The Reasons of the Christian Religion Part 1, Conclusion · Objection 12 – Objection 15
OBJECTION XII.
THat which is generated is corruptible: but the ſoul is generated: Ergo, &c.—
Anſw. 1. If by [corruptible] you mean that which hath [à poſſe perire] or a certainty of periſhing, if God uphold it not, I grant it of the whole Creation. But if you mean that which in its nature is ſo fitted to diſſolution, periſhing or decay, as that God ſeemeth to intend it to ſuch an end; or muſt miraculouſly preſerve it, or elſe it will periſh; or that which eventually will periſh, then we muſt not ſo eaſily diſmiſs you.
2. The word [generated] is of ſo great ambiguity, and generation it ſelf a thing ſo little underſtood by mortals, that this reaſon doth but carry the controverſie into the dark, and argue ab obſcuriore & minùs noto; which is the way of a wrangler, and not of one that would reveal the truth. Either generation is the production of ſome new ſubſtance, not exiſtent before ſo much as in its matter; or it is only the compoſition of pre-exiſtent ſubſtances. If it be the later, then you may prove the poſſibility and probability of the diſſolution of the frame, and ſeparation of thoſe ſeveral ſubſtances. But you will confeſs your ſelves, that each part retaineth its proper nature ſtill; and that if one were a more noble and active element than the reſt, it is not annihilated, but remaineth ſo ſtill without debaſement. Therefore if their opinion were true, who hold the pre-exiſtence of that pureſt part of man which we call his ſoul, (either in a common element, or individuate) no reaſon can think that the diſſolution doth any more than ſeparate the parts of man, and return that ſoul to its pre-exiſtent ſtate; where ſtill it will be as noble a creature as it was here.
But if Generation do produce a ſubſtance de novo, which did no way pre-exiſt, then it is either a corporeal ſubſtance, or a ſpiritual or incorporeal: which ſoever it be, can you give any reaſon why this ſhould periſh at the diſſolution, any more than if it had pre-exiſted? If the nature of it be the ſame, why ſhould not the duration be the ſame? one of the two you will confeſs it, either a corporeal ſubſtance or an incorporeal, if it be at all a ſubſtance: and you confeſs that no ſubſtance is annihilated, or periſheth, otherwiſe than by diſſolution of parts. If the reaſon of your major be, becauſe the thing generated hath a beginning, and did oriri de novo, ſo did all matter and ſubſtances that be created. Or if you ſuppoſe them all from eternity, yet do but ſuppoſe them to be created and have had a beginning, and yet to be the ſame as if they had been eternal, and you will ſee that there will be the ſame reaſon to prove their continuance, as long as their nature and their dependance on God are both the ſame.
But it may be you will form your objection better, and ſay, that Generation produceth no new ſubſtance, but only a compoſition, order and temperament of pre-exiſtent ſubſtances: But ſouls are generated: Ergo, They are no ſubſtances, but the order or temperament of pre-exiſtent ſubſtances.
Anſw. I never ſaw any thing like a cogent proof of the major: and moſt Chriſtians think you can never prove the minor.
A ſubſtance may be called new, either becauſe it is made of nothing, as in creation, or becauſe it ariſeth to its natural ſtate of perfection ex ſemine vel natura foecunda, where it was only virtually and ſeminally before.
Before you can prove your major even in the firſt ſenſe, you muſt be better acquainted with the nature of God, and of Spirits, and of Generation, than you are: I cannot imagine what ſhew of proof you can bring to prove, that univerſally no generation cauſeth a ſubſtance totally new, unleſs you will go to Scripture, (which you believe not) and plead from Geneſ. 1. that God then ended all his works, and therefore doth create no more. But, 1. He may cauſe them totally de novo, without ſuch a creation as is there ſpoken of: for he may by a ſtabliſhed Law of Nature adjoyn his producing influx to the act of a creature, (ordinarily) and ſo difference it from that proper creation. 2. No man can prove that God hath there ſaid one word to aſſure us, that he will never create any thing hereafter. Cannot a workman look on his houſe, and ſee that it is well done, and ſay, I have finiſhed it, without obliging him never to build another, nor to make any reparations of that as there is cauſe? May not God create a new Heaven and Earth? may he not create a new Star, or a new Plant or Animal, if he pleaſe, without the breaking of any word that he hath ſpoken? For my part, I never ſaw a word which I could diſcern to have any ſuch ſignification or importance. The argument from Geneſ. 1. is no better than theirs, who from Chriſt's conſummatum eſt do gather, that his death and burial which followed that word, were no part of his ſatisfactory meritorious humiliation.
