Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable, Conclusion · Section 6
§. VI. The true face or Scheme of the Dominican predeterminant way, as to the ſenſe and conſequents.
I Do readily confeſs that, as the ſumm of all the Controverſie is, Whether man have truly any Free-will, that is not moved as neceſſarily as any natural motions are cauſed; ſo the arguments of Hobbes and the Dominicans and Dr. Twiſſe are not eaſily anſwered. And had we not better proof of all that Morality and Religion which is inconſiſtent with this opinion, I ſhould my ſelf be inclined alſo to think, that we muſt be contented with the naked name of Liberty; there being nothing indeed, but Volition neceſſitated; and that man is an Engine moved by God and other cauſes, no leſs neceſſarily and phyſically than a Clock or Watch, but only by more inviſible cauſes and to us unknown, and therefore our Volitions are called Contingent and free, when truly there is nothing contingent in the World. We that converſe in the body with things corporeal, are ſo much ſtrangers to our ſelves and to all the race of Intellectual-free Spirits, that we are very prone to ſuch groſs corporeal imaginations, and to think that all action is like the motus projectorum, violent, and neceſſitated; and that it belongeth to the perfection of the firſt mover that it ſhould be ſo, yea, that he himſelf ſhould be in all things the moſt neceſſary agent, and conſequently all things neceſſitated by him.
But as Alvarez confeſſeth, Free-will is proved by Aquinas and many others, by natural proofs, and no Predeterminant or Hobbiſt can give the tenth part ſo full and certain proof, of the neceſsitation of all Volitions, as we can give of all the contrary principles in Morality which are overthrown thereby.
And therefore (whatever ſome think of the fatum Stoieorum) the Light of Nature taught almoſt all the Philoſophers in the World, the Freedom of mans will, and the morality there founded: of which Groti…s hath collected ſo full a Volume of teſtimonies in his Book entituled De fato, that it ſhall ſave me the labour of tranſcribing any.
Yet though I think Chriſtianity inconſiſtent with their opinion, I doubt not but many of the Predeterminants are good Chriſtians, and excellently learned and acute Divines, as not apprehending the inconſiſtency of their own thoughts: And I confeſs that there is a Religion conſiſtent with their fundamental error, which I ſhall therefore put into the Scheme, leſt any think that none but Hobbes hath made the right deductions from it.
And remember, that I charge them not to ſay all the words which I here lay down, but only that the reaſon why I my ſelf do above all others ſhun their principles, is becauſe I take this following to be the true ſenſe and complexion of them, which I muſt alſo believe, if I do believe them: And I ſuppoſe the Reader to be acquainted with their own words, and to have their Books at hand.*At leaſt that he have read Bradwardine and Alvarez, and Dr. Twiſſe and Rutherford. de Prov. Better ſaith Joh. Racon in 1. ſent. d▪ 40. art. 2. De…s aliqua futura non vult v…lie efficaci; ſed ſolu… permiſſive: & reſpectu ſic productorum voluntas divina eſt Cauſa per Generalem, tr…buens agenti particular… facultatem agendt ſic vel ſit: non tamen determinat agens ad aliquam neque efficienter vult banc vel illam: & iſt… modo Voluntas divina eſt cauſa actuum noſtrorum quantumcunque deformium:—Talium actuum eſt cauſa determinans Voluntas humana praeſuppoſitâ influentiâ generali Del▪ Unde ideo pecco quia vol… pèccáre: ità quod actus voluntatis m…ae eſt jam determinans me ad peccandum. And Gab. Biel poſt Scotum▪ Ità eſt ca…ſa effectiva rectit…dinis quod quantum eſt de ſe daret illam act…, ſ… voluntas cooperaretur. Univerſaliter enim quicquid D…us dedit antecedenter; daret et…am conſequenter, q…antum eſt ex ſ…, ſi non eſſet impedimentum: Vcluntas autem quantum eſt ex ſ… non dat rectitudinem actul. Gal. in 2. d. 37. a. 3. q. 1. dub. 1. Ità & Okam in 1. d. 46. & 38. & fer… iiſdem verbi… Orbellis m. 2. d. 37. & ita Fr. Mayro 1. d. 37. q. 1. ad 4. & q. 2. ad 4. & q. 3. concl. 4. & Greg. Arim. 2. d. 37. q. 1. a. 3. & d. 28. q. 1. a. 3. ad arg. 12. & alil quamplurimi. … Bradwardine l. 1. c. 34. p. 300, 301, &c. ſpeaketh too plainly to this purpoſe, with Hug… 1. de Sac…. 