Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable, Conclusion · Section 7
§. VII. Of Janſenius his way of reconciling Grace and Free-will.
§. 1. BUt after all theſe cometh Janſenius, and juſtly blaming Philoſophy as the great occaſion of our hereſies and errours, which miſled the Schoolmen, Jeſuites and others, he goeth to Auguſtine alone (as Lombard thought he had well done before him;) and diſgraceth his cauſe by ſaying that Auguſtine firſt taught it to the Church, (as if Grace had been unknown by the former ages:) And becauſe many will not be at the labour to know his mind by reading ſo big a volume, I ſhall briefly ſelect what concerneth the matter in hand, and animadvert upon it.
1. His firſt Tome deſcribeth the Hereſie of Pelagius, wherein he proveth that Pelagius held all this that followeth concerning grace:
1. The Remiſſion of ſins, containing 1. Converſion to God, 2. The abſterſion of the blot and filth, 3. Reconciliation, or remiſſion of Gods offence, 4. And of the eternal puniſhment. Janſenius Aug. To. 1. l. 5. c. 22. p. 126, 127.
2. That Pelagius owned the Infuſion of habitual grace. And that God in Baptiſm did blot out all ſins, purge, cleanſe and expiate them, ſave and renew the ſoul, reſtore nature, deliver from the body of this death, and from the contracted cuſtome of ſinning: He held that Grace doth Regenerate, Illuminate, cauſe Faith, Juſtifie, (even Infants,) Sanctifie, make us new Creatures, incorporate us into Chriſt as his members, give us the anointing of the Holy Ghoſt, not only reſtoring us to the ſtate that we were in in Adam, but to a better, and to be adopted ſons of God, and ſaved. cap. 24. And 25. as to the Relative effects, that Grace Reconcileth man to God, maketh him an adopted Son of God, and the Temple of the Holy Ghoſt, an Heir of God, and co-heir with Chriſt: So that they acknowledge not only Habitual Infuſed Grace, but more; even in Baptiſm: As alſo the Aſſiſting motions of the ſpirit to good acts, making them poſſible.
Alſo that after Pope Zozymus had condemned the Pelagians, they went further, and that their deſign was but to lay mens ſalvation or damnation on free-will. lib. 6. c. 7. &c.
And when he cometh to characterize Pelagius, he doth it as he doth elſewhere the Proteſtants, and as Malignants do Religious perſons, by preſumptions: viz. that he was indeed as Auguſtine ſaith, Temperate and of a good life but ſingular and very proud, (which he proveth by his opinion, and becauſe he was againſt Swearing, and ſaid, that Gods ſervants mouths ſhould vent no bitter thing, but only that which is ſweet; and that Chriſtians muſt be ſo patient as readily to let go what is taken from them, and that gallantry and gay cloathing is contrary to God, and that enemies muſt be loved as friends, and yet not believed, and that Riches muſt be forſaken, &c.) as holding nothing mean and moderate: that he affected novelty (and yet his …rrours were old, coming from Origen, …uffinus, Palladius, Evagrius, Jovin…an and the Philoſophers) that he affected fame, admiration, hypocriſie, pretending to more holineſs than others, under the garb of poverty, &c. over-…alued Reaſon, Logick, Syllogiſmes, Philoſophers, &c. All which I mention, not to abate any mans diſlike of any one errour of Pelagius, but to ſhew that it is ſo uſual for diſſenters to make one another ſeem odious, and to feign or aggravate faults, and to vilifie or deny Gods grace in others, that he that would not be tempted into malice, uncharitableneſs and ſlander, muſt take heed what he believeth, even of men accounted moſt abominable hereticks. Doubtleſs Pelagius his denying original ſin, and his laying too much on mans will, and too little on grace, are things to be deteſted.
II. Janſenius aſſerteth that the Angels and Adam had ſuch Free-will as could obey or diſobey, and ſo could determine it ſelf to good, and perſevere therein, without any more grace than they had when they did it not: And that by this Free-will ſome Angels ſtood and ſome fell, and Adam fell when he might by it have ſtood, and thereby fell from a nobler ſort of Free-will, which conſiſteth in a due ſubſervience to God, and fell to the Love of Himſelf (not primarily of external things) inſtead of God, and to ſelfdependency and dominion. De Grat. primi hom. c. 6. p. 40, 41, 42. &c. 7. [Nos hic aſſerimus tanquam ſine dubitatione veriſſimum juxta doctrinam ſancti Auguſtini & eccleſiae, omnia hujuſmodi opera adeoque & ipſam fidem & dilectionem Dei, ab eo potuiſſe per arbitrii libertatem fieri ſic ut ea non donaret ei gratia Dei.] vid. c. 7, 8, &c. The reaſon of this was ſanitas Voluntatis Adami. c. 9.
III. Yet Grace was neceſſary to man and Angels both to perſeverance and to every good act. c. 10, 11. And c. 12, 13, &c. this Grace neceſſary to all was not Habitual Grace, (for that they had;) nor general concurſe, which none denyed: but it was Actual Adjuvant Roborating help. But the Grace given to Angels and Adam was Adjutorium ſine quo non, giving the will power to determine it ſelf, but not Adjutorium quo which ever determineth it. One giveth the Power, and the other the Act. (The ſame that is meant by the common diſtinction of Grace ſufficient and effectual by the Dominicans.) Yet this Adjutorium ſine quo non did with free will procure the Act in the ſtanding Angels, and Adam while he ſtood: But that made it not Adjutorium quo becauſe it is not ſo called (efficax) only ab eventu: but becauſe it ſo helpeth that illo praeſente continuo fiat id propter quod datur; illo abſente nunquam fiat. p. 63. c. 14, 15. One is like Light and the viſive faculty ad videndum; the other ut ipſa viſio (ſuch as all formal cauſes are, and Gods ſimultaneous efficiency.) The difference is (c. 15.) that Adjutorium ſine quo non doth but perfect the power, and the chief honour belongeth to the will that uſeth it and could chooſe: But contrarily the adjutorium quo is the principal cauſe of the Act, and leaveth not the event to the will, but uſeth it effectually to the act intended. Therefore merit and perſeverance in Innocency were no ſpecial gifts of God.
IV. That without or before faith no good work is done, but lies and ſins: l. 3, & 4. c. 1. p. 223. no nor without true Godlineſs, p. 261. & paſſim. To think that Infidels and ungodly have any true virtue, is dotage. c. 17.
V. The firſt ſin had no neceſſity, being meer ſin, and no puniſhment, and ſo eaſily avoidable and wholly voluntary: Other ſins are alſo puniſhments, and ſo partly involuntary and unavoidable and neceſſary: Though a ſinner may forbear one ſin by another. cap. 22.
VI. A rational Creature could not be made of God ſinleſs without true Love to God, or at leaſt a faculty moſt ſufficient to love him and cleave to him. De ſtatu nat. pur. l. 1. c. 17. p. 323, 324. nor can God withdraw that grace of Love from the innocent. c. 13.
VII. The grace of Adam, and of Chriſt, Adjutorium ſine quo non, & Quo, do thus differ, that the firſt ſerveth the will, and is determined by it: The ſecond (Adjutorium medicinale) giveth▪ the ipſum velle to the unwilling, which elſe it could not have. The Grat. Chr. Sal. Li. 2. c. 4. and is more than Lex, ſcientia, revelatio, remiſſio peccatorum, gratia ſufficiens, habitualis, & per congruitatem efficax. c. 5. Alſo 1. The Adjutorium ſine quo non giveth not Merit to the will, but it meriteth it ſelf: But the Adjutorium Quo giveth us the ipſum opus & meritum. 2. The former is meritum humanum; the ſecond meritum divinum, as given of God. 3. To the firſt Life would be merces meriti: To the ſecond it is a free gift; Reward and Gift are repugnant. Angels merited life. 4. By the firſt and free will Angels perſevered: but we cannot but by the ſecond. 5. The firſt (fine quo non) was given them that were to be differenced by free-will: The ſecond to them that are to be differenced by grace. c. 6, 7, 8. One is adjutorium poſſibilitatis, the other actionis. c. 9.