On the contrary, there have been both Philoſophers and Divines, who have thought, that God doth in omni inſtanti, properly create all things which he is ſaid to conſerve: of whom the one part do mean only, that the being of the creatures is as dependant on his continual cauſation, as the life of the branches is on the tree: but that the ſame ſubſtance is continued, and not another daily made. But there are others who think, that all creatures who are in fluxu continuo, not per locomotum, but ab entitate ad nihilum, and that they are all but a continual emanation from God, which as it paſſeth from him tendeth to nothing, and new emanations do ſtill make ſuch a ſupply, as that the things may be called the ſame; as a River, whoſe waters paſs in the ſame Channel. As they think the beams or light of the Sun doth in omni inſtanti oriri & feſtinare ad nihilum, the ſtream being ſtill ſupplied with new emanations. Were it not for the overthrow throw of individuation, perſonality, rewards and puniſhments that hence ſeemeth to follow, this opinion would ſeem more plauſible than theirs, who groundleſly prohibit God from cauſing any more new beings.
But though, no doubt, there is unto all beings, a continual emanation or influx from God, which is a continued cauſation, it may be either conſervative of the being firſt cauſed, or elſe reſtorative of a being continually in decay, as he pleaſe: for both ways are poſſible to him, as implying no contradiction; though both cannot be about one and the ſame being, in the ſame reſpect, and at the ſame time. And our ſenſe and reaſon tell us, that the conſervative influx is his uſual way.
2. But it is commonly, and not without reaſon, ſuppoſed, that generation produceth things de novo in another ſenſe: not abſolutely, as creation doth; but ſecundum quid, by exalting the ſeminal virtue into act, and into perfection. New individuals are not made of new matter now created; but the corporeal part is only pre-exiſtent matter, ordered, compounded and contempered: and the incorporeal part is, both quoad materiam ſuam metaphyſicam, & formam vel naturam ſpecificam, the exaltation and expurgency of that into full and perfect exiſtence, which did before exiſt in ſemine virtuoſo.
When God had newly created the firſt man and woman, he created in them a propagating virtue and fecundity: this was, as it were, ſemen ſeminis: by this they do firſt generare ſemen ſeparabile: which ſuppoſitis ſupponendis, hath a fecundity fit to produce a new ſuppoſitum vel perſonam; and may be called a perſon ſeminally or virtually, but not actually, formally and properly: and ſo this perſon hath power to produce another, and that another in the ſame way. And note, that the ſame creating word, which ſaid, Let there be light; and, Let us make man; did ſay alſo to man, as well as to other creatures, Increaſe and multiply: not, [create new ſouls or bodies] but by generation, [Increaſe and multiply] which is the bringing of many perſons out of two, and ſo on, as out of a ſeminal pre-exiſtence or virtual, into actual formal exiſtence.
He knoweth not the myſteriouſneſs of this wonderful work of God, nor the ignorance of mankind, who knoweth not that all generation of man, bruits or plants, hath much that is to us unſearchable. And they that think it a diſhonour to a Philoſopher, not to undertake or pretend to render the juſt cauſes of this and all other the Phaenomena in nature, do but ſay, I will hide the diſhonour of my ignorance by denying it; that is, by telling men that I am ignorant of my ignorance, and by aggravating it by this increaſe, and the addition of pride, preſumption and falſity.
This much is certain, 1. That whatſoever diſtinct parts do conſtitute individuals, which are themſelves of ſeveral natures, ſo many ſeveral natures in the world we may confidently aſſert, though we underſtand not whether they all exiſt ſeparatedly, or are found only in conjunction with others.
2. We certainly find in the world, *The Platoniſts method of progreſſion is thus ſummed up in Plotinus Ennead. 4. l. 3. p. 384. and out of him by Ficinus,[Sicut aëris ſummum primum omnium ignitur, ab infimo ignis, ſic coelum ſummum corpus primo animatur ab anima quae eſt ultimum Divinorum: Ipſum Bonum eſt quaſi Centrum: Mens, lumen inde emicans; & permanens: Anima, Lumen de Lumine ſe moven…: Corpus, per ſe opacum illuminatur ab anima; ſed Animae in coelo, ſecurae illuminant; ſub coelo non ſine curâ. Eſt utique aliquid velut centrum; Penes hoc autem circulus ab ipſo micans: Praeter haec & alius circulus, Lumen de lumine: ultra haec inſuper non amalius Luminis circulus, ſed jam Luminis indigus alieni, propriae lucis inopia. Inqu. Plot. ibid.1. An intelligent nature; 2. A ſenſitive nature; 3. A fiery, active, vegetative nature; 4. A paſſive matter, which receiveth the influx of active natures; which is diſtributed into air, and water, and earth.
