The Reasons of the Christian Religion Part 1, Conclusion · Objection 1

The Reasons of the Christian Religion Part 1 · Conclusion · Objection 1

p. 495OBJECTION I.

MAtter and Motion, without any more, may do all that which you aſcribe to ſouls.

Anſw. When nothing ſeemeth to us more falſe and abſurd,The Platoniſts opinion that the Soul is all the Man, and that Animus cujuſque is eſt quiſque, is incomparably more probable, and of honeſter tendency, than theirs that think the Body is all the Man. Qui putant hominem eſſe ex Anima corporeque compoſitum, conſequenter utile à juſto ſejungunt; Qui vero hominem eſſe animam conjungunt. Proclus de Anim. & doem. per Ficin What then will they hold and do, that think man is tantum corpus. For as Proclus there ſaith, and Cicero oft, moſt Philoſophers agree that vivere ſecundum ſuam naturam, is man's great duty and felicity: Therefore as men differ about man's Nature, they will differ about his Duty and felicity: They that think he is all Body, will deſcribe his work and his happineſs accordingly▪ a truth of ſad and deſperate conſequence. than the matter of your objection; you cannot expect that your naked aſſertion ſhould ſatisfie us without proof: and a ſatisfactory proof muſt reach to all the nobleſt inſtances, and muſt have better evidence than the bold and confident affirmations of men, who expect that their conceptions ſhould be taken for the flower of reaſon, whilſt they are pleading againſt the reaſoning nature it ſelf. And to what Authors will they ſend us for the proof of this aſſertion? Is it to Mr. Hobs? We have peruſed him, and weigh'd his reaſons, and find them ſuch as reflect no diſhonour on the underſtandings of thoſe, who judge them to be void of probability as well as cogent evidence. But after ſo ſmart a caſtigation as he hath received from the learned D… Ward, (now Biſhop of Exeter) and from that clear-headed Primate of Ireland, Dr. Bramhal, I hope it will not be expected, that I trouble my ſelf or my Reader with him here. Is it to Gaſſendus? He writeth for the immaterial created humane ſoul himſelf. And Charity obligeth me not to charge him with prevarication, whatſoever to Carteſius or any where elſe he writeth, which ſeemeth injurious to this Doctrine. And if Sorberius number it with his honours, (in vita Gaſſendi) that Mr. Hobs could not ſufficiently admire his works, Qui Heroem noſtrum nunquam majorem apparere pronunciabat, quam in retundendis larvis, tenues in auras tam facilè diffugientibus, gladio imperviis, nec ictum clava excipientibus: ita enim ſentiebat vir emunctae naris de Meditationibus Carteſii & de illa Gaſſendi diſquiſitione, &c. It was becauſe he weighed not honour in an Engliſh ballance, nor judged not of an Engliſh-man by an Engliſh judgment, nor himſelf well perceived what was indeed honourable or diſhonourable in his friend. If you ſend us to Epicurus and Lucretius, they are ſo overwhelmed with the number of adverſaries that have fallen upon them, that it is a diſhonour to give them p. 496another blow. Beſides all the crowd of Peripateticks, Platoniſts and Stoicks, even the moderate latitudinarian Cicero hath ſpit ſo oft in the face of Epicurus, that when Gaſſendus hath laboured hard in wiping it, he thought meet to let this ſpot alone. But becauſe it is onelyonly this ſort of men, that are the adverſaries with whom we do contend, I will this once be ſo troubleſome to the Reader, as to give him firſt ſome general countercharges and reaſons, againſt the authority of theſe men; and next ſome particular reaſons againſt the objected ſufficiency of Matter and Motion, to do the offices which we aſcribe to ſouls.

And, 1. When I find men diſpute againſt Man, and reaſon againſt the power of Reaſon, I think humane intereſt alloweth me to be diſtruſtful of their ſophiſt…y, and to yield no further than I have cogent evidence. If man's ſoul be his form, he denieth man to be man, who denieth him that ſoul.

2. I find Philoſophers ſo little agreed among themſelves, that it greatly diminiſheth their authority and requireth a man who is juſt to his reaſon, to make a very accurate trial before he fall it with any of their opinions. Their diviſions are ſufficiently opened and aggravated by Laertius, Cicero, and many more of themſelves; and contemptuouſly diſplayed by Hermas, Arnobius, Athenagoras, Lactantius, Euſebius, and many other Chriſtians. There are few things that one aſſerteth, but there are many to riſe up againſt him and contradict it. They muſt better defend themſelves againſt one another, before their authority be much reverenced by others.

3. I find the wiſeſt of them ſo conſcious of their ignorance, that they take moſt for uncertain which they ſay themſelves; and confeſs they talk but in the dark: which made the Pyrrhonians and Arceſilas have ſo many followers; and Cicero with the Academicks ſo over-modeſt in diſclaiming certainty and confidence, and writing by Dialogues with ſo much indifferency and wavering as they did. I need not ſend you to Zanchez his Nihil ſcitur, nor to our Mr. Glanvil's Vanity of Dogmatizing, for ſatisfaction. The learned Gaſſendus his modeſty is ſufficient, who if he ſpeak of Occult Qualities, will ask you, What Qualities are not occult? And if he ſpeak of the magnitude and diſtances of the Stars, p. 497will tell you how little poſſibility of aſſurance is left to mortals,The truth is, as Fire is per eſſentiam, a moving, enlightning, heating ſubſtance; ſo the ſoul is per eſſentiam, a Life or Vital Principle; and therefore, as Porphyry argueth, for the ſoul to die, is for life it ſelf to die; or that which is per eſſentiam life, to ceaſe to be what it is. about thoſe things which others with over much confidence have aſſerted. And about the caſe in hand, he could no better defend Epicurus againſt Cicero's [Hoc eſt optare, & provincias dare atomis, non diſputare] than by confeſſing [Vere quidem id objici; ſed eam tamen eſſe ingenii humani imbecilitatem, ut objici idem nemini non poſſit — De ipſis principiis dicere nil aliud licet, niſi quod haec iſto, illa illo modo ſe habeant, ex ſuae naturae neceſſitate; cum ignoremus germanam cauſam ob quam ita ſe habeant; immo cum ea fruſtra quaeratur, niſi ſit cundum in infinitum. §. 1. l. 3. c. 7. pag. 275. And ingenuouſly he confeſſeth, §. 2. l. 2. c. 3. p. 560. Verum quicquid dicatur (ſcil. per Carteſium & Epicurum) hypotheſis ſemper mera eſt, ac difficultas remanet, fierique nihil tutius poteſt, quàm profitendo ignorantiam, totum quem videmus rerum ordinem in arbitrium, ſummi opificis conferre. Dicere certe quod aliqui, ſolem v.g. idcirco hic potius quàm alibi eſſe, quia ejus naturae ita exigat, id quidem vere dicitur; ſed interim nil aliud eſt, quàm reſpondere ipſum quaeſitum, & diſſimulando ignorantiam, videri eſſe animi in cauſam optimam parum grati. Which is true and applicable to many other caſes. And it is ingenuouſly confeſſed lately by the very ingenious Mr. Samuel Parker, [I am lately grown ſuch a deſpairing Sceptick in all Phyſiological Theories, that I cannot concern myſelf in the truth or falſhood of any hypotheſes. For though I prefer the Mechanical hypotheſes before any other, yet me-thinks their contexture is too ſlight and brittle to have any ſtreſs laid upon them: and I can reſemble them to nothing better than your glaſs drops, from which if the leaſt portion be broken, the whole compages immediately diſſolves and ſhatters into duſt and atoms: for their parts which rather lie than hang together, being ſupported only by the thin film of a brittle conjecture, (not annealed by experience and obſervation) &c. And upon the like reaſons it is rejected by that eminently learned and induſtrious man, Dr. Willis, de ferment. p. 3. At quoniam principia ſua ſupponit potius quam demonſtrat, docetque qualis figurae elementa iſta corporum ſint, non quae ipſa fuerint, atque etiam notiones inducit valde ſubtiles & à ſenſu remotas, quaeque naturae phaenomenis quando ad particularia deſcenditur, non ſatis quadrant, hac inſuper habita, &c.

p. 498Quibuſdam qui ne ignem calere putant, niſi cum manu contrectarint, nihil credendum eſſe placet, quod ſupra progredientem naturam videatur. Multorum quoque ſtudia tardantur, quod id credere noluit quod minus ſub …orum cognitionem cadit: quae errorum pravitas ex ingeniorum imbecilitate defluxit: ſiquidem cum ſenſuum anguſtiae ex quibus hominem agnitio eruitur, in externorum ſenſilium genere verſentur, ſatis notum eſſe debet, his tanquam compedibus intelligentiae curſum retardari, divinaque capeſſere nequire. Paul. Carteſ…n 1 Sent. diſ. 9. p. 22.4. And I find that the Philoſophers that have rejected or vilified Epicurus and his way, have been very numerous; multitudes to a few, and of the moſt venerable names in the ages and places where they lived; and no one ſect of them ſo vilified by the reſt, as the Epicureans were by all.

