Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable, Section 9

Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable · Section 9

p. 27SECT. IX. Of Predeſtination and Free-will (of which ſee more Sect. 20. againſt Mr. Rutherford.)

158. THough Pre-determination belong to Gods Execution, and be after his Volitions in order, yet becauſe I am now only to ſpeak of it, as a pretended medium of his knowledge of ſin, and as quid decretum, I ſhall touch it here. It is confeſſed that there is no ſubſtance which God is not the Maker of (beſides himſelf); Nor any Action of which he is not the firſt Cauſe.

159. God may well be called the perfect firſt Cauſe of humane Actions, in that he giveth man all his Natural faculties, and a Power to Act or not act at this time, or to chooſe this or that, and as the Fountain of Nature and Life and Motion, doth afford his Influx neceſſary to this free agency. So that when ever any Act is done, as an Act in genere, God is the firſt Cauſe of it: For it is done by the Power which he giveth and continueth, and by his Vital Influx; And there is no Power uſed to produce it which is not given by God.

160. An Act as ſuch, hath no Morality in it, but is quid naturale; And ſo it is from God as he is fons naturae. But the Morality of an Act is formally the Relative Rectitude or obliquity of it, referred to Gods Governing Will or Law, and to his amiable Goodneſs or Will as it is mans End. And Materially it is (not the Act as ſuch, but) the Act as exerciſed on an unmeet object rather than on a meet one, or to an undue End rather than a due End, or elſe the Omiſſion of the Act as to the due End and Object, which is the ſin, and the fundamentum of the ſinfulneſs; and ſo è contra.

161. This Comparative mode of exerciſe addeth no proper Phyſical Entity at all to the General nature of the Act as ſuch. In Omiſſions (of Loving, Truſting, Fearing, Serving God) there is no Natural Act, but a privation of it. In committed ſins, to Love this Object rather than that, hath no more Natural Entity than to Love that rather than this; and no more than is in the general nature of Love as ſuch. A modus Entis is not Ens: But this Comparative choice, is but the Modus Modi entis: For an Action is but Modus Entis, and this is but a modus actionis.

162. It is therefore an invalid argument which is the All of the Dominicans, that Man ſhould be a Cauſa prima, and ſo be God, if he could determine his own will without Gods pre-determining pre-motion; and there ſhould be ſome being in the world which God is not the Cauſe of: For this morality and modality is no proper being above the Act as ſuch.

163. If any will litigate de nomine entis, let them call it Being or nobeing as they pleaſe; but it is ſuch as God can make a Creature able to do. And he that dare ſay that God Almighty who made all the World, is not Able to make a Creature that can determine his own will to this object rather than to that, under Divine Univerſal Influx, without Divine pre-determining pre-motion, on pretence that his wit doth find a contradiction in it, is bolder againſt God, than I ſhall be. And if God can do it, we have no reaſon to doubt whether it be done.

164. Men ſeem not in denying this, to conſider the ſignification of the word **It is a contradiction therefore of Dr. Twiſſe who oft ſaith, that God denyed to Adam no grace ad poſſe, but he denyed him grace neceſſary ad agere: For he hath not the Power who hath not that which is neceſſary to the act. Vid. Rad. li. 1. Cont. 29. art. 1. pag. 457.[POWER] when they confeſs that God giveth man the Power to chooſe or refuſe, and yet ſay that it is Impoſſible for him to Act by it, without the ſaid pre-motion. If ſo, It was only a Power to Chooſe when p. 28predetermined to it. He that hath a proper Power to Chooſe, is Able to Chooſe, and Can Chooſe, by that Power.

165. God therefore is truly the firſt Cauſe of the Act by Giving the Power, and doing all that belongeth to the fons naturae to the exerciſe. And he is the firſt Cauſe of our Liberty in making us free-agents; and he is the firſt Cauſe of the Moral Goodneſs of our actions, by all that he doth by his Laws, Providence and Grace to make them good. But he is no way the firſt Cauſe of them as evil.

