Vindication of the Doctrine of Predetermination, Pages 63-123

Vindication of the Doctrine of Predetermination · Pages 63-123

p. 63Arg. 4. (which is Mr. Gale's ſecond), is, There is no action ſo ſinful, that it hath not ſome natural good as the ſubſtrate of it, Poſtſc. p. 36.

Anſw. 1. To which Argument, propoſed by way of Queſtion, Mr. Howe anſwers, True.

Reply. But then, if that be true, your former poſition, that ſome actions are evil in the ſubſtance of them, p. 33. muſt needs be falſe. Let us but formalize the Oppoſition thus: ſome actions are ſo ſinful that they have no natural good, as the ſubſtrate matter of them; [which is the ſenſe of the words juſt now quoted] no actions are ſo ſinful that they have not ſome natural good, as the ſubſtrate matter of them; and it will appear, that they are propoſitions contradictory, and conſequently, that they cannot both be true. They are two known Rules in Logick, contradictio eſt oppoſitio inter univerſalem & particularem Enunciationem [aut propoſitionem] And, Harum alterutra ſemper vera, & altera ſemper falſa.

Anſw. 2. Mr. Howe preſently flinches, and Sophiſter-like, puts more into the concluſion, than was in the premiſes. And what muſt be inferr'd (ſays he) viz. from his own conceſſion, That therefore God muſt by a determinative influence produce every ſuch action [what-ever reaſon there be againſt it].

p. 64Reply. Thoſe words included in the ſemiquadrates are injuriouſly foiſted in. For Mr. Gale's Argument entirely is thus, If there be no action ſo ſinful, that it hath not ſome natural good as the ſubſtrate of it, then God is the cauſe, (viz. by Predetermination) of that natural good that is in every action, ſed verum prius; Ergo & Poſterius. And indeed the Argument it ſelf excludes any ſuch addition. For there can be no reaſon againſt Gods production of what is good in any action, unleſs it be (what Mr. Howe objects) the accidental adherence of evil thereunto; which, if it be of any moment, militates as much againſt immediate concurrence, (as hath been ſhown but now). That paſſage of Auſtins, opportunely offers its ſervice to us, as to the force of Mr. Gale's Argument, Deus boni tantummodo cauſa eſt, &c. i. e. God is only the cauſe of good, therefore he is not the Anthor of evil; becauſe he is the Author of all things that are, which are ſo far good as they are. 'Tis indeed Mr. Gale's Argument in other terms.

Anſw. 3. Mr. Howe pretends, Mr. Gale might better argue from his premiſes, The neceſſity of his producing every hour a new world; in which, there would be a great deal more of poſitive entity and natural goodneſs, Poſtſc. p. 36.

p. 65Reply. This is too great a ſcorn to be caſt upon ſo learned a man, as Mr. Gale is well known to be. For there is no medium that can, with the leaſt probability, be judged likely to be able to tack Mr. Gales Antecedent, and Mr. Howes conſequent together. To be ſure, not that which he ſuggeſts; for that is falſe and unworthy of a Philoſopher, at leaſt if theſe maximes be true, ſubſtantia non recipit magis & minus; ens & bonum convertibile; though 'tis eaſie to conceive there would be more poſitive Beings in number, upon Mr. Howe's ſuppoſition, yet 'tis hard to conceive there would be a great deal more of poſitive entity, and ſo of natural goodneſs in the new world, than is already in the old one.

Anſw. 4. The natural goodneſs that is in the Entity of an action, is no ſuch invitation to the Holy God, by determinative influence to produce it, as that he ſhould offer violence to his own nature, and ſtain the juſtice and honour of his government, by making it to be done, and then puniſh it, being done, p. 36.

Reply. 1. The natural goodneſs of an action, hath invitation enough in it to induce God to produce it, both becauſe it is good, and becauſe it cannot be done without him.

p. 662. By Mr. Howe's own conceſſion, ſomething or other does induce God to produce it, by giving and conſerving the powers, and immediate concurrence to the act of thoſe powers.

3. It remains upon Mr. Howe to prove, that the producing of an action by determinative influence, is more liable to thoſe abſurdities he names, than the producing it any other way, (except what Durandus pitches upon; which if he will alſo own, then I know what I have to rejoyn). In the interim, I am aſhamed he ſhould clog his Reader with, crambe bis cocta, coleworts twice ſod; I mean, an odious conſequence impoſed upon predeterminative influence, that it offers violence to Gods nature, and ſtains the juſtice and honour of his Government; which we ſhall deny, till he hath proved, that by it God makes an action to be done, i. e. in his ſenſe neceſſitates it to be done, and then puniſhes it being done; which laſt clauſe is very abſurd in its connexion, for it ſuppoſes a contradiction, viz. that the action is naturally good, and yet, that God puniſhes the natural goodneſs in it.

Arg. 5. (which is Mr. Gale's third and laſt). The denial of Predetermination, even of ſinful actions as ſuch, cuts off the moſt illuſtrious part of divine providence in p. 67governing the lower world, Poſtſc. p. 33.

Anſw. I am aſhamed to anſwer it. Name any act of providence, I hereby deny, if you can, ibid. So Mr. Howe.

Reply. 1. This act of providence thereby you deny, which in words you own, to limit and moderate ſinful actions, Poſtſc. p. 45. This will appear by conſidering what influence your mediate or immediate concurrence (for you do ſo fluctuate, that I know not which of the two you will abide by), can have upon this effect. The mediate can have none, for that is nothing elſe but a conſervation of the being, with its powers and faculties, and ſo but abuſively called concurrence or concourſe; and ſo does but keep the powers indeterminate, not determine, nor limit their acts: nor yet can immediate limit any action, becauſe as ſuch, it is neither before nor after the creatures action, but with it. The withdrawing of concourſe immediate, may hinder, I grant, the creatures action: but whether God does ever withdraw it or no, Strangius. L. 1. c. 11. p. 65. doubts, and ſo may you, perhaps, upon his ground. Let us, for the exemplification of this limitation, conſider it, with reſpect to thoſe things which it is converſant about.

1. As to the objects of its acts; as, that Abſaloms Adultery with Davids wifes, rather p. 68than any other women. This is plain, by comparing 2 Sam. 12.11. with Chap. 16.22. In the former place, the words are, Thus ſaith the Lord, Behold, I will raiſe up evil againſt thee out of thine own houſe: and I will take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them unto thy neighbour; and he ſhall lye with thy wives in the ſight of the Sun. In the latter place the event anſwers the threat. And Abſalom went in unto his Fathers Concubines in the ſight of all Iſrael.

2. As to the time, when, or how long the ſinful acts ſhall be exerciſed about their objects. When, Gen. 45.5, God did ſend me before you to preſerve life, ſays Joſeph to his Brethren; whereas, they might not have ſold him, till the famine came. How long; That is intimated in Pſal. 125.3, The rod of the wicked ſhall not rest upon the lot of the Righteous.

3. As to the event, or iſſue of the actions. That an oppreſſour ſhall impoveriſh, not utterly undo him he does oppreſs: that he who ſtrikes his neighbour with an intent to kill him, ſhall yet but wound him.

4. As to the decree of the act, Pſal. 76.10, Surely the wrath of man ſhall praiſe thee; the remainder of wrath thou ſhalt restrain, foreign, cinges, ligabis; which I underſtand p. 69of binding up the faculty, that it put not forth its utmoſt force in the act iſſuing from it: as when a man is but in a pet, as we ſay, not outragiouſly angry. Thus God makes as great a difference between the ſame man and himſelf, as a Rider does when he uſes a ſtrait rein, or lays the bridle on his Horſes neck.

2. The over-ruling and diſpoſing of a ſinful action to good, againſt the deſign and inclination of the ſinful Agent, Poſtſc. p. 45. n. 10. is an act of Providence, which Mr Howe denies, in the denial of Predetermination. For immediate concurrence is all that Mr. Howe allows of; which, being but Gods action with the creature, and not exiſtent before nor after it, cannot therefore direct the action to any end. And particularly in puniſhing one ſin with another. As in the inſtance of Abſalom; his Adultery with his Fathers Concubines, was a puniſhment of Davids Adultery with Ʋriah's Wife. In this and ſuch like inſtances, God is the Author, ordinis in malo, though not mali, as the moſt learned Dr. Field, Dean of of Glouceſter, expreſſes it, of the Church, p. 131, 132). i. e. God is the Author of the order of conſequence, that one evil ſhall follow another, and have the reaſon of a puniſhment thereof; which how he can be, is no way explicable, but p. 70by the Doctrine of Predetermination which, importing an application of the creature to action, and to one rather than another, and at one time rather than another, &c. (as hath been ſhown) gives an eaſie account, how God may diſpoſe of ſinful actions to good ends, and particularly to this, to be puniſhments of preceding ſins.

And now, it is high time that we take a view of Mr. Howe's Arguments, for the negative of the Queſtion hitherto diſcuſſed, for which we muſt return to his Letter again, where he ſtates the Theſis he oppoſes, as importing an irreſiſtble predeterminative concurrence to all actions of the creature, even to thoſe that are in themſelves moſt malignantly wicked, Let. p. 32.

Reply. Here are divers ambiguities in the terms (beſides that of predeterminative concurrence, which hath been faulted already, as not very proper).