5. I find alſo, that the moſt who in this age adhere to the Epicurean (or Carteſ…an) Hypotheſis, are the younger ſort of ingenious men, who have received prejudice againſt the Peripateticks, Platoniſts and Stoicks, before they did ever throughly ſtudy them; but reverencing more ſome perſon noted for much ingenuity, by his authority have been drawn to defend, what they ſcarce underſtand themſelves. And that it is the meer novelty of ſome of theſe new-ſtarted notions, which maketh them ſo much followed; as novelties in Religion are with ſome young and wanton wits: and accordingly I expect, that ere long they will grow out of faſhion, and die again before ever they come to have ſuch ſupporters as the other Philoſophy hath had.

6. Reſpicere ad plurima, to take in all that muſt be taken in, is the character of true wiſdom. But I find that the Epicureans do reſpicere ad pauca; they look ſo much at things corporeal, that they quite over-look the nobleſt natures; and they reduce all to Matter and Motion, becauſe nothing but Matter and Motion is throughly ſtudied by them. And like idle Boys, who tear out all the hard leaves of their books, and ſay they have learn'd all when they have learnt the reſt; ſo do they cut off and deny the nobleſt parts of nature, and then ſweep together the duſt of agitated Atoms, and tell us that they have reſolved all the Phaenomena in Nature.

7. And I find that they are very kind natured to their own conceptions, and take thoſe for demonſtrations, which other men think are liker dreams.

8. I perceive that they are deluded by taking the veſtigia and images of things, for the things themſelves. The Intellectual nature is the image of the Divine, and the Senſitive of the Intellectual, and the Vegetative of the Senſitive, and the Fiery of the Incorporeal. And when they can prove no more in any of the lower, but ſuch an image of the higher, they would on that advantage confound them all; and would p. 499hence conclude that Bruits are intellectual, and deny the differencing forms of all things.

9. I find that as they look ſo much at the Organ, as to over-look the Agent; and look ſo much at the particles of matter, as to over-look the different natures of it: ſo do they obſerve the ſecond cauſe with ſo narrow a mind, as much to over-look the firſt: or when they have acknowledged that there is a God, they think they have done fair, though afterwards they conſider not that intereſt of his in all operations, which their own conceſſions neceſſarily infer.

10. Laſtly, I perceive that they proceed not methodically in their collections, but confound all by mixing certainties with uncertainties. Whereas the firſt, the great, the moſt diſcernable truths, ſhould be firſt congeſted as CERTAINTIES by themſelves, and the uncertainties ſhould not be pleaded againſt them, nor ſuffered to ſtand in conteſt with them.

Perceiving all theſe general Reaſons to diſtruſt this ſort of Philoſophers above others, though I reſolve to be impartial, I cannot willingly be ſo fooliſh, as to over-look their diſadvantage in the preſent cauſe.

II. The particular reaſons which diſſwade me from believing the Epicurean ſufficiency of Matter and Motion are theſe following.

1. They all (with whom I have now to do) are conſtrained to confeſs an incorporeal intellectual ſubſtance; even that there is a God, and that GOD is ſuch. Epicurus himſelf doth not deny it, yea, ſeemeth to ſpeak magnificently of God, and in honour to him would excuſe his providence from the minding of inferiour things. For, 1. They know that matter did not make it ſelf; and motion is but its mode: and therefore matter cannot be made by its own motion. Its being is in order of nature before its motion. And matter is in it ſelf ſo dull a thing, (and by the adverſaries ſtripped of all forms, which are not cauſed by motion) that if it were ſaid to be from eternity in its duration, they will confeſs it could be but as an eternal effect of ſome nobler cauſe. So that at the firſt word they grant, that matter hath an incorporeal cauſe. 2. And motion, as it is found in matter, could not cauſe it ſelf; though it be but of the mode of matter, it is ſuch a p. 498duplicate page p. 499duplicate page p. 500mode as muſt have a cauſe.Read the Myſtic. Aegypt. & Chald. Philoſ. to prove that ſouls are not corporeal; and Nemeſius and Mammertus. And the paſſive matter yet unmoved, is ſuppoſed by themſelves to be void of all antecedent moving power. So that they are all fain to ſay, that God made the matter, and gave it the firſt puſh. And ſo all matter and motion is reduced to a firſt efficient, who is incorporeal: And therefore an incorporeal being is acknowledged.

If the ſoul be nothing but Matter and Motion, then no man is the ſame this year as he was the laſt. For Matter is in fluxu continuo, as they object themſelves anon: We have not the ſame ſleſh and bloud to day which we lately had: and the motion of this inſtant is not the ſame with the motion which ſucceedeth in the next: So that no man's ſoul, and conſequently no man, is long the ſame: and ſo (as I have ſaid after) Kings will loſe their titles to their Crowns, and all men to their lands, as being not the ſame who were born heirs to them. And there muſt be no rewards or puniſhments, unleſs you will reward and puniſh one for another's faults: And they need no more to fear the pain or death which will befall them, than that which befall their neighbour, becauſe it is not the man that now is who muſt undergo it. Nor ſhould any man have a wife or child of his own one year together. If they like not theſe conſequents, let them either prove that Identifying Matter and Motion are permanent, or grant that ſome other permanent thing doth identifie the perſon. See this as the argument of Ammonius and Numenias, preſt by Nemeſius de Anim. c. 2. p. 477. Vid. & Clean this argumenta pro animae corporeitate à Nemeſio profligata ibid. p. 479 &c.2. I meet with none of them who dare deny this God to be an intellectual free Agent; ſo that though it be granted them, that intelligere, velle be not in God the ſame thing formally as it is in man; yet is it ſomething which eminently muſt be ſo called; man having no fitter conception or expreſſion of it, than from theſe acts of his own ſoul. Epicurus will not make God defectively ignorant, impotent, or bad. When themſelves divide all things into ſuch as have underſtanding, and ſuch as have none; of which part do they ſuppoſe GOD to ſtand? Things that are void of underſtanding, (formally or eminently) are below the dignity of things that have underſtanding. So that they confeſs there is exiſtent an incorporeal, intelligent, free Agent.

3. As they confeſs that this intellectual Agent is the firſt cauſe both of matter and motion, ſo they cannot deny that he ſtill cauſeth both, by his continued influx or cauſing efficacy. For there can be no effect without a cauſe; and therefore when the cauſe ceaſeth, the effect muſt ceaſe. The material part of a moral cauſe may ceaſe, and yet the effect continue. But that moral cauſation continueth which is proportioned to the effect. The Parent may die while the child ſurviveth: but there is a continued cauſe of the life of the child, proportioned to the effect. Matter is not an independent being. To ſay that God hath made it ſelf-ſufficient and independent, is to ſay that he hath made it a God. p. 501Suppoſe but a total ceſſation of the Divine emanation, influx and cauſation, and you muſt needs ſuppoſe alſo the ceſſation of all Beings. If you ſay that when God hath once given it a Being, it will continue of it ſelf, till his power annihilate it: I anſwer, if it continue without a continuing cauſation, it muſt continue as an independent ſelf-ſufficient being. But this is a contradiction, becauſe it is a creature; GOD is no effect, and therefore needeth no cauſe of ſubſiſtence: but the creature is an effect, and cannot ſubſiſt a moment without a continued cauſe. As the beams or communicated light cannot continue an inſtant, if there were a total ceſſation of the emanation of the luminary, becauſe their being is meerly dependent: and they need no other poſitive annihilation, beſides the ceſſation of the cauſation which did continue them. It was from one of your own Poets that Paul cited, [In him we live, and move, and have our being, for we are his offſpring.] And nothing is more abhorrent to all common reaſon, than that this ſtone or dirt, which was nothing as yeſterday, ſhould be a God to it ſelf, even one independent ſelf-ſufficient being, as ſoon as it is created; and ſo that God made as many demy-gods as atoms. We ſee paſt doubt, that one creature cannot ſubſiſt or move without another, on which it is dependent; how much leſs can any creature ſubſiſt or move without its continued reception of its Creator's influx. If you could ſuppoſe that for one moment there were no God, you muſt ſuppoſe there would be nothing. If I thought any would deny this, beſides thoſe inflated vertiginous brains, that are not to be diſputed with, I would ſay more for the illuſtration of it.