4. part. 1…. being more careful to make people think well of his [Deus vult malum] than to deny it; [Non quia quod dicitur, non bene dicitur, ſ…d quia quod b… ne dicitur, non recte i… telligitur.] And his mollification is that [God willeth ſin only ſecundum quid; for Gods Velle ſimplic…ter, as it's commonly taken, is to Love and approve it as good, and to reward it: And becauſe the Vulgar ſo take it, we muſt not before them ſay that God wi… leth ſin, becauſe they too much abhorr it. No act is unjuſt ſimply, but all juſt, and all the conſequents of it juſt, in reſpect of God the Author. Therefore ſimply in the Univerſe, there is no ſin or deordination; God willeth ſin as a Phyſicion doth poyſon in his medicine, for the exerciſe of the good, the puniſhment of the evil, the contemplation of the beauty of the world. He is not the author of evil as he is of good; for of that he, is the ſole giver of faith, charity, &c. creating it. And God conſtraineth not men to ſin againſt their wills: nor doth he cauſe it unjuſtly and culpably, &c.] Is not this meer Hobbs? 1. Doth God will any thing but good? Is not ſin good then if he will it? 2. Is Gods not Rewarding it, a not willing it? What if he rewarded not men for loving him? You feign God to will and cauſe all ſin, and then damn men for it, and then prove that he is not culpable or did not properly will it, becauſe he damned men for it. 3. Do you not make God as much the cauſe of evil habits and acts as of good, when you make him the total cauſe of all that is in them? 4. Do you not ſay that the ſinner doth evil for good ends, and not for evil, as well as God? 5. Is not man an agent in Loving God as well as in hating him? 6. Is it any better to make a man ſinful and miſerable by making him willing, than to make him ſo by force againſt his will? Nay, could a man be made a ſinner by force without making him willing? Is it not a contradiction? 7. Why call you it poyſon which God maketh a medicine of? You mean not that there is any evil in it which God cauſed not (as you ſay) more immediately than man: and ſo that God▪ firſt made it poyſon and then put it into his medicine. 8. And why are you afraid of ſpeaking your opinion: to the world? Is it not becauſe you are conſcious that you ſpeak againſt the common principles of nature, in which the vulgar are founder than your ſelf? 9. And much of this is▪ becauſe you cannot tell how God puniſheth ſin with ſin, unleſs he cauſe ſin. What if by the Law of nature in Creation he ordain that he that is a glutton ſhall be ſick, and that Arſenick ſhall corrode his bowels that eateth it, &c. and drinking too much Wine ſhall breed the Gout, &c. Doth he therefore cauſe men to eat and drink too much? or is not the exceſs from them? and yet the penal relation and conſequents from God? And ſuitably to all this he defineth Grace and Free-will; viz. Grace effectual (without which no one ſin can be avoided) is Gods will that it ſhall be done: (And ſo no man can any more do any thing, than what he doth, than he can make a world.) And free-will (li. 2. c. 1.) is [Potentia rationalis rationaliter judicandi, & voluntarit exe… quendi:] ſo that to will▪ and freely to will, is all one. And ſo man is moved to every ſin, by neceſſitating premotion to do it freely, that is, he is made willing, that is, ſinful. So c. 32. [In omni nonactione Deo & creaturae communi, prius naturaliter eſt Deum non-agere quam ipſam & quia Deus certam actionem per creaturam non agit, ideo creatura illam non agit, & non è contra.] So that all omiſſions (of faith, repentance, obedience, &c.) are fully reſolved into Gods firſt non-agency p. 611. [Quis neſciat quod quia Deus non fecit unum Angelum, aliam Stellam, coelum majus, ideo non facta ſunt? Ità quioquid non fit à cauſa ſecunda Deus vult non fieri, & non vult poſitivé: Scilicet habet noll… illud fieri ab ta. Prius ergo naturaliter & cauſaliter eſt Deum nolle poſitive, quare & non v…lle & non facere cauſam ſecundam agere, quam ipſam non agere.] This is plain dealing: All men that Love not God, and all that hate him, are ſuch becauſe God will have it ſo, and make them do as they do. It would ſave many tedious volumes and intricate diſputes if all would ſpeak as plainly. But what is the Chriſtian Religion then?
