The Reasons of the Christian Religion Part 1, Conclusion · Objection 2
OBJECTION II.
BY Senſe, Imagination, Cogitation, Reaſon, you cannot prove the Soul to be incorporeal, becauſe the Bruits partake of theſe; whoſe Souls are material and mortal.
Anſw. 1. It is eaſie for men, that ſet themſelves to ſay all they can, either with Mr. Chambre to extol the bruits as rational, or with Gaſſendus to talk of the whiſpers and conſultations of the Ants, or with Teleſius and Campanella to ſay that every thing hath ſenſe; or on the other hand with Carteſius, to deny all to a bruit which belongeth not to an engine. But our converſe with them doth teach all men to judge of their natures, as between both theſe extremes, unleſs by ſtudy and learning they learn to know leſs than they did before, and do but ſtudy to corrupt their underſtandings, and obliterate things that are commonly known. I doubt not but the Minerals have ſomething like life, and the Vegetatives have ſomething like to ſenſe, and the Senſitives have ſomething like to reaſon: but it doth not follow that therefore it is the ſame. But this is ſo copiouſly written of by very many, that I ſuperſede my further labour about it.
2. If it were ſo, that the apprehenſions of a bruit might be called Reaſon or Intellection, yet the difference betwixt it and humane Intellection is ſo great, as may eaſily prove to thoſe that have their reaſons in free uſe, that they are ſeveral ſpecies of creatures, made for ſeveral uſes and ends. And none of the twenty Arguments which I uſed, are at all debilitated by this. If a bird have reaſon to build her neſt, and to feed her young, yet ſhe hath none to build Cities and Caſtles, nor to uſe Navigation, nor any of the Arts: much leſs to ſet up Government by Laws, and to write Syſtems of Philoſophy and other Sciences; and leaſt of all to enquire after God, the cauſe of all things, or to hope for bleſſedneſs in another life, or to eſcape a future miſery, or to be ruled in this life by the intereſt of another. Beaſts think not of God, nor of loving him, ſeeking him, pleaſing him or enjoying him, or of being judged by him. I know the perverſe wrangler will ask me, How I know this? And I can anſwer him no better than thus: As I know that a Stone doth not ſee or feel, or that my Paper doth not talk; becauſe they manifeſt no ſuch thing: And theſe are all operations which they that exerciſe, are apt to manifeſt; and things that in their nature are unapt to be long hid. Campanella, who hath written de ſenſu rerum, to prove Bruits Rational, and Plants ſenſible, hath yet in his Atheiſmus Triumphatus written more for the excellency of humane nature and the Souls immortality; than any Infidel can ſoundly anſwer.
3. And how prove you, that the Souls of Bruits exiſt not, after death?See Sir W. Rawleigh Hiſt. l. 1. of Fire, making it certainly a thing unknown, and probably quiddam medium between things corporeal and incorporeal. Of their Individuation we ſhall ſay more anon. But there is no part of their ſubſtance annihilated as you will confeſs: Nor any part of it abaſed below the ſame nature which it had in the compoſition: Only the conſtituting parts are ſeparated, retaining their ſeveral natures ſtill. All men that confeſs that Bruits are ſenſible, do confeſs that there is ſome one predominant part in their compoſition which is the principal cauſe of ſenſe: whether it be the fineſt Atomes, or the materia ſubtilis or globuli coeleſtes, or Elementary Fire, or Ariſtotles quinteſſence analogous to the coeleſtial Starry ſubſtance, or yet an incorporeal ſoul: whatever it is, it is not annihilated, nor the nature of the ſimple eſſence deſtroyed.