Object. But though matter ſubſiſt not without a continued divine cauſation, or emanation, or efficacious volition; yet motion may continue when all divine cauſation of it ceaſeth: Becauſe when God hath given it one puſh, that cauſeth a motion, which cauſeth another motion, and that another, and ſo in infinitum, if there were no ſtop.

Anſw. 1. If this were ſo, it muſt be on ſuppoſition of a vis motiva communicata vel impreſſa: for if there had been no ſuch, the firſt motion would have not been, or all have preſently ceaſed for want of a continued cauſe. As there is no motion ſine vi motiva, ſo none can be communicated, but p. 502by the communication of that force. Action is not nothing: nor will be cauſed by nothing: As the delapſus gravium would preſently ceaſe, if we could cauſe the pondus or gravity to ceaſe; ſo is it in all other motions. If there be no vis or ſtrength communicated along with the motion, there would be nothing in that motion to cauſe another motion, nor in that to cauſe another. (And if it were by way of traction, if the cauſe ceaſe which is the prima trahens, all the motion ceaſeth: and ſo alſo if it be by way of pulſion) So that in every motion, there is ſomething more than matter and motion.

2. All motion (of things below within our reach) hath many impediments: and therefore would ceaſe, if the firſt cauſe continued not his powerful efficacy.If the doctrine of Matter and Motion only were true, there would never be any true miracles in the world, but all things go on from motion to motion as the firſt touch did put them into a neceſſity: whereas (however the world hath been deluded by many fictions, yet) many certain miracles there have been. Whether the removing of the mountain by ſaith mentioned by M. Paulus Venetus, J. 1. cap. 18. be true or not, and the non-diſſolution of excommunicate bodies in Conſtantinople, mentioned in Mart. Cruſius his Hiſt. Eccleſ. Turco graec. l. 2. with multitudes of the likes which moſt Hiſtorians have, &c. Yet certainly that there have been ſome ſuch, hath been fully proved unto many. It is tedious and needleſs to enumerate inſtances.

3. The moving power of the nobleſt creatures, is not purely active, but partly paſſive and partly active, and muſt receive the influx of the higheſt cauſe▪ before it can act or communicate any thing. Therefore as ſoon as the firſt mover ſhould ceaſe, the reſt would be ſoon ſtop'd, though ſome active power was communicated to them. As we ſee in a Clock when the poiſe is down, and in a Watch when the ſpring is down; the motion ceaſeth firſt where it firſt began.

4. Can you conſtrain your reaſon to imagine, that God is the ſole principal active cauſe, for the firſt touch, and, as it were, for one minute, or inſtant, (while he cauſeth the firſt motus) and is an unactive being, or no cauſe ever after, (ſave only reputativè, becauſe he cauſed the firſt.) This is to ſay, that God was God till he made the world, and ever ſince he hath done nothing, but left every atom or creature to be God. Is God ſo mutable, to do all for one inſtant, and to do nothing ever after?

5. The infiniteneſs and perfection of God fully proveth, that all continued motion is by the continuance of his efficiency. For it is undeniable, that he who made all things is every where, or preſent to all his creatures, in the moſt intimate proximity. And it is certain, that he cannot but know them all: and alſo that his Benignity maintaineth all their beings and well-beings; and therefore that he is not an unactive being; but that his power as well as his wiſdom p. 503and Goodneſs, is continually in act. How ſtrangely do theſe Epicureans differ from Ariſtotle? who durſt not deny the Eternity of the World, leſt he ſhould make God an unactive Being ad extra, from Eternity till the Creation? When-as theſe men feign him to have given but one inſtantaneous puſh, and to have been coetera otioſus, or unactive from Eternity.

Seeing then it cannot by ſober reaſon be denyed, that God himſelf is by a continued Cauſation, the Preſerver and intimate firſt mover of all things, it muſt needs thence follow, that matter and motion are ſtill inſufficient of themſelves: and that this is to be none of the Controverſie between us: but only whether it be any created Nature, Power, or other Cauſe, by which God cauſeth motion in any thing, or all things? or whether he do it by his own immediate Cauſation alone without the uſe of any ſecond Cauſe, ſave meer motion it ſelf? ſo that the inſufficiency of Matter and Motion to continual alterations and productions, muſt be confeſſed by all that confeſs there is a God.

4. It is alſo manifeſt in the effect, that it is not a meer motion of the firſt Cauſe, which appeareth in the being and motions of the Creature. There is apparently a tendency in the Creatures motion to a certain end, which is an attractive Good; and there is a certain Order in all motions to that end; and certain Laws, or Guidances and overrulings, to keep them in that Order: ſo that Wiſdom and Goodneſs do eminently appear in them all, in their beings, natures, differences, excellencies, order and ends, as well as Motion the effect of Power. 1. It is certain that God who is unmoved himſelf, is the firſt mover of all: 2. And if God were not unmoved, but by ſelf-motion cauſed motion, yet he exerteth Wiſdom and Goodneſs in his Creation and Providence, as well as Motion. 1. He that is Infinite, and therefore not properly in any place or ſpace, or at leaſt is limited in none, can himſelf by Locomotion move himſelf in none: which methinks none ſhould queſtion: And they that make the World infinite, or at leaſt indefinite, as they call it, methinks ſhould not deny the Infiniteneſſe of God: And they acknowledge no motion themſelves but Locomotion, or migratio a loco in locum. But ſaith Gaſſendus, p. 504Vol. 1. pag. 337. Et certè captum omnem fugit, ut quippiam quantumvis ſit alteri praeſens conjunctum que , ipſum moveat, ſi in ſeipſo immotum maneat, &c.— Ita que neceſſe omnino videtur, ut cum in ſerie moventium quorum moventur alia ab aliis procedi in infinitum non poſſit, perveniatur ad unum primum; non quod immotum moveat, ſed quod ipſum per ſe moveatur. Anſw. You gather from hence, that it is the contexture of the moſt ſubtile Atomes which is the form and firſt mover in phyſical beings. But you granted before, that God moved thoſe Atomes, and alſo put a moving inclination into them. And atomes are far from being unum or primum. You ſaid before [ſufficiat Deum quidem eſſe incorporeum, ac pervadere fovereq, univerſam mundi machinam.] And if ſo, then movere etiam as well as fovere. Either you mean as you ſpeak in confeſſing a God or not: If not, it is unworthy a Philoſopher to diſſemble for any worldly reſpects whatſoever. If you do, then, Is it beyond your capacity to conceive that God being unmoved moveth all things? or not? If not, why ſhould it be beyond your capacity to conceive the ſame in a ſecond Order of a ſecond ſpiritual being? The reaſon as to motion is of the ſame kinde. If yea; then either you believe God is the firſt Mover or not: If not, withdraw your former Confeſſion. If yea, what Locomotion (for you deny all other) can you aſcribe to God, who is unbounded and infinite? what place is he moved from, and what place is he moved into? And is his motion rectus vel circularis? is it one or multifarious? or rather will you not renounce all theſe? 2. And as God moveth being unmoved, ſo he doth more than move: He moveth Orderly, and giveth Rules and Guidances to motion; and moveth graciouſly to the felicity of the Creature, and to a deſireable end. A Horſe can move more than a man; for he hath more ſtrength or moving power: But he moveth not ſo regularly nor to ſuch intended ends, becauſe he hath not wiſdom and benignity or goodneſs as Man hath. He that buildeth a Houſe or Ship, or writeth ſuch Volumes as Gaſſendus did, doth ſomewhat more than barely move, which a Swallow or a Hare could have done as ſwiftly: And he that looketh on the works of God, even to the Heavens and Earth as Gaſſendus hath himſelf deſcribed them, and ſeeth not the effects of Wiſdom and Goodneſs p. 505in the Order, and tendency, and ends of motion, as well as Power in motion it ſelf, did take his ſurvey but in his dream: ſaith Balbus in Cicero de Nat. Deor. l. 2. p. 62. Hoc qui exiſtimat fieri potuiſſe (that is, for the World to be made by meer fortuitous motion of atomes, &c.) non intelligo cur non idem putet, ſi innumerabiles unius & viginti formae literarum, aliquo coniciantur, poſſe ex his in terram excuſſis Annales Ennii, ut di…inceps legi poſſint effici, quod neſcio an in uno quidem verſu poſſit tantum valere fortuna. Quod ſi mundum efficere poteſt concurſus atomorum, cur porticum, cur templum, cur domum, cur navem non poteſt, quae ſunt minus operoſa, & multo quidem faciliora? Certè ita temere de mundo effutiunt, ut mihi quidem nunquam hunc admirabilem coeli ornatum, qui locus eſt proximus, ſuſpexiſſe videantur. Where he brings in this paſſage as from Ariſtotle, that if we ſhould imagine men to have lived in ſome Dungeon or Cavern in the Earth, and never to have ſeen the Sun or Light, or World, as we do, and if there ſhould be a doubt or diſpute among them, whether there be a God; and if you ſhould preſently bring up theſe men into our places, where they might look above them and about them, to the Sun and Stars, and Heaven and Earth; they would quickly by ſuch a ſight be convinced that there is a God. But as he truly addeth, Aſſiduitate quotidiana & conſuetudine oculorum aſſueſcunt animi, ne que admirantur ne que requirunt rationes earum rerum quas ſemper vident: perinde quaſi novitas nos magis quam magnitude rerum debeat adexquirendas cauſas excitare.