VIII. That ſince the fall no good can be in or of man, but by Gods gift, and is not laudable in any but God. c. 23. Man hath no part of the praiſe. This grace is, ever effectual, determining, rapeth the will ſo that it is ſcarce perceived to act: It uſeth the will as an inſtrument, which way God will: It is inſuperable, irreſiſtible, not meerly potential: It is never uneffectual, but in all that have it infallibly effecteth. c. 24, 25.
IX. There is no grace of Chriſt but this (quo): None now fine quo non, or ad poſſe. c. 27. That ceaſed with innocency.
X. This grace is ever effectual, but not ad omnia: It giveth ſome ſmall degree to ſome, and more to others: And the weakeſt have not enough to produce faith, prayer, hope, obedience, but ſome Velleities and Complacencies only. c. 27. p. 86.
XI. He diſtinguiſheth ſufficient Grace into that Prater quod nil aliud ex parte Dei per modum Principii neceſſarium eſt ut homo Velit …t operetur: And that Quod ſatis eſt ut homo dicatur poſſe operari, quamvis ali… adhu… neceſſarium eſt ut de facto operetur. The later he denyeth not: As to the former he ſaith, Nullum jam dari hominibus lapſis gratia ſufficiens, quin ſit ſimul efficax. lib. 3. c. 1. p. 102, 103. This Gratia ſufficiens is but the ſine quo non, the grace of innocency and not medicinal, and that which Pelagius and the Maſſilienſes held againſt Auguſtine, yea, ad gratiam naturae pertinet, & Lapſorum reparationi inutilis & pernictoſa. cap. 2. p. 104. For it ſuppoſeth Nature to be ſound. Quid homini miſero pernicioſius, quam illa gratia abundare, qua nemo unquam, fatentibus ſcholaſticis, niſi majorem damnationem aſſecutus eſt? Hoc ipſo quippe …ſquiſque damnabilior eſt, quo magis ſufficienti gratia abundavit, Nemo … unquam ſufficienti gratia uſus eſt, aut utitur, aut uietur in aternum; qui mitius puniretur ſi tali auxilio caruiſſet; quo Deus neminem vel damnandorum vel ſalvandorum uſurum eſſe praeſcivit.
He concludeth c. 4. Nullam Chriſti gratiam effectu operi… ad quem efficiendum voluntati datur, ulla voluntatis pervicacia fruſtrans.
XII. He maketh this to be the great doctrine of Auguſtine, that All Gods Law, both old and new, is given to convince men that they cannot keep it, and all written precepts are to ſhew men their ſin, which maketh them the worſe, becauſe of the Laws reſtraint and commands: And that Law and Grace thus differ, that Chriſts Grace is only Gods making us will and do; and the Law ſheweth that we cannot, and ſo driveth us from is to Grace; c. 4. That to Jews and Chriſtians that have written Laws, there is no ſufficient or adjuvant grace, but what maketh them do the act. c. 5. No potential grace (that giveth the power) is ſufficient to the act, unleſs it give the act. c. 6. Hence is the neceſſity of ſinning, p. 126. Unbelievers want Remote as well as Proximate ſufficient help and all its principles. c. 11. And the Commands are to them impoſſible, yet make them unexcuſable, c. 18, 19.
XIII. That impotency excuſeth a man, when he ſtrongly would do the act and cannot; but not that by which he would not do it, though he cannot will it without grace. p. 145, 146.
XIV. Chriſts dying for All, is meant only for all the Church, or all ſorts: yet as he giveth to others the grace of faith and Love without perſeverance and ſalvation, ſo far he dyed for them▪ and prayed for them. c. 20. p. 163, 164.
XV. The eſſence of the grace of Chriſt is a Heavenly Suavity or Delectation, given before our free act, by which the will is bowed to act what God will. It is a vital and indeliberate act of the ſoul, even of Love and Deſire before Conſent, and that Delight which is our Reſt and Joy. li. 4. c. 1. & 11. Plainly it is a neceſſitated complacency, which is the firſt act of Love; when God and Righteouſneſs, not for our ſelves, but for themſelves and as ſuch, are Pleaſing to the ſoul.
XVI. Chriſts grace is neceſſary only to Love God ſincerely in every act of obedience, and only this Love and Suavity is Chriſts grace, whatever other graces or acts as to the name it is found in. li. 5. c. 1. For nothing is good that is done only by Fear, and not in Love of Juſtice. The Juſtice Loved is not any habit or act of the ſoul, but God the Eternal Juſtice. c. 2. and the Juſtice of his Precepts. Virtue is nothing but the Love of God. c. 3. The four Cardinal Virtues are fourfold Love of God: And ſo all others. c. 4, 5.
XVII. By the Love of God is not meant only that degree by which we Love him above all, but true ſincere Love of God for himſelf, and not ullius creaturae intuitu: which is either Imperfect, not Loving him ſo well as the creature, (but only to an uneffectual Velleity) which yet how remiſs and ſmall ſoever, is the true and chaſte fruit of the Love of God, even amoris amicitiae: or more perfect, which juſtifieth. The firſt is quaedam dilectio juſtitiae quaſi ſimplex ejus complacentia, quae non eo uſque increverit, ut adverſantia iſti bonae voluntati valeat ſuperare. This goeth uſually firſt, and ſinners find a good will to goodneſs, and like it, and many years perhaps are wiſhing and purpoſing to leave their ſins for it, and turn to God, till at laſt Love prevaileth. And this though imperfect, is true ſincere Love, not from a perfect habit, but from the excitation of the Holy Ghoſt: It hath the ſame object as perfect Love, that is, Juſtice for Juſtice, or God for God, not loved on conſideration of any other reward: which proveth it ſincere Love. Such wiſh to live chaſtely, temperately, juſtly, but cannot come to it. Out of this imperfect love, ſprings faith; faith may be habitually many years before Juſtification: Juſtification is the grace of perfect Love to God above all: Hope and Perfect Love alſo come from this initial Love. c. 7, 8, 9.
XVIII. As Hope, ſo Reward and reſpect to it may ſtand with this grace of Love: For the Reward is not deſired ex amore concupiſcentia for our ſelves only; cum enim charitatis proprium ſit & unica voluptas diligere Deum, non quia hoc ſibi ſuave vel utile vel glorioſum eſt, vel alia quacunque conſideratione redundat in ſe, ſed quia ita eſt ordo creatur… ſub creatore, qui propter ſeipſum ſuper omnia (ex ſuperexcellenti bonitate) diligendus eſt—ita unicum praemium eſt, veritatem & bonitatem Dei facie ad faciem contemplando ardentius amare & lauaare Deum; non quia utile eſt & beatificum diligenti, ſed quid ae…rnae veritati▪ congruum, dilecto debitum, &c. Amoris hic inchoati, Amor futurus conſummatus unica merces. Praemium Dei ipſe Deus eſt. Quiſquis delabitur ab illa charitatis puritate, ut amore concupiſcentiae incipiat velle & concupiſcere ſibi Deum, totum dilectionis ordinem quem natura docet, & Lex aeterna praecipit, diligendi perverſitate perturbat. Nam & Deum ad ſe refert, & ſeipſo fruitur, quorum utrumque aeterna & indiſpenſabili lege proſcriptum eſt. c. 10.
