Vindication of the Doctrine of Predetermination, Title page – Preface
DE CAƲSA DEI: OR, A VINDICATION Of the Common Doctrine of Proteſtant DIVINES, Concerning Predetermination: (i. e. The Intereſt of God as the firſt Cauſe, in all the Actions, as ſuch, of all Rational Creatures:)
From the invidious Conſequences with which it is burdened by Mr. JOHN HOWE, In a late Letter and Poſtſcript, of GOD'S PRESCIENCE.
By T. D.
LONDON, Printed for R. Roberts, and are to be ſold by Walter Davis at his Houſe in Amen-Corner, 1678.
To the Reverend Mr. JOHN HOWE, Author of the late Letter and Poſtſcript of God's Preſcience.
SIR,
WHen I had read the Title-page of your late Letter to the Honourable Mr. Boyle, and thereby underſtood its deſign, and withal obſerved the ſmallneſs of the Bulk, I promiſed my ſelf that it would be Pagella, hoc ſolo nomine redarguenda, quod ſit tota Gemmea. For elſe I thought it would not be worthy of ſo great a Moecenas, a Maſter of all ſort of Learning; and [ſo] whoſe nobility is not only in Parchment, (as Charron ſpeaks): nor of the Author, (for I was aware of him, though he had concealed his name) whoſe parts I well knew (and have always had the candor upon all fit occaſions to acknowledge) were not of the lower ſize: nor yet of ſo excellent a ſubject, and ſo needful in theſe dregs of time, which verge ſo much toward Socinianiſm. And in the peruſal of the Letter it ſelf, for ſome time I pleaſed my ſelf with an apprehenſion that I had not impoſed upon my ſelf; nor had my affection to the Author ſeduced my judgment. Fancy and Reaſon were in ſo happy a conjunction, that I hoped they would never be parted thoroughout the whole Diſcourſe. But alas! too ſoon I found my hopes ſhamefully baffled. For (beſide a corrupt gloſs upon Act. 4.28. pag. 28. which I could not digeſt, and divers paſſages in the proceſs of your after-Diſcourſe not unexceptionable) from pag. 32, to 50, to ſpeak my ſenſe freely, I found pro theſauro carbones, i.e. Coals inſtead of Treaſure, ſhining indeed, but black and ſmutty; politeneſs of ſtile, I mean, continued, but the ſeries of well-digeſted thoughts broken and diſſevered; jejune Anſwers to Arguments full of ſenſe; old Popiſh Arguments dreſſed up A-la-mode, and many of which militate as much againſt your aſſertions as ours; and a great deal of good eloquence put to a very ill uſe, and a far worſe than it would be to play at Duck and Drake with broad pieces in the Thames; and ſometimes degenerate eloquence, which (like painted glaſs) though it was an ornament, yet impeded the tranſmiſſion of the light: and (which is worſt of all) the whole deſign of thoſe Pages I found to be an averment of the old Popiſh Calumny, that by the Proteſtant Doctrine God is made the Author of ſin; which I muſt needs profeſs was a ſtrange ſurpriſal to me; and ſo much the more, becauſe I could not conceive what ſhould induce you a… Proteſtant Divine, to make affidavit of a Pontificial accuſation, nor why in this Diſcourſe. For if the end you aſſigned your ſelf in doing it was the vindication of the bleſſed God from the imputation of being the cauſe of moral evil, you have certainly lurcht the Reader of his expectation, by offering nothing toward it but what he can eaſily ſee through, (viz.) that God is not the cauſe [univerſally] of natural good; or at leaſt as remote as the Grand-father is of the Grand-child. [See your own words, Let. p. 36.] Two cauſes which might ſeem probable of your doing it in this Diſcourſe, your ſelf has removed out of your Readers way. It was not the requeſt of the Honourable Perſon to whom your Letter is directed, but (for ought I can collect) as the defending God's Predeterminative concourſe unto ſinful actions was an unenjoined task, Let. p. 150. So was the overthrowing it too. Nor was it the connexion between Preſcience and Predetermination (as it lies in the Divine Decree, and is the only true ground of the certainty of Divine Preſcience) for that was not your deſign to demonſtrate Gods Preſcience of all whatſoever futurities, and conſequently of the ſins of men; but ſuppoſing it to ſhew its reconcileableneſs with what it ſeemed