But I ſuppoſe it will be granted me, that the firſt mover doth more than meerly move, the effects of Wiſdom and Goodneſs being ſo legible on all the World; but you'l ſay, that to do it wiſely and to attain good ends by it, &c. is but the modus of action with the effect, and therefore matter and motion rightly ordered may be nevertheleſs ſufficient to all effects. To which I anſwer, that the Creatures motion requireth not only that the Creator move them, but that he place and order them, and move them rightly, and that he remove and overcome impediments, &c. Therefore there is neceſſary in the firſt mover, both Wiſdom and Love as well as Power: And neither his Power, Wiſdom or Love are Locomotion in himſelf. And this much being proved, that in p. 506every motion, there is Divine Power, Wiſdom and Love, which is more than matter and motion it ſelf, I proceed next to enquire,

5. Do you think there is any thing exiſtent in the World, beſides matter and motion, or not? As to meer ſite, and figure and other ſuch order or modes of matter, I know you will not deny them to have now a being as well as motion. But is there no different tendency to motion in the parts of matter? Is there not in many Creatures a Power, an Inclination, or aptitude to motion, beſides motion it ſelf? Is there not a reaſon à priore to be given, why one Creature is more agile and active than another? and why they act in their various wayes? Why is fire more active than earth? and a Swallow than a Snail? If you ſay, that the different ratio motus is in ſome extrinſecal agent only which moveth them, you will hardly ſhew any poſſibility of that, when the ſame Sun, by the ſame virtue (or motion as you will ſay) is it that moveth all: And if it were ſo, you muſt go up to the firſt Cauſe, to ask for the different motions of thoſe movers; when our enquiry now is de natura moventium & motorum Creatorum? If you ſay, that it is the Ratio recipiendi in the different magnitudes or poſitions of the parts of matter, which is the cauſe of different motions; I would know, 1. Whether this difference of magnitude and figure and ſite, being now antecedently neceſſary to different motions, was not ſo heretofore as well as now? If you ſay, No, you feign without proof a ſtate of things and order of Cauſes, contrary to that which all mens ſenſe perceiveth to be now exiſtent? And who is the wiſer Philoſopher? he that judgeth the courſe and nature of things to be, and have been what he now findeth it, till the contrary be proved? or he that findeth it one thing, and feigneth it ſometime to have been another without any proof? That which is now antecedently neceſſary to diverſity of motion, it's like was ſo heretofore. 2. And then how could one ſimple equal act of God, ſetting the firſt matter into motion, cauſe ſuch an inequality in motions to this day, if it be true that you hold, that only that which is moved or in motion it ſelf can move? and that motion is all that is neceſſary to the diverſity? 3. Either the firſt matter was made ſolid in larger parcels, p. 507or all conjunct, or in Atomes: If it was made firſt in Atomes, then Motion cauſed not Diviſion. If it was made conjunct and ſolid, then motion cauſed not conjunction and ſolidity. And if the firſt diviſion, or conjunction, ſite and figure of matter was all antecedent to motion and without it, we have no reaſon to think that it is the ſole Cauſe of all things now.

But ſurely quantity, figure and ſite, are not all that now is antecedent to motion. Doth not a man feel in himſelf a certain Power, to ſudden and voluntary motion? He that ſate ſtill, can ſuddenly riſe and go: And if you ſay, that he performeth that ſudden motion by ſome antecedent motion, I anſwer, that I grant that; but the queſtion is, whether by that alone? or whether a Power diſtinct from motion it ſelf, be not as evidently the Cauſe? For otherwiſe the antecedent motion would proceed but according to its own proportion: It would not in a minute make ſo ſudden and great an alteration. I can reſtrain alſo that motion which ſome antecedent motion (e.g. paſſion) urgeth me to? Surely this Power of doing or not doing, is ſomewhat different from doing it ſelf. A power of not-moving is not motion.

And what is the Pondus which Gaſſendus doth adde to magnitude and figure as a third pre-requiſite in Atomes? I perceive he knoweth not what to make of it himſelf. But in concluſion it muſt be no natural Gravity by which the parts are inclined to the whole in themſelves, but the meer effect of pulſion or traction, or both. At the firſt he was for both conjunct, pulſion of the Air, and traction of the Atomes from the Earth: But of this he repented, as ſeeing impulſionem aeris nullam eſſe: and was for the traction of Atoms alone. (Than which, his Friends conceit of the pulſive motion of the Sun in its Diaſtole or whatever other motion, is the cauſe, doth ſeem leſs abſurd.) But that man that would have me believe that if a Rock were in the air, or if Pauls Steeple ſhould fall, the deſcent would be only by the traction of the hamuli of inviſible Atomes, (or by the pulſion of Air and Sun conjunct) muſt come neerer firſt, and tell me how the hamuli of atomes can faſten upon a marble rock? and how they come to have ſo much ſtrength as to p. 508move that rock (which no man can move in its proper place) if there be no ſuch thing as ſtrength or power beſides actual motion? and why it is that thoſe drawing atomes do move ſo powerfully Earthwards, when at the ſame time it is ſuppoſed, that as many or more atomes are moving upwards by the Suns attraction, and more are moved circularly with the Earth? why do not theſe ſtop or hinder one another? and why doth not the Rock as well go upward with the aſcending atomes? And when the Rock deſcendeth, doth it carry down none of the aſcendants with it? As likely as for the deſcendants to carry down it. Are thoſe atomes that carry down the Rock, more powerfull than an hundred thouſand men, who could not lift it up at all; much leſs ſo ſwiftly? And why do not the ſame (partial) atomes, bear down a Feather, or the Birds that fly quietly in the air? And why feel we not the power of their motion upon us? How eaſily can ſome men believe any thing, while they think that their increaſe of wiſdom lyeth in believing no more than evidence conſtraineth them to? If Gaſſendus his inſtance of the Load-ſtone put under the ballance to increaſe the pondus of the Iron, prove any thing, it will prove ſomething more than a traction of the hooked atomes, even the traction of Nature that needeth no hooks.

And mark,Thoſe that fly to this ingenita diſpoſitio vel pondus, will in other words grant that Nature, form or quality which they deny. And thoſe that grant nothing to move but former motion, muſt needs make ſome degrees of motion daily to diminiſh in the World, one thing or other ſtill ceaſing its motion; and all motion within our knowledge having ſuch conſtant impedition, that before this time we may think all things would have ſtood ſtill, if their opinion were true. If they ſay that the Sun or ſome ſuperior Movers renew the motion of things inferior, I grant it; But that is becauſe it hath a moving nature: For if they ſay, that the Sun it ſelf hath not the leaſt impedition to diminiſh the degrees of its motion, they ſpeak not only without any proof, but contrary to our obſervation of all things known, and to their own opinion, who make the Air impeditive to other motions, and the effluvia of other Globes to be impeditive to the Sun. I pray you, what Gaſſendus granteth, when he ſaith [ Ʋnum omnino ſupponere par eſt, viz. quantacun que fuit atomis mobilitas ingenita tanta conſtanter perſeverare, ſo that, ſaith he, they may be hindered from moving, but not from endeavouring to move and free themſelves from their reſtraint. What need we more than this? or what more do we plead for? It is granted us then that when a moveable or active being is ſtopt from motion, it doth not thereby loſe its mobile or active nature or diſpoſition: And ſo, that it is not only motion that cauſeth motion; But that there is in atomis mobilitas ingenita, which continueth when the motion p. 509ceaſeth. You'l ſay perhaps, that he meaneth only a paſſive receptivity by which one thing is eaſier moved by an exterior cauſe than another. But you miſtake him: for he taketh not mobilitas ingenita only paſſively, but alſo actively, and therefore ſaith, that [it endeavoureth to move and free it ſelf.] And lib. 5. c. 2. he ſaith, [Non motus ſed impetus, ab initio perſeverat; vel niſus perpetuus.] which is as much as I deſire now. For then there is ſomewhat beſides matter and motion; even as Impetus & Niſus, which muſt alſo come from a Power which per niſum & impetum doth ſhew it ſelf.