166. When we ſay that God cauſeth the Act of ſin as Cauſa univerſalis, **Bellarmin's Univerſal Cauſe, ſeemeth the ſame wi… what Durandus meaneth. And Pennottus denying Durandus's opinion, ſaith, l. 4. c. 16. p. 212. Non quod evidenter ſequatur ex hac opinione dari duo prima rerum principia: Multi enim Philoſophi, ut Plato, Ariſtot. …gnoverunt unum primum principium omnium, & tamen non agnoverunt iſtud primum principium eſſ… cauſam immediatam omnium eſſe…luum Cauſarum ſec…ndarum.the ſenſe of this word muſt needs be opened by this diſtinction. A Cauſe is called Univerſal, 1. In praedicando, Logically; And ſo Artifex is cauſa univerſalis rei artificialis, & Statuarius eſt Cauſa particularis, & Polycletus eſt cauſa ſingularis hujus ſtatuae. 2. In cauſande, as to the effect. And ſo that is an Univerſal Cauſe, whoſe cauſality extendeth to many effects. And this is two-fold: 1. When it is the cauſe of ſome-what common to all thoſe effects, but not of all that is proper to each, unleſs its cauſality be otherwiſe (as by the diſpoſitio recipientis) determined. And ſo the Sun is cauſa univerſalis of the ſweetneſs of the Roſe, and the ſtink of the Dunghill, &c. And ſo God is the Cauſa univerſalis ut fons naturae, by his common ſuſtaining and moving Influx, of all ſinful actions, 2. When it is the Cauſe of thoſe actions, not only as to that which is common to them all, but as to that which is proper to each by which they differ from one another, and that of it ſelf, and not as determined by the diſpoſitio recipientis, or by any other cauſe. And ſo God is the Univerſal Cauſe of all that is meerly phyſical in all beings and actions; As in Generation, &c. which is properly to ſay that he is at once, both Cauſe univerſalis, particularis & ſingularis. And how far he is thus alſo the Cauſe of all the moral Good of all Actions I muſt open to you more diſtinctly in the third part. But of the ſinful morality of Actions he is not ſuch a Cauſe; but only a meer Univerſal as aforeſaid.

167. They that denying our ſelf-determining power, do make Volition, and free-Volition to ſignifie the ſame, and Cogency to be nothing but to make men willing and unwilling both at once in the ſame act, do ſeem rather to jeaſt, than ſeriouſly diſpute. And to define Free-will, to be only Lubentia vel Volitio ſecundum rationem, is no other. For Velle juxta rationem, is no more than Velle; the Will being the Rational Appetite diſtinct from the ſenſitive. And if Velle and Libere Velle be all one, why do we blind the World with words, and do not plainly put the caſe whether man hath any will, and not whether his Will be free? And if to take away its Liberty or conſtrain it, be nothing elſe but to make the ſame numerical act which is a Volition ſimultaneouſly to be no Volition, or not the Volition of another thing, the queſtion whether the will may be conſtrained is ridiculous. If the will be not forced as long as it willeth, or willeth juxta rationem, then to queſtion whether it can will by conſtraint, is to queſtion whether it can at once will and not will; ††Of this ſee Ie Blanks excellent Theſes de lib. arbitrio abſolut. The definition of Alvar… of Free-will is [lib. arbitrium eſt facultas voluntatis & rationis ad utrumlibet agendum vel non agendum & agendum unum vel alterum] which Rivet reſteth in, and fitteth the doctrine of neceſſitation; but I think expreſſeth not Liberty ſtrictly taken: It may be ad utrumlibet if Satan had a power to move it as I move my pen. Bellarmine's is [lib. arb. eſt libera poteſtas ex his quae ad finem aliquem conducunt unum prae alio eligendi, aut unum & idem respuendi vel acceptandi pro arbitrio noſtro ad magnam Dei gloridm conceſſa] which Paraeus diſſenteth not from. But all defining is vain, …ill the ambiguous word [Freedom] be diſtinguiſhed, and the ſenſe accordingly variouſly ſtated.yet is this deſcription only of Liberty and conſtraint too common with ſome.

168. But if this were ſo, then ☞ 1. The ſuſpenſion of the will might be nevertheleſs by force or reſtraint: which is a non velle; And ſo when they ſay Voluntatem ab ipſo Deo non cogi poſſe, becauſe when it acteth it acteth willingly, (that is, when it willeth, it willeth) the conſequence holdeth not, becauſe it may be forced from all action: (unleſs they mean that it cannot nolle & non agere at once). 2. And if this were ſo, then either they mean that God cannot naturally neceſſitate the will to act, or that ſuch a natural neceſſitation conſiſteth with its Liberty. If p. 29the firſt, they deſtroy their doctrine of Predetermination: For what is that but Gods Phyſical irreſiſtible efficacious premotion, determining the will to act? And what is natural neceſſitation if this be not? If the latter, then they contradict their own definition of Liberty, which they oft give us, that it is Liberty from natural neceſſity (which Twiſs calleth Libertas naturae diſtinct from Libertas conditionis, vel civilis.) And what more natural neceſſity than that which refulteth from that premotion of God as the firſt cauſe of all action, without which no agent natural or free can act, and which none can reſiſt?