I. Their fundamental Principle is, that It is naturally Impoſsible for any agent Natural or free to do any act, or vary any; comparatively or circumſtantially, but by the Immediate Phyſical efficient adequate predetermining Premotion of Gods Omnipotency, as the firſt Cauſe; beſides his Influx by which he ſuſtaineth their natures and concauſes, and affordeth them his general Concurſe or premotion to the act as an act in genere only. And it is Impoſsible for any Agent ſo predetermined by phyſical premotion, not to act in all the circumſtances that it is ſo moved to act in.
II. To ſay that any creature can act without this phyſical predetermination to all the circumſtances, or can forbear to act when ſo predetermined, is by conſequence to ſay, that ſuch a creature, is God, the firſt cauſe. For it is as impoſsible, as to be God, or to make a World.
III. Yea, the creature that will forbear any act which God ſo predetermineth him to, muſt be ſtronger than God and overcome him, or do contradictions.
IV. And if God had not decreed ſo to predetermine by phyſical efficient premotion, he could not have known any future acts. No, though with Scotus we ſay, that he willed all thoſe Acts antecedently to his preſcience, it would not ſerve, unleſs he willed ſo to predetermine the agent in cauſing them.
V. Yet we will ſay, that the Will is free: but we mean only that to will and to will freely are words of the ſame ſenſe. For a man is ſaid to will freely in that he willeth, and his Willing is not a Nilling.
VI. Free-will then is nothing but Facultas Voluntatis & rationis …d utrumlibet agendum vel non agendum & ad agendum unum vel alterum: ſed tantum prout à prima cauſa phyſice praedeterminatur: That is, it is ſuch a faculty as God can predetermine to act which way he will, by making it will: yet its Indifferency is not only objective or paſſive, but alſo Active, becauſe it is an Active Power of the will which God predetermineth. God predetermineth the will to determine it ſelf.
VII. We will call this the wills Power, but it is but hypothetically a Power, viz. It can act if God phyſically predetermine it: elſe not at all. As the Wheels of the Clock can move if the Poiſe or Spring move them, or rather; as the hand can move, if the Will and the Spirits in the Nerves do move it.
VIII. The will is ſaid to be free, partly by reaſon that its active power is capable of being determined by God, and then by it ſelf ad utrumlibet, and partly in that it is not lyable to coaction.
IX. The will that is by Omnipotent phyſical premotion efficiently predetermined by God, is not conſtrained, becauſe it willeth not unwillingly: that is, ſo far as it is willing it is not unwilling and reluctant.
X. Yet the will that was one way enclined, habituated and acted in the precedent inſtant, is oft phyſically premoved and predetermined by Omnipotency to the contrary act in the next inſtant, which it could not reſiſt: As he that in this inſtant wil…eth Chaſti…y, may in t…e next inſtant be predetermined by unreſiſtible Omnip…tency to will fornication; or he that Loved God may be predetermined and premoved by God to hate him the next moment. But we will not call this irreſiſtible efficiency [coaction,] becauſe it is ad Volendum, and ſo in ipſo act… there is no reluctancy or reſiſtance.
XI. When God hath given man a Power with liberty to will or nill, or not will, to will this or that, and alſo giveth him all neceſſary objects and concauſes, and alſo as the firſt cauſe of natural and free action giveth him all that Influx which is neceſſary to an Act as ſuch, yet the moral ſpecification of that Act, to this propoſed object rather than that (as to hate God, rather than to hate ſin,) or to this Act rather than to that (as to hate God, rather than to Love him, or to ſpeak a lye, rather than the truth) hath ſo much Entity in it, that it is a blaſphemous deifying man to ſay, that man can do it, without Gods fore-deſcribed unreſiſtible predetermining phyſical premotion.
XII. God made the Law which forbiddeth ſin, and God made mans nature Intellectual and free to be ruled by Law; and God made and ordereth all the objects, temptations and concauſes; and God by the ſaid efficient, phyſical premotion cauſeth irreſiſtibly every act of ſin in all its circumſtances: (As when David was deliberating, Shall I do this Adultery and Murder or not? God firſt by omnipotent motion determined his will to it, or elſe he could not poſſibly have done it.) And ſin in its formale is nothing but the Relation of Diſconformity to Gods Law, which can have no cauſe but that which cauſeth the ſubjectum, fundamentum & terminum; nor can it poſſibly be, but it muſt exiſt per nudam reſultantiam, hiſce poſitis. And yet though God make the man, the Law, the act, the object, and all that is in the world from whence ſin reſulteth as a meer relation, we are reſolved to ſay that God is not the Author or Cauſe of ſin.
