The Reasons of the Christian Religion Part 1, Conclusion · Objection 16 – Objection 17
OBJECTION XVI.
BOth Soul and Body are like a Candle in fluxu continuo; and we have not the ſame ſubſtance this Week or Year as we had the laſt, there being a continual conſumption or tranſition and accretion: Ergo, being not the ſame, we are uncapable of a Life of future Retribution. Will you reward and puniſh the man that is, or the man that was?
Anſw. It is a fooliſh thing to carry great and certain Truths into the dark, and to argue againſt them à minus notis, from meer uncertainties. As to your ſimile, I confeſs that the Oyl of your Candle is ſtill waſting, ſo is the wick; but not that new is added to make it another thing, unleſs it be a Lamp. I confeſs, that the lucid fume which we call the flame is ſtill paſſing away. But whether the fiery Principle (in its eſſence not viſible, but only in its Light) be not ſtill the ſame till all the paſſive matter be conſumed, is more than you know. So alſo if you argue from the Vegetative life of a Tree: Whether the ſame Principle of Vegetation (enlarging it ſelf) continue not to the end to individuate the Tree, though all the paſſive Elements (Earth, Water, and Air) may be in fluxu and a tranſient ſtate? It is certain, that ſome fixed Principle of Individuation there is, from whence it muſt be denominated the ſame. The water of the haſty River would not be called the ſame River, if the Channel which it runs in were not the ſame: Nor your Candle be called the ſame Candle, if ſome of the firſt Wick or Oyl at leaſt did not remain, or the ſame fire continue it, or the ſame Candleſtick hold it. And what is it in the Tree which is ſtill the ſame? or what in the Bird that flyeth about, which is ſtill the ſame? when you have ſearched all, you will finde nothing ſo likely as the vital Principle, and yet that ſomething there muſt be.
2. But doth not the light of Nature, and the concurrent ſenſe and practice of all the World confute you? and tell you that if you cannot underſtand what the Individuating Principle is, yet that certainly ſome ſuch there is and doth continue. Why elſe will you love and provide for your own Children, if they be not at all the ſame that you begat, nor the ſame this year as you had the laſt? Why will you be revenged on the Man that did beat you, or hang the Thief that robbed you, or do Juſtice on any Murderer or Male-factor, ſeeing that it is not the ſame man that did the deed? If he tranſpire as much as Sanctorius ſaith, and his ſubſtance diminiſh as much in a day as Opicius ſaith, certainly a few dayes leave him not the ſame as to thoſe tranſitory parts. Surely therefore there is ſomething which is ſtill the ſame. Elſe you would deny the King his title, and diſoblige your ſelves from your ſubjection, by ſaying that he is not at all the ſame man that you ſwore Allegiance to, or that was born Heir of the Crown. And you would by the ſame reaſon forfeit your own Inheritance. Why ſhould uncertain Philoſophical whimſies befool men into thoſe ſpeculations, which the light and practice of all the world doth condemn as madneſs. But arguing ab ignotis will have no better ſucceſs. Of the individuation of Bodies in the Reſurrection I ſpake before †The ſumm of their Reaſons, who thinke that Bodies at the Reſurrection are Identified only by the Souls identity, you may ſee in Thom. Whites Theolog. Inſtitut. To. 2. li. 3. Lect. 4. p. 239.340..
OBJECTION XVII.
IF the Soul be a ſubſtance, we muſt confeſs it not annihilated: Read Plotinus in Ennead. 4. pag. 374… (Ed. Baſil.) de individuatione Animarum. As alſo the following pages, provin… that our Souls are no parts of the Anim… Mundi. Et ſect. 8… pag. 377. Quomod… animae differant: & quomodo ſint immortales in form… propria reſtantes?But it is moſt like to proceed from ſome Element of Souls, or Ʋniverſal Soul, either the Anima Mundi, or rather the Anima Solis, vel hujus ſyſtematis: And ſo to be reduced to it again, and loſe its individuation, and conſequently to be uncapable of Retribution.
Anſw. 1. That the Soul which we ſpeak of is a ſubſtance, is paſt all controverſie: For though, as I have ſhewed, there is truely an order or temperament of the parts, which he that liſteth may call the form, the life, the ſoul, or what he pleaſe; yet no man denyeth but that there is alſo ſome one part which is more ſubtile, pure, active, potent, and regnant than the reſt; and this is it (whatever it is) which I call the Soul. We are agreed of the Thing; let them wrangle de nomine who have nothing elſe to doe.
2. That this ſubſtance (no ſubſtance elſe) is not annihilated, as I have ſaid, is paſt diſpute.
3. Therefore there is nothing indeed in all this buſineſs which is liable to Controverſie, but this point of Individuation, which this Objection mentioneth; (and that of action and operation following.) And I muſt confeſs that this is the only particular, in which hereabouts I have found the temptation to error to be much conſiderable. They that ſee how all waters come from the Sea, and how Earth, Water, Air, and Fire, have a potent inclination of union, and when the parts are ſeparated, have a motus aggregativus, may be tempted to think it a probable thing, that all Souls come from, and return unto a Univerſal Soul or Element of which they are but particles. But concerning this, I recommend to the ſober Reader theſe following Conſiderations.