4. And here let me venture to tell you once for all, that I never found cauſe to believe that any mortal man, †Hence it is that the wiſeſt Philoſophers differ in this point, whether any proper matter be found in the Soul of man. Micraelius Ethnoph. l. 1. c. 13. p. 23, 24. hath inſtanced in many that are for ſome materiality. Eam ſententiam inter veteres probavit apud Macrobium, Heraclitus Phyficus, cui anima eſt eſſentiae Stellaris ſcintilla: & Hip parchus apud Plinium cui eſt coeli pars: Et Africanus apud Ciceronem, qui detrahit animum ex illis ſompiternis ignibus, quae ſydera vocamus; quae que globoſ…e & rotundae divinis animatae mentibus circulos fuos orbeſ que conficiunt celeritate mirabili: & Seneca, qui deſcendiſſe eam ex illo coeleſti Spiritu ait, & Plato ipſe, qui alicubi animam vocat foreign, radians & ſplendidum vehiculum: Et Epicterus qui aſtra vocat nobis foreign, amica & cognata Elementa: ipſe que cum Peripateticis Ariſtoteles, qui eam quinta eſſentia conſtare & foreign, in animabus ineſſe dicit. Inter noſtrates Scaliger quo que vocat animam naturam coeleſtem, & quintam eſſentiam alia quidem a quatuor Elementis natura praeditum, ſ…d non ſine omni materia. Eadem opinio arridet Roberto de Fluctibus, &c.is ſo well acquainted with the true difference between a Corporeal and an Incorporeal ſubſtance, as to tell us certainly wherein it doth conſiſt; and to lay the ſtreſs of this Controverſie upon that difference. I know what is ſaid of Moles & extenſio, & partes extra partes; of diviſibility and impenetrability; and ſo on the contrary ſide. But how much of this is ſpoken in the dark? Are you certain that no true matter is penetrable? (If you ſay, that which is ſo, we call not Matter, and ſo make the Controverſie de nomine only intelligible, I muſt paſs it by.) And are you ſure that no matter is indiviſible? And that no ſpiritual incorporeal ſubſtance is quantitative, extended, or diviſible? It now goeth for current that Light is a Body: And Patricius that ſo judgeth, doth take it to be indiviſible in longitudine radiorum, and to be penetrable; and that it can penetrate other bodies. And it's hard to be ſure that Diaphanous bodies are not penetratrated by Light. I know Gaſſendus and others think that it paſſeth but through the pores of the Glaſs or Chryſtal: But I have heard of no Engyſcope that hath perceived pores in Glaſs. In Cloth they are certainly diſcernable, and large, and numerous, when yet the Light doth not penetrate it as it doth the Glaſs: Gaſſendus ſaith, the reaſon is, becauſe the pores of the Glaſs and other diaphanous bodies, are all one way, ſo that the Light is not intercepted by their irregularity: And he giveth us a proof of his opinion, becauſe that if you ſet white Papers on each ſide the Glaſs, there will be umbels on one ſide, and light reflected on the other. I have oft tried,Lege rationes Carpentarii in Dec. 1. Exerc. 7. contra poroſitatem diaphanorum. Dicit Plato univerſae naturae animam porrectam eſſe a centro orbis terrae uſ que ad extremas oras coeli: Non ut locum iſta notet po…ectio, ſed extenſionis quendam modum, quem Mens & Ratio aſſequatur. Nemeſ. de Anim. c. 2. pag. 487. and ſee indeed abundance of ſuch umbels: But I as plainly ſee that they all anſwer the Squilts or ſanded faults that are in the Glaſs (the bigger ſort of which are all as viſible as the ſhades). And ſurely all the reſt of the Glaſs is not pores, or nothing! And if the pores lie all one way, how cometh it to paſs, that a Glaſs of water, or a Ball of Chryſtal is equally perſpicuous every way. Look which way you will it is all alike: Therefore it muſt be every way equally porous. But I would know whether we have any atomes ſmaller than the body of Light, which thus penetrateth the Glaſs and Chryſtal? I think they all make it the moſt ſubtile matter: And yet Gaſſendus thinketh that they are Bodies (and ſuch as have their hamuli too) which flow from the Load-ſtone to the Iron: And if ſo, then thoſe Bodies muſt be more penetrating than Light: For they will paſs through a brick wall, and operate by their attraction on the other ſide, where no light can paſs. And whether the Air be penetrable by Light, is ſcarce well cleared or underſtood. They that think there is no Vacuum I think (with G…ſſendus) can never prove that there can be any motion, unleſs the Air or ſome bodies are penetrable. Let them talk of a Circulation with Carteſius as long as they will, ſome body muſt cedere before the next can move: And no one can give way till the motion or ceſſion begin at the utmoſt part of the coporeal world. My underſtanding is paſt doubt that there muſt be an inane or a penetration. And yet on the other ſide, I am ſatisfied that Entity is the firſt excellency, and that ſomething is better than nothing. And therefore if Rarity be only by the multitude and greatneſs of interſperſed Vacuities, and the rarity and ſubtilty of matter be but the ſcantneſs