1. The term irreſiſtible; which may either import, a neceſſity of infallibility, as to the event, or a neceſſity of coaction or compulſion. If he takes it in the former ſenſe, 'tis altogether improperly. For irreſiſtible, imports a relation of the action of the agent, to ſome reſiſtance or counteraction of the patient; as when the water endeavours to put out the fire, which p. 71would lick it up; or in free agents, when a man with all his ſtrength reſiſts him that by force would carry him away Priſoner. If he underſtands the term in the latter and proper ſenſe, I underſtand not why he impoſes the term upon our Theſis; for we do not aſſert any compulſion in Predetermination of the will, nor can we conceive it poſſible in any caſe; not if we ſhould ſuppoſe per impoſsibile, a rational creature made under no Law at all; for then as it would have a power, and alſo an inclination to uſe it, ſo there would be no need of any force to reduce it to act; not ſuppoſing it (as it is) under a Law, would there be any need of compulſion, not as to good actions, becauſe there are gracious habits to diſpoſe the will to actions congenerous; not as to evil actions, (no not if God did predetermine to them as ſuch) for the will in regard of ſinful habits is of it ſelf inclined enough to any evil actions.

2. The term, in themſelves moſt malignantly wicked. To which I ſay, that it may be underſtood in a double ſenſe, either with reſpect, to the different kind of Laws that prohibit actions, thus; Thoſe actions are ſaid to be in themſelves evil which are a breach of the Law of nature, and ſo are oppoſed to thoſe which are evil only by a poſitive law; or elſe with reference to the degrees of rectitude p. 72in one and the ſame Law; thus ſome actions are ſaid to be in themſelves evil, when they are evil in regard of their object, as that is oppoſed to the end and circumſtances. Thus the hatred of God, and Adultery, are in themſelves evil, becauſe no end or circumſtance can make them good; but giving Alms out of vain glory is not in it ſelf evil, becauſe changing the end, the action is good, that before was bad.

But Mr. H. underſtands the term in another ſenſe, and overlooks the genuine ſignification of it; viz. thus, that wickedneſs is of the eſſence of ſome actions. This I collect from that clauſe, Nothing is more apparently a ſimple and moſt ſtrictly natural impoſſibility, than to ſeparate the malignity thereof from an intrinſecally evil action, Let. p. 33. Now 'tis plain enough, if we take the hatred of God, which is Mr. H's inſtance of an action in it ſelf evil, that the evil of that action is ſeparable from it, for the ſame paſſion, if the Devil be the object of it, is good. And the evil of this action is as ſeparable from it, as in actions that are evil, as to their circumſtances. As to read the Scriptures, when it is our preſent duty to hearken to the Sermon. The reaſon is the ſame in both, the action of hatred is evil only in regard of the undue object, and the action of reading the Scriptures only in regard of the undue circumſtance p. 73of time. And if Mr. H. underſtands actions in themſelves evil, of actions eſſentially evil, let him enjoy his own ſatisfaction, but let him not impoſe it upon us, who look upon it as one of the greateſt abſurdities a learned man can be guilty of believing. To ſtate the Queſtion therefore aright (though we have done it before) we ſay, that we reject the term irreſiſtible, as not being in the Queſtion, but being a begging of the Queſtion, becauſe it ſuppoſes ſome force on Gods part the Agent, which the Creature as far as it can reſiſts. And we diſown the diſtinction of actions, which Mr. H. introduces into the Queſtion, for we know of none that are in themſelves malignantly wicked; that is (in his ſenſe) eſſentially evil. But that which we aſſert is, That God does predetermine the Creature as well to the actions that are evil, as to thoſe that are good. Let us now hear his Arguments againſt our Aſſertion.

Arg. 1. If there be an irreſiſtible determinative concurrence to all, and ſo to wicked actions of the Creature, then the matter of all Gods Laws in reference to all wicked actions was a ſimple and moſt ſtrictly natural impoſſibility. But the Antecedent is, Therefore we muſt own the conſequent, Let. p. 32.

Anſ. 1. In general, If we take his words ſimply as they found, we ſee not but we may p. 74grant the whole, with as little inconvenience to our aſſertion as to his. For the conſequence will be the ſame, if ſome of his aſſertions be placed for an Antecedent in the room of ours. If God does certainly foreknow all, and ſo all wicked actions of the Creature, then for the Creature not to do thoſe wicked actions, was a ſimple and moſt ſtrictly natural impoſſibility. For 'tis as truly impoſſible that ev…ts ſhould not be ſuch as God fore…ows they will be; as that men ſhould yield obedience to the Laws of God, when God hinders them thorugh his own irreſiſtible counteraction, Mr. H's phraſe p. 37. Again, we may argue thus, If there be an irreſiſtible determinative concurrence to all good actions of the Creature, then the matter of all Gods Laws in reference to all good actions was a ſimple and moſt ſtrictly natural impoſſibility; i.e. it is ſimply impoſſible, that good men ſhould not do thoſe good actions, exacted of them by the Law. As to this laſt, I cannot apprehend any reaſon why Predeterminative concurrence to evil actions ſhould make the avoiding of them impoſſible; and the like concurrence to good actions ſhould leave the neglect of them poſſible.

2. But becauſe Mr. H. intends more by Impoſſibility than the Predeterminants can allow him, we ſhall borrow a little learning p. 75from the Schools for the explication of it. It is a Queſtion in Metaphyſicks, An poſſibile & contingens a parte rei aequipolleant; i.e. Whether for a thing to be poſſible and contingent, … of the ſame ſignification or import? To which it is anſwered affirmatively, Si poſſibile accipiatur pro eo quod ſeſe habet indifferenter ut ſit; i. e. If for a thing to be poſsible be taken for an indifferency to be or not to be. And by the like reaſon impoſsible and neceſſary muſt be terms equipollent, if impoſsible be taken for that which is not indifferent to be, and not to be; or, which as it is not, ſo nor can it be. 'Tis true indeed, that Impoſſible is …ontrary to Neceſſary; as Neceſſary is taken generally for that which cannot but be, and Impoſſible for that which cannot be: yet theſe two are equipollent, if the one be affirmed, the other denied; for that which is neceſſary to be, is impoſſible not to be; and that which is neceſſary not to be, is impoſſible to be; and on the other hand, That which is impoſſible to be, is neceſſary not to be; and that which is impoſſible not to be, is neceſſary to be. We muſt therefore make a little enquiry into the kinds of neceſsity, which as to things is either ſimple, or compound. The latter (for the former is irrelative to our buſineſs) agrees to things in their coheſion or connexion each with other; this p. 76is divided into a neceſsity of the conſequent, and of conſequence, or abſolute, and reſpective. The former is a connexion of thoſe things which cannot be ſever'd without a contradiction; i.e. deſtroying the nature of their ſubject. So juſtice to God, reaſon to man, agree ſo neceſſarily to their ſubjects, that if you deny either, you do in effect deny them to be what they are, The latter, a neceſſity whereby thoſe things that are not in their own nature conjoined, are yet upon ſuppoſition of ſomething antecedent conjoined for this or that time. Whence Baronius calls the former, a neceſsity of nature; the latter, an accidental neceſsity. Of this latter ſort is this example, If Iſlanders will export Goods out of their own Country, they muſt make uſe of Ships. And from theſe modes of neceſſity it is eaſie to collect the modes of Impoſſibility, That ſomething is, ſaid to be impoſſible, either abſolutely, which involves a contradiction, as for a ſtone to be a man; or reſpectively, as if a man will fly that he ſhould have wings. And here we may ſtop a while and obſerve how Mr. H. hath gratified his own unſcholaſtick humour, in neglecting the ſtrictneſs of Scholaſtick terms, to the overthrow of his own aſſertion. For I am much miſtaken if it is not plain enough that Mr. H. confounds the diſtinction of neceſsity or impoſsibility, into abſolute and reſpective; and p. 77makes the matter of Gods Laws, &c. upon ſuppoſition of Gods irreſiſtible determination to wicked actions, to be an impoſsibility of both kinds, and ſo of neither. For if it be an impoſſibility only upon Hypotheſis of Determinative influence, how is it a ſimple and ſtrictly natural impoſsibility? If it be a ſimple, &c. impoſsibility, how is it an impoſſibility only upon an Hypotheſis? [viz. that now mentioned.]

Way being thus made by explication of the Terms, to the antecedent or minor, I anſwer by denial, That the Determinative Influence to all wicked actions we aſſert, does infer any coaction on the Will.

Arg. If Determination of the Will imports Coaction, or is inconſiſtent with the freedom of the Will; then it is either from ſome general reaſon agreeing to all Determination, or from ſome ſpecial reaſon agreeing only to this Determination, viz. to ſinful actions; but neither of theſe: Ergo, it does not import any ſuch thing at all; no Determination of the Will in general does import Coaction, or deſtroy its liberty.

1. Upon Mr. H's own conceſſion of a Predetermination of good actions, Poſt. p. 39. which I preſume he will not aſſirm to be compulſory; yet becauſe I cannot ſee a reaſon why he ſhould not, (as well as of evil actions) I will ſuppoſe him to acknowledg p. 78it. And then I would demand whether God compels men to the natural actions as ſuch, or to them as morally good. Not to the natural actions as ſuch, but to them there is no need of it, for the powers that produce them, are apt and habile for any congenerous action, by Mr. H's confeſſion, Poſt. p. 45. Not to the actions as good, for the powers being renewed by Grace, (ſo far as they are ſuch) need but an excitation, not a compulſion.