3. The moſt active nature is moſt communicative of it ſelf, in the way of its proper operations.
4. We certainly perceive that the Sun and fiery nature are active upon the air, water and earth, which are the paſſive Elements. And by this activity in a threefold influx, Motion, Light and Heat, do cauſe the ſenſible alterations which are made below; and ſo that it is as a kind of life, or general form, or ſoul to the paſſive matter.
5. We alſo find that Motion, Light and Heat, as ſuch, are all different totâ ſpecie from ſenſation; and therefore as ſuch are not the adequate cauſes of it. And alſo that there is a ſenſitive nature in every animal, beſides the vegetative.
6. Whether the vegetative nature be any other than the fiery or ſolar, is to man uncertain. But it is moſt probable that it is the ſame nature, though it always work not to actual vegetation, for want of prepared matter. But that the Sun and fiery nature is eminenter vegetativè, and therefore that vegetation is not above the nature of fire, (or the Sun) and ſo may be an effect of it.
7. In the production of vegetatives by generation it is evident, that as the fiery active nature is the neareſt cauſe efficient, and the paſſive is the matter and recipient. So that this igneous nature generateth as in three diſtinguiſhed ſubjects, three ſeveral ways. 1. As in Parentibus & ſemine, into which God ab origine in the creation, hath put not only a ſpark of the active virtucus fiery nature in general, but alſo a certain ſpecial nature, differencing one creature from another. 2. The Sun and ſuperiour globes of the fiery nature, which caſt a paternal, though but univerſal influx, upon the foreſaid ſemen. 3. The calor naturalis telluris, which may be called, as Dr. Gilbert and others do, its ſoul or form; which is to the ſeed as the anima matris is to the infant. And all theſe three, the fiery nature of the ſemen, of the Sun, and of the calor naturalis telluris, are generally the ſame: and by their agreeableneſs do meet in co-operation for generation.
8. Herein all three as conjunct are the cauſe of Life, as Life, the Sun, the ſeed, and the calor telluris, communicating conjunctly what in their natures they all contain: that is, an active nature, having a power by motion, light and heat, to cauſe vegetation and its conjunct effects. But the calor & motus ſolis, and the calor telluris, are but univerſal cauſes of life as life: but the virtus ſeminalis is both a cauſe of life in genere, and a ſpecifying cauſe of this or that ſort of Plants in ſpecie: the reaſon why e. g. an Oak, an Elm, a Roſe-tree, and every plant is what it is in ſpecie, being to be fetch'd from the ſeed alone, and the Creator's will.
9. Though the ſeed be the chief or only ſpecifying cauſe, (why this is Adeantum, and that Betonica, and that Calendula, &c.) yet the Sun and Earth, the univerſal cauſes, do contribute much more to the life as life, than the ſeed it ſelf.
10. This fiery, or ſolar active nature, is ſo pure, and above the full knowledge of mortals, that we have no certainty at all, whether in all this generative influx, it communicate to vegetatives from it ſelf a pre-exiſtent matter, and ſo draw it back to it ſelf again by circulation) or whether it do only by the ſubſtantial contact of its active ſtreams, cheriſh, and actuate, and perfect the ſubſtance which it findeth in ſemine & materiâ paſſivâ; or whether per influxum virtutis, it operate only by that which is commonly called Quality, without any communication or contact of ſubſtance.
11. In all this operation of the Solar or fiery nature in generation, it is quid medium, between the paſſive matter and the animal nature, and is plainly an image of the animal nature and its operations: ſo like it, that it hath tempted many to aſcribe all animal operations only to the Solar or fiery nature, and hath cauſed wiſe men to doubt whether this nature be to be numbred with things corporeal or incorporeal; and to place it between both, as participating in ſeveral reſpects of both.