169. Their opinion of Liberty alſo leaveth no difference between bruitiſh appetite or ſpontaneity, and free-will, ſave only that this doth follow reaſon: which indeed is a difference of Guides, but not of Liberty.

170. And according to this opinion, if God gave Satan power to move any mans will to ſin by as true a phyſical motion and as unreſiſtible as I move my pen, it were no conſtraint, nor loſs of natural Liberty, becauſe it is moved to be Willing.

171. And if they lay all on the Acts congruity to the Habit or Inclination, then if Satan could infuſe unreſiſtibly into the Will, an Inclination to hate God or to any ſin, and then phyſically determine it according to that inclination, it were no force, or loſs of natural liberty.

172. But I think he that by irreſiſtible efficiency makes a mans will wicked both in its Inclination and Acts, doth incomparably more againſt him and his liberty, than he that could force his tongue or hand againſt his will, or he that only tempted and perſwaded him.

173. The grand Reaſons why we cannot receive the Dominicans doctrine of predetermining premotion, are elſewhere given; I now name but theſe three, 1. Becauſe (whatever vain talk is uſed to blind men) it maketh God the ſole-total-firſt-neceſſitating cauſe of all the ſin that is committed in the world, or can be. 2. It unavoidably deſtroyeth the Chriſtian faith: For if God be really the ſaid determining Cauſe of all lyes and other ſins in the world, then his Veracity which is the formal object of faith, is gone: And no mortal man can tell whether Prophets and Apoſtles are predetermined to ſpeak true or falſe, nor when God moveth them to the one or the other: For to Call their motion by the name of Inſpiration, will ſatisfie no man, that Gods Inſpiration can do any more (at leaſt to intereſt himſelf in the act) than his neceſſary phyſical premoving determination. 3. Becauſe it feigneth God to damn moſt of the world for not-conquering God, who inſuperably predetermined them to the forbidden act; that is, for not being Gods, or greater than God: And that he ſent Chriſt to die only for thoſe ſins which he thus pre-moved us to irreſiſtibly, and it was as impoſſible to forbear, as to touch the Moon.

174. In the iſſue of all theſe Controverſies, the ſharpeſt contenders ſeem agreed, whether they will or no: Arminius granteth that all events of ſin or damnation are from eternity neceſſary neceſſitate conſequentiae, **Bonavent. in 1. d. 38. q. 1. Reſol. Praeſcientia Dei rebus praeſcitis neceſſitatem non imponit cum …o modo res cognoſcat quo futurae ſunt—Duplex eſt neceſſitas: Abſoluta quae opponitur Contingentiae, dicitur neceſſitas conſequentis: Respectiva dicitur neceſſitas conſequentiae: & haec non opponitur contingentiaeut ſi ambulat, movetur—In praeſcito non eſt neceſſitas abſoluta, ſed ſolum conſequentiae. Nicol. D'Orbellis 1. d. 38. dub. 1. Duplex eſt neceſſitas, Conſequentiae & conſequentis: Bene ſequitur neceſſitate conſequentiae, Deus novit me cras ſeſſurum, ergo ſedebo: conſequens tamen eſt contingens—ut homo currit, ergo movetur. Nos concedimus Liberum arbitrium in …o quod agit, liberum eſſe ab omni neceſſitate, ut proprie non poſſit neceſſario agere quoad exercitium ſui actus; quamvis respectu Divinae ordinationis certo & infallibiliter agat. Ameſ. Bellarm. Enervat. To. 4. l. 4. c. 1. He meaneth it of a cauſed phyſical neceſſity, no doubt.which is (as is ſaid) but a Logical neceſſity in ordine probandi: that is, It is a good conſequence, [This God fore-knoweth, ergo it will come to paſs:] And it is only the neceſſitas conſequentis which he denyeth; (which Rob. Baronius Metaph. calleth neceſſitas cauſata, and I had rather call neceſſitas effecti) which is in ordine productionis. And Dr. Twiſs doth ſharply reprehend him for feigning that he or any others do aſſert any more than neceſſitas conſequentiae: And bringeth in the teſtimony of many Schoolmen profeſſing concordantly that there is no more than this, which alſo fore-knowledge it ſelf will inferr; It's worth p. 30the reciting: Vindic. Grat. Li. 2. p. 1. Digreſ. 5. [Quid quod ab eruditis eadem ſtatuitur neceſſitas ab utra que profluens, tam à praeſcientia Dei quam ab ipſius Voluntate. Nam licet Arminius voluerit neceſſitatem à Dei voluntate profectam eſſe neceſſitatem Conſequentis, à praeſcientia verò promanantem duntaxat Conſequentiae; aliter tamen viſum eſt magnis Theologis. Sic enim Durandus [Non bene dicunt illi qui dicunt quod omnia de neceſſitate eveniant per comparationem ad Voluntatem divinam; quia omnia reſpectu Voluntatis Divinae eveniunt libere; & ideo abſolute loquendo poſſunt non evenire.] Expreſſius Bonaventura [Dei voluntatem abſolutam neceſſe eſt impleri; conditionalem verò minime: ſed advertendum quod eſt neceſſitas conſequentiae, ſicut praedictum eſt de praeſcientia: Ipſa enim non habet neceſſitatem conſequentis ſed conſequentiae; Quia neceſſario infertur & ſequitur, Deus praeſcivit hoc; Ergo hoc erit: Sed tamen non neceſſario praeſcit: quia in actu praeſciendi frequenter notatur effectus contingens. Sic intelligendum eſt quod Voluntas Dei abſoluta connotat eventum rei, & ideo eſt ibi neceſſitas conſequentiae: ſed non conſequentis; quia non mutat eventum rei—unde ſicut praeſcientia quia neceſſario infert effectum, non poteſt falli: ſic voluntas abſoluta quia neceſſario infert (that is, in arguing) non poteſt impediri.]Annatu… de ſcient. Med. cont. Twiſs de Libertate cap. 6. ſeemeth not to underſtand him, as to this Neceſſity conſequentiae, which is not at all Cauſal of the event, but of the Concluſion in arguing; Leaving it out, from whence the event is.

