The Reasons of the Christian Religion Part 1, Conclusion · Objection 3 – Objection 4
OBJECTION III.
HƲmane ſouls are but forms: and forms are but the qualities or modes of ſubſtances, and therefore accidents: and therefore periſh when ſeparated from the bodies.
Anſw. Lege Plotinum de Anim. En. 4. l. 3. c. 391. ſect. 26.The world of learned men do find themſelves too much work, and trouble others with controverſies about names and words, and eſpecially by confounding words and things, and not diſcerning when a controverſie is only de nomine, and when it is de re. And they have done ſo about forms as much as any thing. The word form is uſually liable to this ambiguity: In compounded beings, it is ſometime taken for the active predominant part or principle; and ſometimes for the ſtate which reſulteth from the contemperation of all the parts. Which is the fitteſt to be called the form, is but a queſtion de nomine. Gaſſendus himſelf confeſſeth this ambiguity of the word, and having pleaded that all forms, except man's intellectual ſoul, are but modes or qualities of bodies, and accidents. He addeth, §. 1. l. 6. c. 1. Si formae nomine ſpiritum quendam & quaſi florem materiae intellexeris, cujuſmodifere concipimus animam in equo, tum forma dici poteſt ſubſtantia, immo & corpus tenuiſſimum, quod craſſius pervadat, perficiat & regat — At ſi formae nomine intelligatur diſpoſitio ac modus quo tam ſubſtantia illa ſpirituoſior quam craſſior reliqua ſe habet, & ad quam facultates actioneſque naturales conſequuntur tum poſſe Qualitatem conſeri ac dici. Whether the ſouls of bruits be only the ſpirits, or the flos materiae, or not, it is granted by him, and by almoſt all men, that in mixt bodies there is one part more ſubtil than the reſt, which is the moſt active, powerful, predominant part, and which doth corpus pervadere, perficere, regere. He thinketh that this is but that ſubtil matter which others call fire; but others think upon the reaſons before given, that it is a ſuperiour nature, and that the ſpirits, or fiery nature, is but its neareſt inſtrument: Becauſe no ſubtilty will make atoms ſenſible or appetitive, which in their proper nature have no ſuch thing. But what ever becomes of the controverſie, whether the animal principle in bruits be material or immaterial, it is granted us, and is certain, that in all mixed beings, there is a difference of the conſtitutive parts: as the fiery nature (ſuch as the Sun is of) is active in compariſon of the other three Elements, which to it are paſſive; ſo the vital principle in bruits is active, powerful and regent, as to the reſt of the compounding parts. And it's certain, that the name of a [form] is by contenders taken, ſometime for that regent active principle or ſubſtance, (be it what it will) and ſometime for the temperament reſulting from all the parts. In Engines where there is no principle or part which is notably predominant, the name of the [form] is given to the ordered conjunction of all the parts. So in a Watch, the ſpring, though the beginning of motion, is not ſo fitly called the form of the watch, as the order of the whole frame. But in living things, there is more room for a competition between the regent part and the temperament, which of them ſhould be called the form. Now it is undeniable with all men, that both in men and bruits, that regent principle is a ſubſtance, and that the contemperation or order of the parts is but their mode, and maketh no other kind of being than Ordo Civitatis vel Reipublicae is, which ceaſeth upon the diſſolution. And the form of ſimple beings, corporeal or incorporeal, elements or ſpirits, is neither another ſubſtance, diſtinct from the Phyſical and Metaphyſical matter, nor yet an accident or mode: but that peculiar nature, conſiſting in certain powers or virtues, by which, as eſſential to it, that being is ſpecifically differenced from others: which ſome call an eſſential quality, and ſome a ſubſtantial quality, and ſome a ſubſtantial form, becauſe it is the perfection and eſſential nature of the ſubſtance in ſpecie, and not another ſubſtance beſides it.
