The Reasons of the Christian Religion Part 1, Conclusion · Objection 11
OBJECTION X….
THat is not incorporeal, Vid. Paul. Carteſium in Sent. 1. Diſ. 1. p. 7. & Diſ. 2. p. 8. That ſpiritual things are better known than corporeal, and of the knowledge of God.which neither knoweth it ſelf to be incorporeal, nor hath any notion but negative of an incorporeal being: But ſuch is man's ſoul.
Anſw. 1. If the ſoul know not it ſelf to be an immortal ſpirit, what maketh almoſt all the world to judge ſo of themſelves? inſomuch that thoſe men that under pretence of Philoſophy deny it, are fain to ſtudy very hard, and take many years pains to blot out this light of nature from their minds; becauſe they cannot be ignorant of it at eaſie rates: The underſtanding will not loſe its natural light, nor ſuffer ſuch verities to be obliterated, but by a great deal of induſtry, and by the engines of abundance of falſe notions, which are ſought after to that uſe. As Cicero ſaith of the Epicureans, They learn thoſe things, quae cum praeclare didicerunt nihil ſciant. (Piſo de fin. 5. p. 204.) They learn diligently to unlearn the truth, that when they have learn'd much, they may know little.
2. Hath man no notion but Negative, of an incorporeal being. I ſhewed you before why the notion of materiality ſhould not be here uſed for a cheat or blind. But look back on what I ſaid even now, and you will ſee that as Cartes truly ſaith, we have not only poſitive conceptions of a mind, but the firſt, the cleareſt, and the ſureſt conceptions of it, in the meaſure that is fit for our preſent ſtate.
Queſt. 1. Have you not a poſitive conception of Intellection and Volition? If not, you are unfit for any controverſies about them, and cannot own your own humanity.
Queſt. 2. Have you not a clearer perception, that you think, and know or reaſon (either right or wrong) than you have what that thing is that you think or reaſon about?
Queſt. 3. Have you not a ſure and poſitive conception, that omnis actus eſt alicujus actus, & quod nihil, nihil agit? and therefore that you are an intelligent volitive being.
Queſt. 4. Have you not a poſitive ſure conception, that quicquid agit agere poteſt, and that nothing doth that which it cannot do; and therefore that your ſouls are beings potentiated for Intellection, Volition and Execution?
Porphyr. de occaſ. inq. Anima eſt Eſſentia inextenſa, immaterialis, immortalis, in vita habente à ſeipſa vivere atque eſſe ſimpliciter poſſidente.Queſt. 5. Have you not a poſitive ſure conception, that you have a natural inclination to theſe acts, and a pleaſure in them, and that they are natural and perfective to you? and conſequently that your ſouls are beings, that have not only a power, but a vis & inclinatio naturalis, or a power that is natural, and active, and inclined to theſe particular actings.
Queſt. 6. Have you not a poſitive ſure conception, that the end and higheſt objects of theſe acts and inclinations, are things above ſenſe, viz. your ſelves or minds in the firſt place, and then the things above you, the firſt Being, Cauſe, and Mover of all; the infinite Power, Wiſdom and Goodneſs, who is your Maker and your End? If you find no ſuch thing, The Lord have mercy on you, for every honeſt man may find it.
Queſt. 7. Have you not a poſitive ſure conception, that ſuch as the Operations are which flow from the eſſential powers or faculties, ſuch in nobility, and excellency, and nature is the ſubſtance thus potentiated and acting.