or ſmallneſs of its quantity in that ſpace, then it would be but next kin to annihilation, and the rareſt and moſt ſubtile matter would be coeteris paribus the baſeſt, as being next to nothing. For inſtance, Sir Kenelme Digby telleth Gaſſendus from two accurate Computers, that Gold in the ſame ſpace is ſeven thouſand ſix hundred times heavier than Air: ſo that Air is in the ſame ſpace ſeven thouſand ſix hundred times neerer to nothing than Gold is; and the whole Air betwixt us and the Heavens hath interſpaces that are vacuous, to the ſame proportion of 7600 to one: And then we may well ſay that datur inane! Nay quaere, whether it be more proper to ſay, that all between us and Heaven is a Vacuum or not? when it is to be denominated from the ſpace which ſo far exceedeth all the reſt as 7600 to one? And then if the aether be ſomething more ſubtile, it muſt be ſtill more neer to nothing, and conſequently be moſt vile: But I am ſatisfied that dung is not ſo much more excellent than Light as it is more groſs. And that theſe terreſtrial bodies are not the moſt noble, nor have moſt of Entity or Subſtance, becauſe they are more groſs: †I hope we ſhall not have Philoſophiam ſtaticam, and judge of Eſſences and Excellencies by the ballance.Therefore though Gaſſendus put off Sir K. Digby by ſaying only that the ſaid diſproportion is no inconvenience, I ſee not how theſe inconveniences will be anſwered. I am ſatisfied, that nothing, is not ſo good as Entity, and yet that the moſt ſubtile and inviſible ſubſtances are the life of the World, and of greateſt excellency and force. But what will hence follow about penetrability I know not; But I know that it's little about theſe things which men underſtand of what they ſay. The fiery nature ſeemeth as Patricius ſaith to be ſome middle thing between corporal and incorporeal. And I much doubt whether Materia be a ſummum genus; and whether the loweſt degree of things incorporeal, and the higheſt degree of things corporeal, (ſuppoſe fire, or that which is the matter of the Sun) do differ ſo much more than Graduals, as that mortals can ſay, that one of them is penetrable and indiviſible, and the other not. There have been ſome Philoſophers that have thought that ſenſibility was as fit an attribute to characterize Matter or Bodies by, as any other; But then they meant not by [ſenſible] that which Man can perceive by ſenſe: But that which is a fit object for ſenſes of the ſame kinde as mans, ſuppoſing them elevated to the greateſt perfection that they are capable of in their kinde. And ſo aire and atomes being of the ſame kinde as other matter, may be viſible to a ſight of the ſame kinde as ours, if it received but the addition of enow degrees. And for ought I know, this is as wiſe Philoſophy as that which is more common. I am ſure it is more intelligible.
And for Diviſibility they have Demonſtrations on both ſides that a Punctum is diviſible, and that it is not. One thinketh, that if three be ſet together, it's poſſible at leaſt for God duplicate page duplicate page to divide juſt in the midſt: Another with Gaſſendus thinketh, that it's unlike to be true, that every part ſhould be as much or more than the whole, and a point as much as all the Univerſe: And that if a point may be divided into infinite parts it is infinite in magnitude, and therefore bigger than the World: And is it any marvell, if Indiviſibility then be an unfit property to know a Spirit by, when they are not agreed about it as to Bodies? Certain it is, that there is a true Individuation of Souls, and ſo a numeral diviſion of them. That which is your Soul, is not your Neighbours. And it is certain, that created Spirits are not infinite as to extent. And what Diviſion God can make upon them, is more than I can tell.
Scotus thinketh, that the ſubject of Phyſicks is not Corpus naturale but ſubſtantia naturalis; and ſo that Angels are moved motu phyſico. Scaliger, Schibler, &c. ſay, that Angels have extenſion and figure, that is, extenſion entitativè diſtinct from extenſion quantitativè. vid. Scalig. Exercit. 359. §. 4. The termini eſſendi, ſaith Schibler, being no other than are ſignified per inceptionem, ſeu dependentiam ab alio & deſitionem: and that no Creature is immenſe, but hath finitas adeſſendi according to which it is determinate to a certain ſpace. He ſaith, that Angels are finite, 1. Eſſentia, 2. Numero, 3. Poteſtate, 4. Quantitate, h. e. non eſſe immenſos. And that they are in ſpatio intelligibili. He ſaith alſo Exerc. 307. Ʋnum primum eſt: alia dependent igitur. Ergo ſua natura omnia praeter unum ſunt corruptibilia. Tametſi ſunt Entia abſoluta à ſubjecto & termino, non ſunt abſoluta à Cauſa.
Damaſcene ſaith, de Orthod. fid. l. 2. That God only is a Spirit by nature, but other things may be Spirits by indulgence and grace.
The doctrine of Pſellus †In Ficinus his collections, lib. de daemonib.is too groſs, and largely delivered by himſelf.
