch, that one p. 9and the ſame action is the action of God and of the creature.

3. As to Predetermination, it is thus defined. It is a tranſient action of God which excites every creature to act. It is called a tranſient action of God, in oppoſition to Immanent, or the Will and Decree of God that the creature ſhould act. That is diſtinguiſhed from Concourſe or Concurrence thus. 1. The very difference of the particles, Prae and Con, i. e. Before and with, notes that the former is in order of nature (though not of time), before the creatures action, the latter with it. 2. That the former notes the reduction of the creatures powers into act: the latter notes Gods acting with the creature. 3. The former is to be conceived of per modum principii, under the notion of a principle, or cauſe of the creatures acting: the latter only, per modum actionis, i. e. as importing Gods acting with the creature. 4. The Terminus or object of that action of Gods, which we call Predetermination, is the ſecond cauſe it ſelf, the reaſonable creature: but the Terminus or object of that action of Gods, called concourſe or concurrence, is the action of the ſecond cauſe, and effect produced by that action. So that the Queſtion in plain words is, Whether God does move men to all their natural actions, p. 10and ſo to one rather than another. The Proteſtants generally maintain the affirmative, and how forcibly Mr. Howe oppoſes it, remains now to be conſidered.

The terms explained, we ſhall endeavour a defence of our Arguments, which Mr. Howe hath thought meet to ſingle out.

The firſt of the two Arguments of ours; which ſeeming most importunate and enforcing, he hath attempted to enervate, is.

Arg. 1. That it neceſſarily belongs to the Original and Fountain-Being to be the firſt Cauſc of whatſoever Being; and conſequently, that what there is of poſitive Being in any the moſt wicked action, muſt principally owe it ſelf to the determinative productive influence of this firſt and Soveraign Cauſe: Otherwiſe, it would ſeem that there were ſome Being that were neither primum, nor a primo, [i. e. neither the firſt Being, nor from the firſt Being], Let. p. 35.

Anſw. To which he Anſwers, It may well be thought ſufficiently to ſalve the rights and priviledges of the firſt Cauſe, to aſſert that no action can be done, but by a power derived from it; which in reference to forbidden actions, intelligent Creatures may uſe or not uſe as they pleaſe, without over-aſſerting, that they muſt be irreſiſtibly determined alſo, even to the worſt of actions done by them, Let. p. 36.

p. 11Reply. For the better underſtanding of our Argument, and the proof thereto annexed; together with Mr Howes Anſwer thereunto, it will not be unneedful to reduce them to Syllogiſms: the Argument thus,

All poſitive Being are effects of the firſt Cauſe. All ſinful actions, as actions, [for that is our limitation], are poſitive Beings. Ergo, All ſinful actions [as actions] are effects of the firſt Cauſe, [viz. God].

The Major [or firſt propoſition] is proved by an Hypothetical Syllogiſm, thus: If all poſitive Beings are not effects of the firſt Cauſe, then there is ſome poſitive Being which is neither primum [ens] nor a primo, [i. e.] neither the firſt Being, nor from the firſt Being, [or which is neither God nor a Creature]. But there is no poſitive Being which is neither the firſt Being, nor from the firſt Being. Ergo, All poſitive Beings are effects of the firſt Cauſe. To the Argument it ſelf Mr. Howe replies nothing, nor yet to the proof, in form (as by the Laws of Argumentation he was obliged). But ſeems to diſtinguiſh in the Major between a double dependance, which poſitive Beings have upon God as the firſt Cauſe; one, that they have no power but from God; the other, that the exerciſe or uſe of that power is from p. 12God. The former he grants; the latter he denies, but with a limitation as to forbidden actions.

To which we Reply,

1. That this Anſwer is fatal to his own Conceſſion of Gods immediate concurrence to all the actions of his Creatures, Poſtſc. p. 28. For it amounts to as much, as if in terminis, he had aſſerted a mediate concurrence only to ſome actions, (viz. forbidden actions; and this was the paſſage I preſume that gave Mr. Gale occaſion to charge Mr. Howe with Durandus his Opinion, which was, That God concurs remotely and mediately with ſecond Cauſes, (viz.) no otherwiſe than as he confers and conſerves their Eſſence and Power of action, by which they themſelves act nextly and immediately. And for ought I can yet underſtand a very juſt occaſion; for though Mr. Howe in the place abovecited acknowledges immediate concurrence; yet in the Letter it ſelf, by which Mr. Gale was to make an eſtimate of his judgment, there was ne gru quidem, not a Syllable of any ſuch thing.

2. It is hard to conceive the reaſon of Mr. Howe's limitation; why forbidden actions ſhould be only by power derived from God; and good actions or indifferent, require alſo an irreſiſtible determination; p. 13when the material of the actions morally diverſified is often the very ſame. For inſtance, In the motion of my hand to kill another out of ſpleen and private revenge, or to kill my enemy in a lawful ſelf-defence, or to ſtrike my friend in merriment. I am aware that he attempts to wipe off the aſperſion of ſymbolizing with Durandus, becauſe he denies immediate concourſe univerſally, whereas himſelf denies only determinative concourſe to wicked actions, Poſtſc. p. 28, 29. And be it ſo, that his attempt hath been ſucceſsful, yet I muſt give Durandus the precedence of Mr. Howe for ſagacity in this point; and do judg that he ſpake more conſonantly to himſelf, and the truth, when he affirmed that the indetermination of the power given to the creature, was ſo univerſal, as to extend equally to evil actions and to good. For it ſeems evident enough that all natural actions, as ſuch, [the Subjects of moral good and evil] muſt either have, or want immediate concurrence.

3. This Anſwer runs counter to Mr. Howe's aſſertion elſewhere, That in reference to ſinful actions by this influence [determinative] God doth not only ſuſtain men who do them, and continue to them their natural faculties and powers whereby they are done, [which is all Mr. Howe hath granted us p. 14hitherto in his Anſwer to our Argument, from the dependance of the ſecond Cauſe upon the firſt]; but alſo as the firſt mover, ſo far excite and actuate thoſe powers, as that they are apt and habile for any congenerous action, &c. Poſtſc. p. 41. For if by exciting and actuating the powers, he means that God reduces them to act, he hath taken a large jump from Durandus to Twiſſe: for the latter (nor we who follow him) neither ſays nor means any more by Predetermination. And we cannot tell what other meaning to affix to his words, without upbraiding him with ſtrange inadvertency in his choice of them. For elſe he conſounds Concurrence either with Conſervation; which latter keeps the powers apt and habile [as they are made] or with Predetermination, whereas this goes before, that goes along with the Creatures act.

But now I attend to the proof of his ſtrange Aſſertion, for a proof I underſtand it to be) though he introduces it with a Beſides; (a particle which commonly is a ſign of an additional Argument) which thus preſents it ſelf.

Anſ. It ſeems infinitely to detract from the perfection of the ever bleſſed God, to affirm he was not able to make a creature of ſuch a nature as being continually ſuſtained by him, and ſupplied with power every moment ſuitable to p. 15its nature, ſhould be capable of acting, unleſs whatſoever he thus enables, he determine [th… is, for it can mean no leſs thing, impel] it to do it alſo. Let. p. 36, 37.

Rep. 1. If we ſhould take liberty of judging things by their appearance at firſt ſight, without giving our ſelves the trouble of a ſtrict diſquiſition, we might eaſily be ſeduced into an imagination, that it does no leſs infinitely detract from the Divine Perfection, to affirm. That God was not able to make a Creature of ſuch a nature, as that it might continually ſuſtain it ſelf, without a ſupply of power every moment from God; for that opinion ſeems to tye God to a ſhorter tedder, than an ingenuous Artificer, who can raiſe an Edifice that ſhall laſt many years, without any need of his help for reparations.