2. It appears from the general principle of Divines, Libertas a coactione eſt eſſentialis voluntatis proprietas; i. e. That liberty from force and compulſion is an eſſential property of the will. Which may be thus evinced. 1. By the nature of the wills liberty, that it is foreign, ſpontaneum intellectuale; i.e. ſpontaneum praeeunte intellectus lumine vel judicio, as Strang. acknowledges, De Vol. Dei, p. 686. That is, an Intellectual ſpontaneity. A ſpontaneity in oppoſition to the acting of neceſſary agents, ſuch as the Sun in ſhining; and Intellectual, to diſtinguiſh it from that ſpontaneity which agrees to brutes, or to mankind, who are acted by fancy, without previous judgment, as Infants, Fools, Mad-men, who whileſt they remain ſuch, are brutes in the ſhape of men and women.

2. It appears by the repugnancy of the p. 79terms in conjunction. For the Will to be forced is but invita aliquid velle, i. e. to will any thing unwillingly; which were to will and not will the ſame object at the ſame time, which is an implicit contradiction.

2. 'Tis not from any peculiar reaſon agreeing to ſinful actions. If there be any, Mr. H. would befriend the world to bring it to light. Which will appear,

1. Upon Mr. H's grounds, if Coaction be inſeparable from compulſion, upon any ſpecial reaſon agreeing to one ſort of actions, rather than another, it muſt be with reſpect to good actions, not to evil. For God determines the Will by irreſiſtible grace, to ſuch actions as by nature ſince the fall it is averſe unto; and remains ſo in a degree after the bleſſed change it hath undergone: whereas the Will having a natural Bias to evil, [as it is not, ſo nor] does it need to be predetermined, i.e. forced, [if Mr. Howe be a faithful interpreter of the word.]

2. There are manifeſt indications of liberty in ſinful actions, pregnant proofs that man hath not only potentiam in ſe liberam, but liberum uſum potentiae; i.e. a power in it ſelf free, but as to them a free uſe of his power. An inſtance of his own, hatred of God, will ſerve our turn. This act muſt be ſpontaneous, or 'tis not the act of an humane will, p. 80which is an [intellectual] appetite; no, nor of a ſenſitive appetite, for to this laſt ſpontaneity is eſſential, and intellectual too: and ſo it is, for it proceeds from, and is guided by a precedent [though miſtaken] judgment of the underſtanding, which repreſents God to him as a Tyrant, that abuſes his authority by needleſs reſtraints upon mans natural inclinations. Suppoſe to unchaſtity with any woman whoſe skin and features attract his liking. Joſeph's Brethrens hatred of him, was determined by God to the ſelling, rather than killing of him; yet as they acted ſpontaneouſly, ſo upon precedent conſideration. Two Reaſons determined their choice of the milder courſe of the two they had in view, He is our Brother, and our Fleſh, and what profit is it if we ſlay him, and conceal his blood? Gen. 37.26.

3. If there be any reaſon to infer Coaction from Predetermination, it muſt be the inconſiſtency of neceſſity on Gods part, and contingency on mans: Which if it be univerſally affirmed,

1. Then I know not how Mr. Howe will ſalve the objection againſt immediate concurrence, [which he ſeems to grant,] that thereby the liberty of the will ſeems to be loſt, both as to the exerciſe and ſpecification of the act. Unleſs as Burgeſdicius does, (whoſe ſolution offers it ſervice, he being the firſt Metaphyſick p. 81Author that ever I read,) That the concourſe of God takes not away the contingency of voluntary actions, becauſe it does not precede the action of the ſecond cauſe. Burg. Met. l. 2. c. 11. n. 9. But then that reaſon (if aſſented to) will give a mortal wound to the Predeſtination (which certainly precedes them) of good actions, which Mr. H. acknowledges: or if he will looſe the knot artificially, he muſt ſay that the concourſe of God is ſo accommodated to the nature and manner of the creatures acting, that notwithſtanding it, natural cauſes act neceſſarily, and voluntary cauſes contingently, or freely; and then the ſame anſwer will fit Predetermination of free agents to all their actions.

2. The denial of the conſiſtency between liberty and neceſſity in general, will bear as hard upon (what we grant, and Mr. H. cannot deny) actions in themſelves good, as Amor Dei, the love of God; as it can do upon (what we deny, and you aſſert) actions in themſelves evil, as odium Dei, the hatred of God. And harder, for the Will is but in part free to good actions, when as 'tis wholly free, I mean diſpoſed and inclined to evil actions. We are now the better prepared by way thus made, to anſwer Mr. H's proofs of his conſequence. Which are,

1. Not to do an action whereto the agent p. 82is determined by an infinite power is impoſſible, Let. p. 33. Ergo, not to do wicked actions, [for that's the ſum of his conſequent, in his Hyp. Syll. whereof this Enthymeme is a proof] to which the creature is determined is impoſsible.

Rep. 1. In general, that [ſuppoſing his Antecedent true, as 'tis in the ſenſe before given] yet the impoſsibility he ſpeaks of is not a ſimple and moſt ſtrictly natural impoſſibility, which he before aſſerted; but an impoſſibility reſpective, to the determination of an infinite power, (as hath been proved.)

R. 2. That if he intends a reſpective or conditional impoſſibility, I grant his Enthymeme, for it hurts our Hypotheſis no more than his, viz. of determination to good actions. For all determination does infer a neceſsity, that the thing determined ſhould be, as it is determined to be; or an impoſsibility, that the thing determined ſhould not be, as it is determined to be.

Rep. 3. If we muſt ſupply from the Hypoth. major, the term irreſiſtibly to modifie the determination he oppoſes, and we muſt underſtand by it compulſion or force, we again concede the whole without any diſadvantage to us. And ſo we may rid our hands of it, as an ignoble begging of the Queſtion, for that was incumbent on p. 83him to prove, not to take for granted, that our Predetermination imports a Coaction.

Mr. H's ſecond Enthymeme is this, To ſeparate the malignity of an action intrinſecally evil is impoſsible, p. 33. Ergo, not to do ſuch wicked actions to which the creature is determined, is impoſsible.

Rep. 1. Granting his Antecedent for Arguments ſake, I cannot imagine how he will defend the immediate concurrence of God to all the actions of his creatures; and ſo to ſinful actions, and ſo to thoſe (if there be any ſuch) as are in themſelves evil, againſt the charge of involving God in the production of ſinful actions, as ſuch, ſeeing by Divine immediate concurrence the intrinſecally evil action is as much Gods as mans action. Baronius and Strangius (who are as Heterodox as Mr. H.) do both confeſs, that it is very hard to ſhew how God may be freed from that charge, when-as he co-operates with the creature to every ſinful action. Bar. Met. 98. D. 3. n. 72. Strang. de Vol. Dei. p. 344, 372. Though Mr. H. would lay the great difficulty and encumbrance infer'd upon our Religion, only upon Predeterminative concourſe to wicked actions. Yet, the Learned Ameſius, a Predeterminant, tells us not without reaſon, Deformitas moralis magis annexa videtur actui in exercito, quam p. 84in applicatione ad agendum. Cont. Grev. p. 189. i.e. Moral deformity ſeems more cloſely joined to action, than to application unto action. For an object may be innocently preſented to the eye, which may put a man upon action, viz. unchaſt deſires.

Rep. 2. We will grant the Antecedent, ex animo, becauſe it does implicate, that there ſhould be any ſuch action. 'Tis a received maxim, Malum eſt in bono, tanquam in ſubjecto, i.e. Evil is in good, as in its ſubject. And Auguſtine's ſaying is well known, and as well approved, Ipſum quantulum-cunque eſſe bonum eſt, quia ſummum eſſe bonum eſt. De vera Rel. c. 34. i.e. Being it ſelf how inconſiderable ſoever is good, becauſe the chiefeſt Being is good.

R. 3. We deny that there cannot be a ſeparation of an action, from the evil of it. Of this ſeparation there are many inſtances: ſuppoſing Uſury lawful, (which I will not now diſpute) I may lawfully take up money at uſe at Ten pounds per Cent. (if my neceſsity require it) when the Intereſt allowed by Law (which to break in matters of publick benefit is ſinful) is but 6 l. A Chriſtian Prince may urge the great Turk to ſwear to Articles of Peace, though the former knows the latter will ſwear by his Mahomet. Theſe are inſtances p. 85of our concurrence to the actions of others in a remoter kind, [than God does concur to the actions of his creature] as Mr. H. ſpeaks in another caſe, Poſt. p. 33. And by the like reaſon may God Predeterminatively concur (as Mr. H. delights to ſpeak, though not accurately) to an action that is evil, and yet not to the evil of it; which the Learned Twiſſe illuſtrates by divers pretty ſimilitudes. An Horſeman that puts on a lame horſe to go, is the cauſe of his motion, not of his halting, that proceeds from ſome hurt in his leg, the inſtrument of motion. The Sun by his warmth makes the dunghill ſtink, of which ſtink that that warmth is not the cauſe appears, in that the very ſame influence draws forth a fragrant ſavour from a bed of Roſes. That the dunghill ſmells is from the Suns drawing forth the vapour…, but that it ſmells ill is from the condition of the matter. The upper-wheel of a Clock, though by its motion it draws along with it an under-wheel, that is irregular in its motion, yet it is not the cauſe of that irregularity. When a dexterous Penman writes upon ſinking paper he makes [pothooks, as we ſay of children that begin to learn the art of writing] blots rather than letters, which yet is not his fault, but the Papers. Twiſſe Vind. Gr. l. 2. p. 1 a. p. 26.

p. 86Reply. 4. There muſt needs be a ſeparation [and therefore 'tis poſſible to be] between actions, and the evil of them upon Mr. Howe's own Hypotheſis (viz.) That God does predetermine to all good actions, which in the preſent ſtate are but imperfectly good. Here he muſt diſtinguiſh between the efficiency of God and man, as to the ſame action, and aſcribe the action and grace of it to God, and the evil that adheres to that action to man, unleſs he will aſcribe all to God. Abſit blaſphemia verbo! If Mr. Howe can extricate himſelf, and not us with the ſame Anſwer; or rather, if he can excogitate any other Anſwer, than by this exſibilated diſtinction—erit mihi magnus Apollo, and without an Irony, ſapientum octavus.