XIII. Yea, though the Habits of ſin are certain Entities, and therefore God muſt needs be their firſt cauſe in their full nature, according to our principles, who account it proper to God to be the firſt and principal cauſe of any ſuch entity; yet we are reſolved to ſay, that God is not the Cauſe or Author at leaſt of ſin.
XIV. Yet we will ſay, that he is an enemy to Gods Providence, that holdeth that man can poſſibly do any wickedneſs, unleſs God thus predetermine both Will, Tongue, Hand, and every active part, to every act which he hath forbidden with all its circumſtances.
XV. Sin is cauſed by God as to the circumſtantiated Act which is the materiale, but not as to the formale: And yet we muſt confeſs, that the Relation is cauſed by cauſing the ſubject, foundation▪ and term, (all which God principally doth,) and can be cauſed no otherwiſe.
XVI. But the formale of ſin is but a defect or privation, which is nothing: Therefore man and not God is the cauſe of it; For God cannot be a deficient cauſe, nor have any privation. And yet we cannot deny but that 1. There is as much poſitivity of Relation in diſobedience as in obedience, in curvity as in rectitude, in diſconformity as in conformity. 2. Nor that God can be a Cauſe of Privations (ſuch as death is,) though not a ſubject of them; even ſuch a cauſe as they can have. 3. Nor that ſome of ours (even Alvarez) ſay that ſins of commiſſion (and habits) are poſitive in their formale. 4. And ſin is ſuch a Nothing, as is mans miſery, and he is damned for and by. And if it be ſuch a Nothing as can have no cauſe, man can no more be the cauſe of it than God. 5. And that the Reaſon of non exiſtences, negations, or privations, is as notoriouſly reſolved into the will or non-agency of the firſt neceſſary cauſe of the contrary, as exiſtences and poſitives are reſolved into his will and agency. And if a man cannot think a good thought by any help that God can give him, unleſs he phyſically predetermine him to it, then the reaſon why man doth it not is as notoriouſly to be reſolved into Gods not-predetermining him to it, as the reaſon why he doth it into his predetermination: and as it is night, becauſe the Sun ſhineth not.
XVII. But at leaſt we can ſay that God is not the cauſe of ſin, becauſe he is under no prohibiting Law. Though it be true, 1. That his nature or perfection, the root of all Laws, is more than a Law: 2. And we know indeed that this proveth him not at all to be no cauſe of the ſin of man, but only to be no ſinner himſelf though he cauſe it: which is none of the queſtion.
XVIII. And from this neceſſity of predetermination it followeth, that all that part of our holineſs and obedience which conſiſteth in not ſinning, is not at all cauſed by God, e. g. that we hate him not, nor his truth and wayes and ſervants, that we murder not, commit not adultery, ſteal not, lye not, covet not, blaſpheme not, wrong none, do no evil, &c. we need no help of God for this; Becauſe if he will not move our wills by efficient predetermination to do them, it is impoſſible for us to do them at all.
XIX. And though we ſay that God willeth ſin to be, by his permiſſion only and not by his efficience, yet indeed predetermining by efficiency as the firſt cauſe, is the principal efficiency: And properly we muſt ſay that God permitteth no ſin at all; For we ſay that his permiſſion proveth the conſequence of the thing permitted: And therefore we muſt ſay that he permitteth no ſin but what is done. And that which is done by commiſſion poſitively he effecteth by effecting the fundamentum; and therefore permitteth not: And men ſin by omiſſion becauſe God doth not make them ſin, and not becauſe he meerly permitteth it. For permiſſion is not de impoſſibilibus.
XX. God willeth not ſin, becauſe he willeth it not as ſin, in its formale: which alſo we muſt confeſs that the wicked themſelves do not.
XXI. And whereas we hold that God cannot foreknow things future, but as he willeth or decreeth them, we muſt confeſs that the formale peccati as well as the materiale, was (ſuch as it is) quid futurum, (if it was but futura privatio:) And therefore this would inferr that God willed and decreed the formale peccati alſo.