And this I the rather take notice of, becauſe I find it the ſentiment of the moſt acute Suarez, That they who deny Gods immediate Operation in every action of the Creature, [which Mr. H. ſeems to do in his Anſwer now under diſcuſſion] will doubtleſs be compelled to deny that the Creature does depend immediately upon the actual influence of God. For (which is his reaſon) that which depends not upon God in acting, nor does it depend upon him in its being. Met. Diſp. 20.

p. 162. This confirmation of Mr. H. Aſſertion is guilty of two unpardonable faults in a man of Learning and Ingenuity, (viz.) a too early anticipation, and immodeſt begging of the main Queſtion. An anticipation, in alledging the impelling, i. e. compelling (for that is his ſenſe of the term, as will appear e're long) men to act, as the import of Predetermining; whereas there is no neceſſity of hooking in ſuch an import of it: for ſuppoſe it no way to abridg the liberty of the Will, yet by Mr. H's Argumentation, it is eo nomine to be rejected, becauſe the ſuſtaining the Creature and ſupplying it with power every moment ſuitable to its nature, [that is, in Durandus ſtile, mediate concurrence] is to be judged ſufficient to enable the Creature to act, without determining it to action; upon no leſs peril to them that ſhall dare to judg it inſufficient, than to be reputed detracters from the Perfection of the ever-bleſſed God. And a begging of the Queſtion 'tis, which I may well call immodeſt, becauſe he knows we neither can nor will grant it, without ruining our Hypotheſis; nor need we do it, becauſe he elſewhere owns it unreaſonable to imagine that God cannot in any caſe determine the will of a rational Creature, in a way agreeable enough to its nature. Let. p. 141.

I confeſs he gives us here but an inch, but p. 17we will venture to take an ell; I mean, to extend his conceſſion of ſome caſes to every caſe, and particularly to our caſe of ſinful actions. For let our ſentiment be burdened with what other load Mr. H. ſhall pleaſe (as the truth is he is not over merciful to the Predeterminants) I think he hath diſcharged it of forcing the will, till he hath evinced a ſpecialty in our caſe, which will be ſomewhat an uneaſie task, though we ſhould grant him his own option, that God predetermines to ſinful actions in concreto, i.e. to the actions and ſinfulneſs of them too; for upon that ſuppoſition there is leſs neceſſity to imagine that God cannot determine the will in a way agreeable enough to mans [corrupt] nature; becauſe he does but determine it to what it hath an innate propenſion to of it ſelf; and ſo Gods determination is but as the wind in a mans back, which puts him on a little faſter in the way he was going before.

3. We are at a great loſs as to Mr. H's meaning, whether it be that it is a detraction from Gods perfection, to affirm, God was not able to make a Creature that could not act univerſally without determination, or particularly as to forbidden actions; the generality of the terms calls for the former ſenſe, the concluſion he was to prove, for the latter.

p. 181. If the former ſenſe be that he will own, I ſeem to my ſelf fairly allowed to infer, that then man in his primitive ſtate had not, nor have the good. Angels at preſent, any Divine determination to good actions, becauſe to both unneceſſary; and unneceſſary it muſt be preſumed, becauſe it is a detraction from Gods Perfection to conceive he could not make them of ſuch a nature, as that they ſhould not need it, and becauſe they had no diſinclination to be overcome by an efficaciouſly determinative influence, (which is the reaſon Mr. H. gives of the neceſſity of Predetermination to holy actions in the lapſed ſtate. Poſt. p. 35. Which if it be of any force makes it unneceſſary to a ſtate of Integrity.) And if this inference be natural, I wonder not that Man fell, but that he fell not as ſoon as he was ſet upon his legs; nor that ſome of the good Angels turned Rebels ſo ſoon to their Soveraign Lord, but how the reſt perſevere in their Loyalty. I have hitherto ſwom with the ſtream of Proteſtant Divines, (not becauſe it was eaſie, but in my apprehenſion ſafe) who have conceived the good Angels ſecurity an effect of a greater degree of determinative influence, (to borrow Mr. H's Phraſe) or corroborating grace, that is, in the terms of the Queſtion now agitated, Predetermination, than was afforded to the [now] bad Angels; or to ſpeak more ſtrictly p. 19of the continuance of that Predetermination to the one, which was ſuſpended as to the other: which conception of Divines (to note that in paſſage) may be eaſily freed from the imputation of reflecting either upon Gods Holineſs, Juſtice, or Truth; upon the firſt, becauſe God by the ſuſpenſion of Predetermination was no more the Efficient of the Angels ſin, than the Sun of the darkneſs that overſpreads the air, when it hath withdrawn its rays; upon the ſecond, for it is a ruled caſe in the Schools, Non datur juſtitia proprie dicta inter Deum & Creaturas; i. e. God cannot be properly ſaid to be a debtor to his Creatures; no not when he hath paſſed a promiſe to them, for even then, (if we will ſpeak ſtrictly) he is a debtor to himſelf, namely to his own truth and fidelity, not to them; and if he ſhould (to ſuppoſe an impoſſibility for illuſtration-ſake) break his word, he would be but Mendax, non injurius, a Lyar, not unjuſt. Not upon his Truth, for he was not under the bond of a promiſe, (as he is to the part of repaired Mankind, whom we denominate Saints) to preſerve the Angels from Apoſtacy. As for thoſe who take this Doctrine for a blemiſh upon Gods goodneſs, I turn them over to God himſelf, for a reconciliation of theſe two ſeemingly contradictory Propoſitions, contained in his Word, and within the verge of p. 20our own experience, that God is good, and [yet] that he hath permitted a paſſage for ſin, which he could have impeded.—If the latter ſenſe be avowed, as a genuine interpretation of Mr. H's mind; I know not how it will be able to ſave its credit, if I ſhould charge it with being guilty of this groſs abſurdity, viz. a ſuppoſal that God made Man with an ability to do ſinful actions in concreto, i. e. the natural actions, and ſin that adheres to them. 'Tis true, God made Man mutable, and how could he do otherwiſe? (unleſs he ſhould have made him a God) which very terms involve an inſufferable contradiction) and ſo in a remote capacity of ſinning. But Mr. H's words import a next or immediate capacity of acting, which the Creature is capable of, as ſoon as it ſtarts out of nothing into ſomething, without the intervenient aid of Predetermination. I am very averſe from thinking this to be Mr. H's meaning; and I would offer him a friendly hand (if he would accept of it) to help him out of the pit he is fallen into, by minding him of our diſtinction between the materiale and formale of ſin, the natural action that is the ſubject, and the ſin that is the [inſeparable] adjunct, in our temporary eſtate: which diſtinction ſuppoſed, in conj…nction with Mr. H's Hypotheſis, Mr. H's meaning will be freed from the encumbrance p. 21now inferred upon it; and it will amount to no more than that the power of acting God gave to man, ſuffices to the natural actions, ſince ſin adhered to them, as well as before, without the help of Predetermination. But then this friendly hand will prove unfriendly in the iſſue; for though it may clear him of one, yet it will entangle him in many abſurdities, or (at leaſt ſelf-contradictions: For then,

1. How ſhall he quit himſelf from the blame of being a Favourer of Durandus Hypotheſis? for the ſenſe is the ſame, and the words not much different. And yet why ſhould he once attempt it, ſeeing that Hypotheſis ſerves his profeſſed deſign of quitting God of the blame of being the Author of Sin, with much officiouſneſs: and that he may accept this ſuggeſtion the more kindly, a moſt Learned hand ſhall tender it to him: Some are of opinion that God hath no immediate influence, but mediate only, in reſpect of voluntary agents. And according to this opinion it is eaſie to clear God from the imputation of being the Author of Sin, and yet to acknowledg his concurrence with ſecond Cauſes, in producing their defective effects. If the will of the Creature, ſaith Scotus, C. 2. Diſt. 37. Q. 1. were the total and immediate cauſe of her action, and that God had no immediate efficiency, but mediate only in reſpect thereof, as p. 22ſome think: It were eaſie according to that opinion to ſhew how God may be freed from the imputation of being the Author of Sin, and yet to acknowledg his concurrence with ſecond Cauſes, for the producing of their effects: for whether we ſpeak of that which is material or formal in ſin, the will only ſhould be the total cauſe of it, and God ſhould no way be a cauſe of it but mediately, in that he cauſed and produced ſuch a will, that might at her pleaſure do what ſhe would. Durandus ſeemeth to incline to this opinion, ſuppoſing that ſecond Cauſes do bring forth their actions and operations by and of themſelves, and that God no otherwiſe concurreth actually to the production of the ſame, but in that he preſerveth the ſecond Cauſes in that being and power of working, which firſt he gave them. Thus far the moſt Learned Dr. Field, of the Church, B. 3. Ch. 23. pag. 121, 122. And yet he adds his diſlike of Durandus opinion in theſe words: But they that are of ſounder judgment reſolve, that as the light enlightneth the air, and with the air all other inferiour things: ſo God not only giveth being and power of working to the ſecond Cauſes, and preſerveth them in the ſame, but together with them hath an immediate influence into the things that are to be effected by them, &c. Ibid. p. 122.