1.Read the Note in the Margin of the laſt Leaf. There is in Nature more than a probability that the Ʋniverſe hath no Ʋniverſal Soul (whatever particular Syſtems or Globes may have). For we finde that Perfection lyeth ſo much in Ʋnity, and as all things are from One, ſo as they go out from One, they go into Multiplicity, that we have great cauſe to think, that it is the Divine Prerogative to be Ʋnicus Ʋniverſalis. He is the Ʋnicus Ʋniverſalis in Entity, Life, Intelligence, &c. As he hath made no one Monarch of all the Univerſe (no nor of all the Earth) nor no one Head of all the Church, that is not God (whatever the Roman Vice-god ſay) nor hath given any one a ſufficiency hereto; (whatever a ſelf-Idolizer may imagine of himſelf;) ſo he hath not given away or communicated that Prerogative, which ſeemeth proper to the Deity, to be an Ʋniverſal Minde, and conſequently an Ʋniverſal Parent, and King, yea more, to be Omnia in Ʋno. Having no ſort of proof that there is any ſuch thing, finding it ſo high and Divine a Prerogative, we have little reaſon to believe that there is any ſuch thing at all in being.
2. If you mean therefore no more than an Ʋniverſal Soul to a particular Syſteme, or Vortex in the World, that Ʋniverſal will be it ſelf a particular Soul, Individuated, and diſtinct from other Individuals. And indeed thoſe very Elements that tempt you, might do much to undeceive you. There is of Fire a ſpecifical Unity, by which it differeth from other Elements; but there is no univerſal aggregation of all the parts of Fire. The Sun which ſeemeth moſt likely to contend for it, will yet acknowledge, individual Starrs and other parts of Fire, which ſhew that it is not the whole. The Water is not all in the Sea: we know that there is much in the Clouds, whatever there is elſewhere (above the Clouds). We have no great cauſe to think, that this Earth is Terra Ʋniverſalis: I confeſs, ſince I have looked upon the Moon through a Tube, and ſince I have read what Galilaeus ſaith of it, and of Venus, and other Planets, I finde little reaſon to think that other Globes are not ſome of them like our Earth. And if you can believe an Individuation of Greater Souls, why not of Leſſer? The ſame reaſons that tempt you to think that the Individuation of our Souls will ceaſe, by returning into the Anima Syſtematis vel Solis, may tempt you to think that the animae ſyſtematum may all ceaſe their Individuation by returning into God (and their exiſtence too.)
3. If this were left as an unrevealed thing, you might take ſome liberty for your Conjectures. But when all the Twenty Arguments which I have given, do prove a continued Individuation and Retribution, it is deceitful and abſurd to come in with an unproved dream againſt it, and to argue, ab ignoto, againſt ſo many cogent arguments.
4. And we have proved ſupernatural revelation to ſecond this, which is evidence more than ſufficient to bear down your unproved conjectures.
5. If it had been doubtful whether the ſouls individuation ceaſe, (and nothing of all the reſt is doubtful) yet this would not make ſo great a difference in the caſe as ſome imagine; for it would confeſs the perpetuity of ſouls, and it would not overthrow the proof of a Retribution, if you conſider theſe four things.
1. That the parts are the ſame in union with the whole, as when they are all ſeparated. Their nature is the ſame, and as Epicurus and Democritus ſay of their atoms, they are ſtill diſtinguiſhable, and are truly parts, and may be intellectually ſeparated: the ſame individual water which you caſt out of your bottle into the ſea, is ſomewhere in the ſea ſtill; and though contiguous to other parts, is diſcernable from them all by God. The Haecceity, as they ſay, remaineth.
2. That the love of individuation, and the fear of the ceaſing of our individuation, is partly but put into the creature from God pro tempore, for the preſervation of individuals in this preſent life. And partly it is inordinate, and is in man the fruit of his fall, which conſiſteth in turning to SELFISHNESS from GOD. And we know not how much of our recovery conſiſteth in the cure of this ſelfiſhneſs; and how much of our perfection in the ceſſation of our individuate affections, cares and labours. Nature teacheth many men by Societies, to unite as much as poſſible, as the means of their common ſafety, benefit, and comfort: and earth, water, air, and all things, would be aggregate. Birds of a feather will flock together. And love, which is the uniting affection, eſpecially to a friend who is fit for union with us in other reſpects, is the delight of life. And if our ſouls were ſwallowed up of one common ſoul, (as water caſt into the ſea is ſtill moiſt and cold, and hath all its former properties, ſo) we ſhould be ſtill the ſame; and no man can give a juſt reaſon why our ſorrows or joys ſhould be altered ever the more by this.
3. And God can either keep the ungodly from this union for a puniſhment, or let them unite with the infernal ſpirits, which they have contracted a connaturality with; or let them, where ever they are, retain the venom of their ſin and miſery.
4. And he can make the Reſurrection to be a return of all theſe ſouls, from the Ocean of the univerſal nature, into a more ſeparated individuation again. I only ſay, that if it had been true, that departing ſouls had fallen into a common element, yet on all theſe reaſons, it would not have overthrown our arguments for a life of full retribution. God, that can ſay at any time, [This drop of water in the Ocean is the ſame, that was once in ſuch a bottle] can ſay, This particle of the univerſal ſoul, was once in ſuch a body, and thither can again return it. But the truth is, no man can ſhew any proof of ſuch a future aggregation.
And to conclude, the Scripture here cleareth up all the matter to us, and aſſureth us of a continued Individuation yet more than Nature doth, though the natural evidences before produced are unanſwerable.
And as for the ſimilitude of Light returning to the Sun, it is ſtill an arguing à minus noto: we know not well what it is: we know not how it returneth: and we know not how the particles are diſtinguiſhable there. They that confeſs ſouls to be indiviſible (though the individuals are all numerically diſtinct) muſt on the ſame ground think that two or many cannot by union be turned into one, as they hold that one cannot be turned into two, or into ſeveral parts of that one divided.