The Reasons of the Christian Religion Part 1, Conclusion · Objection 9 – Objection 10
OBJECTION IX.
THere is nothing in the Intellect which was not firſt in the Senſe, from which it receiveth all its knowledge by the Idea's of the Phantaſie; Therefore the Soul can reach no higher than to corporeal ſenſible things: Therefore it is but ſuch it ſelf.
Anſw. The Antecedent is falſe, and both the Conſequents. Had he limited his aſſertions to corporeal objects, I ſhould eaſily acknowledge to Gaſſendus, that Omnis quae in mente habetur Idea ortum ducit à ſenſibus. Et Omnis Id…a aut per ſenſum tranſit, aut ex iis quae tranſeunt per ſenſum formatur. Et quae Idea propriis acquiritur ſenſibus perſectior eſt eâ quae ex facta ab alio deſcriptione formatur. Qualis Idea rei, talis definitio. But that theſe things will not hold true as he delivereth them univerſally, I think I ſhall make plain, and confute this Objection to the ſatisfaction of any one that knoweth himſelf.
Ortum ducere à ſenſu is an ambiguous phraſe: The ſenſe may be the Occaſion ſine qua non, of that whereof it never had the leaſt participation in it ſelf. I deſire you but to diſtinguiſh between the Intellects Object and its Act, and thoſe Objects which it knoweth by the mediation of other extrinſick objects, and thoſe which it knoweth by the mediation of its own Act. Theſe differences are paſt all doubt. When the eye ſeeth theſe Lines and this Paper, the Light and Lines and Paper are each one thing, and the ſight of them is another. I ſee the Light, and thereby the Paper; but I ſee not my ſight: My ſight is not the object of my ſight: It may be ſaid, that the Object is in my ſight, but not that my ſight is in my ſight: Yet by ſeeing I perceive not only what I ſee, but that I ſee; and I perceive much more plainly that I ſee, than what I ſee. I may doubt of a thouſand objects which I ſee, what matter, ſhape, or colour they are of; but I doubt not at all of the act of ſeeing; that right or wrong ſome fight I have, or that I ſee the Light: ſo is it with the Intellect. This book is one thing, and the underſtanding it is another thing. The book is the object of my underſtanding; but (at leaſt in primò inſtanti) my underſtanding is not the object of my underſtanding; but by underſtanding I have an immediate perception that I underſtand. And (as Carteſius truely ſaith) the act of Intellection is more perceived than the object: I am more certain that I think and underſtand, than I am of the nature of that which I think of and underſtand. If any ſay, that the act of Intellection is the object of another Intellection, becauſe intelligo me intelligere, and ſo that intellectio non eſt tantum actus intellectus, ſed etiam eſt in intellectu, and that the Intellect doth underſtand its own act intuitivè as ſome ſpeak, or by reflexion as others (though doubtleſs the firſt perception that I underſtand, is not by reflexion, but by that ſame act of underſtanding ſomething elſe) (as ſight doth not reflect upon it ſelf to get a perception that I ſee) I will enter no controverſie about any of theſe notions of the manner of our underſtanding our own act of Intellection, which doth not concern the preſent buſineſs. But it is moſt certain that Actus intelligendi nunquam fuit in ſenſu: when the object of Intellection did paſs through the ſenſe, the Act of Intellection did not: nor the intellection or perception of that Act of Intellection, did not: Nor the Intellection of the common nature of an Intelligence, which from hence I gather; nor the Intellection of particular Intelligences as Angels; nor my Intellection of any mans Intellect or intellectual act, whoſe nature I gather from mine own: Nor the conception I have of a Deity as the moſt perfect intellect; nor the perception which I have of my own Volition of my own felicity, or of the means thereto as ſuch, nor of the pleaſing of God, nor of another mans good: Nor my perception of the nature of the will hence gathered; nor my conception of the Volitive power in other perſons; nor my conceptions of the Volitions of God, of Angels, &c. nor my conception of Intellectual or moral habits, nor of the Wills natural inclinations! None of all theſe were ever in the Senſe; nor paſſed through the Senſe: ſome of them (which Gaſſendus de Ideis overlooketh) are without any Idea at all properly ſo called (as the firſt perception of the act of my own underſtanding and will, by underſtanding and willing other things; as we perceive that we ſee non videndo Ipſum viſum, ſed alia videndo): And that Idea which we have of all the reſt, is fetcht from this perception of our own acts, and not from any thing which ever was in the ſenſe: The Soul by knowing it ſelf, doth gather the knowledge of all higher intellectual beings, which is its moſt conſiderable worthy knowledge. I hope I have given you inſtances enow; and plain enough, and you ſee now what truth there is of nihil eſt intellectu quod non fuit prius in ſenſu.