3. What account can be given of his exploding our diſtinction between the material p. 23and formal part of ſin? [approved of above by Dr. Field]. Moſt of his way, (viz. Mr. Gales) mince the buſineſs, and ſay, the concurrence is only to the action, which is ſinful; not as ſinful, ſo Mr. Howe's Poſtſc. p. 33.

Anſw. Except it were affirmed, that it implied a contradiction for God to make ſuch a creature, there is no imaginable pretence, why it ſhould not be admitted he hath done it, Let. p. 37. and ſubjoins ſoon after, I muſt confeſs a greater diſpoſition to wonder that ever ſuch a thing ſhould be diſputed, than diſpute ſo plain a caſe, p. 38.

Reply. That it is affirmed, Mr. Howe cannot ſurely be ignorant; nay, he frees himſelf from that blame. I am not altogether ignorant what attempts have been made to prove it impoſſible, p. 38. but in the interim he incurs another of contradicting himſelf.

This Argument, ab abſurdo, from the implication of Gods making a creature independent upon himſelf, is urged againſt thoſe that deny immediate concurrence (and ſo by juſt conſequence conſervation) and Predetermination.

1. As to mediate concurrence, 'tis urged for it by Durandus, That there is no repugnuncy nor contradiction for God to make a creature that ſhould be able to act without p. 24his help [otherwiſe, that is, than by conſerving its being and powers]. To this is Anſwered, Involvere repugnantiam quod creaturae ſit potens, &c. That it involves a repugnancy and contradiction, that the creature ſhould be able to act independently upon the Creator, as well in reſpect of the created cauſe it ſelf, which hath neceſſarily a power of acting commenſurate and proportionable to its own being, as in reſpect of the action or effect flowing from it; for ſeeing they are Beings by participation, they eſſentially depend upon the firſt Being. Wherefore, as the Divine power cannot produce a Being independent upon him in its Being, ſo nor produce an Agent independent upon him in acting. Suarez. Met. T. 1. D. 22. n. 16. One egg is not more like another, than Durandus Argument to Mr. Howe's; nor can a more ſolid Anſwer be given thereto, no, though Mr. Howe ſhould acknowledg immediate concurrence, (as in his Poſtſc. he does) of which, in his whole Letter there is altum ſilentium, and deny only Predetermination: for this Anſwer is a ſhoo that will fit either foot (as will appear in its place).

2. As to conſervation, the no neceſſity of Gods continual influx to that end ſeems colourably affirmed upon this ground too, That it is not repugnant to Omnipotency to produce ſuch creatures, as when once made, p. 25may continue their Being; though the operation of the Agent ceaſe, by which they were produced. To this Argument Suarez alſo fits a rational reply; Ad amplitudinem divinae potentiae ſpectat, &c. It belongs to the amplitude of the Divine Power, that nothing is, nor can be a moment after its production without its influence; and alſo that it have full dominion over all his creatures, and an intrinſick power of annihilating them, by the ſuſpenſion or withholding of his influence, Suarez. Met. T. 1. D. 21. n. 2, 17.

3. Which is directly to our caſe upon Mr. Howe's explication of his mind, that he does really believe Gods immediate concourſe to all actions of his creatures, both immediatione virtutis & ſuppoſiti, yet not determinative to wicked actions, Poſtſc. p. 28. we ſhall adventure a demonſtration, that it implies a contradiction for God to make a creature that can act without Predetermination, i. e. applying it to action, and to one rather than another action; and 'tis this, that ſuch a creature would be but ens ſecundarium, a ſecond being; not cauſa ſecunda, a ſecond cauſe, or (which is all one) God ſhould be but ens primum, not cauſa prima, the firſt Being, not the firſt Cauſe; which I prove thus.

Arg. 1. If God does concur only by ſimultaneous concourſe, and not by Predetermination, p. 26or previous motion, then God cannot be the cauſe of the actions of the creatures as they proceed from them. But the conſequent is abſurd; and Mr. Howe, I preſume, will not own it. Therefore ſo is the Antecedent. The Conſequence is proved thus: God is not by concourſe the cauſe of the actions of the creatures, as thoſe actions proceed from them, becauſe then concourſe muſt be before the action of the creature (for every Phyſical cauſe is before the effect), but the very name concourſe, imports a joyning together in the ſame action, as the Maſter and Scholar, whoſe hand is guided in ſhaping the ſame letter. And all conſent, in concourſe, neither does God act before the creature, nor the creature before God, but both together, and at once.

Arg. 2. To make good the Engliſh Proverb, He is twice killed, that is killed with his own weapon. I ſhall retort, Mr. Howe's two conceſſions upon him.

1. If there be an immediate concourſe, then there is a Predetermination, or putting the creature upon action before it acts; or elſe the creature is the firſt mover of it ſelf to action. The conſequence is plauſible enough, as depending on this ground, that by concourſe alone we have no account given us how God and the creature join in one individual p. 27action rather than another. As for inſtance, in the ſtate of innocency, when man was incircled with a variety of trees of the Garden, all good and fit for food, whence was it that he will'd to eat of one rather than another. The concourſe of God with Adam's will in the election of one (ſuppoſe that in the midſt of the Garden, before the prohibition paſſed upon it) could not determine it to that rather than to any of the reſt, as is plain in external actions. Two men lanching a wherry-boat concur to the ſame effect; but the one does not determine the other, by lending common aſſiſtance to that act. There muſt be therefore a Predetermination in order of nature, though not of time, to that act of Adam's will [ſuppoſed] of eating that tree inſtanced in, to which God concurred. This may be illuſtrated by the example of a Writing-Maſter and his Scholar, wherein there is a concurrence to the action of writing, and its effect the letter written; and alſo a Predetermination, a putting the Scholar upon the action of writing, (not morally, for that influence is diſcerned in commanding a Scholar to write by himſelf; but Phyſically, by putting his hand on the Scholars to write, and to write one letter rather than another. An account how the particular action of any rational p. 28creatures will, comes to be determined upon the excluſion of Predetermination, I know none can be given. Not by chance, upon the occaſional ſudden preſentation of an object; becauſe the action is Gods (who is not liable to any ſuch impreſſions) as well as the creatures; not by the creatures ſelf-determining power, for that, as ſuch, is indeterminate as to the acts to which we conceive it muſt be ſome way or other determined. And theſe two Propoſitions are ſo evident, that concurrence immediate does not determine the will, and that yet it muſt be determined, that Baronius himſelf, who is an Antipredeterminant, does acknowledg both, Met. 7, 8. Diſp. 3. n. 66. and he does ſuggeſt a reaſon againſt any neceſſity laid upon a thing by Divine Preſcience, which we will accept of for a neceſſity of Divine Predetermination to the acts of the will. Illud ſolum imponit neceſſitatem alicui rei, quod eſt prima ratio cur illa res non potuit non evenire, i. e. That alone impoſes neceſſity upon any thing which is the firſt reaſon or cauſe why that thing could not but fall out. Baron. Met. 7, 12. D. 2. n. 59. [which neceſſity, that it excludes not the liberty of mans will, ſhall be cleared in due time].