XIX. The fear of puniſhment (and attrition) is good, being f…g… mali; an Antecedent of wiſdom: It is from a certain general grace, but not that properly called the grace of Chriſt: The Spirit of the Old Teſtament even of fear, is Gods Spirit: not that which Chriſt dyed to give men, which is contrary (delectation;) but another much inferiour grace, which after the firm belief of Gods judgement and eternal puniſhment, fortaſſis Gratiam peculiaris cujuſdam providentiae & operationis non excedit. They that have but the Righteouſneſs of fear by knowing the Law, have not Gods righteouſneſs but their own: Indeed they have faith and that radicated, but not Chriſts proper grace, but that which may come ex proprii arbitrii viribus, excited by providence, or, if you will, inſpired fear: no ſin can be avoided by it, but by other ſin. c. 22, 23, &c. It is but of ſelf-love. It is Legal righteouſneſs and our own. c. 31, 32.
XX. Liberty of will is either meer Voluntarineſs, whoſe contrary neceſſity is involuntarii coactio; or that free ſtate which is the Love of God, conſiſtent with ſimple neceſſity. lib. 7.
XXI. Gratia Chriſti eſt Praedeterminatio voluntatis, ſed non Dominicanorum praedeterminatio. 1. Praedeterminatio phyſica eſt motio neſcio quae virtuoſa, habens eſſe incompletum, ut colores in a…re, impetus in impulſo: Gratia Chriſti eſt veriſſimus motus voluntatis, ineffabilis, viz. delectatio, &c. 2. Praed. phyſica non eſt eis actus Vitalis animi, ſed aliquid cui voluntas tantum paſſive ſubjacet: Gratia contra, &c. 3. Praedet. phyſica in quibuſcunque circumſtantiis voluntas collocetur, omnem ſuperat reſiſtentiam & ſemper facit effectum: contra delectatia victrix, ſi alter ard…ntior eſt, in ſolis inefficacibus deſideriis haerebit animus. 4. Praed. phyſica eſt inſtar concurſus cujuſdam generalis Dei in ordine ſupernaturali: Adjutorium Chriſti non ita. 5. Praed. phyſica neceſſaria ſtatuitur omnibus agentibus ex vi cauſae ſecundae, &c. Chriſti adjutorium laeſa tantum voluntati propter vulnus neceſſarium eſt. 6. Praed. phyſica propter naturalem indifferentiam voluntatis exigitur: Gratia non ita—7. Praed. phyſica ſtatui innocentiae neceſſaria dicitur: Gratia Chriſti non ita, ergo hi (Dominicani) magis Ariſtotelici quam Auguſtiniani ſunt. Gratia tamen eſt Praed. phyſica: And grace and free-will are reconcilable as Predetermination and free-will are. l. 8. c. 2, 3, 4. Summa eſt, quod Gratia Amantem & Volentem facit: & non tantum poſſe velle dat. In concluſion he belyeth Calvin, 1. As denying in man boni & mali electionem, and ſo in many …ther points. cap. 21.
XXII. His doctrine of Predeſtination as congruous to this I paſs by, …nly adding that he denyeth Angels to be elected of grace or to perſeve…ance, which was but foreſeen, and they were made to differ, not by …race, but by merits: Man is elected to merits and glory; but to glory …efore the foreſight of merits. The Reprobation of Angels was after the …urpoſe of giving them ſufficient grace, and the foreſight of ſin▪ Permiſ…on of ſin was no effect of it: But the Reprobation of men was by Gods poſitive abſolute will, of men in original ſin, and the effect of it excaecation and obduration; but not the permiſſion of the firſt ſin. lib. 10.
This is the Epitome of Janſenius as far as concerneth our preſent buſineſs.
The Animadverſions.
§. 2. I. IT ſeems Auguſtine and Pelagius were both pious men, that differed in the methodizing and wording thoſe fundamental conceptions in which they agreed; by which Pelagius ran into errors. And I doubt, he was not ſo innocent as Janſenius intimateth, when he maketh Auguſtine to be the firſt true Teacher of grace, and Pelagius his Opinion to have been ſo antient. And if it were not too bold to ſay ſo againſt one that read over all Auguſtine ten times, and all his writings againſt the Pelagians thirty times, I would ſay that I think that Auſtin owned more univerſal grace and free-will, than Janſenius ſuppoſeth him to have owned. Of Proſper and Fulgentiu… it cannot modeſtly be denyed; who I think were of Auguſtines mind.
II. He confeſſeth that ſelf-determining free-will and ſufficient Grace, were the condition of the Angels and innocent man; and ſo that it is not alien to Gods government, or prerogatives, for ſubjects to be ſo Ruled and Judged.
III. He ſeemeth to me to aſcribe far too much to innocent man and Angels in uſing ſufficient grace, when he maketh their wills the chief laudable cauſe of the effect: I rather think that no Angel ever did any good, the chief praiſe of which was not due to God as the principal firſt cauſe. God giveth them all the power, liberty, help, means, motives, by which they do it; Beſides that they did nothing but what he fore-decreed and willed they ſhould (eventually) do: Therefore there is no good but of him as the firſt cauſe, though not as the ſole cauſe.
IV. Whether the beſt actions of Infidels or ungodly men be properly to be called good, is but a Logomachy: Call them but a Leſs evil, or the abatement of evil, and actions that tend as Means to their repentance, and ſalvation, and I ſhall not diſagree with you in this.
V. His conceſſion that the firſt ſin was not neceſſitated is of great moment: But it is a great miſtake, that following ſins are neceſſary, becauſe they are puniſhments. It is not the exiſtence of the ſin that is a puniſhment, but the hurtfulneſs of it ſuppoſing the exiſtence. If drunkenneſs, or gluttony be themſelves noxious and penal, that is but a conſequent of their exiſtence, which was not neceſſitated by God as puniſhing them that cauſed them.
VI. The ſixth I think ſound, and the Schools [pure nature], as if Adams Love (in the principle) was not his neceſſary Sanity, is unſound.
VII. Here again, 1. I think he giveth too much to free-will in innocency, and too little to God. For Gods Help did not then ſerve mans will ſo much as Gods; and God fulfilled all his will while Angels uſed their power and liberty, and they did no good but what God willed and cauſed as he ſaw beſt. And while man and Angels uſed their liberty, they fulfilled Gods will in all their duty, as much as if they had been neceſſitated by natural predetermination.
2. And it is not true that their ſufficient grace gave not Merit to the will: For it followeth not, that becauſe they could have omitted a duty, therefore in doing it they did any thing of which God was not the prime cauſe: He that gave them all their power, diſpoſition▪ objects, helps and motives, did give them that which he calleth Merit.
3. It is his grand error that Gift and Reward are repugnant, and that Life would not have been to Adam, and was not to the Angels of free gift, though of Reward. For it is impoſſible that any creature can merit of God as a Proprietor in point of Commutative Juſtice; ſeeing God is the abſolute Owner of us and all things, and no creature can give him any thing but what is his own: Therefore there is a natural impoſſibility that quoad valorem rei, aut ipſum beneficium a creature can have any thing but of free gift: But God who is an Owner and Benefactor is alſo a Rector, and ſo the cauſe of Moral Order as well as of real Benefits; And ſo that which as a Benefit is a meer gift, yet quoad ordinem conferendi is given by God per modum praemii to thoſe that will Accept the Gift according to its nature, and denyed to thoſe that will deſpiſe it and refuſe it. As a Father will give a purſe of Gold to the Child that will thank him, and humbly take it; and not to the Child that will ſpit in his face.
