Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable, Conclusion · Section 4
§. IV. II. Of Durandus's way.
II. AS to the way of Aureolus, Durandus, Ludov. à Dola, &c. I conceive it is commonly rejected, becauſe not underſtood, or becauſe the wording of it ſoundeth diſgracefully; But it is a great matter that all confeſs, how eaſily it would end all theſe controverſies, were it true. And by Lud. à Dola's Explication, and what Capreolus ſaith of Aureolus, I conceive that they are commonly miſtaken. Durandus thinketh, that to the motion of the Creature it is neceſſary 1. That God by his continued No doubt but God is quoad praeſentiam Immediate in all his efficiency, and as Near to the effect, as if he uſed no ſecond cauſe: But yet he is not ſo immediate as to exclude ſecond cauſes, as media: And while he uſeth them, he operateth on us according to their kind of operations, even as if they were between him and the effect. And this is the ſenſe of Durandus and à Do…a, and eaſily reconcileth all. Amyraldus de lib. Arbit. c. 4. concurreth with Durandus. It is conſ…derable that all confeſs, that if Durandus's way did hold, it eaſ…ly ended all the controverſie. As Lud. le Blank noteth Theſ. 3. de Concurſ. Juxta hos doctores nulla eſt difficultas in conciliando divino concurſu cum libertate, &c. And this way is as conſiſtent with Gods certain diſpoſal of events as predetermination it ſelf.influx continue the being and the nature and properties of the agent; 2. And that he continue all the circumſtant creatures, concauſes and objects and the media of action; 3. And that no powerful impediment hinder the action. Now, ſay the Jeſuits and Dominicans and the reſt, God doth moreover concurr as the firſt cauſe to the Act it ſelf, by an Immediate efficient Influx, beſides that by which he upholdeth the Power and ſecond Cauſes. But I think that Durandus meaneth as much as they: that is, that God doth not only uphold the creature in its meer eſſe, but in its Nature, which is its Mobility, and its principium motus; And this Nature is not only a Power to Action, but alſo an Inclined Power. So that for God by conſtant Influx to continue a Natural Power and Inclination to Action or motion, with all neceſſary concurrents, without impediments, is truly by his Influx to concurr to the motion as the firſt Cauſe; while his Influx is not only as to Being, but as to the Motive force, and inclination: And no more than this doth ſeem to me to be ſimply neceſſary to motion.
Here the Reader muſt know, that the Controverſie is equally of Natural and Free agents and action. And firſt let us enquire of natural action.
I. Fire is an Active nature, as much Inclined to Action as Earth to non-action or reſt. Yea, its Active Virtue and Inclination is its very Eſſential Form, and this as to a threefold action, viz. Motion, Light and Heat. If God then make Fire and continue its Nature or Eſſential Inclination For I have before ſhewed how many wayes this is certainly done. The whole experience of the world ſheweth, that God doth operate by ſecond cauſes according to their natures and wayes of operation; Therefore it more concerneth us here to know, what ſecond cauſes do on the ſoul in good and evil actions, than in theſe diſputes is uſually obſerved. Adrian. Quodl. 3. fol 18. Sententia Durandi & plurium aliorum certum tenet, &c. Quam opinionem ultimo tradit Magiſter 37. d. 2. judicium relinquens prudentis lectoris examini.to theſe acts, and continue fuel approximate with all neceſſary concauſes and media without impediments, to ſay that this Fire yet cannot burn or act, without another kind of Divine premotion beſides all this, even an Immediate phyſical impulſe, beſides the deſcribed Influx, is a plain contradiction: For Fire is eſſentially an Inclined Power to act. And that▪ which hath a true Power to act, can act: It's a contradiction to ſay, It hath power, but it cannot. And a Power naturally inclined to act, will act, caeteris paribus.
The queſtion then is, Whether it be an impoſſibility for fire to burn▪ if God do but as the firſt Cauſe of Nature, continue its burning power▪ and inclination with all concauſes? or rather, Was it not a Miracle for the three Confeſſors, Dan. 3. not to be burnt in that fiery Furnace▪ If you ſay, that the Miracle was, in Gods withholding his additional premotion, you then imply that God as principium vel cauſa prima Naturae doth ordinarily give that additional premotion. For that is no Miracle which is not diſſonant from the common courſe of nature. But nothing can belong to God as the Cauſe of Nature, but to continue Nature as he made it, and he actually premoveth and concurreth while by his Influx as the firſt cauſe, he continueth all its Moving Nature, both Power and Inclination.