And indeed, it doth not only overpaſs our Reaſon, but contradict it, that meer ſubtilty of matter, or ſmallneſs of particles, ſhould be all the cauſe of motion that is found in the matter it ſelf. Muſt we believe that an Alcohol impalpalile of Marble or Gold, if it could but be anatomized more, would be as moveable as fire; or would thereby turn to fire it ſelf: or as active as the Vital and Intellectual Creatures; yea turned to ſuch a thing it ſelf: If all matter was Atomes at firſt, then all was fire, and all was of one kinde, and equally moveable: And what hath made the difference ſince? And if you will feign that God made ſome parts Atomes, and ſome parts more groſs; or that he diſtinguiſhed matter ab initio into Carteſius his materia ſubtilis, globuli aetherei, and groſſer matter, why may not we better ſay, that the ſame Creator hath diſtinguiſhed matter by different natures and powers, which we finde them poſſeſſed of? And by what proof do you diſtinguiſh matter into thoſe three degrees, or ſorts, any more than into two, or four, or ſix, or ten, or ten hundred? who can chooſe but ſhake the head, to ſee wiſe Philoſophers thus impoſe upon the world? and at the ſame time ſay, It is the firſt duty of a man that would be wiſe, to believe no more than by evidence he is forced to? Yea, and at the ſame time to ſay, Theſe are but our Hypotheſes, which ſaith one, I acknowledge to be falſe, and ſaith another, I cannot ſay is true: and yet they are our foundation; and from theſe our Philoſophical Verities reſult; which muſt make you wiſe, who muſt believe nothing without proof. Alas, what is man!

And I would know whether they can prove againſt Gaſſendus, p. 510that Impetus & Niſus vel conatus is ipſe motus? when the heavieſt poiſe is at a Clock that ſtandeth ſtill, the poiſe doth not move; but it doth niti vel conari: Hold but a Weight of an hundred pounds of Lead in your hand, as immoveable as poſſible, I am of opinion you will feel that it doth incline to motion, though it move not. Is not this inclination then ſomewhat different from motion? If you tell me again of nothing but the inviſible tractive hooked atomes, I adviſe you to involve a thouſand pound of Lead in a ſufficient Caſe of Feathers, which it ſeems are charmed from the power or touch of atomes, and try then whether it be no heavier than the Feathers are? The ſame I may ſay of a Spring of Steel which is wound up in a ſtanding Watch, or other Engine. There is no proof of any motion: and yet there is a Conatus different from motion. You'l ſay perhaps that the particles in the Steel are all in motion, among themſelves: but when will you prove it? and prove alſo that they are ſo in the Lead or Rock that by Gravity inclineth to deſcent? and prove alſo that the particles are moved by an extrinſick mover only, and have no principle of motion in themſelves?

Moreover, what think you is the nature of all our Habits? Is there nothing in a Habit but actual motion? Suppoſe that you ſleep without a dream? or that a Lethargy intercept your intellectual motion? or that other buſineſs alienate your thoughts? Do you think that all your Learning is thereby obliterated? Or that you are after as unapt for your arts and trades as if you had never learnt them? Let a Muſician, an Aſtronomer, a Phyſician, try! whether they will not, return more expert than an Ideot? what then is this Habit? It is not actual motion it ſelf? Elſe it would be totally extinct when the motion is but for an hour intercepted. If you ſay, that there is other motion in us ſtill, to renew it: I anſwer, why ſhould that other, (e.g. the motion of the Lungs or Heart, or the Circulation of the blood) make you an Artiſt the next morning, any more than your Neighbour, if that were all? You'l grant, I ſuppoſe, that a Habit is ſomewhat diſtinct from Motion, but it is the Effect of it only, and one of the Phaenomena which we ſay that matter and motion are ſufficient for. To which p. 511I anſwer, Do you deny that a Habit doth it ſelf conduce to future motion, or not? If not, it is no Habit: If yea, then as to future actions there is more than matter and motion needfull: and the Principles are more: And then what reaſon have you to contradict us, who finding ſome Principles in Nature which conduce to motion as much and more than Habits do, do aſſert ſuch Principles? And how know you that former motion proceedeth not from ſuch Natures, or Principles, when you confeſs that later motions do ſo? If you ſay that Habits are nothing but a Curſus motuum, as of water that by running in a certain Channell is inclined to run that way again: I anſwer, They are certainly ſomething that remain when the action ceaſeth; and therefore are an Inclination ad agendum, as well as a curſus actionum; And they are ſomething that are active Principles, and not only ſo many Channels which the Spirits have made themſelves in the brains and nerves: Otherwiſe the numberleſs variety of objects would ſo furrow and channel the brain that they would conſume it, (as gutta cavat lapidem, &c.)

6. And do you know what you oblige your ſelves to, when you undertake to ſolve all phaenomena by matter and motion only? and how have you ſatisfied the ſtudious and impartial World herein? I hope you will not put off all queſtions that are put to you, with theſe ſame two general words only? when we ask you, what cauſeth the deſcenſus gravium, do not tell us, It is matter and motion: but tell us the differences in the motion or matter which cauſe this effect as different from others: What is the reaſon in motion that Fire aſcendeth? what is the reaſon that the motus projectorum doth continue? why doth the Ant take one courſe, and the Bee another, and the Fly another, &c. what different motions are they that are the cauſe? what motion is it that cauſeth the Hen to ſit on her Eggs in faſting and patience, and to know her Chickens, and to cheriſh them till they are mature, and then beat them away? And ſo almoſt of all other Birds and Beaſts? What is the difference in motion that cauſeth one Creature to love this food, and another that; that one eateth Graſs, and another Fleſh? that every ſeed doth bring forth only its proper ſpecies? what are the differences in motion, which cauſe the difference p. 512in odour, and taſte and virtue, and ſhape of leaves, and flowers, and fruits, &c. between all the Plants that cover the Earth? that all that come of one ſeed have an agreement in leaf, and flower, and fruit, and odour, and taſte, and virtue, e.g. Germander, Betony, Peony, &c. what are the different motions that cauſe all theſe differences? even in the very ſeeds themſelves? To tell us only in general that the difference is all made by motion, is to put an end to learning, and ſtudies, and to give one anſwer to all the queſtions in the world, and one deſcription of all beings in the world: You may as well tell us, that you ſalve all the Phaenomena, to tell us, that all things are Entities, and made and moved by God. It is a fair advancement of Knowledge indeed, to caſt away and deny all the nobleſt parts of the world, and to tell us, that all the reſt is matter of various magnitude and figure, variouſly moved and placed. This is ſhort Philoſophy. And the particular ſpecifying differences, you do not, you cannot tell us, according to your Principles.

Gaſſendus, §. 1. l. 3. c. 2. denyeth the tranſmutation of Elements. Others of the Atomiſts tell us, that every Hour changeth the Elements, and that continual motion is continually turning one into another: And that Fire e.g. is but that part of matter which falleth under ſuch or ſuch a motion: And that the ſame matter which is Fire this moment while it moveth, is ſomething elſe the next when that motion ceaſeth: And that whatever matter falleth under the ſame motion, be it Stone or Earth, or any thing, it is preſently by that motion turn'd to Fire, as Fire may be into Stone or Earth. But that which we expect from them is, to tell us, what motion it is that maketh the different Elements? and what doth conſtitute them? and what tranſmuteth them, and not to put us off with two general words, when they boaſt of ſolving all the Phaenomena.

We expect alſo to hear from them, how Denſity and Solidity come to be the effects of motion? And how the Coheſion of the particles of Gold or Marble, or Glew, is cauſed by the meer magnitude and figure of Matter, or by the motion of it, without any other material properties.