J…nſenius doth ſo weakly open the nature of Merit and Reward, as that alone would ſhew that he was not meet for his great undertaking: Though he excellently ſhew that God is our Reward himſelf, yet the Rat… …nes praemii he …aith little to, that can ſatisfie the judicious. Of which more anon.
4. Angels were differenced inter ſe by Gods will and their own: And we confeſs, that ſo far as ſin made the difference, it was by their own will and not by Gods: But was he ſure that no ſuch difference is made ſince the fall among men? He will confeſs, that when Eve ſinned before Adam, it was ſhe that made the difference: And how can he prove, that it was not Cain who by ſin firſt differenced himſelf from Abel? or the Prodigal, Luke 15. that by forſaking his Father, firſt differenced himſelf from his Brother? According to his own principles who holdeth falling away from Grace and Juſtification, doth not he that falleth away, difference himſelf from him that ſtandeth? He can never prove, that now two men may not have equal help from God to go to Church, or read a good Book, and one do it, and the other go to the Tavern; or read a Play-book.
VIII. 1. God doth not ſo uſe man as his Inſtrument in good, but that he giveth the Inſtrument its proper aptitude and action as to the effect: And that which it is and doth may be ſpoken of it: To ſay a thing is gud, is to praiſe it▪ and good muſt be called good; And to ſay that you were the Actor of Good and that Voluntarily, is to praiſe you. Therefore the Actor of good ex natura rei deſerveth praiſe, ſeeing Truth muſt be ſpoken of all things.
2. God himſelf doth ſo often praiſe his ſervants, and promiſe to honour them that honour him, that to ſay no praiſe is due to them is to charge God with error.
3. To deny all Reward, and Merit as it ſignifieth Rewardableneſs, or Moral …ptitude for Reward, is to deny the greateſt part of the Scripture; to deny God to be our Rector, and ſo to be our God, to deny the whole frame of his Sapiential Government, and his glory therein, and ſo to deny his Laws, Judgement and Execution, Sin▪ Duty, Heaven and Hell.
Th… ſumm of all is this, …. No man or Angel can merit of God in Commutative Juſtice as Proprietor▪ But only as Rector. All is (as is before ſaid) of free gift from God as …roprietor and Benefactor▪
2. The ſame God who is Omnipotent, is alſo ſapientiſſimus & optimus: And he that glorifieth his Power eminently as the Author of Nature, as Creator, Conſervator, and Motor, doth alſo glorifie his Wiſdom in rerum Ordine: And he ordereth Moral Agents eminently per ſapient…am …t Rector per media moralia, viz. Doctrinam, Leges, Judicia: And he glorifieth his Goodneſs and Love partly Antecedently (to mans Actions) and as a free Benefactor; partly conſequently, according to the order of his Laws. So that as his Attributes are inſeparable, ſo are (herein) the operations of them. And the ſame Benefit is ut quid productum the effect of Gods Omnipotency and Dominion; and ut Bonum & Beneficium the effect of the Benefactors Love; and yet quoad ordinem conferendi it is Pr…mium à Rectore adjudicatum. And between all theſe there is no repugnancy.
3. We grant that God Rewardeth no man now, according to the Law of Innocency, (for that condemneth every ſinner.)
4. Nor according to, or for the works of the Moſaical Jewiſh Law.
5. Nor for any ſincere obedience to the Law of Nature, or any other, without Redemption by Chriſt.
6. We are agreed that the Reward is now doubly and eminently a free gift, and the reward of Chriſts merits. It is not only free as all Benefits from God to man are, as to commutation: but alſo after forfeiture freely given to ſinners; and it is procured by the merits of Chriſt, who was freely given to be the Saviour of the world; and it is given us by Chriſt as free gifts are, upon condition of Acceptance; and an Accepting Will is Gods free gift; and they that have it not, want it becauſe they refuſed Preparatory grace, which they were able to have better uſed o… ſubmitted to.
So that the Reward is only ſuch as a free gift, which quoad ordinem conferendi, & rationes adjudicandi is given by God as a Father; who at once uſeth Power, Love and paternal Juſtice, according to the tenour of his own Law of Grace, which is founded in Chriſts perfect merits, and is Chriſts own Law.
VIII. and IX. 1. That quoad eventum the good Angels grace was effectual, and Adjutorium quo as well as ſine quo non, he granteth▪ (And Adams till he fell.) Let us find out the difference then. To ſay that yet They could have ſinned, is a doubtful ſpeech: If [could] ſignifie P…t… …iam naturalem, it is no… for want of Natural Power that Chriſt himſelf ſinned not; but becauſe perfection cauſed the right uſe of that Power. To be able to ſin, or not to believe, or not to love God, if it ſignifie any more than the Natural power which men abuſe, is an improper ſpeech▪ for ſin is from moral impotency, (or indetermination,) and not an va…t of (other) power. But a Logical Poſſibility of any event but what …ame to paſs, Gods very fore-knowledge will exclude, (and ſo his Decree.) And if the queſtion be Whether Adam could not have ſtood when he fell, it is agreed that he could.
It ſeemeth then that our Controverſie lyeth plainly▪ … theſe two things, 1. Whether any man now (Holy or unholy) have any help from. God by Chriſt by which he is truly able to do any one good action more … other than he doth, or to forbear any more evil? 2. Whether all Divine cauſation or operation …e ſuch, as of it ſelf alone will inferr the …tainty of mans Volition as the Effect? We g…ant that Divine preſcie… doth inferr it, e… …oeſſitate infallibilit…. Divine Volitions ſome think are ever efficient of all that is willed, and that God hath no other operation but Volition (as Bradwardine and others.) Others deny this, … that God hath Power operative as much diſtinct from Volition a… …tellection is, and alſo that God willeth more than he operateth or totally cauſeth. And of this opinion muſt Janſenius needs be, becauſe he held that the free-will of Adam before his fall, and of the good Angels cauſed more obedience than God cauſed as to the totality of cauſation: And yet …ethinks he ſhould be loth to ſay that it was more than God willed or decreed. However the former is but a wordy ſtrife: For if God operate only Volendo, yet his will as Immanent and a meer will (as mans,) muſt be diſtinguiſhed from his will as tranſient and efficient by operation. So then the thing in queſtion is, Whether Gods power or will ſo far only as it is operative be ſo total a cauſe, as that hac poſita ex vi cauſandi neceſſario ſequitur effectum (viz. fidem, charitatem humanam) ſecuturum? And we grant that as ex perfectione Intellectus, it followeth, Deus praeſc…t hoc futurum, ergo futurum eſt: ſo ex perfectione Voluntatis, & ſummo Imperio, & foelicitate Divina it followeth, Deus vult hoc futurum eſſe; ergo futurum eſt: and that ex neceſſitate exiſtentiae, no doubt it is a good conſequence, Deus hoc fecit, ergo factum eſt: But Whether from his meer adjutorium, or prime efficiency, limited by his own will, it be a good conſequence, [God giveth as much help as is of neceſſity to mans volition; ergo, man will conſent or will?] is the doubt. He granteth that in Innocency it would not have followed, but he thinks that now it will.