12. If the ſenſitive nature be really above, or ſpecifically different from the fiery, we may, in what is ſaid, conjecture much at the order of the generation of things ſenſitive, viz. by a three-fold cauſe co-operating, one ſpecifying, and two univerſal and cheriſhing. The ſpecifying is the virtus ſeminalis maris & foeminae conjunct, and of neither alone, (the ſame God which bleſs'd the ſingle ſeed of a plant with the gift of multiplication, bleſs'd only the conjunct ſeeds of male and female animals with that gift:) The ſuperiour univerſal cauſe is either ſome anima univerſalis ejuſdem naturae, or God immediately. By an Anima univerſalis I mean not an anima totius mundi▪ but of that ſuperiour vortex or part which this earth belongs to. Either this is the Sun, or ſome inviſible ſoul. If it be the Sun, it is not by its ſimple fiery nature before mentioned; becauſe ſenſation ſeemeth to be ſomewhat totâ ſpecie, different from motion, light and heat: and then it muſt prove that the Sun is compound, and hath a ſuperiour form and nature, which either formaliter or eminenter is ſenſitive; and that by this it is that it animateth inferiour ſenſitives. But of this we mortals have no certainty: It ſeemeth very improbable, that a worm or flie ſhould have a nature ſuperiour to any that the Sun hath: but probabilities are not certainties: there are things higheſt and things loweſt in their ſeveral kinds. But remember, that if it ſhould be the Sun, it is by that nature ſuperiour to fire, by which it doth it: The maternal univerſal Cauſe of the ſenſitive life is the Mother. Whether the ſpirits of a ſenſitive Creature have more in them than the ſpirits of a Plant; and do more by nutrition, than cauſe Vegetation; whether they nouriſh ſenſitive Life as ſuch, is doubtfull: But if they do ſo, they be but an univerſal and not a ſpecifying Cauſe; that is, the Cauſe of Life as Life, but not of the vita bovis, equi, canis, felis, aquilae, qua talis. And therefore if the late-diſcovered trick of paſſing all the blood of one animal into another, be proſecuted to the utmoſt tryal, poſſibly it may do much to the advantage of Life and Senſe as ſuch; but never to the alteration of the ſpecies, to turn a Dog into a Swine, or any other ſort of Animal.
13. Whether the ſenſitive nature be moſt refined-corporeal, or totally incorporeal, is paſt the reach of man to be aſſured of.
14. The foreſaid difficulty is greater here than in the Vegetative Generation, viz. Whether in the multiplication of ſenſitive ſouls, there be an addition of ſubſtance communicated from the Univerſal Cauſes? or a greater quantity or degree of matter (phyſical or metaphyſical) propagated and produced into exiſtence by generation, than there was before? It ſeemeth hard to ſay, that a pair of Animals in Noahs Ark, had as much matter or ſubſtance in their ſouls as the millions ſince proceeding from them: But whether ſuch ſouls have quantitive degrees? or by what terms of gradation the ſouls of millions are diſtinct from one? beſides the number? or whether God in the bleſſing of multiplication, hath enabled them to increaſe the quantity of matter which ſhall ſerve for ſo many more forms? are things which we cannot fully underſtand.