Reply. 2. To the connexion. I Anſwer, That it infolds a twofold contradiction.

1. For it ſuppoſes ſome actions to be intrinſecally evil, and yet (by our Hypotheſis), to be determined, i. e. compell'd, (if Mr. Howe may be admitted our Interpreter); whereas, that is not ſin which is not ſpontaneous, neither is that ſpontaneous which is neceſſary, i. e. violent [or compell'd]. For violence is a Phyſical action upon the Patient; in which ſort of actions vertue or vice hath no place: for the will is the principle of moral actions. So the learned Camero p. 87de Scand. p. 98. [where note, that I preſume Camero denies not original ſin imputed, to be ſuo modo, i. e. in its kind voluntary, [and ſo truly ſin], according to St. Auſtins ſentiments, nos omnes eramus ille unus homo, i.e. we were all that one man, [Adam], and ſo ſinned in him. This to prevent any miſapprehenſion].

2. It ſuppoſes ſin to have an efficient cauſe, whereas 'tis a known Rule in Divinity, Peccatum qua tale & eſſentialiter eſt effectus moralis, & non habet cauſam Phyſicam, i. e. Sin as ſuch, and eſſentially is a moral effect, and hath no Phyſical cauſe.

Reply 3. Having given an Anſwer to Mr. Howe's Antecedent, and Connexion, we ſhall now proceed to raze the foundation of his Hypotheſis, by proving, that there are no actions of free agents evil in themſelves; or that no moral evil is poſitive, but only privative, (which latter are the common terms of Philoſophers and Divines, in enquiring into the nature of moral evil). And I ſhall borrow one Argument, which will be inſtead of all, from the moſt learned Dr. Barlow, the now Renowned Biſhop of Lincoln.

Arg. Every real and poſitive Being is from God the author and firſt cauſe of all Being. But moral evil [formally] taken, is not from God the author and firſt cauſe of all Being. p. 88Ergo, moral evil [formally taken] is not a real and poſitive Being.

The Minor is evident, and acknowledged by the very Heathens, in the appellation of Optimus, the Beſt, which they apply to their Jupiter, together with Maximus the Greateſt: [And will no doubt be owned by Mr. Howe; who, eo nomine, for that very reaſon, rejects Predeſtination of evil actions, becauſe, in his apprehenſion, it makes God the author of moral evil].

The Major, let us hear the learned Biſhop prove, [and the rather, becauſe it will much confirm our firſt Argument for Predetermination of all actions as ſuch].

Proof. Becauſe it is impoſſible that there ſhould be any finite and created Being, which does not depend, and hath its Being from an infinite and uncreated Being, [viz. God]; for it muſt needs be, if there be any Being not cauſed by God, that that Being be independent upon God as the firſt cauſe; and conſequently, God ſhall not be the firſt cauſe in reſpect of that Being, whence follow many abſurdities, &c. [whereof I ſhall only take the ſum, as himſelf hath given it us, with an application to moral evil]. If moral evil, [i.e. any ſin or breach of Divine Law], be a real Being; then, 1. God ſhall not be the cauſe of that Being; for of ſo deformed a birth, divine goodneſs cannot be the Parent. p. 892. This granted, it will follow, 1. That there is a ſecondary Being, and a Being by participation, [ſuch as every finite Being is ſuppoſed to be]; which does not partake of [or receive its] being from the firſt Being. 2. That there is a finite Being independent upon God, both as to production and conſervation. All which things we know, and believe are contrary, not only to Philoſophy, but Divinity. Thus far the moſt acute Philoſopher and Divine, Exercit. metaph. 2 a. de natura mali, ad calcem Scheib. met. p. 32, 33.

Let us take notice of the inſtances of thoſe ſins, which are ſuppoſed to be evil in themſelves, [or poſitive].

Obj. 1. Sins of commiſſion which are evil, ex genere & objecto; (whereof two are ſpecially inſiſted on: Adams eating of the forbidden fruit, and [by Mr. Howe] the hatred of God) are in themſelves evil.

Anſw. 1. In general. If all ſins ſubſiſt in ſome actual motion of the ſoul, body, or both, and this motion abſtractively conſidered, be the material part of every actual ſin, and hath God for the prime cauſe, in whom we live, and move, and have our being; then no ſin can be aſſigned, wherein this material part may not be found. So the Learned Davevant, ſometime Biſhop of Sariſbury, Animadv. on Hoard, p. 174, 175.

p. 90Anſw. 2. As to the inſtances. The firſt, in eating the forbidden fruit, the material part of the ſin, in regard of the Soul was the appetition thereof; in regard of the body, the maſtication [chewing] and manducation [eating], and other bodily acts. Separate theſe from the formal part, which is modus appetendi, the manner of deſiring, and containeth a repugnancy to Gods command, and God was the prime author thereof. The act of deſiring and eating muſt of neceſſity be reduced to God, without whom there neither is nor can be any motion of body or ſoul: but the diſorderly manner of deſiring and eating contrary to the Law of God, this is reducible (as being a defect) only to the defective will of man, Davenant. ibid. p. 175. As to the ſecond inſtance, hatred of God; That the act terminated upon that object, in complexo, is evil, and cannot be otherwiſe, we deny not; but then, that is true of acts and undue ends, as Hoſpitality out of vain-glory; of acts and undue circumſtances, as walking in the Fields, when we ſhould be at Church; as of acts and undue objects, whereof this is an inſtance. And ſo all ſinful actions are evil, as to their ſubſtance, which Mr. Howe hath not affirmed. That hatred of God is not evil in it ſelf, becauſe the act invaried, the object but changed, that act which was evil, p. 91is become morally good. So our Learned Biſhop of Lincoln, again, Exerc. met. p. 41. which he illuſtrates and proves by the inſtance of Adultery, where the act being the ſame for the ſubſtance, is altered in its moral reſpect, by making the woman, with whom I committed Adultery, my wife, Id. ibid. Which inſtance of our Learned Biſhop is plain, in the caſe of David and Bathſheba, whoſe ſociety together was unlawful before, but lawful after their marriage. They that deſire further ſatisfaction in this point, may do well to have recourſe to a learned Diſcourſe in our native Language, of Mr. H. Hickman, of the poſitivity of ſin.

Obj. 2. One ſin is the cauſe of another, as original ſin inherent [as that ſtands oppoſed to original ſin imputed] is the cauſe of actual ſins; therefore ſin is not meerly privative.

Sol. The privation which is in the natural propenſion of the will to ſin, [in which natural propenſion original ſin conſiſte], is not the real efficient of evil actions; but the will, in regard of that propenſion, is the real and true cauſe of evil actions. So Baron. wet. §. 5. n. 30. & 33.

Obj. 3. Our Divines do make a poſitive part in original ſin.

Sol. Yet they hold ſin to be only Privative. But then it will be demanded how p. 92their aſſertions will agree together.

I Anſwer, In inherent ſin there is ſaid to be a poſitive and a negative Quality. This latter Divines call a want of original righteouſneſs, or not to be able to do good. The former, they call a pravity of nature, or to be able to do evil only, which is called Poſitive Legice, becauſe 'tis expreſſed affirmatively; whereas the latter is expreſſed negatively: ſo Maccov. op. Poſt. p. 83. [r. fuſe de hac re diſſerentem Giſb. Voet. Diſp. Theol. p. 1. p. 1084

Arg. 2. If God hath a prede erminative concurrence to the moſt wicked actions, it is then no way explicable how the influence and concurrence the holy God hath to the worſt of actions, is to be diſtinguiſhed from that which he affords to the beſt; wherein ſuch inherently evil actions are leſs to be imputed to him who forbids them, than to the malicious Tempter, who prompts to them, or to the actor that doth them, or wherein not a great deal more? Let. p. 32, 33. which Argument Mr. Howe gives us more conciſely afterward, That God hath as much influence and concurrence to the worſt actions, as to the beſt; as much or more than the ſinner or the Tempter, Poſtſc. p. 25. [viz. according to our Doctrine].

Anſw. 1. If our learned Adverſary underſtands the antecedent, as we do whom p. 93he oppoſes, of the materiale of wicked actions, we grant his conſequence: for we cannot yet ſee the inconvenience of owning, that there is an univerſal or indifferent influence upon the actions of free Agents, as ſuch, abſtracted from their morality. The actions of the underſtanding and will Phyſically conſidered, are neither holy nor ſinful; thoſe denominations being taken from the relation of the actions to the Law preſcribed, as a compliance with, or deviation from it: and therefore, in linea Phyſica, Gods influence and concurrence is the ſame, when they are the ſubſtrate matter of moral evil, and moral good.