And they muſt give us a better account than they have yet p. 513done, of the true cauſe of ſenſe in matter and motion. They know our argument, but I could never yet underſtand how they anſwer it. We ſay that Nihil dat quod non habet, vel formaliter vel eminenter. (All the objections againſt this Maxim they may find anſwered (beſides others) in Campanella, de ſenſu rerum.) Atoms, as matter, have no ſenſe: they ſmart not, they ſee not, they feel no delight, &c. Formaliter you will not imagine that they have ſenſe: and they cannot have it. eminenter, being not above it, but below it; and ſhewing us nothing that doth tranſcend it, or is like it. And motion is no ſubſtance, but a mode of matter, and therefore hath it ſelf no ſenſe.

Object Doth not Campanella, Teleſius, &c. argue, that all things have ſenſe?

Anſw. 1. Their fanaticiſms are no part of our Phyſical Creed. 2. They mean, when all is done, but this much, that there is ſome Image or Participation of Life in Inanimates, of Senſe in Vegetatives, of Reaſon in Senſitives▪ and of Angelical Intellection in Rationals. 3. As it is ſaid in the Myſtic. Aegypt. & Chald. Philoſ. aſcribed to Ariſtotle, [Et ſi quibuſdam videtur quod elementa habent Animam, illa eſt aliena adventitiaque eis. Cumque ſint viva, vita illis eſt accidentaria, non naturalis: alioquin forent inalterabilia.] l. 12. c. 11. So the Sticks deifi'd the fire, and made it Intellectual; but it was not as it is matter, but as they ſuppoſed it animated with an intellectual form. So many of the ancients thought, that the Angels were compounded of an intellectual form or ſoul, and of a fiery or aethereal body. But it is only the body that we are now enquiring of. Have atoms ſenſe? doth matter feel or ſee as ſuch?

Object. We ſay not that all matter or atoms have ſenſe, but only ſome part of it, which by motion is ſubtilized.

Anſw. Still nihil dat quod non habet; you grant then that matter as ſuch hath no ſenſe at all. Elſe the argument would hold ad omnem. And if it have none as matter, motion can give it none as meer motion; for motion hath not ſenſe to give. Let motion attenuate the matter, and ſubtilize it, it is but matter ſtill; and it can be no leſs than atoms. Therefore ſhew us how materia ſubtilis, or atoms, ſhould feel or ſee, becauſe of the ſubtility or parvity, and by its magnitude or groſsneſs p. 514loſe that ſenſe. Tell us how and why the change of meer magnitude and figure ſhould make a thing feel that felt not before. If you difference not matter by ſome natural difference of forms, or properties and virtues, you will never ſpeak ſenſe in proving ſenſe to be in matter, by meer atomizing it, or moving it. The alkohol of Marble feeleth no more than the ſolid ſtone; nor the air than the earth, for any proof that we have of it. The boys that whip their tops, and the women that turn their wheels ſo ſwiftly, that the motion ſhall not be diſcerned,Sane ignis, aër, aqua, terra, ſuapte natura carent anima: & cuicunque horum adeſt anima, hoc vita utitur peregrina: Alia vero praeter haec nulla ſunt corpora. Plotin. Ennead. 4. l. 7. c. 2. p. 457. yet put no feeling into either, though the motion be ſwifter than that of the heart, or lungs, or blood. What the learned Dr. Ward hath ſaid of this againſt Mr. Hobs, I refer you to peruſe, and excuſe me for tranſcribing it. Scaliger, Sennertus, and many others, have heretofore challenged theſe Philoſophers, to ſhew the world how atoms by motion, or elements by mixture, can get that ſenſe which neither matter, motion nor mixture have; but we can meet with no account of it yet worth the reading: not by Carteſius, not by Regius or Berigardus, not by Gaſſendus, nor any other that we can get and read. How unſatisfactory is it to tell us that facultas ſentiendi & movendi, quae anima ſenſitiva vulgo dicitur, eſt partium animalis in ſpiritus, nervos & alia ſenſoria, &c. talis attemperatio & conformatio, qua animal ab objectis variis motibus affici poteſt; as Regius, l. 4. c. 3. p. 267. This is an eaſie ſolving of the Phaenomena indeed. But qualis eſt illa contemperatio? & quomodo poteſt contemperantia inſenſibilium, ſenſibile conſtituere? Nonne dat iſta contemperatio quod non habet?

Perhaps you will ſay with him in Cicer. de Nat. Deor. that by this argument God muſt be a Fidler, becauſe he maketh men that are ſuch. Anſw. By this argument no fidler, nor any other man, hath more wiſdom than God, or can do that which God cannot do: but becauſe God is above him in his skill, doth it follow that the names which ſignifie humane imperfection muſt be put on God? Can God enable a man to that which he is not able to do himſelf, and can he give that which he hath not to give?

Object. None of the parts of a clock can tell the hour of the day, and yet all ſet together can: and none of the letters of a book are Philoſophy, and yet the whole may be a learned ſyſtem: p. 515and no atoms in a Lute can make melody, as the whole can do.

Anſw. This is but to play with words. In all theſe inſtances the whole hath nothing of a higher kind in nature than the ſeveral parts, but only a compoſition by the contribution of each part. The clock telleth you nothing but per modum ſigni; and that ſignum is only in the ſound, or order of motion. And ſound and motion belongeth to the whole, by vertue or contribution of the parts, and is not another thing above them. And that the motion is ſo ordered, and that man can by it collect the time of the day, is from the power of our underſtandings, and not from the matter of the engine at all. So the book is no otherwiſe Philoſophy at all, but per modum ſigni: which ſignum is related to mans underſtanding both as the cauſe and orderer, and as the receiver and apprehender. So that the letters do nothing at all, but paſſively ſerve the mind of man. And ſo it is in the other inſtance: the ſtrings do but move the air, and cauſe the ſound which is in the ear: that this is melody, is cauſed only by the mind of man, who firſt frameth, and then orderly moveth them, and then ſuo modo receiveth the ſound, and maketh melody by the aptitude of his apprehenſion. If you had proved that Clock, or Book, or Lute do make themſelves, and order and uſe themſelves, and know the time, or underſtand or delight in themſelves, you had done ſomething. But by the deceitful names of Philoſophy and Melody, to confound the bare natural ſound and ſign, with that ordering and that reception, which is the priviledge of a mind, is unfit for a Philoſopher.