15. In the like manner we may riſe up, and conceive of the Generation of Mankind. We are ſure that he hath an intelligent nature, much nobler than the ſenſitive. And we know that homo generat hominem: And we know that in his Generation there is an Ʋniverſal Cauſe, and a ſpecifying Cauſe: (for though there be but one ſpecies of men, yet there are more of Intelligences; and that one may have an Ʋniverſal Cauſe, producing that and other effects, and an Univocal ſpecial Cauſe.) We know that becauſe he is Generated, the ſpecifying Cauſe, is the fecundity or propagating power of the Parent, generating a ſeparable ſeed, which ſeed (in conjunction as aforeſaid, & ſuppoſitis ſupponendis) is ſemen hominis, and is man ſeminally and virtually, but not actually: that is, Hath both Paſſive and Active Power, and virtue, by reception of the influx of the univerſal Cauſe, to become a man. The univerſal inferior or feminine Cauſe, is the Mothers Body, and Soul, or the whole Mother, in whom the Infant is generated and cheriſhed. I call it Ʋniverſal: For it is only the ſemen that ſpecifieth: And therefore by a falſe or bruitiſh ſemen a woman may produce a Monſter. The Ʋniverſal Paternal Cauſe is certainly GOD ut prima, and it is probable alſo ut ſola: For he made Mans Soul at firſt by that immediate communication, which is called Breathing it into him: And the Intellectual nature (though ſpecified into Angels and Men) is the neereſt to GOD that we have any knowledge of: And therefore Reaſon will not teach us to look to any intermediate univerſal or ſuperiour Cauſe; becauſe there is no created ſuperiour Nature to the Intellectual: And it's abſurd to goe to the Inferior to be the Cauſe of the ſuperior. If any will needs think, that under God, there is ſome Ʋniverſal Intellect (not of the whole Univerſe, for that's plainly improbable, but of our Syſteme or Vortex,) they muſt take it to be ſome Angelical Intelligence, as Ariſtotle, or the Sun, No man can prove either of theſe to have any ſuch office. And for the Sun, it is certain that it is not poſſible, unleſs it ſelf be an Intelligence: And though to humane Reaſon it ſeem very likely, that ſo glorious a corporeal Nature as the Sun, ſhould not be deſtitute of as noble a form, as a lump of Clay, a humane body doth poſſeſs, that ſo there may be a proportion in Gods works between the nobility of matter and form; yet all this to man is utterly uncertain; nor doth any man know whether the Luminaries are animated with either ſentient or intelligent Souls, or not. He that moſt confidently aſſerteth either, and ſcorneth the Contradicter, doth but tell you, that he is ignorant of his ignorance. But if it ſhould prove true, as many of the Fathers thought, and Mammertus ubi ſupra aſſerteth, that Angels have fiery Bodies which they animate, and ſo that the Sun is animated with an Intelligence, it would not follow that as fiery or as ſenſitive, but only as intellective, it were a ſubordinate univerſal Cauſe of compleat humane Generations, and that Sol & Homo generant hominem; (ſave only quoad Corpus, which is but ſecundum quid.) But that God is the Ʋniverſal Cauſe is unqueſtionable, whether there be any ſubordinate or not.
16. And here it is no wonder if the doubts ariſe which were in the caſes of the forementioned Generations. Whether God as the univerſal cauſe produce new-metaphyſical matter for new forms? Whether millions of Souls ſince generated, have not more ſuch metaphyſical matter, than the ſoul of Adam and Eve alone? How Souls may be ſaid to have more or leſs ſuch matter or ſubſtance? Whether he educe all Souls è virtute & foecunditate primarum, by giving them a power without any diviſion or diminution of themſelves, to bring forth others by multiplication? and ſo cauſe his Creature to participate of his own foecundity, or power of cauſing Entities, &c. But ſuch difficulties as theſe, which ariſe not from uncertainties in Theology, but are the meer conſequents of the imperfection of humane Intellects, and the remoteneſs, depth, and unrevealedneſs of theſe myſterious works of God, ſhould turn no man from the holding of other plain revealed truths. As that man generateth man; that God is the chief ſpecifying Cauſe by his firſt making of man, and giving him the power and bleſſing of propagation, which he ſtill maintaineth, and with which he doth concurre: That Man is the ſecond ſpecifying Cauſe in the exerciſe of that power of Generation which God gave him. That God is the chief univerſal Cauſe; and to the production of an Intellectual nature as ſuch, doth unſpeakably more than man. That the mother as cheriſhing the ſemen utriuſ que Parentis, is the maternal univerſal Cauſe, &c. We know not fully how it is that one Light cauſeth a thouſand, without diviſion or diminution of it ſelf: and what it is that is cauſed de novo. It is eaſie to ſay, that it is but the motion of one part of the atomes or materia ſubtilis moving another, which was all pre-exiſtent: But few men that can ſee through a ſmoke or duſt of atomes, will believe, that the Sun and other fiery bodies, which ſhew themſelves ſo wonderfully to us by Motion, Light and Heat, have no peculiar Nature, Power or Virtues to cauſe all this, but meer magnitude, and figure: And that thoſe Corpuſcles which have ſo many hundred degrees of magnitude, and figures, ſhould not fall into as many hundred ſuch Bodies as we call Elements, rather than into two or four.