We grant that God giveth not only the poſſe velle, but the ipſum velle to thoſe that have it: His giving it being but a cauſing their faculties to Act: And we grant that wherever God abſolutely willeth that his Help ſhall be ſucceſsful, it is ſo: And alſo that whereas all the effect cometh from our natural Power, and Gods grace conjunct, God is the cauſe of both; And is ever the total cauſe quoad effectum, that is, totius effecti. And we grant that Gods cauſing Impreſs on the will is ſuch on ſome, (and perhaps on all in the act of ſpecial ſanctification) as ex vi cauſae will inferr the effect, and is unreſiſtible, and doth not only determine the will, but ſo determineth it as overcometh all moral power or diſpoſition to the contrary.
But yet that there is a Grace or adjutorium of Chriſt, which giveth a power either not neceſſitating the act, or when the act followeth not, ſuch as he calleth ſine quo non, I think for theſe reaſons:
1. Becauſe elſe no man can do any more good or leſs evil, than he doth: which I believe not.
2. Becauſe elſe All men that periſh are damned only for original ſin, and its conſequents which they had never power to avoid: which is quite contrary to the tenour of the Scripture.
3. And then God would judge them only by the Law of Innocency: whereas he will judge them by Chriſt and by his Remedying Law, for rejecting the remedying grace.
4. And then the Conſcience of the damned, would have nothing to torment them with, or accuſe them for, but original ſin, and its unavoidable conſequents: And it would give them this excuſe and eaſe, God never made it Poſſible for me to do otherwiſe.
5. Becauſe it teacheth men great ingratitude to ſay, I never had any help of Chriſt.
6. And ſo it teacheth them impenitently to extenuate their ſin, if they do but find themſelves wicked, and to ſay, I never ſinned againſt any Grace of Chriſt.
7. And it feigneth God to give men all that reprival, and mercy which the reprobate have, from ſome other Cauſe and not by Chriſt; And ſo to make a kind of grace common in the World which the Scripture knoweth not, nor is according to the Covenant of Innocency or of Grace.
8. Becauſe God is Immutable, and too groſs mutations are not without proof to be imputed to his Laws and Government: Therefore it ſeemeth to me an injurious fiction to ſay as Janſenius, that God had ſuch Laws as ſuppoſed mans ſelf-determining will, and governed ſo as to uſe ſufficient Grace or adjutorium ſine quo non, to man and Angels, at the firſt, and tha… now he hath no ſuch at all, but only a moving efficiency. I ſhould ſooner yield to the Dominicans and Hobbes that no other than neceſſitated Volitions are poſſible or ever were, than to hold as he, that there were other before the fall, and none ever ſince. For as to his great argument (vitiated nature) I anſwer it, 1. Man is man ſtill; And therefore God ruleth him as man; And that in via. And if then man and Angels were ſuppoſed to have a ſelf-determining free-will, that could do this or not do it, we have reaſon to think it is ſo ſtill. Why is not grace meerly ſufficient as conſiſtent with Lapſed as Innocent nature? (ſuppoſing that it is not the ſame help that is now ſufficient to ſalvation as then.) 2. Conſider the great difference between perfect Innocency, and ſome one commanded act: And 3. Conſider that the helps afforded by grace are very great, and that Habitual Grace doth in ſome meaſure heal lapſed nature, or elſe what is it? He that is Habitually Prompt to Love and duty, hath ſome cure, and ſome ability: For to be prompt is more than to be able. And therefore it is an incredible thing, and a reproach of habitual grace, that Adam was more able to live and perſevere without any ſinful thought, word, or deed, than a Holy ſoul is to think one good thought, or ſpeak one good word, or reſtrain one blaſphemy or other ſin. Therefore it is as credible that Chriſts repairing habitual Grace enableth godly men (and his commone… grace common men) to think or do ſomewhat better than they do, as that Angels and Adam had no other grace, and could without other, live without any ſin.
Therefore I take Janſenius to do well in opening Original pravity, and the power of Gods grace, and his ſpecial intent to ſave his choſen. But I think he ſo earneſtly ſtudied for that ſide alone, that he injuriouſly overlooketh the whole frame of ſapiential Government, and the common grace which is preſuppoſed to the ſpecial, and greatly wrongeth Chriſt and his grace, by denying him to give to men in common, that which our experience aſſureth us they poſſeſs.
Ad X. When he maketh uneffectual Velleities to be Chriſts unreſiſtible grace, either he thinketh that men are ſaved with ſuch only, or not; (for he ſpeaketh not his mind plainly in that that I can find:) If yea, then he abaſeth the grace of Chriſt, to think that many are ſaved by it, that love a Whore or any ſin much better than God and Grace and Glory. If not (as I think he held) then he holdeth that moſt that have the effectual grace of Chriſt are damned, and had no poſſibility (properly) of eſcape. And why doth he make ſo harſh a thing of mens aſſerting a ſufficiency of ſome uneffectual grace, and ſay to what purpoſe is it; and yet aſſert that to moſt men the grace of Chriſt had not ſo much as any ſufficiency to ſave them, nor put them into any true poſſibility of life?
Ad XI. I. It ſeemeth to me a contradiction to ſay (as in the ſecond branch of his diſtinction) that Homo poteſt Velle, and yet that aliud adhuc adjutorium neceſſarium eſt ut de facto velit. For neceſſarium eſt ſine quo res eſſe non poteſt: Therefore the non poteſt is preſent wherever the neceſſarium is wanting. But if they talk only of a paſſive or obediential power, and ſay, [Man can believe becauſe God can make him believe,] and ſo denominate man Able to do that, which they mean God is able to make him do, this is but to play with words.
II. His ſaying that now there is no ſufficient grace, is before diſproved, and by him not proved. That it is the ſame with that of the ſtate of Innocency, is vainly ſaid: It is the ſame in general, as man is the ſame; and Intellect and will the ſame: But to be able to live without ſin, and to be able to forbear one ſin or to hear a Sermon, or do one commanded act, are not the ſame. And to hold none but this with Pelagius, is not all one as to hold this with a more ſpecial grace.
And that it is pernicious to the lapſed is raſhly ſaid: For in the reprobate it doth them no harm but good; and in the elect it tendeth to higher grace. And he miſtaketh in ſaying that it ſuppoſeth nature ſound: For if it were proved that nature without grace hath no good inclination, yet why may not unſound nature, receive grace ad poſſe? Is not that grace ſome cure of its unſoundneſs? and tends to more?
III. But as to his ſaying that the more men have of it the more miſerable they are, and the more damnable, and that no man ever uſed ſufficient grace or will do, I anſwer, 1. The good man it ſeemeth forgot that all the ſame may be ſaid as truly of his ſpecial Grace, both in them that come ſhort of faith and Juſtification, and them that apoſtatize from it (as he holdeth many do.) 2. But it is not true, that having it maketh them damnable any more than having life, health and riches; but it's the abuſing it. 3. That never any uſed ſufficient grace, by his leave and the School-mens, is unproved: viz. that no man ſince the fall ever did any good, or forbore any evil, obediently, by ſuch grace as left him able to have done otherwiſe in the inſtant before the act, or as inferred not his volition as neceſſary exviillius cauſae. 4. And that all that which cometh ſhort of the effect, is none of the Grace of Chriſt is unproved, unleſs he mean only the adequate immediate effect. The Law doth make Duty, and ſo hath its effect; And Gods motions make their various Impreſſions on the ſoul, and ſo have their effect: But whether a Godly mans will could not by that ſame motion have produced a better effect in his will than was produced by it, he muſt better prove.