Ita Trigoſius in ſum. Theol. Bonav. [Effectus contingentes & liberi ſi comparentur ad ſcientiam, providentiam, & Voluntatem Dei dicuntur neceſſarii ſecundum quid, ſive ex ſuppoſitione, quae neceſſitas vocatur conditionalis & conſequentiae, non tamen abſoluta & conſequentis.—Quoniam iſtae conſequentiae ſunt optimae [Deus praeſcivit hoc futurum, Ergo erit: Deus vult aliquid fieri; Ergo fiet eo modo quo voluerit, & quando voluerit; Quia non ſtat dari antecedens verum & conſequens falſum.]

Iſtis ad amuſſim congruentia ſunt Aquinatis illa [Quamvis Voluntas Dei ſit immutabilis & invincibilis, non tamen ſequitur quod etiam effectus ſit neceſſarius neceſſitate abſoluta—ſed ſolum conditionata, ſicut & de praeſcientia dictum eſt.] But the word [effectus] here is more than the reſt ſay.

And more fully ibid. ſect. 18. pag. (Vol. min.) 230. [Quid quod Scholaſtici, nominatim vero Aquinas & Durandus (nec quenquam novi aliter ſentientem, N. B.) non aliam agnoſcunt neceſſitatem rerum, ratione Voluntatis Dei, quam quae dici poteſt neceſſitas conſequentiae.]

And yet plainer ibid. ſect. 18. pag. 332. c. 2. [At ea neceſſitas quam juxta noſtram ſententiam oriri putat Arminius ex Decreto Dei, revera non tam ex Decreto Dei fluit, (quod monuit Perkinſius, & vere,) quam ex ſuppoſitione decreti divini, in Argumentatione ſcilicet: quoties ſcilicet poſito decreto Dei de re aliqua futura, legitime infertur neceſſe eſſe ut ſuo tempore futura ſit. At hujuſmodi neceſſitas nihilo minus evincitur ex ſuppoſitione actus liberi cujuſcunque quam ex ſuppoſitione decreti Divini: etenim poſito quod exiſtat actus liber, neceſſe eſt ut exiſtat.]

175. We are all agreed then what Neceſſity it is that fore-knowledge, decree, and providence inferr as to the acts of ſin: viz. of Logical conſequence. Let them now but make it good that their Phyſical efficient predetermining premotion cauſeth no other, and I will contradict it no more.