Moreover I expect from Matter and Motion, Vid. Priſcian. in Theophraſt. Proving that light is neither a Body nor a Quality, c. 19. But I find no ſatisfaction when he cometh to tell us what it is: Nor will I ſubſcribe to Ficinus, who (with other Platoniſts) ſaith, [Coeleſte corpus primum luminis ſuſceptaculum incorporea vita & intelligentia regi à qua & Lumen habeat; caeteriſque tradat— Si Lumen eſſe dicamus, Radios viſuales coeleſtium oculorum in ſe viventium, perque ejuſmodi radios cuncta videntium agentiumque videndo— non errabimus.]an account of motions great concomitants, that is, of Light and Heat. Miſtake me not, I am not undervaluing the effects of motion; I take it for a moſt noble and obſervable cauſe of moſt that is done or exiſtent in the corporeal world: but muſt it therefore be the ſolitary cauſe? I have long obſerved amongſt wranglers, and erroneous zealots in Divinity, that p. 516moſt of their error and miſdoing lieth in ſetting the neceſſary co-ordinate cauſes or parts of things as inconſiſtent in oppoſition to one another. It would make one aſhamed to hear one plead, that Scripture muſt be proved by it ſelf; and another, that it muſt be proved by reaſon; and another, that it muſt be by miracles; and another, by the Church; and another, by general Hiſtory and Tradition, &c. As if every one of theſe were not neceſſary concurrent parts in the proof. Such work have we among poor deluded women and ignorant men, while the Romaniſts ſay, that they are the true Church; and the Greeks ſay, it is they; and the Lutherans ſay, it is they; and the Anabaptiſts ſay, it is they: as if my neighbours and I ſhould contend, which of our houſes it is that is the Town. And ſo do theſe Philoſophers about the Principles and Elements. The Intellectual nature, which is the Image of God, hath notoriouſly three faculties, Ʋnderſtanding, Will and Executive Power; and men think that they cannot underſtand the one, without denying the other two: and the fiery nature which conſtituteth the Sun and other Luminaries, (and is the image of the vital nature) hath three notorious powers or properties, Light, Heat and Motion; and they cannot underſtand Motion, without making nothing of Light and Heat, or greatly obſcuring and abuſing them. Cull out into one, and ſet together, but what Patricius hath ſaid of Light, and what Teleſius hath ſaid of Heat, (and Campanella after him) and what Gaſſendus and Carteſius have ſaid of Motion, and cut off all their ſuperfluities, and you will have a better entrance into ſound Philoſophy, than any one book that I know doth afford you **Leg. Le Grand. Diſſert. in Epicur. Philoſ. ad Gaſſend. & de communi rerum vivendi ratione ad Campanel. & de nominibus Dei ſoli attributis; In which he taketh Atoms or indiviſible particles for the firſt real paſſive matter, antecedent to the diſtinction of Elements: but Fire (called alſo Spiritus Aethereus & Natura) to be of a higher elevation, the Active informer, diſpoſer and moderator of all matter: and animated Fire, (that is, the Sun and its emanations) to be the life and Ruler of the material world: And that this was the ſenſe of almoſt all the old Philoſophers: And that by their numerous names of God, they meant the ſame thing, as diverſly operating; that is, the Sun, Fire or Aether, (which they took to be animated intellectuals) as conſidered in its various reſpects to mortals. Ut docet Hermes, Mens generalis habet pro corpore Ignem, & quaſi Igne ſtipatur & circum veſtitur foreign; ſemper enim & neceſſario Ignis Aethereus & Mens Univerſalis ſihi invicem comites aſſident; amboque ita affinos nihil conſtituunt aliud quàm ſpiritum Igneum, Aethereum, lucidum, coeleſtem, & divinum, ten…broſam hanc & informem immanis materiei abyſſum complentem, illuſtrantem & animantem. Idem ad Campanel. pag. …0. Vide quae ex Mercur. Pimand. citat. pag. 79.I confeſs, that as wiſdom muſt lead the will, and determine p. 517its acts quoad ſpecificationem, Saith a novel Philoſopher himſelf, Ex ſpeculis uſtoriis certum eſt, calorem a ſole creari intenſiſſimum, non acceleratione motus, ſed coalitione radiorum.and the will muſt ſet a work the ſame intellect, and determine its acts quoad exercitium; and the active power doth partly work ad intra in the operations of both theſe, and ad extra is excited by the imperium of the will; ſo that theſe three faculties (as Schibler, Alſted, and many others truly number them) are marvellouſly conjunct and co operative: Even ſo it is in the Motion, Light and Heat of the active element, or fiery or aethereal nature. I know motion contributeth to light and heat;Lumen ſpecies eſt inter omnes ſpecies ſenſibiles prae caeteris intellectualem ſpeciem repraeſentans: & in Intellectu eſt per cauſam; in coelo per formae plenitudinem; in igne per plenitudinem participationis; hinc derivatur in portiones. Ficin. in Theophraſt. de Anim. c. 44. but it's as true that light and heat have their proper, coequal and coordinate properties and effects, and that heat contributeth as much to motion at leaſt, as motion doth to heat: indeed in one eſſence they are three coequal vertues or faculties, the Vis Motiva, Illuminativa & Calefactiva. And ſo vain is their labour, who only from matter and motion give us an account of light and heat, that I find no need nor willingneſs to be at the labour of confuting them. Call but for their proofs, and you have confuted them all at once.

And if no better a ſolution be given us of the nature of Light and Heat, what ſhall we expect from them about Intellection and Volition? do atoms underſtand or will? or doth motion underſtand or will? If not, (as ſure they do not as ſuch) then tell us how that which hath no participation of underſtanding or will ſhould conſtitute an agent that doth underſtand and will? Set to this work as Philoſophers, and make it intelligible to us if you are in good earneſt.

7. But to proceed a little further with you, I take it for granted, that you confeſs that an intellectual incorporeal being there is, while you confeſs a God: and that this ſort of being is more excellent than that which is corporeal, ſenſible and groſs. I would next ask you, Do you take it for poſſible or impoſſible that God ſhould make any ſecondary Beings, which are incorporeal and intellectual alſo? If you ſay, It is impoſſible, give us your proof. If poſſible, I next ask you whether it be not moſt probable alſo? You acknowledge what a ſpot or punctum in the world this earthly Globe is: you ſee here that man, whoſe fleſh muſt rot and turn to duſt, hath the power of Intellection and Volition: you look up to the more vaſt and glorious Regions and Globes, and I am confident you think not that only this ſpot of earth is p. 518inhabited.Non ergo levitas & gravitas cauſae primi … orus ſunt, ſed qualitates ſunt elementorum; ſed tamen ut etiam hoc detur, quomodo ratiocinari, opinari, judicare, gravitatis & levitatis opera eſſe poſſunt; ſi ron ſunt gravitatis & levitatis opera, neque elementorum ſunt: ſi non elementorum, neque certe corporum. Nemeſius de An. c. 2. p. 484. And ſurely you think that the glory of the inhabitants, is like to be anſwerable to the glory of their habitations. You make your Atoms to be inviſible, and ſo you do the Air and Winds; when yet our earth and dirt is viſible. Therefore you take not craſſitude, nor viſibility or ſenſibility, to have the preeminence in excellency. Judge then your ſelves whether it be not likely that God hath innumerable more noble and excellent creatures, than we ſilly men are? And will you reduce all their unknown perfections, or their known intelligence to matter and motion only?

Moreover, when you obſerve the wonderful variety of things, in which God is pleaſed to take his delight, what ground have we to imagine that he hath no greater variety of ſubſtances, but corporeal only? nor no other way of cauſation but by motion? when no man can deny, but he could otherwiſe cauſe the variety which we ſee, and fix in the creatures ab origine their differing natures, properties and vertues; what reaſon then have you to ſay that he did not do ſo?

And can you believe that the goodneſs of that God, who hath made this wonderful frame which we ſee, would not appear in making ſome creatures liker and nearer to himſelf, than matter and motion is?

But to talk no more of probabilities to you, we have certain proof that man is an intellectual free agent, whoſe ſoul you can never prove to be corporeal, and whoſe power of intellection and volition is diſtinct from corporal motion. And we have proof that there are ſuperior Intelligences more noble than we, by the operations which they have exerciſed upon things below.

And what ſhould move you (who ſeem not to be overmuch Divine, and who ſeem to obſerve the order and harmony of the creatures) to imagine, that God doth himſelf alone, without any inſtrument or ſecond cauſe, move all the corporeal matter of the world? If you are ſerious in believing that God himſelf doth move and govern all, why do you queſtion, whether he make uſe of any nobler natures next him, to move things corporeal. And why do you againſt your own inclinations, make every action to be done p. 519by God alone? I doubt not but he doth all: but you ſee that he chooſeth to communicate honour and agency to his creatures. He uſeth the Sun to move things on earth. Therefore if you believe that corporeal beings ſtand at ſo infinite a diſtance from his perfections, you may eaſily judge that he hath ſome more noble; and that the nobleſt are the moſt potent and active and rule the more ignoble: as you ſee the nobler bodies (as the Sun) to have power upon the more ignoble. Therefore to violate the harmony of God's works, and to deny all the ſteps of the ladder ſave the loweſt, is but an unhappy ſolving of Phaenomena.

Nay, mark what you grant us: you confeſs God to have Power, Wiſdom and Will, and that he is incorporeal, and moveth all: and you confeſs that man hath in his kind Power, Ʋnderſtanding and Will; and is there any thing below that's liker God? If not, do you not allow us to take theſe faculties for incorporeal? and that thoſe are ſo that are higher than we?