Ad XII. I. Whereas Paul oppoſeth the Law of works, and the Grace of Chriſt, he oppoſeth, or too far diſtinguiſheth the Law of Chriſt and the Gra…e of Chriſt; Juſt as Sir H. V. in his Meditations. He taketh all ſpoken and written precepts or Laws, to be the Law, which is diſtinguiſhed from Grace, which is meer Alteration of the ſoul. But this is confuſion, and ſubverteth true Theologie. For the Law is the inſtrument of ſignifying Gods mind, and the Spirit worketh with and by it on our minds: And both go together both before the fall and under Chriſt: And both are Grace now even as body and ſoul are one man: The Goſpel is oft called Grace in the New Teſtament: It's true that a Law meerly as a Law may be diſtinguiſhed from the Spirits operations on the ſoul: And ſo Paul and Auguſtine oft ſhew that the Jewiſh Law as a Law could not make men righteous without grace. And we deny not but the Law of Chriſt meerly as a Law is inſufficient without the Spirit… Grace. But to conclude hence that this is the difference between the Old …ovenant, and the New, and the Righteouſneſs of each of them (of men under them), that one is obedience to a written Law▪ and the other is the effect of the Spirit, is not ſound: For under each Covenant there was both Law and Spirit, though with difference. Adam had Grace as Janſenius confuſſeth: And the Fathers before the Flood had Law and Spirit. And the Godly …ews had Law and Spirit: And all Chriſtians are ſubject to Chriſt their King, and obey his Laws, though by the Grace of his Spirit: And it is not two Righteouſneſſes that relate to Law and Spirit, but one as an effect of two concauſes; The doctrine of faith and Law and promiſes of Chriſta…e the Means which the Spirit uſeth in operating our Faith, Love and Obedience. And it is not two Covenants that give theſe two: but as ſoul and body make one man, ſo the Word of Chriſt and his Spirit make up one total cauſe of our ſanctification. The Spirit cauſeth us to believe that which the Word revealeth, and to love the good which it propoſeth, and to obey the Precepts of the Word: Therefore the Goſpel is Grace, and the Spirit is Grace, that is, a free gift of God to miſerable ſinners for their recovery, and inward holineſs is the effect of both. And to feign that all obedience as it is performed to Chriſts Law upon its proper motives is therefore not of the Spirit, or is our own Righteouſneſs oppoſed to Chriſts, becauſe our own reaſon and free-will is exerciſed in it, is Phanaticiſm, and ſubverteth the Goſpel, and the Prophetical and Kingly Office of Chriſt.
II. God never gave a Law, no not to the Jews, only to convince them that they could not keep it; but to be the Rule of their obedience; And the Juſt did keep it in ſincerity. But the Law of Moſes as ſeparated by the ignorant Jews from the promiſe and grace of Chriſt could not be kept by any to Juſtification. To ſay that Chriſts Laws now have no higher end than to tell us that we cannot keep them, is Antichriſtianity. Are we commanded to repent, believe, love God, only to tell us that we cannot do it? It's true, that without the Spirits help, we cannot. But it's as true, that the Command is the Rule of our duty, and all the Goſpel and Covenant of Grace, is the means of exciting us to our duty, by which the Spirit worketh in us faith, repentance, love and obedience. But, ſaith Janſenius, the Law of Chriſt is to humble men in the ſenſe of their diſability, and drive them to ſeek to Chriſt for his grace. I anſwer▪ 1. Is not humbling men, and driving them to Chriſt, a good effect? If ſo, then his Law is the means of all that good. 2. Were the Goſpel and all the Apoſtles Epiſtles written only to drive men to Chriſt, and not to edifie them and make them perfect to ſalvation? Were not the Precepts of Love and Holineſs means of working Love and Holineſs in men? Is not the Word the ſeed that begetteth men to eternal life? and is not the receiving of this ſeed into good and honeſt hearts, made by Chriſt the cauſe of holineſs and ſalvation? Were not the Diſciples clean by the word that Chriſt ſpake to them? and doth he not ſay, that his Word was ſpirit and life, as being the concauſe of the Spirits vivification? He that never received more benefit by Chriſts Doctrine, Law and Goſpel, than to be convinced that he cannot believe, repent, obey or love God, hath not yet the benefit which they are principally intended for.
But ſuppoſe that by Law he had meant the meer penal part or threatning (as ſome words would make a man ſuſpect:) 1. It's a ſtrange deſcription of a Law, to exclude the precept and premiant part, and include only the penal part which is the laſt and leaſt. 2. As it is the ſame Man that hath Love and Hatred, Hope and Fear, ſo it is the ſame Law of Chriſt which hath precept and prohibition, promiſe and penalty: And it is the ſame Holineſs, or New Creature which is a conformity to all together. Of which more anon.
III. He can never prove, that all unbelievers have no Power to …e any means which tendeth to …aith, by a preparatory grace; nor that the uſe of all ſuch means is Impoſſible to them.
XIII. His diſtinction of Natural and Moral Impotency is good▪ But then that Moral Impotency it ſelf muſt not be made the ſame with the Natural: elſe there will be the ſame reaſon for excuſing ſin by it. If mans Will had been made by God ſuch as could not poſſibly love him or holineſs, it would not have left a man unexcuſable in judgement, that his enmity was Voluntary: It is reaſon enough for a man to kill a …oad or Serpent as malum ſibi naturale, becauſe it is a hurtful creature; But this is no Moral Evil in them, nor is their death their puniſhment: nor yet in any ravenous creature, which preyeth on the reſt that are innocent. And ſo would it be with bad men, if God had made them bad▪ Indeed if Adam have made them all bad, and God have given no Saviour▪ Grace or Remedy, they are con…emnable and unexcuſable, as they were virtually in Adam, if judged only by the Law of Innocency as made to Adam: But they are excuſeable if judged by Chriſt by the Law of grace, which condemneth no man meerly as not innocent, or a ſinner, but as a rejecter of grace. Theſe things are ſo plain and weighty, that Ja…ſenius ſhould not joyn with the Antinomians in oppoſing them.
XIV. While he confeſſeth that Chriſt ſo far dyed for all, as to procure them all the mercy which he giveth them, I have no further quarrel with him, but to prove that a Condition pardon of ſin and grant of Life eternal, with much means and help to make men perform the Condition, which is but a ſuitable Acceptance, is indeed mercy.
XVI. That Chriſts grace is Love, or Complacency in good, is a truth which I highly value: but with all theſe exceptions to his doctrine. 1. It is the Heart of the new Creature, and that which muſt communicate it ſelf to all the reſt, or elſe they are lifeleſs and unacceptable: For the will is the man in Gods account; And complacency, or love, or appetite is the firſt act of the will; which is it that he calleth with Auguſtine Delectation: Grace lyeth principally in a Placet. But the man hath more parts than his Heart: And all other parts of ſanctification are graces of Chriſt▪ in their ſeveral places, and not love only.
2. Though no man is to love himſelf as God, nor inſtead of God, nor above God, nor as the nobleſt ultimate object of his love▪ yet all men are neceſſitated by nature to love themſelves; and therefore to deſire their own felicity in loving God, next to God as the final object of that love; And ſo our end is finis amantis vel amicitiae which includeth mutual complacency and union, though not in equality. And to ſuch an end, grace cauſeth us to uſe the means: And Chriſt is propoſed to us as our Saviour, and all his grace as for our good, and all Gods commands as neceſſary for our happineſs, and ſin is deſcribed to us to be hated as our o… evil and deſtruction, and againſt our good as well as againſt Gods will and honour. And with us this is denyed ſcarcely by the Antino…ians themſelves: Much leſs by any judicious Chriſtians.
