The Reasons of the Christian Religion Part 1, Conclusion · Objection 5 – Objection 7
OBJECTION V.
NO immaterial ſubſtance moveth that which is material, as a principle of its operations: but the ſoul moveth the body as the principle of its operations: Ergo.
Anſw. 1. I have already ſaid, that if you proved the ſoul material, it would not prove it mortal.
2. As the body hath various operations, ſo it is moved by various principles or powers. As to locomotion, and perhaps vegetation, the materia ſubtilii, or fineſt atoms, as you will call it, or the fiery matter in the ſpirits, as I would call it, is an active being, which hath a natural power to move it ſelf and the reſt. But whether that motion do ſuffice to ſenſation, is undecided. But certainly there is another inward principle of motion, which guideth much of the locomotive, and over-ruleth ſome of the natural motion, by a peculiar action of its own, which is called Intellection and Volition, as I have proved before. When I go to the Church, when I write, or talk, the ſpirits are the neareſt ſufficient principle of the motion as motion: but as it is done in this manner, to this end, at this time, with theſe reaſons, it is from the intellectual principle.
3 And thus I deny the major Propoſition. And I prove the contrary. 1. God is the firſt principle of all motion in the world, and the firſt cauſe of material motion, and yet is not material. 2. What the lower and baſer nature can do, that the higher and nobler hath power to do, (ſuppoſitis ſupponendis) therefore if a body can move a body, a ſoul can do it much more.
But, ſaith Gaſſendus, Cauſis ſecundis primum agendi principium eſt Atomorum varia mobilitas ingenita, non incorporea aliqua ſubſtantia. Anſw. Angels are cauſae ſecundae, ſouls are cauſae ſecundae, animated bodies of men are cauſae ſecundae: prove it now of any of theſe (in your excluſion) if you can. But he ſaith, Capere non licet quomodo ſi incorporeum ſit, ita applicari corpori valeat, ut illi impulſum imprimat; quando noque ipſum contingere, carens ipſa tactu ſeu mole quae tangat, non poteſt — Phyſicae actiones corporeae cum ſint, niſi à principio phyſico corporeoque elici non poſſiut — Quod anima autem humana incorporea cum ſit▪ & in ipſum tamen corpus ſuum agat, motumque ipſi imprimat, dicimus animam humanam qua eſt intellectus ſeu mens, atque adeo incorporea, non elicere actiones niſi intellectuales, ſeu mentales & incorporeas. Et quum eſt ſentiens, vegetans, praeditaque vi corporum motrice atque adeo corporea eſt, elicere actiones corporeas, &c. And of Angels and Devils he ſaith, That it is known by faith only that they are incorporeal, and perhaps God gave them extraordinary bodies, when he would have them move or act on bodies.
To this I anſwer, 1. Who gave thoſe atoms their ingenite mobility, and how? You ſay that captum omnem fugit ut quippiam aliud moveat, ſi in ſeipſo immotum maneat. If ſo, then it ſeemeth, that either God was moved when he moved atoms, or that he never moved them. How then came they to be moved firſt? But you confeſs that God put into them their mobility. You ſay, De Deo alia ratio eſt, quoniam infinitae virtutis cum ſit, & v…ique praeſens, non ullo ſ…i motu, ſed nutu ſolo agere & movere quidlibet poteſt. If you think not as you ſpeak, it is unworthy of a Philoſopher; if you do, then it is ſtrange that you ſhould overthrow your own reaſoning, and excuſe it no better than thus. If the reaſon why incorporeal ſpirits cannot move bodies be that which you alledge, (becauſe only a body can be applied to a body to make impreſſion on it) then God can leſs move a body than man's ſoul can; becauſe his pureſt eſſence is more diſtant from corporeal groſsneſs than our ſouls are. At leaſt, the reaſon would be the ſame. And to ſay that God is every where, and of infinite vertues, maketh him nevertheleſs a Spirit: and created ſpirits (if that be enough) may have power or vertue enough for ſuch an effect. Doubtleſs if God move bodies, the ſpirituality of an agent hindereth not the motion.