176. But whereas they conſtantly ſay that God predetermineth mans will to the mode as well as to the act, that it be done freely as well as that it be done; if Willingneſs and freedom were all one, I would grant it, on their grounds. But if an Immediate-Phyſical-predetermining-efficient premotion, and an invincible cauſation of Habit and Act by the firſt Cauſe, p. 31bring no other neceſſity but of Logical ſequel, and be no real cauſe of the thing it ſelf, I confeſs I underſtand not what they mean, nor know what Liberty is, if the will have not a Power to act without ſuch a Predetermination.

177. The ſame I ſay of Camero's and others way of predetermining by Vid. Bellar. de lib. arbitr. l. 3. c. 8. prop. 6. Pennot. propug. li. 1. c. 23. p. 46, 47, &c. Scot. 2. d. 25. Henric. quodlib. 1. q. 16. Bannes 1. p. q. 83. a 1. dub. 2. Cont. 2. Suar. Met. q. 19. ſect. 6. Vaſquez 1. p. d. 67. n. 14.a chain of neceſſitating Cauſes, viz. that God by the object neceſſitateth the act of the Intellect in ſpecie. 2. And that the Intellect neceſſitateth the will. For all cometh to one, if all ſinful Volitions be neceſſitated. Nor will it ſatisfie any man well that Camero doth reſolve all mans ſin into the Devils temptation as a neceſſitating cauſe, till he know into what to reſolve the Devils ſin: And he may turn Manichee in time that can believe that God gave the Devil power to neceſſitate innocent man to ſin, and bring all ſin and miſery on the world; much more he that ſaith, that God did all this himſelf.

178. As there is Libera Voluntas, and Liberum arbitrium, or Libertas Voluntatis, & Libertas hominis, ſo there is a coaction or conſtraint of the Co-action in ſenſu compoſito is a contradiction and impoſſible: but not in ſenſu diviſo; to be forcibly or by unreſiſtible power made willing of unwilling. Yet in a large ſenſe I confeſs that Voluntarium quà tale eſt liberum.Will and of the Man. I ſhould take my Will to be conſtrained, if by an unreſiſtible power it were ſuddenly made impious in act and habit, or either. But the man is not ſaid to be conſtrained, ſo long as he hath his Will.

179. The unhappy deſcriptions of free-will, which I mentioned, Janſenius hath To. 3. li. 6. de Grat. Salvat. cap. 5. & 6. And Annatus de Incoacta Libertate confuteth them at large: As [Implicat contradictionem ut Voluntas ſeu Volitio non ſit libera, ſicut implicat ut Volendo non velimus. Latet Contradictio in eorum dictis qui dicunt Voluntatem, id eſt, Volitionem eſſe poſſe quae non ſit libera. Apud Auguſtinum eſſe liberam, & eſſe aliquam hominis & Angeli Voluntatem ſeu Volitionem pro iiſdem prorſus uſurpantur. Voluntas ſeu Volitio, & libera Voluntas idem eſt, ſicut & Velle & libere Velle: & Impoſſibile eſt ut Velle non ſit liberum—] Lege etiam Annatum & Petavium Cont. Vincent. Lerinenſ.; & Pennoti propugnacul. haec plenius tractans.

180. The Liberty of the will conſiſteth not in ſuch an Indifferency as Leg. Guil. Camerar. Scot. Disp. Philoſ. Moral. qu. 4. for Gibie…fs ſence of Liberty as not involving defectibility.leaveth it in aequilibrio equally inclined to this or that (As Macedo againſt Tho. White confeſſeth with others;) For then all Habits or Inclinations to this rather than that, deſtroyed Liberty: But in an Indetermination with a Power of ſelf-determining: which power is called Indifferent, becauſe it is a Power to this or that, and not becauſe it is equally inclined, no nor equally a Power to either. For there may be inequality.

181. When Dr. ††Twiſs. de Scient. Med. l. 2. c. 3. p. 265. Annat. de Scient. Med. Disp. 1. c. 6. §. 5. p. 135.Twiſſe with Bradwardine **Vid. Bradward. l. 3. c. 10, 11. & paſſim.about the definition of freewill, (which poſitis omnibus ad agendum requiſitis poteſt agere vel non agere) limiteth [omnibus] to ſecond cauſes, Annatus playeth upon his overſight, as if he ſaid that [Agere poſſet voluntas ſine requiſitis ex parte cauſae primae.] But no doubt Dr. Twiſſe meant the limitation as to the non-agere only: and that with the explication [non quaſi motio Divina ſit inter ejuſmodi prae-requiſita quae voluntatem creatam indifferentem relinquat.] Though indeed we cannot imagine that the cauſae ſecundae ſhould operate and ponere omnia ad agendum requiſita ſine prima. And we may well ſay indeed that Voluntas poteſt non agere, if the ſecond cauſe only do its part, when non poteſt omnino agere. This therefore ſhould be better opened.