not ſo well to agree, (as you ſince tell us) Poſtſc. p. 4. which I did eaſily apprehend before. For all the mediums you uſe for the eviction of this reconcileableneſs, borrow no ſtrength from the denial of Predetermination. Sometime after your Letter ſucceeded a Poſtſcript, in the view of which I was more aſtoniſhed than before: obſtupui ſteteruntque comae. For whereas I might have hoped that your ſecond thoughts would be better, they proved a great deal worſe. I had ſuch an opinion of your modeſty, that at leaſt you would recall the hard words you gave the Arguments urged for Predetermination to ſinful actions, Thin Sophiſtry, Colluſive ambiguity, Let. p. 41. Vain attempts, 38. Diſmal concluſions, 36. the effects of a Sophiſtical wit againſt ſenſe, and more againſt the ſenſe of our ſouls, and moſt of all againſt the entire ſum and ſubſtance of all Morality and Religion at once, p. 39, 40. and overturning and mingling heaven and earth, p. 50. And that reflexion you make upon thoſe who have uſed the diſtinction of voluntas ſigni & Beneplaciti, that they have only rather concealed a good meaning, than expreſed by it a bad one, p. 106. For take all together, and I ſee not that they amount to a leſs guilt, than of …rampling upon that venerable duſt, which was ſometimes animated by truly Heroick Souls, and bore the names of Zuinglius, Calvin, B…za, Perkins, Pemble, Davenant, Twiſſe, Ames, &c. than which no cauſe hath had, nor needs greater Patrons. But inſtead of recalling, you have avowed them, by the addition of others of the ſame ſort, a contagion, a deadly thing, Poſtſc. p. 15. An ill coloured opinion, Poſtſc. p. 51. Fearful conſequences of that rejected opinion; vanity of the ſubterfuges whereby its aſſertors think to hide the malignity of it, p. 50. Nor was this enough, but as if you were Animal gloriae, (as was ſaid of the Philoſophers) an animal that lived by the air of vain glory and applauſe, and thought your ſelf another Goliah, you cry out, I defie the armies of Iſrael this day; give me a man that we may fight together. What other interpretation are theſe words capable of? Now I perceive that ſome perſons, who had formerly entertained that ſtrange opinion of Gods Predeterminative concurrence to the wickedeſt actions, and not purged their minds of it, have been offended with that Letter, for not expreſſing more reſpect unto it; and yet offered nothing themſelves (which to me ſeems exceeding ſtrange) for the ſolving of that great difficulty and incumbrance, which it infers upon our Religion, Poſtſc. p. 7. Or theſe, If I find my ſelf obliged any way further to intermeddle in this matter, I reckon the time I have to ſpend in this world can never be ſpent to better purpoſe, than in diſcovering, &c. the inefficacy of the Arguments brought for it, p. 50. but moſt immodeſt is your threatning thoſe that aſſert the contradictory to your Propoſition, with your preparations for the defence of it, and plain intimation of the value you put upon them, as ſufficient to ſilence all oppoſers, p. 51, 52. And for ought I can judg to the contrary, if contempt of your Antagoniſts will daſh them out of countenance, and ſo ſilence them, you are likely enough to obtain the victory you aſſure your ſelf beforehand. An inſtance whereof you have given us in your ill treatment of Mr. Gale, a moſt pious, modeſt, and learned man, and our common friend, and one who like a friend touched your ſore ſo gently, that one would have thought you ſhould hardly have cried Oh! much leſs have cried out of Vindictive Hoſtility, p. 16. and that he was the man that might be inſtanced in, that had managed a publick conteſt with that candour and fairneſs, as not at all to intrench upon friendſhip, which you did well know was poſſible to be done, (as you expreſs your ſelf, ibid.) And yet how many holes do you pick in his coat? one while you inſinuate that he is of thoſe mens humours who take an unaccountable pleaſure, in depraving what is done by others, p. 12. whereas I who have known him about 25 years, and was of the ſame Academical Society with you both, have never obſerved any ſuch misbehaviour of his. Another