2. If he intends the formale, or rather, the moſt wicked actions, in concreto, we diſown the antecedent as none of ours, and complain of his diſingenuity in pinning ſuch an aſſertion upon our ſleeve.

3. Yet however, for his ſatisfaction, I ſhall let him know, That (beſides the influence upon good and bad actions in what degree ſoever, which we acknowledg common to both) there are divers differences of the influence we own for diſtinguiſhing of good actions from bad.

1. That as to good actions God does, in genere phyſico, re create thoſe internal habits, which he did concreate in the ſtate of innocency, with the ſeveral faculties, in which they were reſpectively ſeated, (as p. 94knowledg in the underſtanding; a rectitude of the will, conſiſting in a compliance with the laſt dictates of the practical underſtanding); that they might be [actus primi, or] principles of [the actus ſecundi, or] operations of the faculties, [in vertue of thoſe habits], which [faculties] he influences to reduce them to act, by that influence which we call Predetermination. But as to evil actions, God inſuſes no evil, neither indeed can he (beſides the repugnancy ſuch an action would carry to his holineſs); becauſe, though ſin be ſometimes conceived by us, per modum habitus poſitivi, under the notion of a poſitive habit, yet it is not properly ſo, and ſo is not capable of production by that immediate efficiency, (which we call infuſion), as hath been, in part, demonſtrated before.

2. As to good actions God does in the Predetermination to them, ſo excite to the action, as that withal he adds new ſtrength to the habits given, whence thoſe acts immediately proceed; which he does not neither as to evil actions.

3. We have a third difference from Mr. H's own conceſsion: The ordinary appointed way for the communication of this determinative influence is by our intervening conſideration of the inducements which God repreſents to us in his Word, viz. The Precepts, p. 95Promiſes, and Comminations, which are th. moral inſtruments of his Government. Poſtſc p. 40. The meaning of which words, is, that God is not only a Phyſical, but alſo a moral cauſe of good actions: whereas 'tis our ſentiment, that God is only a Phyſical cauſe of the actions to which ſin inheres, but not a moral cauſe of the ſin adhering to them. And (if I do not too much truſt my own judgment) this obſervation is not contemptible for the evincing of it; that the indifferency of the will to chuſe or refuſe the Object propoſed by the underſtanding, is not ſo natural to the will, but that it may be inclined by an inherent quality to chuſe or refuſe one object rather than another.

As for the compariſon which he makes between God, the ſinner and the Tempter, (upon our grounds), and gives God the precedency of them both in his influence upon wicked actions, 'tis an odious and horrible calumny, not backed with any proof; as he intends it of ſuch actions in the concrete, i. e. as including with the action the ſinfulneſs of it too.

Reply. To it I reply, That a ſhort Horſe is ſoon curried. This ſlight objection is eaſily anſwered.

1. Either Mr. Howe means as much phyſical influence, or moral: If the former, we ſay God and the ſinner have both a phyſical p. 96influence, upon the action that is evil, but the Tempter none at all; and that, as to the evil of it, their phyſical influence is alike, i. e. they have none at all; for ſin not being a phyſical effect, cannot have a phyſical cauſe. If the latter, (beſides that that influence is not in the Queſtion), the Sinner and the Tempter have influence and concurrence to wicked actions, and God not at all: for neither by Commands, Counſels, Threats, nor Promiſes, does he induce men to ſin.

2. Were it ſo; yet the immediate concurrence, which he acknowledges to all actions, and ſo to ſinful actions; in conjunction with the notion he entertains with ſelf-applauſe, of the inſeparableneſs of the evil of ſome actions from the actions themſelves, makes himſelf obnoxious to the ſame charge of making Gods concurrence with ſinful actions, to be as much or more than the Sinners, or the Tempters.

Arg. 3. Laſtly, he charges the Predetermination of ſinful actions with irreconcilableneſs with Gods wiſdom and ſincerity, &c. Poſtſc. p. 25. by which, &c. I preſume he intends, in his Counſels, Exhortations, and what-ever means he uſes to prevent them, (which are the expreſſions he uſes in the Title-Page of his Letter, in reference to Preſcience).

p. 97Reply. As to both of theſe perfections of God, I am not aware of any thing well ſaid by Mr. Howe, for the reconcileableneſs of Gods Preſcience with them, which may not by a juſt proportion be applied to Gods Predetermination. For the evincing whereof, we will caſt his Diſcourſe into Paragraphs.

1. To ſpeak particularly of Gods wiſdom.

1. That there ſhould be a direct and explicit contradiction between fore-knowing and dehorting, we may at firſt ſight perceive the terms cannot admit, Let. p. 51.

Reply. The ſame may be ſaid of Predetermining, and dehorting, though not ſimply as to the terms, yet as to the things ſignified by them; for the elicite acts of the will, being the Object of Predetermination, [conteſted for], we may at firſt ſight perceive it cannot be compell'd; and ſo as to the event, infers but a neceſſity of infallibility, as to the ſinners doing what he is dehorted from, (which alſo Preſcience does).

2. Mr. Howe goes on, Let it be ſuppoſed only, that the bleſſed God hath belonging to his nature univerſal Preſcience, we will ſurely, upon that ſuppoſition, acknowledg it to belong to him as a perfection. And were it reaſonable to affirm that by a perfection he is diſabled for Government? or wer p. 98it a good conſequence, he foreknows all things, he is therefore unfit to govern the world? Let. p. 54.

Reply. And why may not we as well argue thus, Let it be but ſuppoſed only, that univerſal Predetermination belongs to Gods nature, we will upon that ſuppoſition acknowledg it a perfection. And were it reaſonable to affirm, that by a perfection [that he not only conſerves the powers of his creatures, but reduces them to act] he is diſabled for government; or were it a good conſequence, He is the firſt cauſe, [not only of all beings], but of all actions as ſuch, therefore he is unfit to govern the world? And I will add; nay ſurely, but the more fit in the preſent ſtate of mankind, [not to intermeddle now with Angels], becauſe all the actions of men, being either in whole or in part ſinful, he would have nothing to govern, if he had not the government of all their actions; and govern them he could not, nor limit them, nor turn them to good, if he did not Predetermine them, (as hath been, I truſt, clearly evinced).

3. Would the ſuppoſition of ſuch foreknowledg in God make that ceaſe to be mans duty, which had otherwiſe been ſo? Let. p. 54. for what influence can foreknowledg have to alter or affect any way, either the nature of p. 99the thing foreknown, or the Temper of the perſon that ſhall do it, any more than the preſent knowledg of the ſame thing now in doing? p. 55.

Reply. And can Predetermination make that ceaſe to be mans duty, which otherwiſe had been ſo? ſeeing that it alters not the nature of the thing: [the will of man], nor the Temper of the perſon [Predetermin'd]; but as it finds the will free, ſo it leaves it; and as it finds the perſon diſpoſed by habitual inclinations, ſo works upon him; which is confirmed, by that grave obſervation of his, which we embrace as our cordial friend, and confederate. It were very unreaſonable to imagine, that God cannot in any caſe, extraordinarily overſway the inclinations, and determine the will of ſuch a creture, as over whom Gods general courſe of Government is by moral inſtruments, [viz. Man], in a way agreeable enough to its nature, Let. p. 141. Only we extend it further, That ſuppoſing, (what hath been before proved), that Predetermination includes a Perfection, God can in all caſes determine the will, without forcing it to actions to which it hath a renitency; for that were to alter the nature of the will, and the temper of the perſon whoſe will it is. And I add, what influence can fore-determining have to alter the nature of the thing, or p. 100perſon fore-determined, more than immediate concurrence to the ſame action, of the ſame perſon, now in doing?

4. But if what was otherwiſe mans duty, be ſtill his duty, what can make it unfit, that it be made known and declared to him to be ſo? and how is that otherwiſe to be done, than by theſe diſputed means? yea, (for this is the caſe), what can make it leſs fit, than that God ſhould quit the right of his Government to his revolted creatures, upon no other reaſon, than only that he foreſees they have a mind to invade it? Let. p. 56.

Reply. All this Argumentation fits our Predetermination as well as Preſcience, (wherein Mr. Howe and we agree): what can make it unfit that God ſhould acquaint man with his duty, by proper means, ſeeing Predetermination ſuppoſes ſuch a foreknowledg (as Mr. Howe ſuppoſes, antecedent to Gods decree) of the creatures having a mind to invade Gods right of Government, if put under ſuch and ſuch circumſtances; or rather, (becauſe we underſtand not any foreknowledg, but of Poſſibilium, things poſſible, not Futurorum, of things future, antecedent to Gods decree) ſeeing Gods determination of the Creatures will to invade his right, without which he could not will ſo to do, leaves the Creatures will as truly free from Co-action, as p. 101if it exerted all its elicite acts, only by a power derived from God, and preſerved apt and habile for action.

4. But it may now be ſaid, All this reaſoning, (ſays Mr. Howe), tends but to eſtabliſh this aſſertion; that notwithſtanding God did foreknow mans ſin, it is however neceſſary he forewarn him of it: but it anſwers not the objected difficulty, (viz.) How reaſonably any ſuch means are uſed for an unattainable end: as it manifeſts the end, mans obedience cannot be attained, when it is foreknown he will not obey, Let. p. 57.