XXII. Gods Will is his Love: and what he Willeth he Loveth.
XXIII. God willeth the futurity and exiſtence of ſin, not only of the materiale, but the formale, even of all the ſin that ever is done.
XXIV. The exiſtence of ſin is Good and Amiable, not only by accident, but per ſe, as being very conducible to the Glory of Gods Juſtice and Mercy, and therefore is per ſe Willed and Loved of God.
XXV. It is incomparably much more ſin than Holineſs which God willeth, and Loveth, and by predetermination cauſeth in mankind on earth: For it is much more ſin than Holineſs that exiſteth in man: And all that exiſteth God cauſeth as aforeſaid (the circumſtantiated act, and ſo the reſultancy of the relative form:) And he willeth and Loveth the exiſtence of all, and the thing exiſting ſo far as he cauſeth it.
XXVI. God Willeth, Loveth and Cauſeth ſin incomparably more than wicked men do: For they Will and Love it with a humane mutable dependent will; but God with a Divine, primary, immutable will. Man cauſeth the forbidden act (whence the relation reſulteth) with a Will that is irreſiſtibly moved ſo to do by God (as the pen writeth; only ſ…o modo with Volition:) But God cauſeth it as the firſt omnipotent unreſiſtible cauſe, of all that the Creature doth in ſinning.
XXVII. The ſame muſt be ſaid of God and the Devil, who can no more commit one ſinful act, till God unavoidably predetermine his will to it, by his premotion, than ſinful man can.
XXVIII. God by his Law, doth ſtrictly forbid all thoſe ſinful acts which he principally and unavoidably cauſeth: And he ſtrictly commandeth all thoſe good acts, whoſe contraries he thus cauſeth us to do.
XXIX. Though there is nothing in ſin which can have a cauſe, of which God is not the Principal cauſe, and though he Willeth and Loveth all that he cauſeth, yet the Scripture ſaith that God hateth ſin, and cannot behold it, and hateth all the workers of iniquity, and that it is abomination to him, that he is as one laden with it, and wearied, provoked, and offended by it. And that he Loveth the Acts of obedience and holineſs, when he will not cauſe them, but doth cauſe and will the contrary.
XXX. Pardon and ſalvation is promiſed and earneſtly offered by God, to the Reprobate themſelves, on condition, that they will believe and repent, when God doth unavoidably as the firſt cauſe, determine their wills to the contrary acts, even to disbelief and impenitent hatred of God and holineſs.
XXXI. The Law of God is, that all the Reprobates ſhall be damned to hell fire, if they will not believe and repent, when his omnipotence doth unavoidably premove and determine them to unbelief and impenitence: and if they will not give over thoſe acts of ſin, to which God doth thus unavoidably move and determine them.
XXXII. Gods executions are anſwerable to theſe Laws; and all ſave Chriſtians, and all profeſſed Chriſtians ſaving the ſanctified, are to be puniſhed in hell fire for ever, only for not doing the acts of Faith, Love and obedience, when God as the firſt cauſe predetermined them to the contrary; and for doing the acts of ſin, when God unavoidably moved them to it, and made them do it: ſo that conſequently all that are damned, ſuffer in hell, for not being Gods, even the firſt ſufficient cauſes of their own acts, and for not being above God or ſtronger than he, that is, for not overcoming or avoiding, his invincible and unavoidable predetermining premotion unto evil acts.
XXXIII. The ſame muſt be ſaid of the Devils, who ſin and ſuffer on the ſame terms.
XXXIV. Q. What kind of torment then will there be in Hell? Can Conſcience torment men for doing that which they were unavoidably made to do by Omnipotency? and for not doing that which without Divine predetermination they could no more do than make a world? or for not doing that whoſe contrary they were thus predetermined to? that is, for not overcoming God? (when they know the caſe.)
Or muſt we not more congruouſly ſay, that the ſtate of Hell torments lyeth in a moſt vehement hatred of God for ſo uſing them, and a juſtifying of themſelves? Or will every mouth be thus ſtopt in judgement?
XXXV. Q. Is not Divine Juſtice the moſt perfect Juſtice? and the exemplar of all humane Juſtice (allowing for diſparities?) And ſhould Kings and Judges imitate this fore-deſcribed courſe? And how then would they be eſteemed?