2. Again, from the neceſſity conceded by Mr. Howe, of immediate concourſe and Predetermination to the production of good actions, p. 29we ſhall infer the neceſſity of both to all actions: This neceſſity muſt take its riſe either from ſomething common to all actions, or peculiar to good actions. The removing the latter, will be the fixing the former in its due place. In order hereunto, we muſt conſider that grace is an habit ſeated in the natural faculties, and fitting them for good actions; which as it was concreated with them in innocency; ſo in the lapſed eſtate it is re-created, or created again by infuſion: which infuſion is not Predetermination: for this latter ſtill preſuppoſes the former. There muſt be grace in habit before it can be acted. Now then the Query is, whether the terminus of Predetermination be the habit or the faculties; not the habit, for that is a Quality that meliorates the faculties, and ſo the actions, in genere morali, and cannot be put upon action, or one rather than another, but mediante potentia, by the intervention of the power or faculty in which the gracious habit reſides. It muſt then be the faculties; the will for inſtance (for of that is the grand inquiry), for otherwiſe (ſuppoſing what has been owned, that holy habits fit the will for holy volitions and nolitions) in what degree the habits are confirmed, in that the will may act without Predetermination, and produce ſincerely p. 30good actions as it pleaſe, as long as theſe good actions are done by a power derived originally from it, [which is Mr. Howe's Hypotheſis, and judged by him ſufficient to ſalve the rights and priviledge of the firſt cauſe, with reference to forbidden actions, Let. p. 36. [and I ſee not, why not as well with reference to commanded actions]. The reſult of this ratiocination will be, that if it be the indetermination of the powers to individual actions that makes an excitation of them to one rather than another neceſſary; and the poſſibility of action contained in the powers, that makes the reducing of that poſſibility to action no leſs neceſſary to good actions, then the conſequence ſeems immovable, that Predetermination in its two Branches is alike neceſſary to all actions, even when they flow from a will tainted with vicious habits and inclinations. Quod erat demonſtrandum And to me this Argument ſeems to carry along with it triumphant evidence, (to borrow one of Mr. Howe's lofty Epithetes, Let. p. 62.) my fancy labours under ſo deſpicable poverty as to be unable to ſupply me with any evaſion.

As for Mr. Howe's phraſe of impelling, by which he intends compelling, we ſhall refer the word and thing to the Head, where it will moſt properly fall under examination. p. 31In the interim, let us attend to what he ſubjoins.

Anſw. I confeſs a diſpoſition to wonder that a matter whereupon all moral Government depends, both humane and divine, ſhould not have been determined at the firſt ſight, Let. p. 38.

Reply. Theſe words imply, that all moral Government, &c. is rendred ludicrous, and a meer Pageantry by the Doctrine of Predetermination; but upon what Mr. Howe, magiſterially enough, takes for granted, but does not once make an offer of proving, that the will is hindered by Gods own irreſiſtible counter-action, p. 37. from yielding obedience to ſuch Government: But if I live till that be proved, my age will certainly exceed Methuſelahs.

Anſw. But Mr. Howe adds, The notion of the goodneſs and righteouſneſs of God, methinks ſhould ſtick ſo cloſe to our minds, and create ſuch a ſenſe in our ſouls, as ſhould be infinitely dearer to us than all our ſenſes and powers. And that we ſhould rather chuſe to have our ſight, hearing, and motive power, and what not beſides diſputed, or even torn from us, than ever ſuffer our ſelves to be diſputed into a belief, that the Holy and Good God ſhould irreſiſtibly determine the wills of men to, and puniſh the ſame thing, Let. p. 19.

p. 32Reply. The ſum of the Argument, though accompanied with a long train of fine words, is, that Predetermination to ſinful actions croſſes the natural notions of mankind concerning Gods Goodneſs and Holineſs. To which we return.

1. That there is not the leaſt colour for any ſuch conſequence from our Doctrine, but upon ſuppoſition of two things; which Mr. Howe would faſten upon us, but we diſown.

1. That God predetermines to ſinful actions, in concreto, i e. to the natural action, and the ſinfulneſs of it: which we conſtantly deny: for though we own it a h…rd province to anſwer all objections that may be ſtarted againſt this partition made between the one and the other, as to Gods influence, which we affirm as to the former, the action, and deny, as to the latter, the ſinfulneſs of it: yet 'we doubt not (in its ſeaſon) to evince theſe two things, that God is the Author, and conſequently the Predeterminer of all the actions of rational creatures, (for as to irrational, though we include them, yet the Queſtion not being of them, we ſhall not intermeddle with them); and that God is not the Author of the ſinfulneſs, and ſo not the Predeterminer thereof. And then as to the modus, or manner of Gods influence, ſo as to ſeparate p. 33theſe that are ſo neerly conjoined in ſinful creatures, we ſhall be leſs ſolicitous, at leaſt with reſpect to Mr. Howe's ſatisfaction, who has profeſſed that he can more eaſily be ſatisfied, to be ignorant of the modus, [i. e. manner], or medium, [i. e. the mean] of Gods knowledg, whileſt he is ſure of the thing; and he knows not why any ſober minded man might not be ſo too, while we muſt all be content to be ignorant of the manner, yea, of the nature too of a thouſand things beſides, when, that ſuch things there are, we have no doubt. And when there are few things about which we can with leſs diſadvantage ſuffer our being ignorant, or with leſs diſreputation profeſs to be ſo, Let. p. 49, 50. And if this Argumentation be true, in reference to Divine acts in general (as there is no reaſon why it ſhould be limited to Gods knowledg only, and himſelf extends it beyond that); I conceive Mr. Howe has againſt his will given us the cauſe; for that God is not the Author of ſin (our laſt propoſition) he every where affirms as well as we. That God is the Author of all the actions of rational creatures, he grants too; or elſe his words are unintelligible, and we have cauſe to quarrel with him, (as he did with Perſius, a crabbed Poet), ſi non vult intelligi, cur vult legi, i. e. If he would not be underſtood, p. 34why would he be read, (an end that every man is preſumed to intend that writes), theſe words, I mean, This active providence of God about all the actions of men, conſiſts not meerly in giving them the natural powers, whereby they can work of themſelves, but in a real influence upon thoſe powers, Poſtſc. p. 39. By which laſt clauſe, if he intends reducing them to act (as his phraſe is, ibid.) we are perfectly agreed ſo far; and the remaining diſagreement will be but about the modus or manner, how God affords a real influence upon the powers defiled with ſin, and yet none upon the ſin it ſelf. And of …his he and I being both (I hope) ſober minded men, may well be content to be ignorant, as long as we are ſure of the thing. But I fear I reckon without my Hoſt, and ſo muſt reckon again; I mean, that Mr. Howe will not ſtand to my comprimize of the difference between us, though I ſee not why he ſhould not, if he will be but a man of his word, ſtand, that is, to his own Aſſertions.

2. Our Doctrine cannot be accuſed of a confederacy, to raze out the impreſſions of Gods Holineſs upon humane nature; but upon this ſuppoſition alſo, That God does irreſiſtibly determine the wills of men to that which he puniſhes men for, viz. to ſin, which is a brat we are not bound to father. p. 35For we neither own irreſiſtible nor reſiſtible determination of mans will to ſin, as ſuch; nor do we acknowledg any determination of the will at all to be irreſiſtible, if he takes that term for equivalent to compulſory; which if he do not, it will be neither a friend to him, nor foe to us.

We might alſo obſerve upon his Rhetorical amplifications of his Argument, that he ſeems to be no ill-willer to Tranſubſtantiation. For if the natural notions of Gods goodneſs ſhould be infinitely dearer to us than our ſenſes, I ſee not why the notion of Gods ſincerity, that he means as he ſpeaks, ſhould not challenge a ſhare in our indearments; and ſo why, Hoc eſt corpus meum, ſhould not aſſure us, that the bread is tranſubſtantiated, though our ſenſes, ſight, taſte, feeling, join in a common teſtimony, that it remains bread after conſecration, as well as before: not that I charge him with that Popiſh ridicule, but I would have him take notice how dangerous ſometimes an affectation of embelliſhments of ſpeech may prove, by leaving him that is guilty of it, at the mercy of his Antagoniſt, in deducing ſuch inferences from them, as can neither be ſafely admitted, nor creditably turned off.

Anſw. Mr. Howe complains of the feebleneſs p. 36and impotency of our defence againſt the forenamed charge, that God makes a Law, and neceſſitates the violation of it; when it is no more than, That man is under the Law, and God above it, Let. p. 40, 41. and he affirms, that a tender ſpirit, &c. will not be relieved or eaſed by the thin Sophiſtry of only a colluſive ambiguity in the word Law, &c. ibid.