Suppoſe (which we may ad verum exquirendum) that there were no more Fire in the Univerſe than one Candle: It having the ſame nature as now it hath, that Candle would turn Cities and all combuſtible matter into Fire. But of the Generation of man quoad animam, I referre the Reader to Sennertus his Hypomnemata (to omit all others)
And now I would know what there is in Generation that ſhould be againſt the Immortality of the Soul?Nemeſius de Anima (which goeth under the name of Greg. Nyſſen.) while he endeavoureth to prove the pre-exiſtence of Souls, doth thus peremptorily conclude [Si animae ex ortu fiunt mutuo, ratione providentiae fiunt, & caducae ſunt ut caetera quae ex propagatione generis oriuntur: ſi ſunt ex nihilo, Creatio haec eſt, ne que verum eſt, ceſſavit Deus ab omnibus operibus ſuis: Non ergo nunc animae fiunt: But there is no appearance of a juſt proof in any thing that he ſaith, againſt either of the Opinions which he oppoſeth. will you ſay, it is becauſe the Soul hath a Beginning? I have anſwered before, that ſo have all Creatures: Is it becauſe it proveth the Soul material? 1. If it did, I have ſhewed that you your ſelves hold a perpetuity of matter. 2. But it doth not ſo. If you ſay, that Incorporeal Spirits generate not: I anſwer, That is but a naked, unproved aſſertion. If you ſay, that Angels do not: I anſwer, that 1. that is not becauſe they are unable or unapt if God thought it fitteſt for them: nor 2. can any man prove de facto whether they do or not. Chriſt ſaith, They marry not: but he ſaith not, whether they at all propagate their ſpecies or not: I know the negative is taken for certain; and I ſay not that it is not true, but that it is not certain not at all known, and therefore an unfit ſuppoſition to argue from, againſt the Immortality of the Soul. And I muſt confeſs, that for my part, as I have oft read, Formae ſe multiplicant, and that the Fire can more multiply or encreaſe it ſelf than Earth, and as I know that the more noble any Nature is, the more like it is to God, and therefore more potent, more active, more fecund and productive; ſo I ſhould farr rather think that the Angelical Nature can propagate it ſelf than the Humane, if God had not told me the later, and ſaid nothing pro or contra of the former. And therefore make no doubt, but if it do not, (which no man knoweth) it is not becauſe things material are more able; but for other reaſons unknown to us. Whether becauſe duplicate page duplicate page God will have this lower World, to be the Nidus vel Matrix Coelorum, and the Seminary of Heaven, and all multiplication to be here, or what it is, we know not.
But if it be on the other ſide concluded, that the whole ſubſtance of a Soul doth proceed directly and immediately from God, it doth make no great alteration in this caſe, or any of the coincident caſes about humane propagation: if you conſider, 1. That it is impoſſible that there ſhould be any ſubſtance which is not totally from God, either immediately, or mediately: And that what is ſaid to be mediately from Him, hath in it as much of his Cauſation as if there were no medium: For God is not a partial Cauſe, but a total in ſuo genere; and he is as neer to the effect as if there were no ſecond Cauſe. 2. That the Somatiſts themſelves ſay, that in the Generation of Plants and Animals (which they ſuppoſe to be totally Corporeal) there is not the leaſt degree of ſubſtance produced de novo, and therefore there is none, but what was totally of God, and the Parents do but cauſe inſtrumentally the uniting of matter prae-exiſtent. Therefore if in the Generating of Man, the Parents do but inſtrumentally cauſe the uniting of ſubſtance which is totally from God, though not prae-exiſtent, it little differenceth the Caſe as to the conſequents. 3. Eſpecially conſidering that what God doth, he doth by an eſtabliſht Law of Nature: As in his making of the World he made the Sun a Cauſa Ʋniverſalis conſtantly to ſend forth the emanation of Light, Heat, and moving force upon paſſive matter, and thereby to produce effects diverſifyed by the preparations and reception of that matter; as to ſoften Wax, to harden Clay, to make a Dunghill ſtink, and a Roſe ſmell ſweet, to produce a poyſonous and a wholſom Plant, a Nightingale and a Toad, &c. and this without any diſhonour to the Sun: So if God the Father of Spirits, the Central efficient of Souls, have made it the original Law of Nature, that he will accordingly afford his communicative Influx, and that in Humane Generations, ſuch and ſuch Preparations of matter, ſhall be as Receptive of his emanations for ſuch and ſuch Forms, or ſpiritual ſubſtances, and that he will be herein but an Ʋniverſal Cauſe of Souls as Souls, and not of Souls as clean or unclean; and that this ſhall depend upon the preparation of the Recipient (whether it be the Body, or a ſenſitive foregoing Principle) (ſtill keeping at his pleaſure, as a Voluntary Agent, the ſuſpenſion or diſpoſe of the effect), this would make no great alteration, neither as to the point of original ſin, nor any other weighty conſequent.