XXXVI. Q Is not that beſt which is moſt agreeable to Gods Will and Love? And therefore ſin better than Holineſs in all that have ſin, and not holineſs, and in the Godly ſo far as they ſin? becauſe that it ſhall be ſo, is more (yea only) willed by God, and cauſed by his predetermination?
XXXVII. Q. Whether this doctrine tend not to utter Infidelity, as to the Chriſtian faith, by making it ſeem to men incredible? Is it credible that God ſent his Son ſo wonderfully to expiate thoſe ſins which he ſo loved and cauſed as aforeſaid? and to ſave his people from their ſins, which God thus unavoi…ably moved them to commit? and to deſtroy the works of God, under the name of deſtroying the works of the Devil? Muſt Chriſt ſuffer, bleed, die and bear Gods wrath, for that which God unavoidably made man do by his principal determination? And is it eaſie for him that believeth one of theſe to believe the other?
XXXVIII. Q. How will men preach and hear the Goſpel, if they do it in congruity with this doctrine? Will they ſay [God ſent us to beſeech and charge you, not to do that ſinful act, which you cannot do unleſs he make you do it by predetermination, and which you cannot avoid if he ſo make you do it. He beſeecheth and importuneth you to do all thoſe commanded acts, which you can no more do than make a world unleſs he predetermine you to do them, nor can forbear them if he do?]
XXXIX. Q. How will men Repent, confeſs, reſiſt temptations, pray, and uſe the means of Grace, if they believe that all ſinful acts in the world are thus unavoidably Cauſed, and Willed and Loved of God as good for his Glory?
XL. Q. Whether they that teach (as Dr. Twiſſe often) that ſin is not malum Dei ſed noſtri, do not take it to be no injury to God, nor diſpleaſing to his will? Or is not injury and diſpleaſing, evil in reſpect to God as the terminus, though it be no h…rt to him, nor his evil as the ſubject or agent? And doth not the opinion that it's Evil only to us, and Good to God as conducible to his glory, teach men to hate it only out of ſelf-love, and not out of love to the glory of God? yea to Love it as conducible to Gods Glory, more than to hate it as evil to our ſelves; ſeeing Gods Glory muſt be preferred above our ſelves?
XLI. Q. Is not ſin thus made a coequal with Chriſt? who is but a means to the glorifying of God, to which faith (Dr. Twiſſe) ſin is ſummè conductbile?
XLII. Q. Doth not this doctrine make the ſanctification of the Holy Ghoſt to be unneceſſary? when all that is to be done to ſave us from ſin, is for God not to make us ſin by his premotion▪ Or doth it not make ſanctification to be nothing but this predetermination of God, which is made as neceſſary to ſin as to duty, and ſo natural and gracious operations made the ſame, and God to do as much to produce evil efficiently as good?
XLIII. Q. Is it not much worſe to man, if God by predetermination make him firſt a ſinner, (and wicked by ſinful Habits) and then damn him for it, than if he ſhould damn an innocent man for nothing? For ſin and pain is far worſe than pain without ſin. And to compel the will unwillingly to ſin, were it poſſible, is leſs than to make it willing.
XLIV. Doth not he that affirmeth that the Devil doth but ſin as efficiently predetermined by God, and doth not force, nor determine any mans will to any ſinful act, but that God predetermineth all men and Devils to every ſinful act committed, I ſay, doth he not deſcribe God as worſe than Satan (horreſco quaerens!) if ſin be the denominating evil, and the cauſing of ſin be more than tempting to it? Had I not rather my will were reſiſtibly tempted to ſin, than unreſiſtibly made to ſin, by predetermining efficient premotion?
XLV. Is not the objective Reaſon in Devils of mans implanted Enmity againſt them, Gen. 3. 15. becauſe they are Enemies to God and us, as being themſelves Lovers of ſin, and Tempters of us to ſin and miſery?
XLVI. Doth not he take the directeſt courſe to root out the Love of God and all Religion from the World, and to tempt men to hate God, and ſo to begin a Hell on Earth, who deſcribeth God in Satans likeneſs and much worſe; as much as being the principal cauſe of all ſin in men and Devils, is worſe than ſinning when predetermined, and tempting others to it?