Reply. If Mr. Howe's candour did but bear any tolerable proportion to his Eloquence, he would never have thus repreſented our Anſwer. For the truth is, this Anſwer is not given by the Predeterminants to that objection to which he applies it (as is plain enough, becauſe we always eſteem our ſelves unconcerned in the charge of repreſenting God as neceſſitating the violation of his own Law), but to another, (viz.) that God ſins when he produces that action with man, which to man is ſin, (which Mr. Howe, who in words at leaſt owns immediate concurrence to all actions as well we, is therefore equally concerned to anſwer). For the proof of this, I ſhall alledg Bellarmine, who (after he had told us, it was only Zuinglius's Anſwer to the ſame Objection that Mr. H. fits it to; adds with the peril of his reputation), Sententiam tamen aliorum quorundam, &c. i. e. That it was the opinion of others alſo, who p. 37though they agreed not with Zuinglius, in teaching that God impels men to ſin, yet they uſe no other medium to evince how God does not ſin, when he produces that action with man, which to man is ſin, than that God is bound by no Law, and nothing is ſin but a tranſgreſſion of a Law, Bell de Amiſſ. Gr. l. 2. c. 18. Yet withal I deny not, but 'tis alſo applied to that Objection, that God ſins, if he does determine to that action, to which ſin inſeparably cleaves. But yet the neceſſitation of the violation of the Law, is no way concerned in the objection.

What now is become of Mr. Howe's charge of thin Sophiſtry, and colluſive ambiguity, when we deny God to be under a Law, in the ſame ſignification of the word, wherein we affirm it of man, (viz. as Mr. Howe expreſſes it), For the declared pleaſure of a Ruler to a Subject, p. 41. This charge diſproved, we yet grant what Mr. Howe objects; that the term Law, as noting an habitual principle, and rule of acting after one ſteady tenour, in which ſenſe the perfect rectitude of Gods nature is an eternal Law to him, &c. Let. p. 41, 42, is yet an Argument againſt our opinion upon Mr. Howe's Hypotheſis, that thereby the creature is neceſſitated to ſin: but that he hath neither attempted, nor ever will be able to prove. If proof could be made p. 38that the conſequence were natural, we ſhould not know how to decline the force of Bellarmine's grave Argumentation upon Mr. Howe's ground, Licet deo non ſit poſita Lex ab aliquo ſuperiore Legiſlatore, tamen ſua ſapientia eſt ipſi Lex, &c. i. e. Though God be not under a Law given him by a ſuperiour Legiſlatour, yet his own wiſdom is a Law to him; and as Zuinglius himſelf teaches us, That what a Law is to us, that is Gods own nature to him. God is therefore no leſs bound, not to act repugnantly to his own wiſdom and nature, than men are bound not to act repugnantly to the Law of God. Wherefore, if God ſhould impel [Mr. Howe's phraſe], men to theſe things, which are contrary to the Eternal Law, and to his own nature and wiſdom, as to Adultery, his will were evil, becauſe repugnant to the right rule of divine wiſdom, and God ſhould deny himſelf, which cannot be (as the Apoſtle ſays). Thus far Bellarmine, ubi ſupra.

Anſw. Mr. Howe concludes, What relief is there in that dream, [of the ſuppoſed poſſibility of Gods making a reaſonable creature with an innocent averſion to himſelf]. For what can be ſuppoſed more repugnant? or what more impertinent? If innocent, how were it puniſhable? A Law already made in the caſe, how can it be innocent? Let. p. 42.

p. 39Reply. Mr. Howe leaves us wholly at a loſs, who it is, that with this dream hath attempted to relieve a pious and ſober mind, cloſely urged with the horrour of ſo black a conception of God, that he does firſt irreſiſtibly determine mens will to, and then puniſh them for the hatred of his bleſſed ſelf, (as he tragically, but falſely repreſents our opinion), p. 40. I ſay falſely, for God does not puniſh that natural paſſion we call hatred, which himſelf, as firſt Cauſe, applies the ſecond to the production of; nor does God determine the will to that natural paſſion, its elicite act, irreſiſtibly, in his ſenſe forcibly. But as Auſtin long ago, of Gods influence upon good actions; [ſo ſay we of bad] God acts Omnipotenter pro te, ſuaviter pro me, Omnipotently according to his own nature, but ſweetly according to ours, (as ſhall be fully cleared in its place). If any particular perſon of our judgment in the main, ſhall propoſe an argument liable to exception, I ſee not that we are obliged to defend it. But as Mr. Howe introduces it, it ſeems to be repreſented as a common extravagancy of the Predeterminants, which I am ſure it is not; nor does Mr. Howe labour under a ſurguedry of candour, in a bare preſentation of this ſuppoſition, without its application to the Queſtion. Both which, becauſe Mr. Howe hath p. 40neglected, I think not my ſelf obliged to give the Reader an account of, but ſhall diſmiſs it without any adoe.

Arg. 2. The ſecond preſſing and importunate Argument of ours which Mr. H. repeats, That God does predetermine ſinful actions as actions, otherwiſe it were impoſſible for God to foreknow the ſinful actions of men (many whereof he hath foretold) if their futurition were a meer contingency, and depended on the uncertain will of the ſubordinate agent, not determined by the ſupream agent [God.] Let. p. 35, 36.

Anſ. To which Argument, this is the ſum of his Anſwer, That this ſuppoſed indetermination of the Will in reference to wick…d actions, is far from being capable of inferring any thing more than that we are left ignorant of the way how he foreknows them, which is a ſmall inconvenience, and manifeſt abſurdity not to ac…nowledg the like in many caſes, ſeeing God does many things, whereof the manner how he does them we can neither explicate nor underſtand. Let. p. 47, 48.

Rep. 1. To which I reply, That the way how God foreknows future contingencies, is in his own Decree, at leaſt as to ſuch which he hath decreed. For I cannot divine what can be oppoſed to this Propoſition, That what God hath decreed he foreknows in his own Decree, (though it ſhould be granted p. 41that he foreknows them alſo antecedently to his own Decree in ſome manner, which we can neither explicate nor underſtand.) Taking that then for granted till it be denied, I think Mr. H. hath much overſhot himſelf in denying univerſally our knowledg of the way how God foreknows future contingencies. For either he muſt exclude the good actions, which he grants God predetermines men to, Poſtſc. p. 39. yea, and all actions of free agents to which he acknowledges God affords immediate concourſe, p. 28. from being Contingencies; (which himſelf as well as we, ſuppoſe in the whole controverſie now agitated) Or deny that they fall under Gods Decree; (which is too abſurd, becauſe there's nothing more evident than that what God does in time, he decreed to do from Eternity) Or if he grants both, then it roundly follows, that God foreknew thoſe acts of the Creatures which in time he did either predetermine to, or concur with; and ſuch are all the actions of men disjunctively.

Rep. 2. We ſhall prove that God foreknows all future contingencies in his own Decree, and conſequently the ſinful actions of men.

1. By Scripture, Iſa. 46.9, 10, I am God, and there is none like me, declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, ſaying, my p. 42counſel ſhall ſtand, and I will do all my pleaſure. Upon which Scripture the Incomparable Calvin, (ſo I call him in compliance with the very Learned Andrews, (ſometime Biſhop of Wincheſter's admonition), that he was a man never to be named without the addition of ſome title of Honour) thus gloſſes, Neque ſolum ejus praeſcientiam hic commendat, &c. i.e. Neither does God only here commend his own Preſcience, but he affirms that he had teſtified by the Prophets what he had decreed. For there were no certainty, nor firmneſs in the Predictions, or Propheſies, unleſs the ſame God who foretells this or that thing would come to paſs, had the event of things in his own hand. As to which words we may further obſerve:

1. The form of the expreſſion: two Attributes are here applied by God to himſelf, Wiſdom and Soveraignty or liberty of Will, and a common adjunct of both, Immutability, [or we may call it a common effect, the certainty of the event] that what God does wiſely and freely determine or decree within himſelf, ſhall certainly come to paſs.