Eugubinus, Niphus, and Vorſtius, were of the ſame minde, that Angels were Corporeal.
Auguſtine himſelf ſaith, that Anima reſpectu incorporei Dei corporea eſt: de Spir. & anim. c. 8.
Caeſarius in Dialog. 1. p. 573. B.P. ſaith, foreign And he applyeth to them the Apoſtles words, There are Bodies celeſtial, and bodies terreſtrial.
Arnobius is a little too groſs herein, and almoſt all the Ancients, eſpecially the Greeks, that ſpeak of that ſubject, take Angels for more ſubtile purer Bodies.
I know not what Athenagoras meaneth to call the Devil, foreign— Materiae ejuſ que formarum Princeps, & alii ex iliis qui circa primum mundi fundamentum erant peccarunt, &c. pag. 71. And hence he and others talk of their falling in love with Virgins, &c.
And when Fauſtus Rhegienſis wrote a Book to prove that Angels and Souls were but a purer ſubtile ſort of bodies or matter, Claudianus Mammertus largely and learnedly confuteth him (who pretended that all the Ancients were on his ſide): Yet doth the ſame Mammertus think, that though Angels quoad ſormam be incorporeal, they had Bodies alſo which were Fire, or of the nature of the Starrs. Which Caeſarius alſo ſeemeth to mean, when he ſaith that [Not only that which is here with us below is Fire; but alſo thoſe higher Powers ſeem to be Fire, and kin to that which is with us, as our Souls are kin to Angels.] Dialog. 1. Q. 58, 59. pag. 584. And Qu. 60. he ſaith [That the Shepherds when they will boil fleſh (in the Fields where they have no Fire) do uſe to fill a glaſs Veſſel with water, and hold it directly oppoſite to the Sun, and then touch dryed dung with it, and it will kindle Fire.] And having thus proved the Sun to be Fire, he ſaith, Dial. 2. Qu. 195. that Omnibus creatis levior eſt ignis naturâ: ideoq, Angeli etiam hanc ſortiti ſunt: Qui facit Angelos ſuos ſpiritus, & Miniſtros ſuos ignis flammam. And Qu. 107. he faith, that the Starre which led the Magi to Chriſt, was an Angel.] It would be tedious to cite all out of Tertullian, Lactantius, and all the Ancients that was written to aſſert that Angels quoad formam were corpor a tenuiora; and out of thoſe that came after them, and confuted them, who yet wrote that they were the Souls of fiery bodies.
And abundance of our writers of Phyſicks, Metaphyſicks and Logick, do tell us, that Angels have Materiam metaphyſicam, and in a certain ſenſe may be called corporeal. And the ſumm of all is, when they determine the queſtions about their locality, extenſion▪ or quantity, that they have their ubi; duplicate page duplicate page their quantity and extenſion (which are the properties of bodies) ſou modo, vel modo metaphyſico, as bodies have them modo ſou phyſico; being not immenſe or infinite no more than bodies. (How far the name of Nature belongeth to them, ſee Fortunius Licetus de natura primo-movente.) And Schibler with others, maketh the difference of extenſion to be this, that Angels can contract their whole ſubſtance into one part of ſpace, and therefore have not partes extra partes. Whereupon it is that the Schoolmen have queſtioned how many Angels may ſit upon the point of a Needle?
For my part I profeſs, that as my underſtanding is fully ſatisfied by the operations and effects, that there are ſuch inviſible potent ſubſtances, which we call Angels and Spirits, ſo it is utterly unſatisfied in the common properties of Penetrability and Impenetrability, Extenſion, or diſcerptibility, and indiſcerptibility or indiviſibility, as the Characters to know them by. And as I think that Materia had been as fit a name as another, for that part or notion of ſpiritual ſubſtances which is diſtinguiſhed from their form, if Cuſtom had ſo pleaſed to uſe it; ſo I think that ſuch Subſtances as we call Spirits or immaterial, may be well ſaid to be compounded of Metaphyſical or ſpiritual matter and form, and this in conſiſtency with ſuch ſimplicity as belongeth to a Creature. And I remember not what apt word we have inſtead of matter to ſupply its place in Latine, which taketh not in the notion of the Form: For the word Matter ſignifieth no real Being, but only a partial inadequate Conception of Real Beings quoad hoc, which have all ſomething more which is eſſential to them. There is no ſuch thing exiſtent as matter without form or peculiar nature. And the matter and form are ſuch partes intelligibiles as can neither of them exiſt alone. Therefore as it is not fit to make too eager a Controverſie de nomine materiae, vel materialis; ſo I think that it is little that we know of any ſubſtances at all, but what their accidents and effects reveal. Matter we know by the quantity, figure, colour, heat or cold, denſity or rarity, hardneſs or ſoftneſs, levity or weight, &c. And forms, or differencing natures we know by their operations: But that either matter or form is known to us immediately by it ſelf, and is the objectum ſenſus per ſe & immediatè, I cannot ſay by any obſerved experience of mine own.
