Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable, Conclusion · Section 5
§. V. III. Of the Scotiſts and Nominals way.
III. ANd as to the third way, aſcribed by Alvarez to the Scotiſts and Nominals, I think that de nomine it is not a proper expreſſion to call God cauſa partialis. But if we agree of the ſenſe, we may bear Vaſqu. (ubi ſup.) taketh Alex. Al. 1. p. q. 26. n. 7. a. 2. ad. 1. & Ronavent. 1. d. 40. a. 2. q. 1. to be for him, becauſe they ſay, Actus noſtros eſſe liberos quia Divina voluntas non eſt Tota Cauſa, ſed cum libero arbitrio; quod cum ſit proxima cauſa modificatur concurſum prim…. But if this be his opinion he joyneth with theſe Scotiſts and Nominals de cauſa non-totali. So Pet. à S. Joſeph. Thoſ. Univ. de Deo, ſaith that God is Cauſa totius effectus, ſed non tota Cauſa, ſed partialis.with improper expreſſions about God, of whom we can ſay nothing without ſome impropriety. Doubtleſs God and man are not to be accounted co-ordinate concauſes of the act; but whatever man doth, he doth it in ſubordination to God. But God operateth 1. As the prime cauſe of Nature, in a ſtabliſhed way, by natural cauſes; And ſo he giveth man his Natural vital power and the Liberty of uſing it: and by this Power and Liberty a man can do more than he alwayes doth. So that Gods natural cauſality and concurſe doth not bring all the Power which he giveth men into proportionable adequate Action: but men freely exerciſe the ſame power ſometime more and ſometime leſs. 2. And in the like manner God cauſeth gracious or holy acts: Rectifying our Powers, and fortifying them by holy habits, and preſerving and actuating them, by the Holy Ghoſt: Yet the Spirit is to Grace, as God the prime cauſe is to Nature: He giveth us more Gracious Power than we uſe, and than his own concurſe alwayes reduceth into adequate act: So that Gods operations in Nature and Grace are not ad ultimum poſſe Dei, nor ad ultimum poſſe hominis; but limited by his moſt wiſe and holy will: And man as a free agent is not only Able, but obliged, to uſe his power further, than by all Gods concurſe or premotion it is uſed.
And in this ſenſe I conceive it is that Scotus and others call God and man Cauſae partiales, in that there is a certain proportion of premotion and help, which God as the firſt Cauſe of Nature and Grace, doth afford to man; And there is moreover a certain uſe of Gods help and Grace, beyond what God predetermineth man to, (as comparative to this object rather than that, &c.) which man can do, and is bound to do; Not independently or in co-ordination with God; but by the Power and Liberty which God only giveth and upholdeth, and affordeth him ſufficient help to actuate. Now if man do this Part which is left to his liberty, the effect alwayes followeth. If he do not, it may not follow, though God gave him that neceſſary help or grace or premotion which is commonly called ſufficient. And when Scotus likeneth God and man, to two drawing a Boat, where the ſtrength of both muſt concurr, I believe he meant no more than I have ſaid.
1. All the Power is of God as the total firſt cauſe.
2. All the Grace that rectifieth and diſpoſeth our faculties, is of God as the total firſt cauſe.
3. All the Act as an Act in genere, is of God as the total (though not the ſole) cauſe.
4. All the Holineſs or Moral Goodneſs of the Act is of God as the total firſt cauſe (though not the only cauſe.)
5. But all the ſinfulneſs or moral evil of Acts and Habits is from Man.
6. And that implyeth, that mans free will is not ſo much freed from ſin, mutability and infirmity, but that it can neglect to uſe well the power and helps of grace afforded. But of total and partial Cauſality I have ſpoken more fully in the firſt Book. And of their opinion, that Gods Influx puts nothing into the will, but only is ad actum ſeu effectum, if it be true, it eaſily endeth the controverſie of the difference of ſufficient and effectual grace, as to that Act: But it is to me unintelligible, and the thing quite above all our underſtandings, and very unfit for bold diſputes, or mutual cenſures.