Thus Burgerſdicius (however in his Phyſicks he ſaith as others) in his Metaphyſicks, l. 1. c. 25. §. 6, 7, 9. ſaith, that [Forma ſubſtantialis eſt quae materiam complet eamque informat, atque it a conſtituit ſubſtantiam corpoream: Forma accidentalis eſt additamentum completae ſubſtantiae inhaerens, & cum illa conſtituens. Ens concretum atque unum per accidens.] And he addeth that [Forma ſubſtantialis non per ſe eſt ſubſtantia: ſubſtantia enim per ſe ſul ſiſtit, &c.— Quid ergo erit ſubſtantialis forma? Nihil aliud quam ſubſtantialis modus.— Quia formis, debetur, quod res corporales tales res ſint, iis etiam ex parte debetur quod ſint: Quia eſſe non poteſt concipi abſque tali aut tali eſſe, & tale eſſe eſt ipſius eſſe complementum.] And yet the ſame man ſaith, i. id. l. 2. c. 17. § 13. p. 304. Reſp Animas vegetativas & ſenſitivas unitas quidem eſſe corpori ex elementis confecto, ſed mediante ſpiritu vituli & animali: Ideoque facultates earum animarum non eſſe temperationes primarum qualitatum, ſed ipſam ſubſtantiam animarum, quatenus ſpiritium ope elementari corpori aliigantur.
If then you take the word [form] for the order of the parts, I ſay that man's ſoul is not his form in that ſenſe, nor is his form a ſubſtance: but if the regent, predominant, active, vital, intelligent principle be called the [form] ſo the form is a ſubſtance, and the ſoul is that form.
Here we muſt not confound formam corporis, formam animae, & formam hominis. 1. The form of Adam's body, before it had received a ſoul, was but the contemperation or order of all the parts, by which it was apt to receive a ſoul, and to be actuated by it, as corpus phyſicum organicum. 2. The form of the ſoul it ſelf, (e.g. in its ſeparated ſtate) is that vis naturalis inteligendi, volendi & exequendi, by which it is eſſentially differenced from all other kinds of being, (commonly comprehended under the name of reaſon alone.) 3. The forma hominis, taken for the ſtate of the parts contemperate and ordered, is that ſaid ſtate or order, and not the ſoul. But taken for the vital, intelligent, regent part or principle, it is the ſoul it ſelf. So that the ſoul is not the forma corporis, nor the forma hominis in the one ſenſe; but it is the forma hominis in the other: and its own differencing nature is its own form.
The li…e ambiguity there is in the word Quality, uſed in the objection. As I was never ſatisfied with the order or number of Ariſtotle's ten predicaments, ſo eſpecially I never underſtood him in the predicament of Quality it ſelf. As it is a very hard thing to know what thoſe are that are by him, and commonly, called Qualities; ſo I think that name too general and defective to ſignifie the nature of them aright. And I ſuppoſed ever that his forma & figura differ much more from the other ſpecies of Quality, than moſt of the predicaments do from one another, (of which ſee Bergerſdicius Metaph. l. 2. cap. ult. & Gaſſendus in Logic.) Judicious Mr. Pemble, de origine formarum, pleadeth hard that principia conſtitutiva are materia (vel ſubjectum) & accidentia; & principium tranſmutationis is contrariarum qualitatum pugna: that forma, exceptâ humanâ, non eſt ſubſtantia, nec materialis, nec immaterialis, ſed accidens vel accidentium mixtura dictum temperamentum, & quod accidentia per ſe & immediate agunt, & non in virtute formae ſubſtantialis. That is, Quod qualitates immediate haerent in materia, & à Qualitatibus immediate profluunt operationes & operandi vires. Quod Qualitates omnes primae, (which he maketh five, lux, calor, frigus, humiditas, ſiccitas) & aliquae ſecundae, tenuitas, eraſſities, gravitas, levitas▪ fluor, conſiſtentia, creationis die primo exiſtiterunt: Quod Qualitates omnes activae generant ſibi ſimile, & ita ſui diffuſivae & ſimilium generativae ſunt, ut neceſſario materiam ſibi proportionatam efficiunt. Quod animae vegetativae in plantis & ſenſitivae in brutis ſunt tantum temperamenta nobiliora qualitatum actuoſiorum in materia ſubtili, pura, ſpirituoſiore.