Would you have me to go further yet? I ſhall then adventure to ſay, That as I feel no ſatisfying notion to difference the higheſt ſimple Being called Material, from the loweſt next it called Immaterial, but what is in and from the forms; ſo I think that it is too ſlippery a ground for any man to ſatisfie himſelf or others by, to ſay only that one is material and the other immaterial. Matter as I ſaid being but a pars intelligi…ilis or inadequate conception of a thing, is not to be a Genus in any predicament. And if ſubſtance expreſs the adequate conception, it muſt comprehend ſomething anſwerable to Matter, with that defferencing nature called the form. And what name beſides matter to give to that part of the conception of a ſubſtance, which is contradiſtinct from the form, Philoſophers are yet but little agreed in: ſome name there muſt be when we ſpeak of any created ſubſtances: For the name of ſubſtance muſt not confound theſe diſtinct Conceptions: Therefore materia metaphyſica vel ſpiritualis is the term, that hitherto men are fain to uſe.
Moreover, it is the form that doth difference and denominate. How then can you ſufficiently difference corporeal and incorporeal from the material Cauſe, by calling one Phyſical and the other Hyperphyſical, or Metaphyſical? Doth any mans underſtanding perceive the true poſitive difference by theſe words? Is Matter as oppoſed to Nihil reale, and is Ens creatum, (or as it expreſſeth our half-conception both of corporeal and incorporeal ſubſtances) differenced ſo diſcernably or toto genere, vel tota ſpecie, without a form to make the difference: Doth mole immunis & mole praedita ſpeak a formal difference or not? If not, what place hath it in arbore Porphyrii vel Gaſſendi? And if it do not, you make the matter of ſubſtances ab origine differenced in ſe without any forms to difference them; that is the Phyſical and the Metaphyſical matter. But if thoſe words do expreſs a formal difference, you ſhould finde ſome other to expound them by: For ſure mole praedita, expreſſeth no form intelligibly: And mole immunis is but a meer negation of quantity.
Differences therefore that are fetcht from matter here (or the material part of ſubſtance) are hardly made intelligible: And we have ſo little acquaintance with ſpiritual ſubſtances in their naked matter (for unleſs you will take foreign which is better than ſubſtance) I know not how elſe to call it) that we ſpeak but by rote when we talk of Indiviſibility, and unextenſiveneſs, and impenetrability as the notifying differences; becauſe they are things beyond our underſtandings.
Is there a difference between Intellectual and Spiritual Beings among themſelves or not? Doubtleſs there is, as the caſe of Angels, Devils, and the Souls of men declare: Is this difference among any of them ſpecifical and formal? It is commonly ſo concluded, as between Angels and men. Is there then any agreement in ſubſtance, or in another eſſential part, where there is a formal difference? I know none that notifie the other eſſential difference of the ſubſtance of mens Souls and Angels; but they commonly confeſs that both are Spirits, not differenced materially otherwiſe than in degrees of purity and dignity (which how far it belongeth to the form I pretermit). But there can be no ſpecifical difference in the matter conſidered without that form which ſpecifieth. At leaſt ſome agreement there is; and of Spirits which are of different forms or ſpecies, there muſt be ſome one name for that in which they ſtill agree. If you ſay that it is in [ſubſtance] you muſt then take ſubſtance as we do matter for an inadequate conception, or only the pars inteligibilis of a being as without the form; But that is not the common acception of it; nor is it then fit for the place aſſigned it in ordine praedicamentali.
