Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable, Section 10
SECT. X. Of Natural and Moral Power as fore-ſeen.
196. ANd having here anticipated the Doctrine of Free-will, I will (as fitteſt for the Readers uſe) connex the Difference of the Natural and Moral Power of the Will or Man, as it cometh under Preſcience and Decree.If you will put the queſtion, Whether homo lapſus ſine auxilio gratiae po …it reſiſtere gravi tentationi? Vel An poſſit eſſica…iter diligere Deum ſine gratiae ſpeciali auxilio, &c. The Schoolmen will ordinarily ſay, No, as well as Proteſtants. Vid. Careres Sum. Theol. 22. cap. 1. p. 11, 12, &c.
Power is called Natural in all theſe reſpects: 1. Becauſe it is in our Natures and we have it from our birth. 2. Becauſe it is eſſential to the ſoul. 3. Becauſe it operateth per modum merae naturae, quantum in ſe, and not freely. Mans ſoul hath three Powers called Faculties, The Vital-Active, The Intellective, and The Volitive Power: Of which the two firſt are natural in all theſe three reſpects, in themſelves conſidered: But the Will is natural only in the two firſt reſpects; And ſo are the other two ſo far as they are imperate by the Will, being, as imperate, participatively Free.
197. Power is called Moral, 1. Becauſe it is it ſelf Morally Good or Evil, as a Diſpoſition of the ſoul. 2. Becauſe it is a Power to Moral Actions. 3. Becauſe it is not called A POWER in the ſtrict phyſical ſenſe, but Morally, that is, Reputatively, called Quaſi Potentia.
198. Two things are called a Moral Power: 1. The Natural Powers themſelves, not ſimply as Natural, but as thus Morally qualified. 2. The Moral diſpoſition of the Natural powers.†Natura humana, e…uſque potentiae Naturales, quamv…s mere naturales ſint, ſibi innatam proſerunt potentiam receptivam gratiae, immo …tiam potentiam activam …x ſe aptam ut ſimul cum divino auxilio vitalit…r producat ſupernatural…m actum fidei, charitatis, &c. Ruiz.
199. Morality is firſt ſeated in the Will, and from it our Power is firſt called Moral: But yet it is ſecondarily in the other two faculties.
200. As to Dr. Twiſſe his ſaying, that Potentia non fundatur in Potentia, (Moralis ſcilicet in Naturali, and as others ſay, Accidens non fundatur in accidente:) I anſwer 1. Potentia univocè ſic dicta non fundatur in potentia: But this is not ſuch. 2. It is falſe that accidens non fundatur in accidente, as the inſtance of Relation proveth: The term [Accident] is indeed ſo ambiguous, as proveth that the diſtribution of all things firſt into Subſtance and Accidents is not genuine and congruous, but inept. If you will call Calor, Lumen, or Motus Accidents, and call Gradus alſo an Accident, and then ſay, that Caloris, Luminis, Motus, non dantur diverſi gradus, becauſe Accidentis non eſt accidens, you are not to be believed. And if you will ſay that Ordo is an Accident, and that Qualitatum, Actionum, &c. non datur or do, it is falſe. 3. But the worſt of the error is, that the Natural Powers are called Accidents, which is a falſhood of very ill tendency in many reſpects: They are the very formal Eſſence of the ſoul. And ſurely the ſoul may have its Good or Evil Diſpoſitions.
201. There is in the very Eſſence of the Natural Power or faculty, beſides the Vis vel Virt…s agendi, a certain Natural Inclination to ſome things, which is Inſeparable from it, from which the Schoolmen ſay even of the Will that it is quaedam Natura, & pondus animae. So the ſoul is Inclined or propenſe (and not only Able) to Activity as ſuch, to Intellection as ſuch, to Volition as ſuch; and objectively to Truth as ſuch, and to Natural Good and felicity as ſuch. And there is an Inclination of the ſoul, which is not eſſential and inſeparable, but is much under the power of the Will, and may be got and loſt.
202. This adventitious Diſpoſition, is found in the ſoul in various Degrees: 1. When it is in ſuch a Degree only, as that immediately and properly without any other power added, the will may be ſaid to be Able to Act thus or thus, then it is called a Moral Power: But when it is in ſuch a degree, as that we are Diſpoſed to Act promptly and eaſily, it is called a Habit.
203. He therefore that is ſo far diſpoſed to any Good act, and whoſe Indiſpoſition, or diſpoſition to the contrary, is but ſuch, as that in his preſent ſtate, without any more help than *Yet the Jeſuits themſelves (as Ruiz ubi ſup.) are not ſo much for the neceſſity of prediſpoſition, but that they confeſs that Grace oft taketh occaſion of things natural, or indifferent, yea, of heinous ſins themſelves. And that the beginning of Juſtification (Sanctification) is not from the ſtrength or endeavours of nature, but from Grace he largely proveth in the whole diſp. 17, 18. as Vaſquez and Suarez and other Jeſuits alſo do.he hath, he can move his own will to the ſaid act, and the difficulty is not ſo great, but that ſuch Power ſometime doth overcome it, is ſaid to have a Moral Power. But he that wanteth not Natural force or power, but only a right Diſpoſition of his Will, and ſo far wanteth it, as that none in his caſe do ever change their own acts to good, without more help and power than he hath, is ſaid to be Morally unable or impotent: and not only to want the Habit.