182. If by [omnibus requiſitis] be meant only [merè neceſſariis ſine quibus agere non poteſt Voluntas] this taketh not away the Moral (much leſs the Natural) Power ad agendum vel non-agendum, nor p. 32neceſſarily determineth it. But there may be ſuch an effectual or **That Auguſt. Anſelm…, I …mbard, Aquin. Scotus, held ſome Liberty con…ſtent with neceſſity, ſee their words cited by Pennottus li. 1. c. 15. p. 32. And ſo doth Alph. à Caſtr. adverſ. Hereſ. in …b. Liberl. for which ſee Rada … 1. moſt accur…tely.potent operation on the will, as ſhall Certainly and Conſtantly determine it, by cauſing to determine it ſelf: and antecedently take away its Moral power ad contrarium, though not its Natural. Of the difference between the Natural and Moral power, I ſhall ſomewhat inſiſt, and elſewhere more at large.

183. The Natural Liberty of the Will muſt be diſtinguiſhed from its Moral Liberty (from evil diſpoſitions) and its Political Liberty (from reſtraining Laws.)

184. The Natural Liberty ſeemeth to ††Quid ſit Libertas, vide Ockam Quodl. 1. q. 16. & Soncin. Meta. l. 9. q. 17. & Scot. 1. d. 39. lit. F. & Waldenſ. Doct. ſid. antiq. li. 1. c. 25. & Medin. 1. 2. q. 6. art. 2. Bannes 1. p. q. 83. art. 1. dub. 2. concl. 2. prob. 4. and many deſinit. cited by Pennottus l. 1. c. 33. p. 63. Vid. Pennol. l. 1. c. 3. five ſenſes of Liberty: But it is no perfect diſtribution. And whereas cap. 14. he maketh only Election as diſtinct from Volition (in four reſpects) to be the formal act of the Will as free, it is true as freedom is taken in the narroweſt ſenſe, as above-cited: But there is a freedom alſo of all Volitions: And there is One common Notion of Liberty which is a genus to both. And he confeſieth that the will ad finem is free quoad exercitium actus.conſiſt in theſe three things; 1. That the Will as a finite dependent Creature, be a Power given and upheld by God of ſelf-determining or morally ſpecifying its own acts, without any neceſſitating Pre-determiner (Divine or humane.) Where note that all Divine Predetermination taketh not away that Liberty: But not to be able to determine it ſelf without Divine Phyſical Efficient Predetermination, is inconſiſtent with its Natural Power and Liberty. 2. Liberty containeth the Wills Empire over the inſeriour faculties (reſpectively with variety, Deſpotical or Political.) 3. To be from under the power of any creature, as to neceſſitation.

185. As the Poſſe Velle hoc vel illud, velle aut non velle (in quibuſdam) ſine divina vel alia extrinſica praedeterminatione, is the Wills Natural Liberty, ſo not to be pre-determined to ſin, (in act or habit) by God or creatures, is the Wills Political Freedom, or Libertas Condition is, as Dr. Twiſſe calleth it: which God himſelf hath given it, and never taketh away from it.

186. And to be Habitually and Actually Holy, is the Wills Ethical Liberty; which all men have loſt ſo far as they are corrupted by ſin: and all men have recovered, ſo far as they are ſanctified by Grace. This is the Free-will which Grace reſtoreth to us.

187. Habits do not determine the Will infallibly per modum nature, or neceſſitate its act. Becauſe a man oft acteth contrary to habits.

188. There are ſome things which Natural Inclination infallibly cauſeth the Will to determine it ſelf to, without the loſs of its primary natural Liberty.