From all this I am not about to injure any mans underſtanding, by building my Concluſions upon any queſtionable grounds: I do but right your underſtandings ſo far, as to remove all uncertain foundations, though they be ſuch as ſeem to be moſt for the advantage of my Cauſe, and are by moſt made the great reaſons of the Souls Immortality. And it is not my purpoſe to deny, that as Angels are compounded ex genere & differentiâ, ſo the generical nature of Angels greatly differeth from the nature of Corporeal things: As God can make multitudes of corporeal Creatures, formally or ſpecifically different, of the matter of one ſimple Element only (as Air, or Fire) without material mixture; ſo he can either make an Element of Souls, either exiſtent of it ſelf, of which he will make Individuals, yea ſpecies formally divers, or elſe exiſtent only in the ſpecies and individuals, as he pleaſe. But then we muſt ſay, that as fire, and air, and water, do differ formally, as ſeveral Elements, ſo the ſpiritual Element or general Nature hath a formal difference from the Corporeal (called the Material). But hence it will follow,Po…phyry de Occaſion. per Ficin. holds that Anima quidam Medium quiddam eſt inter Eſſentiam individuam, at que eſſentiam vera corpora diviſibilem. Intellectus autem eſſentia eſt individua ſolum: ſed qualitates materialeſ que formae ſecundum corpora ſunt diviſibiles. 1. That Angels and humane Souls have a double form (as ſome uſe to call it) that is, Generical as Spirits, which is preſuppoſed as the aptitude of their Metaphyſical matter, by which they differ from bodies; and ſpecifical by which they are conſtituted what they are, and differ among themſelves: (unleſs you deny all ſuch formal difference among them, and difference them only by individuation and accidents; as ſeveral drops or bottles of water taken out of the ſame Sea.) 2. And it will ſeem plain, that our differencing characters or properties between Spirits and Bodies, muſt be ſought for in their different forms, which muſt be found in the noble operations which flow from the forms, and not from uncertain Accidents. Therefore my deſign in all this is but to intimate to you, how lubricous and uncertain, and beyond the reach of mans underſtanding, the ordinary characters from ſuch Accidents are, and that its better fetch the difference from the Operations.
Saith Georg. Ritſchel Contempl. Metap. c. 6. pag. 40, & 43. Difficile eſt rebus materialibus immerſis ſubſtantiam immaterialem concipere.— Et licet pro certo non conſtet an Menti Angelicae omnis ſimpliciter Materialitas repugnet; certum tamen eſt elementarem noſtram ab illis abeſſe; at que Divinam Eſſentiam ab omni eſſe materia ſecretam aeterna ejus & immutabilis habitudo convincit, niſi per materialitatem fortè ſubſtantiam intelligas. — § 15. Dubium quidem nullum eſt immaterialem Mundum eſſentiarum varietate Intelligibilium aequè admirabilem & auguſtum eſſe, at que Mundum corporeum videmus: ſed in quo illa conſiſtat diverſitas, bonis indicio certo non percipitur. Nimirum ſi praeter te & lumbricum at que ſcarabaeum animal aliud nullum vidiſſes, audires autem eſſe alia innumera genera, diverſitate naturae & forma penitus diſcrepantia, tum vagas quidem confuſaſ que de diverſitate volvere cogitationes poſſes; non poſſes autem illas tot beſtiarum, piſcium, reptilium, avium, ſpecies ſuo vultu & coloribus ſignare: Ita quid ſpiritus ſit immaterialis ex te capere, qui Mentem immaterialem habes, qualemcun que notitiam potes, non potes autem in te perſpicere in quo preciſe illa varietas conſiſtat.
To come neerer to the application of what is ſaid to the preſent Objection. 1. The Souls of Men and Bruits, we ſee do not differ in genere entis, nor in genere ſubſtantiae, nor in genere principii vitalis, nor in genere ſentientis; 2. The matter of both, whether it differ as Metaphyſical and Phyſical, or how, is much beyond our knowledge. 3. The great diverſity of Operations, doth ſhew the great diverſity of their Powers and forms, and inclinations. 4. This ſheweth the diverſity of their uſes and ends for which they were created. 5. It is certain, that no ſubſtantial Principle in either of them is annihilated at death. The Souls of Bruits have the ſame nature after death as they had before, and the Souls of men have the ſame nature as before. They are not transformed into other things. 6. Therefore about both of them, there is nothing left of doubt or controverſie, but only 1. About the perpetuated Individuation, 2. The future Operations (and ſo the habits); viz. 1. Whether the Souls of men or bruits, or both, do loſe their individuation, and fall into ſome Ʋniverſal Element of their kinde? 2. Whether they operate after death as now? There is nothing elſe about their Immortality that common Reaſon can make a queſtion of. And for the Souls of Bruits, whether they remain Individuate, or return to a common Element of their kinde, is a thing unknown to us, becauſe unrevealed; and unrevealed, becauſe it is of no uſe and concernment to us. Our own caſe concerneth us more, and therefore is more made known to us by God. As will further appear in that which followeth.