8. And you ſeem to us by your Philoſophy to write of Nature, as the Atheiſt writeth of God; inſtead of explaining it, you deny it. What is Nature but the principium motus & quietis? &c. **So Lipſtorpius in his Specim. Philoſ. Carteſ. Deus in principio mundi materiam ſimul cum motu & quiete creavit— Unde communiſſima naturae lex, &c. vid. pag. 37, 38. So that Nature with the Carteſians is nothing at all, but God's firſt moving act at the creation: as if he cauſed motion, without any moving created principle: and as if ſpirits and fire had no more moving a nature or principle than clay; but only that their matter was either in the creation more moved by God, or ſince by a knock from ſome other mover, put into motion, by which accidental motion clay or water may be made fire. Leg. Petr. Mouſnerii, lib. de Impetu, & lib. 2. de motu naturali: Where the nature of Motion is more exactly handled than by the Epicureans or Carteſians; though too little is ſaid de vi moventis, in compariſon of what is ſaid de impetu mobilis. Leg. l. 2. pag. 76, 77, &c. de cauſa intrinſeca motus localis naturalis. Et pag. 78. his ſeven Reaſons againſt Gaſſendus his doctrine of Gravitation by the traction of Atoms; and his confutation of all extrinſick cauſes, viz. Cauſa prima ſola, aër, terrae vis magnetica (vel per qualitatem diffuſam, vel per vim ſympathicam, vel tractionem filamentorum) virtus coeli pellens, detruſio per lucem, & generans (And as eaſily may the Carteſian reaſon be confuted, which Lipſtorpius ſo magnifieth:) and the Impetus innatus is the reaſon which he aſſigneth, pag. 80, 81, &c. Vid. exceptiones Jo. Bap. du Hamel. contra Carteſ. in conciliat. pag. 148, 151, 170, 209, 210.And you deny all ſuch principia, and ſubſtitute only former motion: ſo that you leave no other nature but what a ſtone receiveth from the hand that caſteth it, or the childrens tops from the ſcourge which driveth them: or rather every turn is a nature to the next turn; and ſo the nature of things is moſtly out of themſelves in the extrinſick mover.

p. 520And ſo you level all things in the world: you deny all ſpecifick forms, or natural faculties and virtues. The Sun and a clod have no natural difference, but only magnitude, and figure, and motion: as if ſo noble a creature had no differencing peculiar nature of its own, nor any natural power or principle of its own motion, and ſo it moved but as a ſtone is moved.

Yea, you make all motion to be violent, and deny all proper natural motion at all: for that which hath no active principle of motion in its nature, hath no proper natural motion as diſtinct from violent.

Hereby alſo you deny all vital powers: you make a living creature and a dead to differ but in the manner of motion; (which whether you can at all explain, we know not) why may not the arrow which I ſhoot, or the watch which I wind up, be ſaid to live as well as you? It hath matter and motion; and ſome inanimates (the Air and Fire) perhaps have as ſubtil matter and as ſpeedy motion, as is in you. Why doth not the wind make the air alive, and the bellows the fire? In a word, you deny all Intelligences, all Souls, all Lives, all Natures, all active Qualities and Forms; all Powers, Faculties, Inclinations, Habits and Diſpoſitions, that are any principles of motion: and ſo all the natural excellency and difference of any creature above the reſt. A ſhort way of ſolving the Phaenomena.

Laſtly, with Nature you deny the being of Morality. For if there be no difference of Beings, but in quantity, figure, motion and ſite; and all motion is Locomotion, which moveth by natural neceſſitating force, than a man moveth as a ſtone, becauſe it is irreſiſtibly moved, and hath no power to forbear any act which it performeth, or to do it otherwiſe than it doth. For if there be no power, habits or diſpoſitions, antecedent to motion, but motion it ſelf is all, then there is one and the ſame account to be given of all actions, good and bad, I did it becauſe I was irreſiſtibly moved to it, and could no more do otherwiſe than my pen can chooſe to write. There is then no virtue or vice, no place for Laws and moral Government, further than they may be tacklings in the engine which neceſſitateth: whatſoever is done amiſs, is as much imputable to God the firſt mover, as that which p. 521is done-well. If you ſhoot an arrow which killeth your friend, the arrow could not hinder it: if you make or ſet your watch amiſs, though one motion cauſeth another, yet the errour of all is reſolved into the defect of the firſt cauſe. They that killed Henry the 3. and Henry the 4. Kings of France, may ſay, that as the knife could not reſiſt the motion of their hand, ſo neither could they the motion of the ſuperiour cauſe that moved them, and ſo on to the firſt. No Traitors or Rebels can reſiſt the power which acteth them therein, any more than the duſt can reſiſt the wind which ſtirreth it up. And ſo you ſee what cometh of all the Government of God and Man, and of all Laws and Judgments, Juſtice and Injuſtice, Right and Wrong. And how little cauſe you have to be angry with the Thief that robbeth you, or the man that cudgelleth you, any more than with the ſtaff. But of this I refer you to the foreſaid writing of Biſhop Bromhal againſt Mr. Hobs, allowing you to make the moſt you can of his Reply.

We are certain by the operations of things, that there is a difference in their natural powers and virtues, and not only in their quantity, figure and motion. God hath not made only homogeneal undifferenced matter: there are plainly now exceeding diverſities of natural excellencies, virtues and qualities in the things we ſee. And he that will ſay that by motion only God made this difference at firſt, doth but preſumptuouſly ſpeak without book, without all proof to make it credible, and taketh on him to know that which he knoweth that he knoweth not. Is not the virtue and goodneſs of things as laudable, as their quantity and motion? Why then ſhould we imagine ſo vaſt a diſproportion in the image of God upon his works, as to acknowledge the magnitude and motion incomprehenſible, and to think that in virtue and goodneſs of nature they are all alike, and none is more noble or more like himſelf than a clod of earth? We ſee that the natures of all things are ſuited to their ſeveral uſes. Operari ſequitur eſſe, Things act as they are. There is ſomewhat in the nature of a bird, or beaſt, or plant, which is their fitneſs to their various motions. If only motion made that fire to day, which yeſterday was but a ſtone, why doth not the ſtrongeſt wind ſo much as warm us? or why doth p. 522it ſo much cool us? Why doth not the ſnow make us as warm as a fleece of wool? the wool doth move no more than the ſnow, and the matter of it appeareth to be no more ſubtil. Indeed man can give to none of his works a nature, a life or virtue, for the operation which he deſireth. He can but alter the magnitude, and figure, and motion of things, and compound and mix them, and conjoyn them: and theſe Epicureans ſeem to judge of the works of God by mans. But he who is Being, Life and Intelligence, doth accordingly animate his noble Engines, and give them natures and vertues for their operations; and not only make uſe of matter and weight where he findeth it, as our Mechanicks themſelves can do. Debaſing all the nobleſt of Gods works, is unbeſeeming a true Philoſopher, who ſhould ſearch out the virtues and goodneſs, as well as the greatneſs of them.

But I have been longer in anſwering this firſt Objection, than I can afford to be about the reſt, unleſs I would make a Book of this, which I call but the Concluſion. I will adde but this one thing more; That in caſe it were granted the Epicureans, that the ſoul is material, it will be no diſproving of its immortality, nor invalidate any of my former arguments for a life of retribution after this. To which purpoſe conſider theſe things.

1. That where matter is ſimple and not compounded, it hath no tendency to corruption. Object. Matter is diviſible, and therefore corruptible, how ſimple ſoever. Anſw. It is ſuch as may be divided, if God pleaſe, and ſo the ſoul is ſuch as God can deſtroy. But we ſee that all parts of matter have a wonderful tendency to unity, and have a tendency to a motus aggregativus if you ſeparate them. Earth inclineth to earth, and water to water, and air to air, and fire to fire. 2. All Philoſophers agree to what I ſay, who hold that matter is eternal, either à parte ante, or à parte poſt. For if matter be eternal, the ſoul's materiality may conſiſt with its eternity. 3. Yea all without exception do agree, that there is no annihilation of matter when there is a diſſolution. Therefore if the ſoul be a ſimple uncompounded being, though material, it will remain the ſame. This therefore is to be ſet down as granted us, by all the Infidels and Atheiſts in the world, that man's ſoul, what ever it is, is not annihilated p. 523when he dieth, if it be any kind of ſubſtance material or immaterial. And they that call his temperament his ſoul, do all acknowledge, that there is in the compoſition ſome one predominant principle, more active or noble than the reſt; and of the duration of this it is that we enquire, which no man doth deny, though ſome deny it to be immaterial. But this will be further opened under the reſt of the Objections. The reaſons of my many words in anſwering this Objection, I give you in the words of a late learned Conciliator, Philoſophiae Platonicae explicationi diutius immorati ſumus, quod res maximas & cognitione digniſſimas complectatur. Habet i… quoque prae coeteris, quod ad aeternas & primitivas rationes mentem erigat, eamque à fluxis & perituris rebus advocatam, ad eas quae ſola intelligentia percipiuntur convertat. Qua quidem in re infinitum prope momentum eſt: Nam obruimur turbâ Philoſophorum, qui nimis fidunt ſenſibus, & nihil praeter corpora intelligi poſſe contendunt. Atque ut mihi videtur, nulla pernicioſior peſtis in vitam humanam poteſt invadere, nihil quod magis religioni adverſetur. Joh. Bapt. du Hamel. in Conſcenſ. veteris & novae Philoſ. Praefat.