189. For all Liberty lyeth not in ſuch an Indifferency as Morally may fall either way: But a certain Natural Liberty is conſiſtent with a conſtant certainty of ſelf-determination ex Inclinatione Naturali, as 1. To a ſimple **Aug. de Nat. & Grat. cap. 46. Perquam abſurdu…n eſt ut ideo dicamus non pertinere ad Voluntatem noſtram quod beati eſſe volumus, quia id omnino nolle non p…ſſumus:—nec dicere aud…mns ideo Deum non Voluntatem, ſed neceſſitatem …aòere juſtitiae, quia non poteſt V…lle pectar…. He that would fully ſee the ſenſe of Auguſt in, Proſpen and Fulgentius de …ibert. with leaſt labour, let him read all their own words in Paul. Iren. his …ias Patru….Volition of our own felicity; 2. As to a ſimple Volition Boni ſenſibilu quà talis. 3. As to a Volition medii unici, noti, ubi nihil repugnat.

190. And yet here, I mean but quoad ſpecificationem actus: For quoad exercitium it may be omitted. 2. I confine it to ſimple Volition, which may conſiſt with ††The common doctrine that Election or comparate Volition is only de Mediis, is falſe: No one thing is neceſſarily our end. God is refuſed by the wicked: Felicity may be refuſed if put in competition with pub-lick good or Gods will. He is a Beaſt that would not chooſe to be annihilated, rather than the World or Kingdoms ſhould be annihilated. But the ſimple Volition here is neceſ…ary.Comparate Nolition of the ſame thing.

191. Some Habits are ſo ſtrong, that (with the Concurrence of convenient objects and circumſtances,) the Will doth never act againſt them; and though they do not abſolutely neceſſitate, nor take away the Natural power ad contrarium, yet do they conſtantly procure that power to determine it ſelf well or ill according to them, as reſembling a Natural In…lination in ſome degree.

192. That which is commonly called Liberty is not the greateſt excellency of the will or felicity of man; An indifferent and undetermined ſtate, is a middle ſtate between that of Brutes and Angels, and is fitted to a Viators condition. But ſo far as Grace and Holy Habits fix the will to a conſtant certain ſelf-determination to Good, ſo far is it ſet in ſuch a Liberty of excellency as Gibieuf deſcribeth, above our ſtate of looſe indifferency.

p. 33193. Becauſe Order is neceſſary to a clear and full underſtanding, and all our controverſies are indeed reſolved into this of Free-will, I will here delineate it, as I underſtand it.

I. FREE-WILL as to the Quid nominis is ambiguous as to the Object, and is

I. Libertas proprie dicta: Quae ſemper eſt Libertas ab aliquo Malo, viz.

I. A malo Effecto viz.

1. A Peccato 1. Actuali 2. Habituali.

2. A Miſeria 1. Privativa 2. Poſitiva.

II. A Mali Efficiente

I. Phyſice.

I. Supra nos: (Deus Optimus Malum peccati non efficit.)

II. Intra nos: Ab inclinatione Naturali determinante ad malum.

III. Extra nos, viz. à

1. Perſonis.

1. Angel…s

1. Bonis, qui nec volunt nec poſſunt.

2. Malis: qui non poſſunt.

2. Hominibus: qui non poſſunt.

2. Rebus: Objectis, &c. quae non neceſſitant.

II. Moraliter.

I. Supra nos: (Deus peccatum non Cauſat moraliter.)

II. Intra nos

1. Ab ipſius Voluntatis

1. Prava Inclinatione.

2. Malis Habitibus.

3. Actibus, (ad pejus ducentibus.)

2. Ab ignorantia & errore Intellectus.

3. Ab inferiorum facultatum (ſenſus, phantaſiae, &c.) tentatione.

III. Extra nos, viz. ab

1. Angelis

1. Bonis: Qui neminem ad malum alliciunt.

2. Malis: 1. Quoad tentationum ſpecies: 2. Gradus.

2. Hominibus, viz.

1. Ne Tyrannide 1. Bona vetent, 2. Mala praecipiant.

2. Ne falsâ doctrinâ Intellectum corrumpant.

3. Ne practicè nos tentent 1. Illecebris 2. Nocumentis.

3. A Rebus 1. Terrorem incutientibus, &c. 2. Allicientibus.

III. A Cauſa Mali Deficiente, viz.

1. Deficientia Phyſicâ:

2. Deficientia Morali

diſtinguendâ, ut antè de Cauſa efficiente videre eſt.

p. 34II. Libertas Improprie dicta: cum illud dicitur Libertas

1. Quod Majus quid eſt, ut Dominatio.

2. Quod Minus: utpote Boni nihil continens:

viz.

