The Reasons of the Christian Religion Part 1, Conclusion · Objection 8
OBJECTION VIII.
SEnſation and Intellection are both but Reception: The paſſiveneſs therefore of the Soul doth ſhew its materiality.
Read Priſcians Theophraſt de Anim▪ with Ficinus Notes, which ſheweth how farr the Senſe is Active.Anſw. A ſhort anſwer may ſatisfie to this Objection. 1. All created Powers are partly paſſive, how active ſoever they be. For being in eſſe & operari dependant on and ſubordinate to the firſt Cauſe, they muſt needs receive his influence, as well as exerciſe their own powers. As the ſecond wheel in the Clock, muſt receive the moving force of the firſt, before it can move the third.
2. It is an enormous error about the operations of the Soul, to think that Intellection yea or Senſation either,Senſus Principium media que & finem ſentiendae rei individuae comprehendit, & Actio eſt, judiciumque perfectum, & in praeſenti momento ſimul totus exiſtit, etſi non abſ que paſſione aliqua inſtrumenti ſenſus efficitur non tamen eſt haec paſſio ſenſus; Quo fit ut patiamur & vigilantes & dormlentes nec tamen perſentiamus. Theophraſt. de Anim. ut ſupr. is meer Reception, and that the ſenſitive and intellective power are but Paſſive. The active Soul of Man (yea of Bruits) receiveth not its object, as the mark or butt receiveth the arrow that is ſhot at it. It receiveth it by a ſimilitude of nature, and by an active attendance, and embracement, yea by an active appetite ſicut foemina marem, vel potius ſicut eſuriens cibum: Yea, it moveth towards its object, and meeteth it: It actively welcometh and improveth it: As I ſaid even now, a Scholar that in his ſtudies ſo far diverteth his thoughts, that he knoweth not that the Clock hath ſtrucken at his ears, and knoweth not what thoſe ſay that talk by him, doth ſhew that ſome active attendance is neceſſary to almoſt all perception. He that feeleth not that his underſtanding doth agere as well as pati (when he is ſtudying, reading or writing) is a ſtranger to himſelf. How oft have I read over many lines when I have thought of ſomething elſe, and not known one word that I have read? Is inventing,Lege Marſ. Ficinum de Volupt. c. 1. & 2. & 3, &c. Platonis dogma defendentem, ſcil. Voluptatem eſſe Actum vel Motum. compounding, dividing, defining, &c. no action? I never felt cauſe from any experience of my own, to believe that I was a meer patient in any thought that was ever in my minde. Nay the Epicurean that ſuppoſeth thoughts to be but a dance of Atomes, called Spirits,Priſcian in Theophraſt. de Anim. c. 13. ſaith, [Anima quidem cum ſit forma vivens & ſenſualis, agit circa illa quae ſibi offeruntur. Vitaliter atque ſenſualiter: & quia eſt in corpore, uſ que ad certum ſpatium operatur. doth think that thoſe atomes or ſpirits are notably active. Carteſius his materia ſultilis is eminent in activity. Do you think that every dead Object which I think on with my eyes ſhut in the night, and ſo much more alive than I, and ſo much more active than my minde, that it muſt be accounted the ſole agent, and my minde the patient. They know little of a minde that talk in this ſtrain.
I know Carteſius telleth us, that the eye hath no fire or light in it, except perhaps the eye of a Cat or Owl. But if the ſtudy of matter and motion had left him any room for the conſideration of other things which he paſt over, he would by a little ſearch have found that the eye doth cloſe with its primary object, Light, by meer connaturality, becauſe it participateth of Light it ſelf, in its own conſtitution. It is fire in the eye, even in the viſive Spirits, which meeteth the fire or light without, and by union cauſeth that which we call ſight. And ſeeing that experience forced him to confeſs it of Cats and Owls, how could he think that all other eyes or ſight were quite of another kinde? Some men have been able to ſee in the dark, and had ſparkling eyes almoſt like Cats. The degree here differeth not the ſpecies. If this materia ſubtilis or globuli aetherei be fire, he might have allowed ſome of that to the viſive ſpirits in Man as well as in Owls. Saith Ficinus in Theophraſt. de Anim. c. 14. Primum luminoſum eſt Coeleſte: Secundum eſt Igneum: Tertium inter compoſita quod quaſi fulget ut Ignis. Primum luminale eſt Oculus, praecipuè radioſus, in animalibus, quae nocte vident; ſed …lii quo que oculi quamvis minus, ſunt tamen luminalus.
Nemeſius †See Alcinous de doctr. Plat. cap. 18. to the ſame purpoſe.l. pro Immort. Anim. in Bibl. Pat. p. 505. approveth Plato's Judgement, (Plato inquit) per confuſionem ſplendorum res aſpici exiſtimat, ut id lumen quod ex oculis proficiſcitur aliquo uſque in aerem, qui ejuſdem eſt ſecum genus effluat. Quod verò à corporibus manat contraferatur, & quod in aere eſt, qui interponitur, facile que diffunditur & vertitur, ſimul cum oculorum igne extendatur]. Et Galenus (inquit) de viſione cum Platone conſentit in 70 de conſenſ. And he ſaith himſelf, that the Sun ſendeth its light by the Air, and the light in the eye ſtreameth alſo into it; which is to ſeeing as the Nerves are to the Brain for feeling. Porphyry ſaith, that ſight is the Soul it ſelf diſcerning it ſelf in all things. But if there were any doubt in the point of ſight (which is performed both by active ſpirits, and an active object, Light) yet methinks that when I feel a ſtone, much more when I meditate on a Mountain, all ſhould confeſs that my ſenſe and intellection is like to have more action than that Stone and Mountain. And if you ſay only that Spirits firſt moved move others, and ſo touch the Intellectual Organs, or Spirits, I have partly anſwered that before, and ſhall anſwer it more anon. We have great reaſon to aſcribe the moſt of action to that part which is moſt ſubtile, vigorous and active.