2. The extent of it, that it refers to all thoſe things which it was Gods peculiar certainly to foreknow, viz. all that ſhould certainly come to paſs. For as Judicious Calvin obſerves upon verſ. 11. Poſteaquam Propheta, &c. After that the Prophet had ſpoken p. 43of the Preſcience of God, he accommodates the general expreſſion he had uſed to his preſent purpoſe, to comfort the Jews in hopes of the return of their Captivity by Cyrus, &c.

3. The argument which is couched in them, to evince the certainty of Gods foreknowledg of what he did predict, viz. becauſe the events predicted were the reſult of his Wiſdom and Pleaſure, or of his own wiſe Decrees.

And now to draw down this General to the particular in queſtion, Whether God foreknows ſinful actions in his own Decree. And for the proof of the affirmative I ſhall quote but that place, Act. 4.28, compared with Chap. 2.23, For to do whatſoever thy hand and thy counſel determined before to be done. So the former place, Him being delivered by the determinate counſel and foreknowledg of God, ye have taken and by wicked hands have crucified and ſlain. So the latter; both ſpeaking of the moſt wicked action that ever was done in the world, the putting the Lord of Life to death. To the former place the Learned Calvin ſays, They who acknowledg only the Preſcience of God, but do not confeſs that all things are managed by Gods will, are eaſily convinced by theſe words, that God hath foreordained that to be done which is done. To the latter place the Learned Dr. Manton (now newly deceaſed, to the great grief of p. 44Pious & Learned Men) affords a notable gloſs, (which I eſpecially recommend to Mr H. for the friendſhip ſake between the Doctor and him, in his Comment on Jam. 1.13. p. 101. Many who grant Preſcience, deny Preordination, [viz. the Decree, whereof Predetermination is the execution; So I underſtand him] leſt they ſhould make God the Author of Sin: but theſe fear where no fear is. The Scripture ſpeaketh roundly, aſcribing both to God, Act. 2.23. [N. B.] Peter ſaith not only foreign, by the foreknowledg; but foreign, determinate counſel; which implieth a poſitive Decree. So far he: and for ought I know conſonantly to the conſtant ſenſe of Proteſtantiſm, till now of late that it grows weary of it ſelf, if we may judg of its preſent humour by Mr H. and Mr. B.) And by theſe ſound Interpretations we may eaſily judg, whether Mr. H.'s gloſs upon Act. 4.28. doth not corrupt the Text. Let us hear it, if our patience can bear ſuch an exerciſe. That is, God foreſeeing wicked hands would be prompt and read for this tragick enterpriſe, his Soveraign power and wiſe counſel concurred with his foreknowledg, ſo only, and not with leſs latitude, to define or determine the bounds and limits of that malignity, than to let it proceed unto this execution, Let. p. 29. And ſoon after, Which purpoſe (viz.) of Chriſts to give himſelf to be a propitiation p. 45for the ſins of men by dying, it was determined [by God] not to hinder prepared hands to execute in this way, p. 30. Theſe words plainly imply a denial of Gods foreknowledg of the Death of Chriſt, as conſequent to his Decree of that event, (which is ſufficiently confirmed by the Scriptures now quoted againſt that denial) and they imply an affirmation of a foreknowledg of Chriſts Death antecedent to Gods Decree; and ſo make a confuſion (where a diſtinction ought to be kept) between Gods foreknowledg of poſſibles and futures; or of what may, and of what ſhall come to paſs; and run Mr. H. into this abſurdity, to deny that any Decree paſſed upon the Death of Chriſt at all. For to what end ſhould he paſs a Decree, if he foreknew it would come to paſs without it? I cannot conceive how Mr. H. can rid his hands of this abſurdity, unleſs he ſhall affirm, the paſſion, but not the action, the death of Chriſt, but not their agency who put him to death was the object of Gods Decree. But then Auſtin will correct him by his gloſs upon that Text, 1 Pet. 3.17, For it is better, if the will of God be ſo, that ye ſuffer for well-doing than for evil doing. Sancti affliguntur ſecundum Dei voluntatem, &c. i.e. The Saints are afflicted according to the will of God, but they cannot ſuffer unleſs wicked men act. He that wills the paſſion, p. 46wills the action. Aug. in Enchir. c. 100. And the Philoſopher will fall foul upon him with his naxim, Actio & Paſſio ſunt idem motus. i.e. Action and Paſſion are one and the ſame motion. And differ but as the way from London to York, and from York to London; and but as the aſcent and deſcent of the ſame Hill. And ſo it cannot be pretended with any colour, that the Decree of God includes the Paſsion of Chriſt, and excludes the Jews and Gentiles action about it. I will diſmiſs Mr. H. as to this Text without further exagitation, when I have but minded him of a paſſage of the acute Twiſſe, (who I preſume, is one of thoſe pious and learned men, to whom his reverence is not extinguiſhed, notwithſtanding the badneſs of their opinion about Predetermination, Poſt. p. 49.) Dictata iſta Jeſuitica, &c. Thoſe Jeſuitical dictates of the foreſeen determination of the humane will before Gods Decree, are not the dictates diſſerentium Theologorum, ſed ſomniantium. i.e. Of Divines diſputing, but dreaming. Twiſſ. Vind. Gr. L. 2. p. 1. Digr. 2. c. 1. p. 31. And ſo I have cried you quittance, one dream for another. [Let. p. 42.]

2. By reaſon we ſhall demonſtrate, that Gods foreknowledg of all future contingencies depend upon his Decree. And I ſhall chuſe to borrow (becauſe I have none of my own better) that of Dr. Twiſſe, which hath p. 47been eſteemed irrefragable, ſays the Learned Strangius, who yet oppoſes it, but not with ſtrength enough to overthrow it; and hath done us the favour to reduce the whole proceſs of the Argumentation into form. De Vol. Dei, &c. l. 3. c. 9. p. 626.

Arg. 1. What is future only by the Decree of God, that God neceſſarily foreknew by his Decree. But every future contingent is future only by the Decree of God. Ergo, every future contingent did God neceſſarily foreknow by his Decree.

2. The Minor proved. That which is future from Eternity, that is not future but by Gods Decree. But every future contingent is future from Eternity. Ergo, every future contingent is future only by the Decree of God.

3. The Major of the laſt Syllogiſm proved. That which from Eternity paſſed out of the condition of a thing poſſible, into the condition of a thing future, that is not future but by Gods Decree. But that which is future from Eternity did paſs from Eternity out of the condition of a thing poſſible into the condition of a thing future. Ergo, That which is future from Eternity is not future but by Gods Decree.

4. The Major of the laſt Syllogiſm proved. That which from Eternity paſſed out of the condition of a thing poſſible into the condition p. 48of a thing future, had for the cauſe of that paſſage the Decree of God, or no cauſe at all. But it cannot be ſaid it had no cauſe at all. Ergo, only the Decree of God was the cauſe of that paſſage out of the condition of a thing poſſible into the condition of a thing future.

5. The Minor of the laſt Syllogiſm proved. Future contingents are either future in their own nature, or not future but by ſome cauſe determining their indifferent nature. But future contingents are not future in their own nature; elſe it would follow, that they ſhould be always future, and never become preſent. For what agrees to any thing of its own nature, agrees to it inſeparably. Ergo, future contingents muſt needs be future from ſome cauſe.

6. The Major of the ſame fourth Syllogiſm proved. If there be any cauſe why any thing paſſeth from Eternity out of the condition of a poſſible thing into the condition of a future, that cauſe muſt be either ſomething without God, or in God; and if in God, either that cauſe ſhall be the eſſence of God, or the knowledg of God, or the will and decree of God. But the cauſe of any thing becoming of poſsible future, is neither any thing without God, nor the eſſence or the knowledg of God. Ergo, it is only the will or decree of God.

7. The Minor of the laſt Syllogiſm proved p. 49by parts. For firſt, nothing out of God could be the cauſe, becauſe that paſſage (which they call futurition) was made from eternity, and therefore the cauſe thereof muſt be from eternity. But nothing is eternal beſides God. Nor can the knowledg of God be the cauſe; for that ſevered from his will, doth rather ſuppoſe, than make things future. Moreover, if the Eſſence of God were the cauſe of this paſſage of things from poſſibility to futurity, it muſt either be ſaid to be the cauſe as acting neceſſarily or freely. Not the former, for then all future things would fall out neceſſarily, and none would fall out contingently and freely. But God in things to be created, or created, hath done, nor doth any thing by neceſſity of nature, but freely. If the Eſſence of God be ſaid to be the cauſe of the paſſage of things from poſſibility into futurity, as acting freely, this is to grant, that the will of God and the determination thereof is the cauſe why any contingent from eternity paſſeth out of the condition of an indifferent thing to be or not to be, into the condition of a thing future, or to determine the futurition of it. It remains therefore that the Decree of God, or the Decreeing will of God, be alone the cauſe of futurition (if you will admit the phraſe) and of its effect. Thus far Dr. Twiſſe.