To this difficulty Mr. Howe anſwers, That there is this noble and important end, which Gods Edicts aim at, (viz.) the Dignity and Decorum of his Government it ſelf. And that he may be found in every thing to have done as became him, and moſt worthy of himſelf. And what could be more ſo, than to teſtifie his averſion to whatſoever is unholy, his love of righteouſneſs, and complacency to be imitated herein, together with his propenſion to make them happy, who do imitate him, p. 61. [I take here but the ſum of Mr. Howe's words, becauſe they contain nothing controverſal].

Reply. Whether this Diſcourſe affords us any new conſideration or no, yet we can claim the benefit of it in the fulleſt extent of it to Preſcience, as to Predetermination alſo.

p. 1022. As to Gods ſincerity, the difficulty may ſtill urge, how it can ſtand with ſincerity; whereas that end alſo which fails, [viz. mans obedient compliance with Gods Declarations of his will, p. 60.] ſeems to have been moſt directly intended, &c. p. 65. To which Mr. Howe anſwers.

1. That the publick Declarations of the Divine will do attain that very end in great part, and as to many, and are the ſucceſsful means of obtaining it, p. 66.

Reply. And ſo they do upon our Hypotheſis, who acknowledg God firſt infuſes gracious habits into ſome, and then determines the powers in which theſe habits reſide, to congenerous actions; which yet excludes not the uſe of Gods Edicts, as means of educing thoſe actions: which becauſe they are vital and free paſſing from the Will, upon a compariſon made in the Ʋnderſtanding between the Goodneſs of the Objects propoſed to it, do require a moral cauſe, whereby the Agent may both underſtand the Object, and by Arguments be induced to imbrace it, (as the Learned Parker obſerves, Theſ. de Trad. Pecc. ad vitam Th. 27.)

2. Nor was it neceſſary that thoſe who would obey ſhould be ſever'd from the reſt, and be dealt withal apart, &c. p. 67.

Rep. This we alſo aſſent heartily unto.

3. Nor was it neceſſary, that effectual p. 103care ſhould be taken that they ſhould actually reach all, and be applied to every individual perſon, p. 67.

Rep. Here is a ſtrange loſs we are put to for an Antecedent to the Relative, They. The only one that I can meet with is, publick declarations of the Divine will touching mans duty, p. 66. and Divine Edicts, p. 67. and I cannot fathom the reaſon of the denial of their neceſſity to their two ends by himſelf aſſigned, Mans Obedience, and the Decorum of the Divine Government; at leaſt if he means by them the Goſpel, (as I gather from his after-diſcourſe.) If he intends by his Relative They, determinative influences to holy actions, to which the nature of man is now viciouſly inclined, (as he elſewhere ſpeaks, Poſt. p. 40, & 35, compar'd) I cannot find that Antecedent in his whole Diſcourſe foregoing: yet the following paſſages might give a ſuſpicious perſon ſome ground to pitch upon this latter for Mr. H's meaning. And thus [by meſſengers running from Nation to Nation, ſome to communicate, others to inquire after the tydings of the Goſpel] how eaſily, and even naturally would the Goſpel ſoon have ſpread it ſelf through the world? Let. p. 69. I confeſs that term naturally will not down with me: for I have always ſeen cauſe to own Dr. Sibs's weighty obſervation, in his Souls Conflict, That though p. 104there are ſeeds of the Law, yet there are none of the Goſpel in man by nature. But upon ſecond thoughts to do Mr. H. all the right I can, out of love to his perſon, and the truth, I find, That the They refers to the Divine Edicts of the Goſpel, which he ſuppoſes not needful to be immediately by the Miniſtry; but the tranſmiſſion of it from thoſe that have heard it publiſhed by them, may ſuffice to others. But to what end he expatiates upon this I do not know; though I do what ill uſe Mr. John Goodwin in his Pagans debt and dowry, makes of this very notion. Sed meliora ſpero.

4. Nor was it incongruous that God ſhould provide by ſome extraordinary means that his gracious tenders might not finally be rejected by all. Let. p. 74.

Rep. Yet it ſeems not of ſuch abſolute neceſſity (as I always conceived it to be) if by the diſpenſations of God towards the whole community of mankind, [whereof he reckons inſtances, and addes] they might underſtand God to have favourable propenſions towards them, and that though they have offended him, he is not their implacable enemy; and might by his goodneſs be led to repentance. Let. p. 75, 77, compar'd. For thus Mr. John Goodwin argues againſt the abſolute neceſſity of the Goſpel ſtrictly taken. And in Phraſes ſo near, that my fancy is p. 105ready to abuſe me with a miſtake, that not J. H. but J. G. is now diſcourſing. Rom. 2.4, The long-ſuffering of God and goodneſs of God are ſaid to lead men to Repentance, becauſe they teſtifie according to a rational and clear interpretation, a willingneſs and readineſs in God to receive all ſuch into grace and favour with himſelf, who ſhall unfeignedly repent of their ſins. So Mr. Goodwin, Pagans debt and dowry, pag. 13. And he adds, There is no other conſideration but this, (at leaſt none without this) in reſpect whereof the patience and bountifulneſs of God can be ſaid to lead, i.e. to perſwade or invite to repentance. There is no motive or perſwaſive, whereof ſinners are capable unto repentance, without hope of pardon upon repentance. Id. Ib. And concludes you ſee it clear from the Scripture, that even Heathen men, and thoſe that want the Hiſtory of the Goſpel have yet a ſufficiency of means whereby to believe, and ſo to prevent the wrath and indignation which is to come. Mr. Goodwin, Ib. p. 14. I muſt profeſs I am none of Mr. J. G's Proſelytes, who ever be; nor was Mr. Obadiah Howe, a moſt worthy perſon, and kinſman of our Learned Antagoniſt, who hath learnedly and largely confuted him, in a Tract intituled ſignificantly, The Pagan Preacher ſilenced, out of whom I ſhall tranſcribe his Anſwer to Mr. J. G's Explication of Rom. p. 1062.4. of Heathens. This ſecond Chapter relates to the Jews, whom he reprehends becauſe by their Law they would condemn the Gentiles as ſinners, when they committed the ſame things. But that the patience [and goodneſs of God] afforded to the Jews was without the word, I think Mr. G. will not affirm, which is the cauſe why the Apoſtle concludes the Jews under a great inexcuſability, becauſe the miniſtry of the word ſuperadded to the light of nature, became not efficacious to reſtrain them from ſin; and from this very Argument he argues againſt the Jews, v. 17, 18. ſtill ſuppoſing that theſe perſons enjoying the patience of God, v. 4. had the letter of the Goſpel. So far Mr. Ob. Howe, p. 52.

5. As to thoſe with whom Gods Methods ſucceed not well, it is to be conſidered, that he doth not apply himſelf to every (or to any perſon) immediately, and ſeverally, after ſome ſuch tenour of ſpeech as this; I know thee to be a profligate, hopeleſs wretch, and that thou wilt finally diſregard whatſoever I ſay to thee, and conſequently periſh, and become miſerable. But however (though I foreſee moſt certainly thou wilt not, yet I entreat thee to hear and obey, and live. Let. p. 79. And afterwards, What is endeavoured for the reducement of ſuch—is by ſubſtituted Miniſters, that know no more of the event than they do themſelves, p. 81.

p. 107Rep. Nor doth God apply himſelf to ſinners in ſuch a tenour of ſpeech with reference to Predetermination of thoſe natural actions; which becauſe ſuch need a cauſe acting efficiently for the production of them: though he knows (without ſpecial grace which to them he affords not) a moral obliquity will adhere to them. And it is as true, that what God does for the reducement of them is by Miniſters, who know as little who are Predetermined to good, and who to ſinful actions, as the Saints or Sinners ſo Predetermined.

Having diſcourſed thus more laxely, Mr. H. proceeds to a more ſtrict diſquiſition of two things.

1. What may be alledged out of Gods word in reference to them that finally periſh in their wickedneſs, which can be thought not conſiſtent with ſincerity to have inſerted, upon the ſuppoſed foreſight of ſo diſmal an iſſue? Let. p. 82. And he inſtances in Gods profeſſing to will the ſalvation of all, 1 Tim. 2.4, Not to deſire the death of him that dieth, Ezek. 18.32; Yea, and profeſſeth himſelf grieved that any periſh, Pſalm 81.12, 13. Ib.

In anſwer to which Scripture in general (beſides many things ſaid well): he ſays, That which Gods declarations do amount unto is, &c. That if they neglect to attend to p. 108theſe external diſcoveries of the word, &c. they are not to expect he ſhould over-power them by a ſtrong hand, and ſave them againſt the continual diſinclination of their own wills. p. 89, 90.

Reply. I am not able to make ſenſe of the laſt words: For I underſtand not what overcoming by a ſtrong hand (in a ſinners caſe) God can make uſe of, that leaves the will under diſinclination to ſalvation; And they ſeem to be repugnant to another Clauſe referring to the ſame perſons: that they cannot promiſe themſelves ſuch power ſhall be uſed with them, as ſhall finally overcome their averſe diſaffected hearts. p. 90.