In the motus projectorum, ſo far as the moving vis impreſſa continueth and prevaileth, the motion continueth accordingly; And who can prove that though the vis impreſſa continue, e. g. in a Bullet ſhot out of a Gun, and all concauſes, yet there can be no motion, unleſs God otherwiſe thruſt it on, or move it by ſome other impulſe▪
Suppoſe a Stone or Rock hang in the Air quaſi per filum, or by ſomewhat that hindereth its deſcent: If God continue the Natural Gravity of that Rock, which is not only a power but an inclination to deſcend, and if he continue all concauſes and media, and if the thred be cut or the impediment removed that held up the ſtone, yet ſaith the Dominican, this Stone cannot fall unleſs God moreover by another action thruſt it down, or▪ by an efficient phyſical premotion predetermine it; or as▪ the Jeſuits ſay, unleſs God concurr with a further moving Impulſe. A plain contradiction: That a Power of motion, ſtrongly inclined to act, ſo as a greater power is neceſſary in the impediment that will hinder it, and this in genere Agentis, continued by Divine Influx, yet cannot act, unleſs otherwiſe moved.
God worketh ſo conſtantly by Natural Inclinations of ſecond cauſes, as fully proveth to us, that ut prima Cauſa Naturae, he hath decreed ſo to work. And how is that then but by his Influx into Nature as Nature?
If my houſe cannot fall when the foundations and pillars are gone, unleſs God otherwiſe thruſt it down; If I cannot fall though I leap down from the houſe top, unleſs God otherwiſe thruſt me down; If the Town cannot be fired unleſs God predetermine it or concurr, beſides his continuation of Nature; why ſhould we fear it; when we know not that God decreeth any more than the continuation of natural cauſes and that action which is by them, and by him as the upholder of them?
II. And the caſe of Free-agents is here confeſſed to be the ſame. The Influx into their Natures and Virtues is it that continueth them in eſſe ſubſtantiali and in eſſe movente & moto: An Act is but the modus ſubſtantiae. And it ſurpaſſeth my underſtanding to conceive what it is, for God phyſice influere in actum immediate, & non in potentiam ſeu virtutem agentem: nor how he can be ſaid to move the faculties to act, that doth cauſe the act and not meddle with, (and therefore not move) the faculty. Nor know I how an Act immediately (and not the agent) can be the terminus of a phyſical motion. Though it's eaſie to conceive how God ſhould cauſe an act by moral and extrinſick objective means. Therefore, as God moveth things Natural by his Influx into their moving Virtues, or into the moving Virtues of ſecond Cauſes, which being Active operate on paſſive matter; ſo as the Soul and its Will is quadam natura inclined to Action in genere, and to will good in ſpecial, God as the cauſe of nature moveth it by his Influx into the faculty, as he doth other natural agents: But having made it a Free ſelf-determining Agent, his Influx upholdeth and moveth it as ſuch: And the ſame Influx is upholding and moving, and moving as upholding; ſeeing God as Motor alſo, doth influere in naturam vitalem & liberam. Beſides which ſupporting and moving Influx, no other predetermining premotion is neceſſary to an Act as an Act, (that I know of.)
But the very natures or diſpoſitions of lapſed man being depraved, the reparation of them is neceſſary to holy actions; And here alſo God operateth on the faculties, by right diſpoſing them, and by that grace which Auguſtine and Janſenius well call Gratia medicinalis, (his ſpecial Influx cauſing, maintaining, and actuating it) he cauſeth the holy actions of believers.
I do verily believe, that Durandus and his followers, under the name of ſupporting the natural and free faculties, did mean incluſively that which Bellarmine pleadeth for, A General Concurſe to the Act as an Act; And that they differ in words and not in ſenſe.
And if his doctrine hold not true, I cannot ſee how God can be ſaid to Permit mens ſinful Actions, or any action at all. For if neither the Inclination of natural agents, (as of Fire to burn, a Stone to deſcend, &c.) nor the Inclination of the moſt wicked nature, would cauſe any act, unleſs God otherwiſe cauſe it by premotion; then there is no place for Impedition, (for we cannot be ſaid to Hinder a Stone from ſpeaking, or a Mountain from walking, nor anything from any act which it could not as): And permittere is non impedire. And therefore Gods moving a man to the Act of ſin, is not a permitting him to ſin; Motion being one thing, and the not hindering of motion, another thing (or nothing.)