I. Ad ſupra, viz. Libertas

1. A Dei Gubernatione, per Leges & judicium.

2. A Dei Attractione & Determinatione Gratioſa & finali.

3. A Dei Dominio & diſpoſitione arbitraria.

II. Ad Intra, Libertas

1. A Voluntatis Inclinatione naturali ad Bonum naturale.

2. A Voluntatis Habitu Confirmato, & Perfectione, Inclinante ad bonum ſpirituale, Deum ſcilicet, ſanctitatem, coeleſtia.

3. Ab Intellectus Lumine, ſpecificante actum per Boni intuitum.

III. Ad Extra, viz.

1. Libertas ab Angelorum Gubernatione & Auxiliis.

2. Ab Hominum

1. Inſtructione per doctrinam.

2. Regimine neceſſario per Leges.

3. Auxiliis amicis (in ſpiritualibus, &c.)

3. A Bonitatis Objectivae determinante attractione.

I mention all theſe Objective Diſtinctions, as about the Common uſe and abuſe of the Name of LIBERTY or Free-Will, that you may be able to examine mens words that ſhall mention it.

p. 35194. II. As to the thing it ſelf: paſſing by our, 1. Moral Liberty from Sin. 2. Our Political Liberty from reſtraints of Rulers. 3. I ſhall ſpeak only of the Natural Liberty in hand: And there ſhew

I. Quid ſit, viz.

I. Eſſentialiter.

1. Voluntatem eſſe ſub Deo principium propriae determinationis, & actuum ſuorum Dominam, potentem ſe praedeterminare ſine neceſſitante praedeterminatione, Divinâ vel extrinſecâ.

2. Imperare caeteris facultatibus (ſed diverſe.)

3. Abſolute, directe & proprie, nulli ſubjici praeter Deum,

viz.

I. Ab extra.

1. Non Angelis vel Daemonibus.

2. Non Hominibus, imperantibus, ſuadentibus, &c.

3. Non Objectis, (ſicut eſt appetitus brutorum.)

II. Ab intra.

1. Non ſenſibus vel phantaſiae, dum objecta praeſentant.

2. Non Paſſionibus; (tametſi moleſtiam ei faceſſant.)

3. Non Intellectui: Qui dirigit; non imperat.

II. Conſequenter.

I. In voluntate: Hinc nihil poteſt

1. Imprimere ei malas Inclinationes, nec auferre bonas.

2. Efficere malos Habitus, aut auferre bonos (neceſſario.)

3. Determinare eam ad Actus malos neceſſario.

II. In Perſona: Et ita Perſonae Liberum Arbitrium eſt, Me

1. Bonum vel Malum morale poſſe agere, ſi velim.

2. Poſſe Mereri ſi velim, & malum non commereri poſſe invitum.

3. Poſſe foelicem eſſe ſi velim, & non Infoelicem niſi Voluntario peccantem.

II. Qualis ſit: Eſt que Libertas Voluntatis,

I. Conjuncta cum neceſſitate conven… ente naturali,

1. In Volitione ſimplici ſeu Amore propriae foelicitatis,

2. In Volitione ſimplici ſeu Amore Boni ſenſibilis,

3. In Volitione Medii unici foelicitatis, omnimode boni,

Quoad Actus ſpecificationem.

II. Separata à neceſſitate naturali, viz.

1. In Subjectione & Amore erga Cauſam primam (Creatorem.)

2. In Volitione ſimplici Dei ut Finis, & Boni ſpiritualis.

3. In Electione Finis ubi plures praeſentantur.

4. In Electione Mediorum ubi diverſa offeruntur.

5. In Actu Intendendi finem electum, quoad Exercitium.

6. In Uſu Mediorum, & facultatibus ſubditis imperandis.

III. Quotuplex ſit Libertas Voluntatis; Eſt que

1. Libertas Contradictionis, vel Exercitii, viz. Velle aut Non-velle; Nolie a…t Non-nolle.

2. Contrarietatis, ſeu ſpecificationis quoad Actum, viz. Velle aut Nolle.

3. Competitionis, Comparationis, vel Contrarietatis, vel ſpecificationis, quoad Objecta: viz. Velle aut Hoc aut Illud; Nolle Hoc vel Illud.

p. 36195. If any man will diſpute about Free-will named and not defined or Vid. D'Orbellis n. 2. d. 25. d…. 2. d… diſtinct. lib… a…bit…ii.diſtinguiſhed, nor tell us in what ſenſe he taketh it; or if Divines will tediouſly and fiercely diſpute An ſit, before they Agree or prove, Quid ſit, they are fitter to be pittied, than to be read or heard.