3. It is paſt the reach of any of us, to prove that our actual love is the firſt effect of the ſanctifying Spirit on the ſoul. I mean not only, Whether ſome other acts (as Intellectual perception, and belief) be not in order of nature before it, and in time with it, and real parts of the ſame new creature, but alſo, Whether a… Alvarez and others ſay, there be not ſuch a divine motion or Impulſe on the ſoul tending to this love, and antecedent to love it ſelf, in nature, (love being an effect of Gods will and m…s,) which J…ſ…nius denyeth.
But 4. If it be not ſo, but really love be the firſt effect of God on the ſoul, then the controverſies are all at an end, about the difference of ſuffici…t and effectual, equal and unequal grace. For then it would be as Ja…ſenius ſaith, and there is no grace but the effect it ſelf, and ſo there would be no queſtion, but Whether all men love God, and all alike. But I yet believe that there is ſoe preparatory grace of Chriſt which tendeth to the love of God.
XVI. I believe that the will is the prime ſeat of Morality, and that love or complacency is as the ſpirit of all ſaving ſpecial grace. But yet it is ill ſaid, that Chriſts grace is neceſſary only to love or delight. For the ſoul of man hath three faculties, which muſt be conjunctly ſanctified, viz. Vital active power, Intellect and Will; and ſin is in all; And the Spirit reneweth them by a threefold effect, Vivification, Illumination and Converſion (or love.) And hatred of ſin, and fear of ſinning, and of God, are graces of Chriſt alſo, (as are obedience, patience, &c.) though below love.
2. There is an Analogical good that is done by ſelf-love and fear, which hath a tendency to mans recovery, though not ſuch good as is true holineſs and hath a promiſe of ſalvation.
XVII. I. Here we come to a difficult caſe: 1. Whether indeed any ungodly man or Infidel, do love God ſincerely amore amicitiae & propter ſe: The doubt is, becauſe to love him leſs than ſinful pleaſures and the creature, ſeemeth to be a loving him as leſs amiable or good. And to love him as ſuch, is not to love him as God, nor indeed to love God, but an Idol of the imagination. I think we muſt ſay, 1. That no man loveth God adequately; for no man hath an adequate conception of him. 2. But yet that there are ſome eſſentials of ſuch true love as is neceſſary and ſuitable to our dark and weak condition, which all muſt have that will be ſaved (either diſtinctly or confuſedly): As to know and love him as the Infinite Spirit the firſt cauſe and laſt end of all, moſt powerful, wiſe and good, our Owner, our Ruler and our Benefactor and chief good: Father, Word and Spirit; the Creator, Redeemer and Sanctifier; the Author of Nature, Grace, Glory. 3. That no wicked or unholy perſon truly loveth God thus, viz. As his own Governour to make him holy, and ſave him from the Fleſh and World: and as the Author of thoſe holy Laws, by which he governeth, and a righteous Judge according to thoſe Laws. 4. Therefore Janſenius's little ſincere Love in ſenſual men is but a love of aliquid Dei, ſomewhat of God, and not properly of God as God: ſpeaking of God as the object of love it ſelf. 5. Yet the ſame perſon may have all the …or…ſaid Notions of a Deity, and may notionally call them all good and laudable; but his Practical Judgement is not ſuch of God as his holy Governour, Judge and End, as to bring him truly as ſuch to love him. 6. Yet this may be called a Love of God analogically, as he is ſaid to love the King who loveth him as great and good to the Common-wealth, though not as a governing reſtrainer of his luſts. By this I would have that explained which I have ſaid of this ſubject in my Saints Reſt.
II. But here I am at … further loſs. Did he mean that this love called ſincere, is in none but thoſe that are ſaved o… not? As I ſaid before, If he did, then a common Drunkard, Adulterer, &c. may have this love and be ſaved: But I ſuppoſe he meant Negatively: And if ſo, methinks hence all his oppoſition to ſufficient Grace turneth back upon himſelf: And to him it may better be ſaid, Why do you feign Chriſt and the Holy Ghoſt to give men ſuch a Grace, ſuch a Love to God, as no man ever was or will be ſaved by, without more? Is it any more diſhonour to Chriſt, to give men ſome ſuch Power to do ſome more good …han actually they do, as Ad…m had to have continued innocent, than effectually to give ſo many perſons ſincere love which ſhall never ſave the…? (Whether theſe be they that he will adjudge to Purgatory I know …: If ſo, he will ſtretch the rank of Venial ſins to thoſe that other men call Mortal.)
III. But yet my greateſt difficulty remaineth: I am in doubt Whether he that denyeth common ſufficient grace, and extendeth the grace of Chriſt ſeemingly but to few, do not really either make it the ſame thing with Nature, or extend it to all: For I ſuſpect that all or almoſt all men on earth, (till they have ſinned themſelves into diabolical deſperate malignity) have this which he calleth Amor amicitiae and ſincere imperfect love to God and Juſtice. For Intellectus eſt Entis & veri intellectus, & Voluntas eſt Boni. Good apprehended ſuch, is the Wills neceſſary natural object. And a ſimple complacency in apprehended good, is the wills firſt neceſſary act. Nature telleth man, that there is created goodneſs; and that the Creator who giveth it, muſt needs have more than all his creatures: And nature tells men, that the World, or millions are better than one perſon; and their good to be preferred: And how can it be then, that he that taketh the World to be ſo much better than himſelf, and God to be better, that is, more amiable than all the World, ſhould not have the leaſt ſimple complacency in thinking of him▪ All men take Wiſdom and Goodneſs, and Beneficence for amiable: And they that believe that God hath moſt of theſe, muſt needs have ſome Love to him, not only as good to them, but as moſt excellent in himſelf: Inſomuch that as Adrian the ſixth before cited ſaith, in ſome ſort a bad man may love God better than himſelf; and he is ſcarce worthy the name of a man, that would not rather be annihilated, or wiſh that he had never been born, than that there were no World, or no God, (if per impoſſibile he ſuppoſed he could live without them.) And if you tell every man that he hath that ſincere love to God which is Gratia Chriſti, who hath the leaſt love to God and Juſtice propter ſe, though he have more love to his fleſhly intereſt and ſinful pleaſures, I doubt you will not much differ from Pelagius, and will have no way left but to ſay, that it is not of Grace by Chriſt that Nature is reprieved and ſupported: Or at leaſt that this is of a common ſort of grace. We may preſume of many things as received from our Teachers: but it is hard to prove, that Adam the next moment after his ſin was totally deprived of all degrees of love to God, and goodneſs, and ſo was privatively as bad as Devils; or that all mankind are naturally ſo: Though I believe that it was of grace, even Gods firſt pardoning act as our Redeemer, not ſo totally to execute the Law, nor take away his grace, and leave man to the utmoſt penalty of his ſin, but to keep nature from being as bad as elſe it would have been. But ſure Man is Man ſtill, and not a Devil: And I ſpeak with few or none that ſeem not to have ſome liking of God and goodneſs, or Juſtice as ſuch; though they love not God or goodneſs, as contrary to their fleſhly luſts, nor love God as their Sanctifier and Ultimate End. And thus the Carnal Mind is Enmity to God, being not ſubject to his Law, though this be conſiſtent with loving him ſecundum quid.
IV. I believe him that there is a faith, ſuch as the Devils, which may be without Juſtification, both in habit and act: But that the ſame Faith which after juſtifieth, can be many years Habitually before Juſtification (that is, Sanctification as he meaneth it) I believe not: Seeing God hath promiſed that all that believe (thus) ſhall be juſtified and have his Spirit.
V. Janſenius ſeems to me to ſet too light by Habitual Grace, as if it were ſome common thing in compariſon of the Act: Whereas I take a Habit of love to God to differ from an act, either as a Spring or Rivolet from a drop, or as Honeſty from an honeſt act, or Learning from a learned exerciſe, or as a fixed friendly Inclination which is like to Nature, differeth from a friendly action, and to be more excellent than a particular act.