XLVII. I think that the Dominican Predetermination, directly and neceſſarily overthroweth all certainty of Divine Revelation, by man, or Angel, and conſequently all certainty of the Chriſtian faith: even by overthrowing the very formal object, the Divine Veracity. For if God efficiently premove and predetermine all wills and tongues and pens to all the lies that ever are made in the world, then 1. To do ſo, is not inconſiſtent with his perfections or his will; 2. And then we can never know when he doth not ſo, unleſs by the event. This is grounded on theſe ſuppoſitions,
1. That Gods revelations to us are not Immediate only by himſelf, but by ſome Creature, Angel or Man, or a created voice or ſign. 2. That the Ratio certitudinis of ſuch Revelations by a Creature, is becauſe it is God that is the chief author of them. 3. That it is not conceiveable how God can by any way of Revelation be more the author of it, than by phyſical efficient immediate adequate predetermining both will and tongue to the act with all its circumſtances. Call it by what name you pleaſe, Inſpiration, Viſion, Illumination, Impulſe, &c. it can ſpeak nothing more of Gods Agent efficient Intereſt than this predetermination doth. 4. If it did do more, yet it would overthrow all certainty of our faith: Becauſe if God can efficiently cauſe, and that▪ as the total principal cauſe by predetermination, all the lies that ever were told in the world; we can never be ſure that the other mode of his operation ſo far differeth from this, as that he cannot be the chief cauſe of a lie in this way as well as of all lies by predetermination. I have driven many to ſay their utmoſt, and could never yet hear any ſuch difference aſſigned, as could prove any Inſpiration whatſoever, to have more of Divine Cauſality in it, than phyſical predetermination doth ſignifie and import: nor how this principle leaveth us any certainty that the tongues of all the Prophets and Apoſtles were not predetermined to ſpeak falſly, (ab antecedente; and ſo their pens.)
XLVIII. To ſay that God is not able to make a Creature with power to determine any one Volition of its own, even as modified, comparate or circumſtantiate, without his efficient phyſical predetermination aforeſaid, ſayeth more againſt Gods Omnipotency (though on pretence of a contradiction) than I dare ſay or think.
XLIX. Yet after all this I grant that if all proper free will and contingency be denyed, and every act in the world (as comparate and circumſtantiate) made as neceſſary by predetermination as the motions in a Clock, yet a certain Religion is conſiſtent with it, and the Atheiſt that hence would nullifie▪ all Religion abſolutely, would raiſe falſe inferences from this principle. Much more perſwaded am I, that many that hold it are very worthy holy perſons, much better than I am or can hope here to be, as not diſcerning the inconſiſtency of their opinions (as I ſaid.)
L. The Religion…conſiſtent with it I conceive muſt be ſuch as this:
1. There is a God who moveth all things by phyſical neceſſitation, even mans Volitions as well as any natural actions.
2. This God doth all that he doth himſelf by neceſſity, viz. of perfection, not of co-action: And there is no contingency in rerum natura.
3. This God hath made his Creatures of various ranks and degrees of excellency: And man a more knowing Creature than the Bruits.
4. Among men he maketh ſome wiſe, ſome fooliſh, ſome good and Godly, and ſome vitious and ungodly; And as he maketh the difference of men and beaſts, of a Horſe and a Toad, of the Sick and the ſound, of Prince and people, rich and poor, ſo doth he of godly and ungodly, chaſt and unchaſte, &c.
5. Yet man being Intellectual, God will move him by means and ſecond cauſes; and therefore hath made him Laws, obliging him de jure, and commanding his utmoſt diligence to keep them; promiſing and threatning Life and death hereafter for the keeping or the breaking of them: and appointing Miniſters and Magiſtrates to perſwade and drive him on.
6. And it's likely though not certain that God will do according to theſe Laws, in ſome conſiderable degree.
7. Man by his Nature, and by Scripture (which may be true) is bound to Love and ſerve his God above all other, as the Cauſe of all the being and good that is in the world, (whatever he do by us,) and of all our good.
8. There is another life of Reward for the good▪ and puniſhment for the bad, which muſt be our hope and fear.
9. Gods Laws are called moral means, but Cauſe only as phyſical engines or tacklings▪ to move mans will by the ſaid neceſſitation.
10. Gods hatred of ſin, is no true hatred or nolition (where ſin is:) but only his prohibiting it to us, and his puniſhing men for it.
11. If God did ſend Chriſt and the Apoſtles, and Miracles, &c. it was only to be tacklings or parts, in this engine of phyſical operations.
12. God cauſeth and Loveth ſin as much as obedience; but he maketh it not ſo Good and Lovely to us, it being our diſeaſe and miſery.