2. But why ſhould it captum omnem ſuperare, that a nobler and more potent nature can do that, which a more ignoble can do? Becauſe I cannot know how a ſpirit by contact can apply it ſelf to matter, ſhall I dream that therefore it is uncapable of moving bodies? Clean contrary, I ſee that matter of it ſelf is an unactive thing: and were it not that the noble active element of fire, (which as a lower ſoul to the paſſive matter, and a thing almoſt middle between a ſpirit and a body) did move things here below, I could diſcern no motion in the world, but that which ſpirits cauſe, except only that of the parts to the whole, the aggregative motion which tendeth to reſt. The difference of underſtandings is very ſtrange: it is much eaſier to me to apprehend, that almoſt all motion ſhould come from the pureſt, powerful, active, vital natures, than that they ſhould be all unable to ſtir a ſtraw, or move the air, or any body.
OBJECTION VI.
THe ſoul is in our ſleep either unactive, See in Ariſtcas Hiſtor. de 70. p. 879. the Kings Queſt. 19. about Dreams, with the Anſwer, how far Dreams are in our power.(as when we do not ſo much as dream) or acteth irregularly and irrationally, according to the fortuitous motion of the ſpirits: Ergo, it is no incorporeal immortal ſubſtance.
Anſw. 1. I ſuppoſe the ſoul is never totally unactive. I never awaked ſince I had the uſe of memory, but I found my ſelf coming out of a dream. And I ſuppoſe they that think they dream not, think ſo becauſe they forget their dreams.
2. Many a time my reaſon hath acted for a time as regularly, and much more forcibly, than it doth when I am awake: which ſheweth what it can do, though it be not ordinary.
3. This reaſon is no better than that before anſwered; where I told you, that it argueth not that I am a horſe, or no wiſer than my horſe, becauſe I ride but according to his pace, when he halteth, or is tired. Nor doth it prove that when I alight, I cannot go on foot. He is hard of underſtanding that believeth, that all the glorious parts of the world above us, have no nobler intellectual natures than man. Suppoſe there be Angels, and ſuppoſe one of them ſhould be united to a body, as our ſouls are: we cannot imagine but that he would actuate it, and operate in it according to its nature; as I write amiſs when my pen is bad. The ſame I ſay of perſons Lethargick, Apoplectick, Delirant, &c.
OBJECTION VII.
REaſon is no proof of the ſoul's immateriality, becauſe ſenſe is a clearer and more excellent way of apprehenſion than Reaſon is; and the bruits have ſenſe.
Anſw. 1. I have ſaid enough to the caſe of Bruits before.
2. The ſoul underſtandeth bodily things, by the inlet of the bodily ſenſes: Things incorporeal (as I ſhall ſhew more anon) it otherwiſe underſtandeth. When it underſtandeth by the help of ſenſe, it is not the ſenſe that underſtandeth any thing. If Bruits themſelves had not an Imagination which is an Image of Reaſon, their ſenſe would be of little uſe to them. We ſee when by buſineſs or other thoughts the minde is diverted and alienated, how little ſenſe it ſelf doth for us: when we can hear as if we never heard, and ſee, and not obſerve what we ſee, yet it's true, that the more ſenſe helpeth us in the apprehending of things ſenſible, which are then objects, the better and ſurely r…w perceive them by the underſtanding. As the ſecond and third Concoction will not be well made, if there be a failing in the firſt; ſo the ſecond and third perception, (…n the Phantaſie and Intellect) will be ill made, if the firſt deceive or fail them. But this proveth not either that the firſt Concoction or Perception is more noble than the third; or that Senſitives without Reaſon have any true underſtanding at all; or that Senſe, Phantaſie and Reaſon, are not better than Senſe alone. But theſe things need not much diſputing. If Senſe be nobler than Reaſon, let the Horſe ride the man, and let the Woman give her milk to her Cow, and let Bruits labour men, and feed upon them, and let Beaſts be your Tutors, and Kings and Judges, commit to them the nobleſt works, and give them the preeminence, if you think they have the nobleſt faculties.