XVIII. His judgement of the Matter of the Reward (that it is but God himſelf ſeen and perfectly loved for himſelf) is of great uſe: But yet it is both lawful and ex individuationis principiis & ex natura humana neceſſary that we take and deſire this as our own felicity, and ſo under God intend our ſelves. And quoad rationem praemii it is the Reward of a Rewardable ſtate or work, and therefore of the free act of a creature not meerly neceſſitated: It may be a gift without Reſpect to our Liberty and Obedience, but not a reward: But it is both a gift and a Reward.
XIX. That Fear and its effects are good, and yet not of Chriſts grace; that they are of Gods Spirit, but not the Spirit given by Chriſt, but the grace of ſome other Providence; All this I take for unſound and injurious to Chriſt and grace. Where doth the Scripture tell us ſince the fall, of any grace given to the World but by the Redeemer, who is Head over all things to his Church? If you ſay, that God can give men the grace to fear him and depart from evil without a Saviour or Mediator▪ how can you prove, that he may not do ſo by the reſt? Either he giveth this grace as Rector according to his Laws or not: If not, then on the ſame reaſon you may feign that moſt men are not his ſubject;, nor under any Law of God; and ſo ſin not, nor are puniſhable: If yea, then it is according to the Law of Innocency, or of Grace, (For if Moſes Law as Jewiſh be called a third, it is nothing to our caſe.) If it be by a Law of grace, it is Chriſts Law, either of the firſt Edition, called the Promiſe, or of the ſecond, called the Goſpel: The Spirit and grace (in various meaſures) given by both, are of Chriſt. It's a dangerous aſſertion, that there is any, yea, ſo much grace, which is not Chriſts: It prejudiceth me againſt Janſenius's Opinion, that it ſhould caſt him on ſuch abſurdities, as to deny ſo much of the grace of Chriſt, while he pretendeth to honour it, and to ſet up ſuch a feigned way and ſort of grace without a Saviour, and yet ſpeak ſo hardly of the Pelagians as he doth for wronging grace.
2. As Fear is one of mans natural paſſions, though but ſubſervient to love: ſo the ſanctifying of it is one part of the Work of Chriſts Spirit.
3. I am ſure Chriſt himſelf commandeth Fear, Luke 12. 4, 5. Heb. 4. 1. & 12. 28, 29. & paſſim. And is it our own Legal Righteouſneſs to obey the commands of Chriſt? Indeed if Fear were all, or had no conjunct hope and love, it would be Legal, and ſhew the Spirit of bondage, from which Chriſt delivereth us by the Spirit of Power, and Love, and a ſound mind, which are the fruits of the Spirit of Adoption: For Moſes Law ſeparated by the Infidel Jews from the Law of Grace or Promiſe of a Juſtifying Mediator, could have no better effects than Fear: But Abraham that believed and foreſaw Chriſts day, rejoyced in that Faith, and yet had a Law of obedience which had its penalty; and ſo hath the Law of Grace which we obey.
XX. Of Free-will I have ſaid enough before: Natural Liberty as diſtinct from the Moral freedom from ſin and ill diſpoſition, is ſure more than meer Voluntarineſs: And I think if God gave Satan or man power, to take away from a Saint all his Habitual and Actual love of God and goodneſs, whileſt antecedently the perſon did hate ſuch a change and pray againſt it, by making him willing of evil, and making a Devil of him remedileſly, he would take away or croſs the Natural as well as the Moral Liberty of his will, though it were Willingneſs that were cauſed. If any think otherwiſe, remember that it is but de nomine, for de re we are agreed, that ſuch a change would be our great miſery.
XXI. I take it to be the commendation of Janſenius, that he renounceth the Dominicans Phyſical Efficient Predetermining Premotion, as naturally neceſſary to all actions natural and free. But his habitation, converſe and worldly intereſt tempted him factiouſly to calumniate Calvin, leſt he himſelf ſhould become odious with his own party, and ſo miſs of his expected ſucceſs; which hath prevailed alſo with Gibieuf, Arnoldus and moſt other Papiſts to do the like, when they differ from their Brethren.
XXII. He well ſaith, that Permiſſion of the firſt ſin is no effect of Reprobation: But his ordination of Gods acts into [this Before and that After] and ſo his differencing the Election of Angels and men, I fear hath ſomewhat in it preſumptuous and unproved.
In concluſion, I much miſlike in Janſenius, 1. His contempt of the Sacred Scriptures, as being not properly Chriſts Laws, but ſome odd occaſional Writings, his Laws being only in the heart and tradition.
2. His ſlighting of Habitual Grace comparatively, which yet is indeed Chriſts Law and Gods Image in the heart.
3. His …eigning a new or odd ſort of grace (fear) which is none of the grace of Chriſt, no not preparatory to his higher work, but a grace of ſome other Providence.
4. Conſequently that there are men (yea, moſt) who are no ſubjects of Chriſt, nor under any Law of grace by Chriſt, and yet not under the meer Law of Innocency; and therefore are under ſome other Law (who knows what?) or lawleſs.
5. His damning all that periſh meerly for Original Sin, and its neceſſitated conſequents, which no man had ever the leaſt power to avoid.
6. His aſſerting that Angels and Adam had ſufficient Grace, and Free-will, by which the Angels did, and Adam could have perſevered in Innocency and never ſinned: And yet that ſince the fall, no ungodly man hath ſuch help and free-will to any one better act than he doth, nor the holieſt perſon to any better than he doth; but the beſt Saint is leſs able to do one better act, than Adam was to keep all the Law.
7. And ſo his conſequent, that it is properly impoſſible for any man in the World, good or bad, to do any better than he doth.
8. That all they love God ſincerely amore amicitia who love God and Juſtice propter ſe as amiable in himſelf, though they love their filthieſt ſins ſo much better, and all their fleſhly worldly intereſt, as that they have but an uneffectual wiſh that they could leave them.
9. That we muſt not ſay, that Chriſt giveth men either a Power to do better than they do, nor yet that Grace of Fear which they have, (as being below him); And yet muſt ſay that he giveth multitudes this uneffectually ſincere love, which never ſaveth them.
10. That a Habit of true faith may be many years in a man before i… juſtifie him: when as the word [true] muſt mean ſome other faith, or elſe that ſame will never juſtifie him which did not juſtifie him ſo long.
11. His Antinomian or Phanatick diſtinguiſhing Law and Grace, as if Chriſt had no Precepts or Laws, but Operations; or elſe his Goſpel and Covenant in ſignis were no part of his Grace.
12. And thence his fiction that all that which is done by any Grace ad poſſe, and in obedience to Chriſts written Law, is a Legal Righteouſneſs of our own, and no part of Chriſts Righteouſneſs.
Theſe with what elſe I have before diſclaimed, I diſlike in Janſenius his way: And yet think that a man that can well diſtinguiſh words from things, and will not be deceived by ambiguous terms, may ſhew that even he and his adverſaries are not ſo far diſagreed as they ſeem. E. g. Whether Chriſt dyed for all? They are agreed that he dyed to procure for all ſo much Grace or Mercy as he giveth them; and that among theſe a conditional Pardon, and Gift of Chriſt and Life, is one, &c. And they agree that he dyed not with any abſolute intent of giving them any more than he doth give them. What remaineth then, but the Controverſie de nomine, Whether this much be fitly called, his Dying for all? which Scripture putteth out of doubt. The like I might ſay of many of the reſt of the differences.