All theſe are clear, undeniable, poſitive conceptions of the ſoul; which ſet together are thus much, that [The Mind or Soul of man is a noble Eſſence, above the reach and nature of ſenſe, naturally potentiated and inclined, as an active being, to intellection, volition, and ſeeking after things celeſtial and everlaſting, eſpecially God himſelf, his ultimate end.] All this is poſitive, clear and ſure. And you would think this enough, 1. If you did conſider what Lud. Vives ſaith, that God hath given man a ſoul to uſe, rather than accurately to know; or to know ſo far as is neceſſary to uſe. As your child may have the uſe of his knife, or clock, or watch, or cloaths, without knowing what metall they are made of, or how to compoſe and make the like, as long as he can but do that with them which is neceſſary to their uſe. Often ſaith Seneca, Neceſſaria ignoramus, quia ſuperflua didicimus. 2. If your minds were not by ſenſe deluded and captivated to ſuch fixed idea's of things corporeal and groſs, as to over-look all other beings, and meaſure all ſubſtance by ſuch groſs idea's. 3. If you well conſidered, that you know in any reſpect little more of things corporeal, and in ſome reſpects much leſs. Let us ſee wherein it is that you know more: either as to the ſenſible or inſenſible parts of ſuch beings. As for the ſubſtances as ſuch, you confeſs they are but per accidens, the objects of ſenſe, and that as ſtripped of their accidents you have no poſitive true conception of them. And as for the accidents, you are no whit agreed either what they are, or how many. Of all things you are moſt unanimous in that of Quantity, moles, or extenſions; but what a poor kind of knowledge is it, to know that this or that is quantum, and not to know what it is that is quantum. What light, colour, ſapor, odor are, and what all the ſenſes that perceive them, you are as much diſagreed as if this age had been the firſt that had debated it. The ſame I may ſay both of Qualities in general, and of all other in particular, except figure, which properly belongeth not to the predicament. Of all the reſt there is the like diſagreement; even time and place, which truly are nothing but entia rationis, are debaſed by you in the firſt place, and are two of Gaſſendus his four predicaments. About the number either of principles or elements, there is no agreement; no nor what any one of the elements are: Who hath told us what is the form of earth, or water, or air, or deſcribed them otherwiſe than by their qualities? And then differ you as much about thoſe qualities. Who hath told us any thing of the naked matter or form of fire (ſuch as the Sun and Luminaries are)? any otherwiſe than by its acts, and powers or vertues of Motion, Light and Heat, as we deſcribe to you the ſoul of man. And if you go to the inviſible part of matter, it would make a man rather ſick than wiſe, to read men provincias dare atomis, as Cicero ſpeaketh; and to think with what bold unreaſonable fiction they number them, as ſhaped and figured; and figure and ſhape them to the uſes which they have feigned for them, and then uſe them and conduct them, and vary their motions, as confidently and ſeriouſly, as if they had given us any proof of any of this, and indeed expected to be believed. Nay, we muſt know how the corners of atoms (pardon the contradiction) came to be filed or worn off by motion, and ſo reduced to greater ſubtilty. And Gaſſendus, after all the fabrick which he buildeth upon atoms, ſaith, [That atoms have not of themſelves a moving force, but from God's firſt motion. §. 1. c. 8. p. 280. Non quod Deo neceſſe fuerit creare ſeorſim atomos, quas deinceps in partes grandiores, grandioreſque ex his, mundus conſtaret, compingerit; ſed quod creans materiae maſſam, in corpuſcula exolubilem, atque adeo ex corpuſculis tanquam minimis extremiſque particulis compoſitam, concreaſſe illi ipſa corpuſcula cenſentur. ib. So that they know not indeed whether God created matter firſt in atoms disjunct, or in more large and bulky parts: and ſo whether motion did divide groſſer and greater parts into atoms, or whether it coagulated atoms into greater bodies. But the ſum is, that they only affirm, that what ever bodies God made, they are diviſible into atoms, that is, into parts by man indiviſible. A great myſtery ſure, that the whole is diviſible into ſmaller parts! And what the nearer is any man by this, for the diſcerning of any of their wild hypotheſes? In a word, God hath given man knowledge for his benefit and uſe, to the ends of his being and life: and ſo far as we have uſe for it we may know all things about us; but to humour our wanton fancies he is not obliged. And becauſe we have more uſe for the faculties of our ſouls, than for fire and water, or any outward thing, he hath given us the firſt and ſureſt knowledge of them; whatſoever ſelf-contradicting Somatiſts ſay, to depreſs this knowledge, and advance that knowledge of Bodies, which their own diſagreements do confute. Sure I am, if that be a probable opinion which hath divers learned men for it, almoſt all things are probable in Philoſophy: and if that be improbable which hath multitudes of learned men againſt it, almoſt all things are improbable.