while, that he had a concealed end of his own glory, viz. [in attacking you], (as if the good man had coveted that inſcription upon his Tombſtone,—Magnis tamen excidit auſis). And again, aſſert that he had a mighty ſtrong and irreſiſtible inclination to ſquabble a little with your Letter, p. 13. And that this inclination cannot but owe it ſelf to ſome peculiar aſpect and reference he had to the Author, p. 14. (whereas I dare be his voucher, that all the harm he wiſhes you is but an increaſe of humility). And this guilt you make account is faſtened upon him, becauſe he hath not attempted ſundry others of former and latter days, which have ſaid much to the purpoſe which your Letter does but touch on the by, p. 13. which is a ſtrange accuſation, and will appear ſuch to thoſe who ſhall upon peruſal find, that he hath run the hazard of his ſafety in medling with thoſe Giants you point at, Poſtſc. p. 14. But if he had not, I think he might apologize for himſelf, that your tract being conciſe, and adorned with good language, might invite more buyers and readers. Ratsbane capt in fine ſugar, may well be judged likely to entice ſome liquoriſh appetite to taſte of it, to their own hurt. But the greateſt provocation not to let you [whoever be let] paſs, is that intolerable reflection upon the Aſſerters of Predetermination; upon their Arguments, and the natural conſequences of them, all at once in theſe words. But the effects of a Sophiſtical wit againſt ſenſe, and more againſt the ſenſe of our ſouls, and moſt of all againſt the entire ſum and ſubſtance of all Morality and Religion at once, are but like the attempt to batter a wall of braſs with ſtraws and feathers, Let. p. 39, 40. This paſſage alone were enough to raiſe indignation, ſufficient to make a diſputant (at leaſt if that paſſion be as effectual to that purpoſe as the old ſhred,—facit indignatio verſum, intimates it is to make a Poet). And this was it that made me inquiſitive after an anſwer to your Letter, and Poſtſcript, as to which, when after many rumours of Anſwers preparing, I found my hopes fruſtrated, I reſolved (though almoſt too late) to attempt one my ſelf, for my reſolution was his in Terence, a quoquam alio quam a me, a me autem potius quam a nemine; that I had rather your anſwer ſhould come from any one than me, but from me rather than no body. I met with many diſcouragements in the laſt clauſe of my reſolution, in general from a conſciouſneſs of my own diſabilities, and particularly from the hard meaſure your other Antagoniſt Mr. Gale hath met with, as in the inſtances above-mentioned, ſo in ſome other. The one, your carping at words, that you make ſo ſevere Ani…nadverſion upon him for an innocent Pleonaſm, The Divine Independent will of God, which meant you no harm, nor was more guilty of any deſign to rob your Eſſay of any part of its eloquence, than that was to pilfer from him any part of his collections, Poſtſc. p. 13. And I was not without ſome apprehenſions that I might fall under your laſh my ſelf, who am not curious in the choice of words, or compoſure of periods. But againſt this fear I was ſomewhat relieved, as againſt the ſorrow I had conceived for Mr. Gales affront, (as if it had fell out for that end, and alſo to juſtifie the old ſaw, aliquando bonus dormitat Homerus) by an happy accident that I have taken you tardy twice in that kind your ſelf: For what elſe but a Pleonaſm is that Phraſe, The rectitude of Gods holy nature, Let. p. 42. and the rectitude of Gods own moſt holy will and way, p 59. in the exceſs of your caution, leſt any ſhould think the holy nature, the moſt holy will and way of God were void of rectitude, Poſtſc. p. 22. And elſewhere actions malignantly wicked, p. 32. i. e. wickedly wicked. But theſe are childiſh criminations, unfit to be bandied from hand to hand by ſober perſons. The other diſcouragement was the difficult inveſtigation of your ſenſe, which I take to be a far harder task than to confute it; of which, that I may not be thought to complain without cauſe, I have collected ſome inſtances of repugnant and ſelf-contradicting Propoſitions, in your Diſcourſes.