I deſire the Reader to take notice, That though I have a great reverence for Dr. p. 50Twiſſe, and do judg the proceſs of the abovecited Argument invincible as to the main; yet I am not clear in my apprehenſion, that the third Syllogiſm is in ſenſe different from the ſecond, (as Strangius objects againſt it with ſome probability.) Nor yet do I wholly diſlike Strangius his alteration of the terms of both the Majors of the ſecond and third Syllogiſm, thus: That which from eternity was poſsible ſo, as that it alſo had the condition of a thing future, its futurition is from the Decree of God. But every future contingent was from eternity poſsible ſo, as that it alſo had the condition of a thing future. Ergo, the futurition of every future contingent is from the Decree of God. And then the fourth Syllogiſm will be the proof of the Major of the ſecond, (leaving out the third) and the words muſt be the ſame; and ſo the argument runs on without any further rub, unleſs perhaps the reaſon given in the fifth Syllogiſm, Why contingent things are not future in their own nature, becauſe then it would follow, that they ſhould be always future, and never become preſent.

For I confeſs ingenuouſly, that I cannot anſwer Strangius contrary conſequent from that antecedent; That if future contingents were neceſſarily future, whether in their own nature, or in reſpect of any other cauſe, as the … of God, they muſt neceſſarily be preſent p. 51ſome time or other. For to be future is nothing elſe than that a thing ſhould ſometime be preſent. Strang. p. 630.

And theſe alterations (though I will not poſitively aſſert to be needful, as not having had time to examine Strangius throughly ſince he came to my hands, (which was long after Mr. H's Letter and Poſtſcript came out,) yet I am the more willing to admit, that I may in part wipe off the aſperſion Mr. H. caſts upon many of us, who hold Predetermination, That whatſoever ſtrength there may be in arguments and replys to and fro in this matter, that which hath too apparently had greateſt actual efficacy with many, hath been the authority and name of this and that man of reputation. Let. p. 42.

As to all the reſt of the Doctor's Arguments, (if I be not a partial judg of my own abilities, an infirmity of lapſed humane nature, which I cannot challenge an exemption from,) I ſeem to my ſelf able to anſwer Strangius's ſubtil evaſions, and ſhould willingly have done it, but that I doubt not but I ſhall meet with them in Mr. H's threatened Rejoinder, in which I expect Mr. H. ſhould anſwer diſtinctly, by denial or diſtinction, to ſome Propoſition in theſe Syllogiſms; and then let him rhetoricate as he pleaſes in the amplification.

We have now diſpatched the two Arguments p. 52in the Letter, there remain three in the Poſtſcript cited out of Mr. Gale's Animadverſions upon the Letter; which, though modeſtly propoſed by way of Queſtion, will conſtringe our Learned Adverſary.

Arg. 3. Whether there be any action of man on earth ſo good, which hath not ſome mixture of ſin in it? And if God concur to the ſubſtrate matter of it as good, muſt he not neceſſarily concur to the ſubſtrate matter as ſinful? for is not the ſubſtrate matter of the act, both as good and ſinful the ſame? Poſtſcr. p. 32.

Mr. H's Anſw. 1. It ſeems then that God doth concur to the matter of an action as ſinful; which is honeſtly acknowledged, ſince by his principles it cannot be denied: though moſt of his way mince the buſineſs, and ſay, the concurrence is only to the action which is ſinful, not as ſinful. Ibid. & pag. 33. So Mr. H.

Reply. Mr. H. miſrepreſents Mr. Gale's meaning: for it is not, that God concurs to the ſinfulneſs of the action, but to the action; which though phyſically one individual action, yet is morally diverſified in reſpect of its conformity and difformity to the Law of God: ſo that conſidering the natural action in concreto, with the good or evil adhering to it, it is no leſs true, that God concurs to the action that hath evil adhering p. 53to it, than that he concurs to the action that hath good adhering to it. This premiſed, to the fault he finds with the diſtinction, I anſwer, that I doubt he muſt recur to it himſelf, when he is preſſed, to know how Gods concurrence immediate to actions ſinful will free him from the imputation of being the Author of Sin: yea, worſe than ſo, I cannot imagine, but that as to thoſe actions, which he calls in themſelves ſinful, he muſt own what he would faſten upon Mr. Gale, that God doth immediately concur to the matter of an action as ſinful; for 'tis impoſsible to ſeparate the malignity thereof from an intrinſecally evil action, (as he tells us) Let. p. 33. [of which hereafter.)

Mr. H's Anſw. 2. This I am to conſider as an argument for Gods Predeterminative concurrence to wicked actions. And thus it muſt be conceived, that if God concur by determinative influence to the imperfectly good actions of faith, love, &c. therefore to the acts of enmity againſt himſelf, curſing, idolatry, &c. To which (beſides an unſeemly ſcoff, is it not a mighty conſequence?) Mr. H. anſwers divers things, as reaſons for the denial of the conſequence.

1. That it is infirm, becauſe the actions in the antecedent are good, quoad ſubſtantiam, but theſe in the conſequent are in the ſubſtance of them evil. Poſt. p. 33.

Reply 1. Mr. Gale doth not limit wicked p. 54actions to thoſe that are in the ſubſtance of them evil, but ampliates the term to all whatſoever ſo that ſuppoſing the conſequence were not good to ſuch actions as Mr. H. inſtanceth in; yet it may be good to thoſe actions that are evil, quoad finem & circumſtantias, as to the end and circumſtances. For inſtance, to be hoſpitable, or charitable out of vain-glory, to be reading the Scriptures at home, when we ſhould attend upon publick worſhip, &c. and Mr. H. ſeems to yield it.

2. I am not yet convinced that there are any actions evil, quoad ſubſtantiam. And it is a wonder to me, that our Learned Antagoniſt ſhould exact of us an implicite faith of that Poſition. It ill becomes his generoſity ſo baſely to beg the queſtion. Let him prove that, and I will be his Proſelyte as to antipredetermination of ſuch actions. But becauſe he neglecteth the duty he owes to his Hypotheſis, I will perform mine to my own anon.

2. Mr. H. denies the conſequence by an argument a pari; That we our ſelves can in a remoter kind concur to the actions of others, yet it doth not follow, that becauſe we may aſſord our leading concurrence to actions imperfectly good, that therefore we may afford it to thoſe that are down right evil; becauſe to prayer, therefore to curſing and ſwearing, p. 55and then ruin men for the actions we have induced them unto. I…d. & p. 34.

Repl. 1. In general 'tis unſafe arguing a pari, from the creature to God; that what the former may not do, neither may the latter. The creature is bound to hinder all the ſin that he can; but if God were under ſuch an obligation, there would not only have been ſo much ſin as the world affords, but indeed none at all. And you your ſelf diſcourſe at large of the incongruity of an univerſal determinative influence to good actions; which yet would have made an admirable Metamorphoſis of all the Sinners in the world into Saints; (at leaſt if in thoſe expreſſions you include, infuſion of grace, which divine Predetermination of good actions preſuppoſes, as I have proved before.)

2. If your arguing be forcible as to this inſtance, I ſee not, but you reflect as highly upon God by the immediate concurrence you grant to all actions of the Creatures, Poſt. p. 28. For will it not follow, that God affords men a leading concurrence to actions down-right evil, and then ruins them for thoſe actions, which were as much his as theirs? I am too dull to imagine how you can extricate your ſelf, but by eating your words, and diſtinguiſhing of concurrence, as you do of Predetermination; that God concurs to actions that are imperfectly p. 56good, but not to thoſe that are down-right evil.