Teleſius maketh the ſame principles (materia, calor & frigus) as to the chief; but he maketh calor & frigus to be ſubſtances, vel formae ſubſtantiales, & non tantum accidentia. So that they that agree that it is Qualities that are the active forms, are never the more agreed what they are, nor what the word Qualities doth ſignifie. And what if by the word Quality, Pemble do mean the very ſame thing as many others do that call them forms, (when they ſpeak of vegetatives.) And what if by ſubſtances, Teleſius mean the ſame that Pemble doth by accidents. Is not the world then troubled with ambiguitie of words? He that will conſider them well may ſuſpect, that they mean as I conjecture. An active power or principle being the chief cauſe of operations, alterations and diſcrimination, is the thing that they all mean by all theſe names. And the followers of Democritus, eſpecially Gaſſendus and Carteſius, do not improbably argue that it is ſome ſubſtantial being which maketh that change or effect upon our ſenſes, which as there received is a quality. So that unleſs Mr. Pemble can better tell us what lux, & calor, are, than by calling them Qualities, he hath given the underſtanding no ſatisfaction at all. Much leſs when he nakedly aſſerteth, without any proof, that ſenſation doth not ſuperare naturam primarum qualitatum, that are none of them ſenſible themſelves. And when he hath no other anſwer to this argument, but that non minus miranda ſunt in inanimatis, which he giveth not one inſtance or word to prove. When Ariſtotle, &c. Scaliger, Sennertus, and abundance more, have ſaid much to the contrary.
I conclude, that for all that is here ſaid, and whether you call them our forms or not, (as you may or may not, in ſeveral ſenſes) humane ſouls are thoſe parts of man which are ſimple, pure, inviſible, active, powerful ſubſtances; and therefore being not annihilated, muſt needs ſubſiſt in their ſeparated ſtate.
OBJECTION IV.Againſt the ſoul's dependance upon matter, the Platoniſts write excellently. Plato himſelf, and Plot…nus, and Jamblicus, Proclus, &c.
THe Soul is material, and conſequently mortal, becauſe it dependeth upon matter in its operations, and conſequently in its eſſence.
Anſw. 1. I have proved already, that if you did prove the ſoul material, you had not thereby at all proved it mortal: (unleſs you mean only, that it hath a poſſe mori vel annihilari;Anima per eſſentiam eſt mobilis ex ſe…pſa; ſed conjuncta corpori quodammodo evaſit etiam mobilis a…unde; ſicut anim ipſa ſua praeſentia dedit corpori ultimum ex ſe movendi veſtigium, ſic & ipſa propter corporeum cont…bernium conditionis notam ſubtit mobilis abunde. Proclus de Anim. & Daemon. which may be ſaid of every creature) for ſimple matter, which hath no repugnant parts or principles, hath not only a poſſe nen mori, but an aptitude in its nature, ad non moriendum. Remember your friends that make the world, or matter, at leaſt, to be eternal. They thought not that materiality was a proof of either annihilation or corruption.
Object. If it be material, it muſt be compounded of matter and form, and therefore is corruptible.
Anſw. True, if that matter and form were two ſeveral ſubſtances, and were one repugnant to the other. The ſoul and body are different ſubſtances; but the metaphyſical matter and form of the ſoul, being but the genus & differentia, are not two ſubſtances, much leſs repugnant; and therefore have never the more a tendency to corruption.
2. The ſoul uſeth matter, and dependeth no otherwiſe on it than its inſtrument. It doth not follow that a man is a horſe▪ becauſe he dependeth on his horſe in the manner of his riding, and his pace: nor that I am inanimate, becauſe in writing I depend on my pen, which is inanimate. If you put ſpirits of wine into water or whey, as its vehicle to temper it, for a medicine, it doth not follow that the ſpirits are meer water, becauſe they operate not without the water, but conjunct, and as tempered by it. If the fire in your Lamp do not ſhine or burn without the oil, but in manner and duration dependeth on it, it doth not follow that fire is annihilated when the candle is out, or that it was but oil before: no nor that it ceaſeth to be fire afterwards, as Gaſſendus muſt needs confeſs, who holdeth that the Elements are not turned into one another, §. 1. l. 3. c. 2. Fire ceaſeth not to be fire, when it goeth out of our obſervation.
The nobleſt natures uſe and rule the inferiour. God himſelf moveth and uſeth things material, and yet is not therefore material himſelf. Yea, if motus be in patiente & recipitur ad modum recipientis, you may conjecture how far God's own operations upon the creatures may be called dependent, as to the effect, as being ad captum & modum creaturae. And the Sun doth move and quicken all paſſive matter here below ad modum recipientis, with great variety through the variety of the matter; and yet it followeth not that the Sun is it ſelf ſuch paſſive matter.
3. The ſoul hath operations, which are not upon matter at all, though matter may poſſibly be an antecedent occaſion or prerequiſite. Such is the apprehenſion of its own intellection and volitions, and all that it thence gathereth of God, and other intellectual natures and operations, of which I muſt ſay more anon.