1. Mediate concurrence.
1. It ſufficiently ſalves the rights of the firſt cauſe, to aſſert that no action can be done, but by a power derived from it, which in reference to forbidden actions, intelligent creatures may uſe or not uſe as they pleaſe, Let. p. 36.
2. All actions good to Mr. Gales Queſt. Is there any action ſo ſinful that hath not ſome natural good as the ſubſtrate matter thereof? you Anſw. True, Poſtſc. p. 36.
3. Predetermination denied as to ſome actions, (viz.) evil. This is the deſign of all your Letter, from p. 32. to 50. and of the Poſtſcript.
2. Immediate concurrence.
1. I do really believe Gods immediate concourſe to all the actions of his creatures, Poſt. p. 28.
2. Some actions in themſelves evil. Some actions of the creatures are in themſelves moſt malignantly wicked, Le. p. 32. and intrinſecally evil, p. 46.
3. Predetermination to all actions granted. The active providence of God about all the actions of men conſiſts not meerly in giving them natural powers, whereby they can work of themſelves, but in a real influence upon thoſe powers, Poſtſc. p. 39. n. 5.
By which laſt clauſe, a real influence upon thoſe powers, if you mean (as I cannot divine what elſe you can) a reducing thoſe powers into act, (as your phraſe is, Ib. n. 6.) you come over to our Camp, and we will give good entertainment to ſo ſerviceable a Deſerter.
4. Predetermination forces the will. Nothing is more apparently a ſimple and moſt ſtrictly natural impoſſibility than not to do an action whereto the Agent is determined by an infinite power, Let. p. 33.
4. Predetermination forces not the Will. It is unreaſonable to imagine that God cannot in any caſe determine the will of a rational creature, in a way agreeable enough to its nature, Let. p. 141. Men are inabled by an internal infuſion of power and vital influence to do much good, to which they are not impelled by it, p. 145.
non eſt ingenii mei hoſce nodos diſſolvere, i.e. I have not wit enough to untie theſe knots. The conſideration of theſe repugnancies, fills me with wonder at your exclamation againſt Mr. Gale, for finding no fault with your Pamphlet but what he makes, Poſtſc. p. 11. and particularly for ſuggeſting that your opinion falls in with the ſentiments of Durandus, which many think not well of, Poſtſc. p. 9. For I muſt needs profeſs, that as far as I can judg, he hath but ſlandered you with a word of truth. For in your Letter, by which Mr. Gale did, and only could take his meaſures of your ſenſe, there's not the moſt implicite intimation of any other intendment, than to cloſe with Durandus. And though you do explicitely diſown it in your Poſtſc. yet you inſtruct not you Reader, how the Grammatical conſtruction of theſe words above cited, p. 36. of your Let. will yield any other meaning, than what Mr. Gale pitches upon. And the foreſight of the probability of being cried out upon for want of candour, in the ſame reſpects, did not a little deter me from the undertakement.
A third, the neceſſity of making a Parallel between your and the Papiſts Arguments againſt Predetermination, which I foreſaw would give you occaſion to fault me, (as you do Mr. Gale), for parallelling your conceptions with theirs, the reaſon whereof muſt needs be becauſe I take a Papiſt for an ill-favoured name, Poſtſc. p. 27. yet here they are.
1. Some actions are intrinſecally evil, and in themſelves wicked, Let. p. 33, 32.
2. God hath as much influence and concurrence to the worſt actions, as the beſt, Poſt. p. 25. [viz. by the Doctrine of Predetermination of ſinful actions.]
3. For God to determine men to the worſt of actions, can mean no leſs thing than to impel them to do them, Let. p. 37. which impelling you call an ineluctable fate, p. 33. [and ſo intend compelling.]