2. Mr. H. adds, Whatſover extraordinary Acts, God may do upon ſome to make them willing. p. 90.

Reply. I am not well ſatisfied (becauſe I am not ignorant of the Arminians apprehenſion about Pauls Converſion) that Mr. H. calls thoſe Acts by which God makes ſome men willing, extraordinary: for though they are ſupernatural, yet they are ordinary to all that are willing. It ſeems to imply, that ſome are made willing by ordinary acts, and others by extraordinary: And ſo it is an ill-ſounding word.

3. Mr. H. at laſt gives us the import of the above-cited Scripture, That they really ſignifie the obedience and bleſſedneſs p. 109of thoſe his Creatures that are capable thereof, to be more pleaſing and agreeable to his nature and will, than that they ſhould diſobey and periſh, which is the utmoſt can be meant [particularly] by thoſe words, God will have all men to be ſaved and to come to the knowledg of the truth. p. 93, 94.

Reply. As theſe words ſound they do not gratify my ear: For I cannot underſtand, that the Connexion of Diſobedience and Deſtruction, ſhould not be as agreeable to Gods Will and Nature, as the Connexion of Obedience and Salvation. I take the import of 2 Cor. 2.15, We [Apoſtles] are unto God a ſweet ſavour of Chriſt, in them that are ſaved, and in them that periſh: that God takes pleaſure in the periſhing of unbelievers, as well as in the ſaving of believers.

2. Yet in ſano ſenſu, I admit them as the moſt learned and pious Davenant, ſometime Biſhop of Salisbury, explains the matter: When God commandeth any thing which is good, he unfeignedly liketh and loveth ſuch actions, and can do no other; his own natural goodneſs, and holineſs terminating, Voluntatem divinae complacentiae [i. e. the will of divine Complacence] unto all holy actions by whomſoever performed, Animadv. on Hoard, p. 350. And Gods meaning when he offereth any grace to men, is, that they ſhould perform ſuch actions whereunto ſuch p. 110grace conduceth; and his meaning when he promiſeth glory to any man if he believeth and perſeveres, is truly to perform it if he do ſo. Id. pag. 353. And not to ſever the learned Biſhops ſentiments: To Mr. Hoards notion [the ſame with Mr. Howes], that mercy is more natural and pleaſing to God than Vindicative Juſtice, which is his ſtrange work; He doth not willingly afflict, &c. [for which are quoted, Mich. 7.18. Iſa. 28.21. Lam. 3.33]. The Biſhop replyes, That is ſaid to be natural and pleaſing to God, which comes originally from himſelf, and is not an act depending upon the miſdeſerts of the Creature. p. 206. As for Vindicative Juſtice it may be called a ſtrange work, becauſe it is opus occaſionatum [i. e. a work occaſioned] by mans tranſgreſſion. p. 287.

And once more to cite this eminent Divine; The abſolute liberty and ſupreme dominion, which God hath in the preparing, or not preparing of effectual grace, wherein the abſolute decrees of Election and non-Election do ſhew themſelves, is a thing as natural and pleaſing to God as his mercy. p. 287.

4. Mr. H. aſſerts, That God doth ſo far really will the ſalvation of all, as not to omit the doing that which may effect it, if they be not neglectful of themſelves, but not ſo as to effect it by that extraordinary exertion of power, which he thinks fit to employ upon ſome others. Let. p. 105.

p. 111Reply. This muſt be mixed with a grain of ſalt: If this omiſſion of Gods refer only to the uſe of means for effecting mens ſalvation, we grant, that in genere mediorum, God is not wanting to them that live under the Goſpel-diſpenſations. And in this ſenſe God repreſenting himſelf under the ſimilitude of an Husbandman, truly ſays of Iſrael, What could have been done more to my Vineyard, that I have not done in it? Iſa. 5.4. But if Mr. H. intends (as the words ſeem to ſound) that ſalvation may be obtained by the uſe of means, without that exertion of power (which he calls extraordinary) whereby that end is obtained in ſome, I cannot take ſuch an aſſertion upon his bare word. I have been taught from my Childhood (and ſee no cauſe to ſuſpect the credulity of that age abuſed to draw me into a misbelief) that ſuch an exertion of power, as whereby God raiſed Chriſt from the dead, is univerſally neceſſary to make the means of ſalvation effectual to their end.

5. Mr. H. profeſſes his diſlike of the common diſtinction of Voluntas beneplaciti & ſigni, in this preſent caſe [viz. to explain how God wills the ſalvation of all, and yet only of ſome] under which ſuch as coyned, and thoſe that have much uſed it, have only rather I doubt not, conceal'd a good meaning p. 112than expreſſed by it a bad one. p. 106.

Reply. And whoever coined it (which I take it was Hugo de S. Victore) few of our Divines but have uſed it, that have dealt in any Controverſie which gave an occaſion for it. And why ſhould Mr. H. charge them with a concealment of a good meaning, which they have ſo often diſcovered? If Mr. H. only diſlkes the terms, I ſhould not contend with him, for I can give him their ſenſe in others from the learned Davenant; The will of God termed voluntas ſimplicis complacentiae, i. e. the will of ſimple complacency [which is the ſame with vol. ſigni] and that which is termed voluntas abſoluta or eſſicax i. e. an abſolute or efficacious will [which is the ſame with vol. beneplaciti] may well ſtand together. God wills that all men believe and be ſaved with the will of complacence; God wills and decrees to permit that ſome continue in unbelief, and be not ſaved but periſh, with the Abſolute will. The former will in effect is but a conditional will; As if the Apoſtle had ſaid, God will have all men to be ſaved, if all men ſhall believe in Chriſt; and to believe in Chriſt is an act ſo well pleaſing and ſo agreeable unto Gods will, that whereſoever it is found it ſhall be rewarded. But notwithſtanding the extent of this will unto all men, there is in God an abſolute will of permitting ſome to continue in their unbelief, p. 113and ſo periſh, Dav. ag. Hoard, p. 220.

But it muſt be obſerved, that whereas the moſt learned Biſhop ſeems to attribute a Conditional will to God above; he afterwards explains himſelf, Meer or purely conditional Decrees agree not with the perfection of the Divine Nature. The ſpeeches therefore cited out of Scripture [He that believes ſhall be ſaved, &c.] do not imply a Conditional Will in God ſuſpended for any moment of time, and then poſt purificatam conditionem, i. e. after the Condition performed] becoming an abſolute and effectual will, &c. But theſe conditional Decrees are grounded on ſome abſolute revealed Decree of God, to the Performance whereof he hath tied himſelf. For example, it is an abſolute Decree of the Divine Will publiſhed in the Goſpel, that whoſoever believeth, &c. ſhall be ſaved. From hence is derived that mixt conditional Decree; If Cain, Judas, or any other believe, they ſhall be ſaved. Now ſuch mixt conditional Decrees carry no contradiction to the abſolute, &c. who ſeeth not theſe Propoſitions may well ſtand together? I will that if Judas repent and believe, he ſhall have remiſſion and ſalvation. I will not to give to Judas the gift of repentance, of faith and of eternal life, Id. p. 225, 226, 227. I have ſaid enough to obviate M. H's exagitation of the terms Vol. p. 114ſigni & beneplaciti, which are not worth the trouble of tranſcribing.

6. But M. H. adds, And of theſe faults the application of the diſtinction of Gods ſecret and revealed Will unto this caſe, though it be uſeful in many, is as guilty. Let. p. 108.

Rep. 1. As to this I ſay (as the aforeſaid Biſhop Davenant of M. Hoard); Mr. H. ſhould firſt have rightly ſet it down, and then have tried his ſtrength in confuting it, and I ſhall add his explication of it: We ſay that there is in God a true will revealed in the Goſpel of ſaving all men that ſhall believe; and a true will liking, embracing, rewarding faith, holineſs, perſeverance in all men whomſoever without diſtinction of perſons: And this is the Will call'd Voluntas ſimplicis complacentiae [or ſigni] which neither decreeth nor determineth any thing infallibly concerning the being or not being of ſuch good acts in this or that ſingular perſon. This Will we know, and therefore we call it his revealed will. There is alſo in God a ſecret will of bringing ſome men to faith, perſeverance, and the Kingdom of heaven, and of not bringing others to any of theſe: this Will we know not, and therefore we call it, the ſecret Will, Dav. ag. Hoard, p. 221: only 'tis to be noted, that when the Reverend Biſhop ſays, This ſecret will of God we know not; it muſt be underſtood, p. 115with reference to the particular perſons whom God intends to work faith, &c. in; for we know in general, that there are ſome perſons whom God will be thus good unto. I add this to prevent a Cavil, which may ſeem very acute to them that uſe it: If God's will of good pleaſure [or abſolute will] be ſecret, how come we to know it? or if it be revealed, how is it ſecret? And then the members of the diſtinction are confounded (as Mr. H. objects, p. 107.) who ſhould have done well to have told us, in what caſes it is uſeful (though not in the preſent caſe). For I dare offer my ſelf to diſprove the uſe of it in any caſe, upon the ſame grounds that Mr. H. can the uſe of it in this.