D' Orbellis diſtinguiſheth Knowledge (largely taken) into ſenſitivè & intellectivè: and both of them into Abſtractivè & Intuitivè. Knowledge Intuitive is of an Object as it ſelf preſent, when a thing in its preſent exiſtence, is the moving object of knowledge. Knowledge Abſtractive is when the ſpecies of the thing doth move us to know the thing it ſelf: and that whether the thing it ſelf be preſent or abſent, and have exiſtence or not. The example of Intuitive ſenſitive knowledge or perception which he giveth, is the Eye ſeeing Colours. The inſtance of Abſtractive ſenſitive knowledge is, as the Phantaſie imagineth colours: The inſtance of Intuitive Intellective Knowledge is, the Saints ſeeing the glory of God in Heaven, and he might have inſtanced in many other things: The inſtance of Abſtractive Intellective Knowledge, is the underſtandings Knowledge of the Quiddity of Colours by means of the ſpecies. To which may be added, that Abſtractive Knowledge is either per ſpeciem propriam, or per ſpeciem alienam: In this life the Soul knoweth its own acts either Intuitively or by an act, if poſſible, yet neerer to its eſſential power, that hath no uſual diſtinguiſhing name. It knoweth its own powers, inclinations, and habits, neither by a knowledge, in proper and ſtrict ſenſe, intuitive or abſtractive: For it is not by a proper ſpecies, but it is its natural innate power of diſcerning this Principle, that quicquid agit poteſt agere quod agit; by arguing ab actu ad potentiam & naturam. But in the large ſenſe as Carteſius uſeth the word, this may be called, an Idea. The minde knoweth God and Angels, and other mens Souls, in this large ſenſe alſo by an Idea, but not per ſpeciem propriam, ſed alienam, that is, not by a ſpecies of God and Angels, but by an Idea borrowed from our own Intellections and Volitions. But this is not an Idea that ever paſſed through the ſenſes: and Gaſſendus might have thought on it, whether it be not an Idea in the Intellect, if not without the phantaſie, at leaſt over and above the Idea in the Imagination, when he denieth that there is any ſuch Intellective Idea's.
2. But what if there had been nothing in the intellect, but what paſſed through the ſenſe? it would no more thence follow that the intellect is no more noble, ſpiritual or immortal than the ſenſe, than it will follow that the King is no better than his Porter, becauſe none cometh to him till he let them in; or that the animal ſpirits are no more noble than the teeth, or than the natural heat; or the third concoction is no more excellent than the firſt, becauſe nothing cometh to the third concoction, but what was maſticated, ſwallowed, and paſſed the firſt and ſecond concoction. Of which, before.
3. And even by the help of things ſenſible, Epicurus can reach the knowledge of inſenſible atoms, and Carteſius of his ſubtil matter, and globuli coeleſtes: why then by things ſenſible may we not reach the knowledge of ſpiritual ſubſtances and powers?
Yet after all this, I am much of their mind, who think that it is not actual knowledge that is born with us; nor is there any true Idea or picture of any thing innate in our underſtandings; and I think that if per poſſibile vel impoſſibile, you ſuppoſe a man born without any one ſenſe, that he would have had no actual knowledge at all, (though that is uncertain.) Becauſe as if I had not ſeen any thing objective, I ſhould not have perceived that I could ſee; ſo if I had never known any other object, I could not have known what it is to know: and other objects have no way, that I know of, to the intellect, but through the ſenſe: (Though what the active ſpirits would have done upon the phantaſie, I cannot poſſibly underſtand.) But all this only concludeth, that the ſenſes reception is the way to the intellection of things ſenſible; and that it was a neceſſary occaſion, ſine qua non, to the perception of our own intellectual act, becauſe thus neceſſary to the act it ſelf: But not that any Idea of our own Intellection, or any of all the things fore-inſtanced, was received through the ſenſes.
OBJECTION X.
THat which things corporeal work upon, is corporeal: for it cannot be conceived how bodies own work upon that which hath no body: But things corporeal work upon the ſoul: Ergo, it is it ſelf corporeal.
Anſw. 1. I largely before ſhewed, that our uncertainty of the juſt conſiſtence of Metaphyſical matter, or incorporeal ſubſtance, doth make all ſuch arguings to ſound like dreams.
2. I have ſhewed, that ſpiritual powers receive not impreſſions as dull matter doth, by a meer paſſive power: but by an activity and outgoing, it worketh indeed upon that which it receiveth, much more than any ſuch matter can be ſaid to work on it: nay, matter doth not properly work upon it at all, but only afford it matter to work upon, and occaſion to exerciſe its active power. As the ſtone or tree doth not work upon the ſight, but the ſight by the help of light doth work upon it. As the eye can ſee a dung-hill, and yet be of a nobler kind, and God and Angels can know beaſts and worms, and yet be incorporeal. So man can know things inanimate, and yet be animate; and things inſenſible, and yet be ſenſible; and things irrational, and yet be rational; and things corporeal, and yet be incorporeal. And this by the activity and extent of its power, and not by any paſſive debaſing defectiveneſs at all.