4. God hath more influence and concurrence to the worſt actions than the ſinner or tempter, Poſt. pag. 25. and in more words, Let. pag. 32. [viz. by our Doctrine.]
1. There are many actions ſo intrinſecally and in themſelves evil, that they always are repugnant to the eternal Law, and Right Reaſon. Bell. de Am. c. 18.
2. Calvin was blaſphemous againſt God in affirming, That God works evil works in us, ſo as he works good, Alvarez de Aux. Gr. l. 4.
3. God, according to our Adverſaries opinion [viz. the Proteſtants] impells men, and ſo compells them to ſin, Bell. c. 5.
4. God according to the opinion of Calvin and Beza is the primary Author of all ſins. Bell. c. 4. de Amiſſ. Gr.
But paſs upon this parallel what judgment you pleaſe, I am at a point. I have propoſed to my ſelf a good end in the exhibition of it, viz. to mind my Readers that the point under debate between you and me is a ſtated controverſie between the Papiſts and Proteſtants, and therefore the affirmative not lightly to be receded from; and in drawing it up I gave my ſelf a little pleaſure mixed with diſdain; that becauſe there was no Smith found throughout all the land of Iſrael, you were ſain to go down to the Philiſtines to ſharpen your axe and your mattock, 1 Sam. 13.19, 20. And I admired that you could not excogitate one new Argument, but preſent us with all old, and ſtrangely unfortunate, which have been bafled as often as urged. I have i…titled my Anſwer De Cauſa Dei, rather than De cauſa Deo; which latter might be proper enough for the ſubject, a Defence of Gods intereſt as the firſt cauſe in all the actions of his Creatures. But herein I have imitated Bradwardine's Piety, who would ſignifie thereby that it was the Cauſe of God he deſigned to ſecure from the impetuous aſſaults of its Adverſaries, among whom I am heartily ſorry you ſhould be numbred, as to this inſtance. I know you will not own the charge, but pretend that you are on Gods ſide, but if ſo, you have neglected an opportunity of ſhewing your ſelf, by not reconciling Gods preventive methods of ſin with immediate concourſe, which is at leaſt as hard as with Predeterminative concourſe: and to be ſure, any one may ſee it was very idle and ludicrous trifling, to offer at reconciling thoſe methods with God's Preſcience, and to wave that (manifeſtly) greater difficulty of reconciling them with his immediate concourſe, if you think there is ſuch a thing, (to uſe your own words with but the variation that a diſſerent inſtance requires) Poſtſc. pag. 3, 4. I have been as brief as I could in my Anſwer, without prejudice to our cauſe; and have come (as Caeſar Borgia ſaid of the French in their Expedition into Italy) rather with Chalk in my hands to mark out the Inns, than with Arms to break through and take poſſeſſion. It will be time enough to arm when your Preparations ſhall riſe out of that duſt and ſilence in which they are buried, Poſt. p. 51. In the mean time I have but pointed out the Fontes ſolutionum, the general grounds upon which our Anſwers depend, to all Arguments that can be produced. To conclude, I could heartily wiſh you would ſerionſly reflect upon your Letter and Poſtſcript, and conſider how many paſſages you are obliged to repent of and retract. Shall I …ind you of that notable ſaying of Auſtin, Illius ſcripta ſumma authoritate digniſſima, &c. i.e. his writings deſerve to be of the greateſt authority, who hath let ſlip never a word, not that he would, but that he ought to recall. He that hath not attained ſo much wiſdom as to be able to ſay nothing not to be repented of, may yet attain ſo much modeſty as to repent of what he knows he has ſaid amiſs, Aug. Ep. 17. And for your encouragement, it may not be unſeaſonable to mind you, of what you cannot but know, that Auſtin who gave this good counſel, did take it himſelf, and left upon record retractation of his Errors, wherein he was a ſingular inſtance of humility, and was rewarded by God with a greater eſteem in the Church than any one man ſince his time. Which is all, beſides that I am
Octob. 31. 1677. Your true Friend and Brother T. D.