OBJECTION XIII.
OMne quod oritur interit: That which is not eternal as to paſt duration, is not eternal as to future duration: But the Soul is not eternal as to paſt duration: Ergo.
Anſw. I confeſs this argument will prove that the Soul is not mortal ex neceſſitate ſuae naturae, without dependance on a Voluntary preſerver. And therefore Cicero after moſt other Philoſophers, who uſeth the Major for a contrary Concluſion, miſtook in this, that he thought the Soul was as natural an Emanation from God as the beams or light is from the Sun: and therefore that it was naturally eternall both à parte ante & à parte poſt: which made Arnobius and other Ancients argue as much againſt the Platoniſts Immortality of the Soul, as againſt the Epicureans Mortality, ſo that (as I ſaid before) one would think that they were heretical in this point that doth not make them well. But it is only this natural Eternity which they confute: And when the Philoſophers ſay, that Omne quod oritur interit, they can mean, or at leaſt prove no more but this, that it is not Everlaſting ex neceſſitate naturae. But yet 1. It may be in its nature fitted to be perpetual. 2. And by the will of the Creator made perpetual. Every Creature did oriri de novo: and yet every one doth not interire.
OBJECTION XIV.
Would you ſee Phyſical Arguments for the Souls Incorporeity and Immortality? Among a multitude that have done it, I deſire you to read Plotinus, En. 4. l. 7. of the Immort. of the Soul; whoſe arguments I pretermit, becauſe I would not be tedious in tranſcribing that which is already ſo well written (abateing their peculiar Conceits.) Vid. & Savonarol. l. 1. c. ult.AMong all your Arguments for the Souls Immortality, there are none but Morall ones.
Anſw. Morality is grown ſo contemptible a thing, with ſome debauched perſons, that a very argument is invalidated by them or contemned, if they can but call it Moral. But what is Morality but the modality of Naturals? And the ſame argument may be Natural and Moral. Indeed we call that a Cauſa Moralis oft-times which doth not neceſſitate the effect: And yet ſometimes even moral Cauſes do infalibly and certainly produce the effect. But cauſation and argumentation are different things, and ſo is an effect and a Logical conſequence. Will you call the conſequents of Gods own Wiſdom, Juſtice, Veracity, Goodneſs, &c. uncertain as coming from a Morali Cauſe? The Soul is an Intellectual free agent, and adapted to Moral operations; And this is its excellency and perfection, and no diſparagement to it at all. And if you will better read them over, you will finde that my Arguments are both Phyſical and Moral: For I argue from the Acts or operations of the Soul to its Powers and Nature; And from its Acts and Nature to its ends, with many ſuch like, which are as truly Phyſical media, as if I argued from the nature of Fire and Earth, that one if not hindered will aſcend, and the other deſcend. And other men have given you other Arguments in their Phyſicks and Metaphyſicks.
OBJECTION XV.
YOu ſeem to confeſs that you cannot prove the endleſs duration of the Soul by any Argument from Nature alone; But only that it ſhall live another Life which you call a Life of Retribution.
Anſw. I told you, that a great probability of it, I thus prove: God hath made the Soul of a Nature not corruptible, but apt to perpetual duration: Ergo, he thereby declareth his will, that he intendeth it for perpetual duration: becauſe he maketh nothing in vain, either for ſubſtance or quality. It may be ſome other will think that this argument will inferre not only a probability but a certainty.
And if you go back to your objection of Materiality, I now only adde, that Ariſtotle and his followers, who think that the Heavens are corporeal, yet think that they are a quinta eſſentia and ſimple, and incorruptible, and therefore that they ſhall certainly be everlaſting: And he taketh the the ſouls of Bruits to be analogous to the matter of the Starrs; and ſo to be of that everlaſting quinteſſence: And can you in reaſon ſay leſs of Rational Souls?
2. It is ſufficient, that I prove by natural evidence a Life of Retribution after this, which ſhall fully make the miſerable ungodly ones repent tormentingly of their ſin, and fill the righteous with ſuch Joyes as ſhall fully recompenſe all their labour and ſuffering in a holy life: And that I moreover prove that duration of this life, and all the reſt, by ſupernatural evidence.