Rep. 2. And yet when Mr. H. hath ſo ſolemnly declared his diſlike of our diſtinction, he owns it himſelf, but in other words, which are the explication of our terms: And whereas it may be thought to follow hence, that hereby we aſcribe to God a liableneſs to fruſtration and diſappointment, that is without pretence: The reſolve of the Divine will in this matter [viz. the holineſs and ſalvation of all men] being not concerning the event what man ſhall do, but concerning his duty what he ſhould, and concerning the connexion between his duty and his happineſs, Let. p. 112.

p. 116Now to leave Mr. H. inexcuſable for the impertinency of his exception againſt our Diſtinction; let us ſee how Dr Twiſſe (a man that much uſed this diſtinction, and therefore blamed by Mr. H.) explains it. There is no contradiction, ſays he, between theſe two wills Divine: For Voluntas ſigni is improperly called a Will, for it ſignifies only mans duty, or what he ſhould do, as what will be pleaſing to God if it be done. But Voluntas beneplaciti is properly and ſimply a will, (viz. whereby is decreed whatſoever ſhall come to paſs, by Gods either efficiency, or permiſſion) Twiſſe Vind. Gr. l. 1. p. 1. §. 12. p. 140. It is evident to any intelligent Collator, that M H's and Dr. Twiſſe's ſenſe is the ſame, and ſo Mr H. hath blamed himſelf in blaming Twiſſe.

7. And if it ſhould be inſiſted, that in aſſerting God to will what by his Laws he hath made become mans duty, even where it is not done, we ſhall herein aſcribe to him, at leaſt an ineffectual and imperfect will, as that which doth not bring to paſs the thing willed: It is anſwer'd, that Imperfection were with no pretence imputable to the Divine will, meerly for not effecting every thing whereto it may have a real propenſion, Let. p. 115, 116.

Reply. We had need tread warily here, for our way is ſtrewed with Daggers, I mean, with terms repugnant to each other.

p. 1171. If God be underſtood but to will mans duty, not the event [his obedience to it] there's no colour for the Objection, that the will of God is ineffectual; for it is effectual (when declared) to make mans duty what it pleaſes.

2. If by willing mans duty, he means the event [the performance of it], then is there an Objection indeed, but without ſolution, and not capable of any.

3. Take it how you will, there's no anſwer to the Objection. For this is, That Gods will is ineffectual if that come not to paſs which is willed: and that is, That God hath no will at all of that which comes not to paſs [which yet the Objection ſuppoſes] for what elſe is the meaning of a real Propenſion, which differs as much from willing as an habit from an act, or as the power of ſeeing when my eyes are ſhut, from my actual ſeeing when they are open?

8. Nor could any courſe have been taken that was fit in himſelf, and more agreeable to ſincerity [viz. than counſels, and exhortations, and whatſoever means God uſes to prevent mens ſins]. There are only two ways to be thought on beſides, either that God ſhould wholly have forborn to make overtures to man in common, or that he ſhould efficaciouſly have overpowr'd all into a compliance with them. And there is little doubt, but upon ſober conſideration p. 118both of theſe will be judged altogether unfit, Let. p. 121.

Reply. As to the former of theſe two ways, I have nothing to oppoſe; As to the Latter, there is a great deal of doubt; and Mr. H. implies ſo much when he ſays, it is loſs obvious.

9. Mr. Howe proceeds to ſhew the unfitneſs of Gods efficacious overpowring all men into a compliance with his Overtures to them, becauſe of two congruities in the courſe taken for the Government of the World.

1. That it be ſteady and uniform; not interrupted by frequent, extraordinary and anomalous actions.

2. That he uſe a royal Liberty, of ſtepping out of his uſual courſe ſometimes, as he ſees meet, p. 131, 132; and adds, If we apply them to the affairs of Grace, there is ſomething correſpondent. That ordinarily [grace] be ſought and expected, in the uſe of ordinary means. And that ſometimes its Sovereignty ſhew it ſelf in preventive exertions; and in working ſo Heroically, as none have befor…hand, in the neglect of its ordinary methods, any reaſon to expect, p. 138.

Repl. 1. This Anſwer is not fitted to the Queſtion. The Queſtion is, Whether it be fitting for God efficaciouſly to overpower all men into a compliance with the overtures he makes p. 119to them in common? The Anſwer is, It is not fit for God to overpower m…n, without making any overtures to them at all: or to alter the terms and keep the ſenſe, the Queſtion is, Whether it be fitting, that God ſhould give all men ſpecial grace, in the uſe of means? And the Anſwer is, It is not fitting, that God ſhould give all men ſpecial grace, without the uſe of means. An admirable incogitancy in a man of parts. If the Queſtion had been about the fitneſs of Gods converting all men (whom he thinks meet to convert) as he did Saul, by a voice from Heaven; the Anſwer had been a-kin to the Queſtion: (though even Saul was not converted without means, but without ordinary means).

2. I am at a loſs for a Reaſon, why it ſhould be unfit for God efficaciouſly to overpower all men into a compliance with the means (ſuppoſing what I hope Mr. H. will not deny, I am ſure will never be able to diſprove; that no man will ever comply with the means, that is not overpowr'd thereunto) unleſs it be this, that it is unfit for God to beſtow grace, and ſalvation upon all men (which would be a very hard ſaying).

Reply. 2. As to his ſecond Theſis, if it be (as 'tis pretended) an Anſwer to the Queſtion propoſed. I Anſwer, That though p. 120it be fitting enough for God to uſe a Royal liberty in giving grace to ſome, and not to others; yet I underſtand not that the ſuſpenſion of his Liberty, and binding up himſelf to give grace to all, had been any way unfit. We poor Mortals, I am certain, are very unfit to judg what is fit or unfit for God to do. We may reſt ſatisfied that God does nothing but what becomes him: but we ſhall intermeddle in things too high for us, if we paſs ſentence, that for God to do otherwiſe in many inſtances than he hath done, would unbecome him. God hath permitted the whole race of mankind to turn Rebels to his Soveraign Majeſty, and but ſome part of the Angelical nature. This became him to do, becauſe he hath done it. But ſuppoſe he had prevented the Rebellion of all his rational Creatures; or mans, and not the Angels; or the Angels, and not mans; or permitted the Rebellion of all the Angels, (as he hath of all mankind); or reſtored the Angels, and left man in his own ruins: would Mr. Howe adventure to ſay, that upon ſober conſideration any of theſe ways would have been judged altogether unfit for God to have taken?

10. Mr. How proceeds, and acquaints us, that it were incongruous that a whole order of Intelligent creatures ſhould be moved only by p. 121inward impulſes: — And that the faculties, whereby men are capable of moral Government, ſhould be rendered to this purpoſe [viz. the Improvement of means] uſeleſs and vain. And that they ſhould be tempted to expect to be conſtantly managed as meer Machines, that know not their own uſe, Let. pag. 142, 143.

Reply. Either this Harangue is impertinent, or it borders as near upon Arminianiſm as Scotland does upon England. If Mr. H's meaning be, that it is incongruous for God to overpower men, that neglect the means [as his words p. 142, imply] whereas the Queſtion he undertook to Anſwer is, Whether it be congruous for God to overpower all (as he does ſome) that uſe the means, then his Diſcourſe is beſides the buſineſs; or if he would inſinuate, that the courſe which God takes with ſome [though not with all] in overpowring them, is to manage them as Machines, and render their natural faculties vain and uſeleſs; This is Arminius's Charge upon the Proteſtant Doctrines of the irreſiſtible operation of ſpecial grace.

To draw now to a cloſe, after too long a Diſcourſe, (that I may not tire my Reader) I ſhall only requeſt him, that he would duly conſider, that of Mr. H's Principles there are theſe deſperate conſequences, (which I have ſo much charity as to believe he does p. 122not ſee, and (ſo) nor own,) That God is juſtled out of his proper place; I mean, of being the firſt cauſe of all the Creatures actions, and the Creature put in his ſtead, as being repreſented able to uſe its powers, as it pleaſes. That one great Perfection of the Divine Nature, viz. Foreknowledg of future Contingencies, is ſeparated from it, by denying the only true ground of ſuch Foreknowledg, the Divine Decrees. And hence, the Providence of God in governing the actions of his Creatures is left in great danger of falling, becauſe a Superſtructure raiſed without a foundation. For how can God govern thoſe actions which depend not immediately upon him in their production; nor are foreknown in his Eternal Decree, wherein lies the model of all he intends to exerciſe his Government upon, in time?

In ſum, his Doctrine opens a wide door for Atheiſm, and deſerves as ſharp a cenſure as one gave of Epicurus's denial of Providence, Verbis Deum poſuit, re ſu…tulit; i.e. He acknowledged God in words, but denied him in deed. For as all Arguments proving any of the Divine Attributes, do prove a God, becauſe thoſe terms are eſſentially convertible: ſo thoſe Arguments which deny any Divine Attributes, do alſo deny a God upon the ſame ground.

I ſhall give the Reader no further p. 123trouble but what (if he be conſcientious) he will willingly give himſelf of examining what he hath read, and judging according to the evidence of Truth; for which in this momentous Controverſie, and not for victory I have entred into this publick conteſt with my ancient and learned Friend, Mr. Howe, which I take to be ſufficiently warranted by that paſſage of holy Writ: But when Peter was come to Antioch I withſtood him to the face, becauſe he was to be blamed, Gal. 2.11. Whence it may be duly collected, that the reverence or eſtimation of any mans perſon ought not to hinder a publick reproof, when he is guilty of a publick ſcandal.

FINIS.

ERRATA.

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End of the text · Thomas Danson, Vindication of the Doctrine of Predetermination (1678)