13. As God no otherwiſe hateth ſin than ſickneſs, and ſinners than the ſick, and looketh on good and bad but as modal phyſical differences cauſed by himſelf; ſo muſt we do alſo: and hate that moſt that hurteth us moſt.
14. To mourn for ſin, and confeſs it, and ſtrive againſt it, or talk of Chriſts ſuffering or ſatisfying for it, any otherwiſe than as a Voluntary diſeaſe and miſery of man, or to avoid any ſin any otherwiſe than as a miſery to our ſelves or others, is but the errour of ſuperſtitious men.
15. Men ſhould do all that ever they can to cure their ſins, and live holily, ſo far as increaſeth not their miſery, and no further; and this only as a phyſical Voluntary perfection, and as the avoiding of a natural miſery to themſelves and others.
16. God will puniſh man, not out of any hatred of ſin (which he willeth and cauſeth) but out of a differencing will, as he maketh Toads and Serpents, and cauſeth Cattle and Fowl to be killed by us, and Horſes laboured in pain: Therefore we have no reaſon to fear any other miſery in Hell, than Gods arbitrary diſpoſal bringeth on the more wretched ſort of his Creatures, without any ſinful commerit or provocation; and perhaps little more than we voluntarily here chooſe and bring upon our ſelves, or of the ſame kind, our ſin it ſelf being our puniſhment though it pleaſeth us, (As ſcratching is to him that hath the itch.)
17. Therefore the end of a mans life is the publick good and his natural felicity; beſides and above which to make God our End, as he is holy and to be pleaſed by Holineſs, is an errour; for all that cometh to paſs whether ſin or holineſs, do equally pleaſe and fulfil his will, as they are equally cauſed by him, according to their ſeveral natures.
I Have delineated this hypotheſis with its conſectaries as truly as I can. If any expect that I ſhould have given you their own words for all that I have ſaid. 1. Remember that I charge not all theſe words on them; but mention their judgement with the conſequents. 2. That I charge not theſe conſequents to be owned by the men, but upon their doctrine. And let any man diſcharge or juſtifie them that can. 3. But I deſire no more to prove that I wrong them not, than that the Reader be acquainted with their own writings, and not to impoſe too many on him, particularly, with Bradwardine, Bannes, Holkot and Alvarez, and with Piſcator, Maccovius, Dr. Twiſſe, and Rutherford de provid. And I deſire him firſt but to read the words which I have before cited and confuted of theirs in this Treatiſe; and the words of Alvarez and Twiſſe which I have cited and anſwered in my Diſput. contr. Praedeterm. in Methodo Theolog.
And I muſt profeſs that the Religion here deſcribed in the end, is all that I can prove conſiſtent with their opinion truly underſtood in it ſelf and its conſectaries; and that if I held their doctrine, I think I could have no other faith: Which I have annexed leſt the Hobbiſts ſhould think that their principle, were it proved, would juſtifie all Immorality and Irreligion. For this much they might be obliged to notwithſtanding it.
But he that can ſee ſo great eyidence for the Dominican predetermination, above the other three wayes, and what I have here farther added, as for the ſake of it, to admit ſo great a change of his Religion, or ſo great a degree of the forſaking of true Religion, he ſeeth not with my eyes, and I hope I ſhall never ſee with his, though I am not a ſtranger to the pretences for their way, that make it ſeem plauſible to them that do reſpicere ad pauca.
And if any think that I deal too harſhly in clogging their opinion with ſuch odious conſequents, Let them prove them inconſequent, and I will recant it: But if they cannot, civility ſhall not make me hide and favour ſo great Impiety; and as little in Doctrine as in manners, (as Adultery, perjury, blaſphemy; &c.) becauſe he that thinketh he doth well, will not Repent, and an erring mind will juſtifie ſin, and fight againſt God and his truth in his own name; and it's more to Teach men to break a com-mand, than to do it, and confeſs the ſin. They think it is for God that they erre; And I think it is for God that I detect it. And who it is that erreth indeed, the Light muſt diſcover, and the ſtudious impartial prepared Children of the Light muſt diſcern; and the Father of Lights muſt finally judge.
Note that in the firſt part I ſpeak as in the name of the Predeterminants; till I come to the Queſtions, and thence-forward I ſpeak as in my own name, which the Reader may eaſily perceive.