204. Whether the Natural Powers be properly called A Power to Believe, Repent, Love God, &c. without the Moral Power or right diſpoſition? though it be a queſtion of ſome uſe among the Contenders about theſe matters, yet it is chiefly de nomine, and therefore of the leſs moment. This is to be granted of all de re, †Of this ſee Mr. Truman's Treatiſe of Natural and Moral Impotency, and Mr. William Fenners notable though popular Tractate of Wilful Impenitency.that Unbelievers want not that Natural Power or faculty, which can Believe and Repent if duly ſuſcitated and diſpoſed: But through an Ill Diſpoſition and contrary courſe of action, and want of due excitation, that Power will not Act, without Gods ſpecial Grace. Which [Will not] ſignifieth, 1. The Undiſpoſedneſs, 2. The Non-agency: And in ſtricteſt ſpeech, the former is beſt expreſſed by [The Will is undiſpoſed and averſe to Believe, &c.] and the latter by [The Will doth not conſent.] But the firſt may be expreſſed by [It cannot] becauſe it will not come to paſs: Though it is no ſuch [Cannot] as is diſtinct from [Will not] but the very ſame. And as [Power] is diſtinct fom [Will] and a man is ſaid to be Able to do that which [he can do if he will], ſo no doubt but he that Will Believe and Repent, can do it, ſo far as he is Willing. And this is it that Auguſtine ſo much pleadeth for, when he would have us diſtinguiſh [Cannot] and [Will not], and when he ſaith, that Poſſe Credere eſt Omnium; Credere autem fidelium.
205. To the fuller opening of this, note the following Concluſions.
No man doth that which he cannot do, at that inſtant.
206. Humane (and all created) Power is dependent, and is not properly a Power to do any thing, but on ſuppoſition of Gods Emanant ſupport and concurſe, as he is the firſt Cauſe of Nature.
207. Humane Power is finite, and is not a Power ad omnia, but ad haec: which therefore are called Poſſible to us.
208. Power being a Relative word, it may be ſaid to be nullified ad hoc by an alteration of the Object only: As if you double the weight, that man may be Unable to bear it, who Could bear it when it was leſs: when the object is changed, and not the power indeed.
209. Power ſuppoſeth the due object and its due propoſal or ſtate. We have no Power to ſee inviſibles, to underſtand things not intelligible, to will things not apprehended to be good, and not ſo revealed, &c.
210. The three Conjunct Powers of the ſoul ſuppoſe each other, though they are not formally the ſame: We have no Power to Will objects not underſtood, nor to underſtand, will or execute without Vital-activity; nor to underſtand moſt things without the Wills determination ad exercitium.
211. The due qualification alſo of the Inferiour faculties (the Senſes, and Phantaſie, and Organs) is ſuppoſed to the being of true Power. We never had Power to ſee without eyes, no more than without Light. This Power of the Inferiour faculties ſome call Potentia ſecunda, as to the acts of the Superiour.
212. It is no true Power ad hoc, which is put to overcome a Greater oppoſing Power. We never had Power to overcome God, or to act againſt his pre-moving pre-determination (as Bradwardine truly ſaith.)
213. A man may be Able mediately to do that which he is not Able Immediately to do: I mean he that can write with a Pen, or move things with an Engine, and ſo act but as a partial, though Principal Cauſe, may not be Able to write without a Pen, nor to do the ſame alone as a Total Cauſe.
214. And a man may have Power to do that Mediately and Hypothetically hereafter, which he Cannot do Immediately, that is, at the preſent time. He can learn to write, and after can write, who cannot write till he hath learnt. Thus Infants have a remote Power of ſpeaking, and Infidels of believing.
215. No man Doth all that he is truly and properly Able to do.
216. No man doth all that he is Diſpoſed and Habited to. Sudden objects oft carry us againt ſtrong Habits.
217. A man ordinarily Willeth and Acteth according to the predominant Habits of his ſoul, if he have objects and means.
218. A man alwayes willeth that which he is ſoley diſpoſed to will, or moſt diſpoſed to will, at that moment; and which he apprehendeth ſub omnimoda ratione boni: Much more if he were perfectly Habited to it, in his Vitality, Intellect and Will.
219. No man acteth without the Eſſential fundamental Inclination to Good and to Natural felicity: But a man may by ſudden inſtigation and occaſions will that which before he had no particular diſpoſition to: A Power may be without a Habit.
220. No Good mans Habits here are perfect in goodneſs.
221. No Bad man here is at the worſt; nor deſtitute of all Moral Power to all things commanded him of God.
222. A bare Moral Power which cometh not up to be an Inclination or Habit, determineth not the Will of it ſelf.
223. Habits tend to the Wills determination per modum naturae, ut appetitus; But they are not ſufficient to it, or neceſſary determiners de eventu.
224. Weak Habits are oft born down: Strong ones rarely, yet ſometimes.
225. An unholy ſoul is much more Impotent as to the great Internal Acts of Loving God, delighting in him, &c. than to any meer external Act which the Natural Power extendeth to: And ſo are the regenerate in that meaſure as they are unrenewed.
226. But we are more able to Love or Will aright, than to Work and Do aright; becauſe here both muſt concurr, which requireth more Power than one alone. E. g. to Rule the Thoughts aright requireth more Power than to be Willing to rule them.
227. Yet in that meaſure that a man is Willing to do Good, he is Morally able, (and more than able) Becauſe Morality being firſt ſeated in the will, it is no farther Morally Good or Bad, than it is Poſitively or Privatively Voluntary. He that is ſincerely Willing, is ſincerely Abole, and he that is Perfectly Willing, is perfectly able (and more.)
228. Every mans Natural faculties may be called Moral Powers as to the Obligation, as being obliged by God to Moral Good.
229. And becauſe Obligation preſuppoſeth ſome true Power to obey, mediately or immediately, preſent or former when the Law was made, therefore mans Natural faculties, though undiſpoſed, are thus far called a moral power to the commanded act.