3. Mr. H's anſwer touches not the intendment of Mr. Gale's argument, which is to evince upon Mr. H's own aſſertion, that as God predetermines to actions imperfectly good; ſo by the like reaſon he may predetermine to actions that are perfectly evil. And the ground of the conſequence is this, that if in actions imperfectly good, the evil and the good of the actions are ſo divided between the creature and God, that only the former is the Creatures, and the latter Gods; whilſt yet the natural actions themſelves are common to both, to God as the firſt, to the Creature as the ſecond cauſe; why may not we infer that in actions perfectly evil, the action is common to God and the Creature, but the evil of it, the Creatures peculiar, and no more chargeable upon God, than in the other inſtance. And this I take for an irrefragable Argument, ad hominem, which if Mr. H. can ſatisfie, I am ſilenced.

4. It is an unaccountable inadvertency, (for to ſalve his honour, ſo I will call it, rather than a ſlip of Judgment) to produce curſing and ſwearing for inſtances of actions down-right, or for the ſubſtance of them evil. I thought that Davids frequent curſing of wicked men in the Pſalms, and p. 57Pauls ſwearing, Before God I lye not, Gal. 1.20. had not paſſed under ſo bad a character; but did reſt aſſured, that (as the actions in themſelves are capable, ſo in them) they were hallowed by their manner and end.

5. To what end Mr. Howe cloſes with this clauſe, And then ruine men for the actions we have induced them to, is not hard to conjecture (viz.) to inſinuate, that our Doctrine repreſents God under the ſame character with the Devil, who induces men to ſin, and then torments them for it. But what is ſaid untruly (as well as Prophanely) of the Devil, is verified of our Doctrine, That it is not ſo black as it is painted. Mr. Howe indeed tells Mr. Gale, you'l ſay God may rather, and adds as his own ſenſe, But ſure he can do ſo much leſs than you, p. 34. This ſuggeſtion deſerves a ſeverer animadverſion than I ſhall make upon it. In general, I ſay 'tis an odious ſlander. For we in no ſenſe aſſert that God induces men to wicked actions, not morally, for we conſtantly affirm, that his commands, threats, are all againſt it; not Phyſically, for ſo he determines men to actions, not to the wickedneſs of them, nor does he ruine men for what he contributes by Predetermination, or immediate concurrence to the Production of (viz.) the natural p. 58actions he moves to and joins in.

Anſw. 3. Mr. Howe denies the conſequence from the evidence of two Scriptures compared, Luk. 6.9. Hoſ. 13.6. p. 35. but (which is ſtrange) hath not directed us how he infers from them the denial of Mr. Gale's conſequence, or how they ſhew a difference between the warrantableneſs of Gods concurring to the ſubſtrate matter of an action as good, which tends to mans ſalvation and bleſſedneſs, and to the ſubſtrate matter of all their evil actions [which tend to their ruine and miſery]; we muſt therefore gueſs at it as well as we can.

Reply. The former Scripture hath theſe words, Is it lawful on the ſabbath days to do good or to do evil, to ſave life or to deſtroy? The latter theſe, O Iſrael, thou haſt deſtroyed thy ſelf, but in me is thine help: From the former Scripture, I preſume, thus he argues: If it be unlawful to man to deſtroy life, then it is unlawful to God. But the antecedent is true, therefore the conſequent. And he proves the conſequence by the latter Scripture, by this Enthymeme; Gods word is to help man. Ergo, it is unlawful for him to deſtroy. And this, viz. that man deſtroys himſelf. Ergo, 'tis unlawful for God to deſtroy him. To which, I return,

1. That the antecedent or minor of the p. 59firſt Syllogiſm, is not true univerſally, for for it is not unlawful for man to deſtroy life, ſe defendendo, i.e. in ſelf-defence; but it muſt be limited to Homicide or murther, which notes not barely the act of deſtroying life, but involves with it a vitioſity, or that act done in caſes prohibited by the divine Law.

2. Suppoſe it were, yet I deny the conſequence, and you cannot be any whit-aſed or relieved by the thin Sophiſtry, of only a colluſive ambiguity in the word [Lawful,] which you muſt have recourſe to. For ſuppoſe you take it in the antecedent ſtrictly, and in the conſequent analogically, in the former, for the declared pleaſure of a ruler to his Subject; in the latter, for an habitual fixed principle and rule of acting after one ſteady tenour, (which are both your own diſtinctions and explications of the word Law), Let. p. 41. yet the conſequence is utterly falſe, becauſe depending upon this falſe ground; that whatever man may not do in regard of Gods Law, God himſelf may not do, becauſe of his own nature, or habitual fixed Principle and Rule of acting after one ſteady nature, (as you ſomething odly deſcribe it). In this ſenſe the ſubtil Twiſſe rejects Zuinglius maxim, Quod nobis eſt Lex, Deo eſt ingenium & p. 60is Gods nature to himſelf. Though in another ſenſe he admits it, That ſuch obligation, as the divine Law lays upon us to do nothing repugnant to it, that Gods nature lays upon him to do nothing repugnant to it. Now then, though it be unlawful to man to kill in ſuch caſes as the Law exempts, yet it is not contrary to Gods nature to kill, and ſo not unlawful to him.

3. To the Enthymeme, we deny the connexion, that becauſe in [or from] God is mans help, that therefore it is unlawful for him to deſtroy, for how then does God own himſelf the author of all evils of ſuffering, Amos 3.6, Shall there be evil in a City, and the Lord hath not done it? And beſides, we ſee not, ſuch is the dimneſs of our ſight, how the conſequence would be proved thereby, were the connexion granted.

The proofs ſubjoined hang together ſo looſly, that I cannot make ſenſe of them, and therefore will diſmiſs them.

Your general drift I am aware of, that you deny Predeſtination to evil actions, though you concede it to good, becauſe it ſeems more congruous to the divine goodneſs to concur (a term that you will ſtill uſe, though improper enough, to ſignifie that divine action, we call Predetermination, as hath been ſhewn once and again) to actions that p. 61have good in them, rather than to theſe that have evil in them, becauſe the one tends to the ſalvation, the other to the deſtruction of man. To which I anſwer: This Argument, if it hath any weight will bear as hard upon immediate concurrence, which you grant to all actions, and ſo to ſinful, as upon Predetermination; and whatever anſwer will relieve you, will with the ſame hand eaſe us. I will pauſe a little with the Readers leave, and try my skill what anſwer I can excogitate for Mr. Howe, which will not be a common friend to us both, (as we have been hitherto one to another, and I hope ſhall remain notwithſtanding this publick conteſt): I have thought out my thoughts, and they afford me but three Anſwers.

1. That immediate concurrence, as to ſinful actions, divides between the action and the ſinfulneſs; ſo that 'tis only the action as ſuch, which is Gods and mans at once: the ſinfulneſs of it is to be attributed to man only. And this diſtinction is an open friend to us, and to which therefore upon all fit occaſions we pay our reſpects.

2. That if it be granted divine concurrence is as immediate to evil, as to good actions, (ſo as hath been explained); yet that does not neceſſitate or compel the will p. 62to any elicite act, [i. e. inward acts of willing or nilling]: neither does Predetermination judg it ſelf guilty, as to any ſuch crime; for that does but put the creature upon that action, which is produced by Gods immediate concurrence with it. And but that it waits a fitter time to ſpeak out her mind, ſhe could ſay, That ſhe conceives not how ſhe can compel the will to any act, without compelling God himſelf: ſeeing one and the ſame act thereof, is as truly Gods as the creatures.

3. If immediate concurrence thinks her ſelf diſobliged to ſatisfie an inquiſitive curioſity, as to the modus or manner how ſhe joines with the creature in an action, to which ſin does neceſſarily adhere, ſeeing the thing it ſelf is plain, that ſo ſtrict is the dependance of the creature upon the Creator, that it cannot act without Gods immediate concurrence: Predetermination claims the ſame priviledg upon the like ground, that the creature cannot exert its natural powers, till they be applied to action, nor determine it ſelf to action, till it be determined; which determination cannot include a compulſion of the will, (which is the main, if not the only controverſie), for if the will act ſpontaneouſly, and from precedent deliberation, how is it forced? if it do not, how is it a will, i. e. a rational appetite?