Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable, Section 8
SECT. VIII. More of Gods Fore-knowledge, and of Permiſſion of Sin.
140. BUt to leave this Wilderneſs, and ſpeak more of things certain, or ſuch as belong to us in our meaſure to know: It is certainly unknown to mortals, formally, what knowledge is in God (as is aforeſaid), and much more in what Manner he knoweth either Futures or Contingents, or any Creatures, ex parte ſcientis.
141. If any particular manner therefore offer it ſelf to your minds, as that which probably ſeemeth to be the right, it may afford you reaſon therefore to ſuſpect that it is not the right: Becauſe it is certain that the Manner is paſt our reach. And what man can comprehend is infinitely below God.
142. If the Caſe of Aarons Sons, the Bethſhemites, Uzzah, Uzziah, and others that preſumed too boldly to meddle with holy Rituals and Ceremonies was ſo dreadful; what is theirs that profanely toſs Gods own Name, and pretend to know that of himſelf, which they know not, and turn his ſecrets profanely into matter of Contention againſt the Churches of Chriſt?
143. Either Futurity as ſuch, is Intelligible in it ſelf to God, or elſe the things future are Intelligible as in Eternity; or elſe futurity is intelligible only in its Cauſes: We can think of no other way (but God hath more than we can think of.) If it be Intelligible in it ſelf, or as things are In Eternity, the Controverſie is moſtly ended: The perfection of Gods underſtanding then is proof enough that he knoweth all that is intelligible. But if it be only in the Cauſes, it is either as thoſe Caſes neceſſarily will Cauſe, or elſe as freely and contingently. The firſt Cauſe reacheth Pennottus propugn. l. 3. c. 11. n. 1. noteth, that even the reconciling of the certainty of Divine pre-ſcience with contingency, was quite paſt the power of mans underſtanding in this life, in the opinion of theſe ſubtile Schoolmen, Gabriel 1. d. 38. q. 1. a. 2. Ock…m ibid. q. 1. Marſil. 1. q. 40. How much more difficult will it be to reconcile Gods D…crees, and moſt of all his premotion if pre-determining with contingency? Plainly and honeſtly ſaith Bonaventure, in few words, in 1. d. 37. q. 2. Divina Cognitio quia à re non Cauſatur, nec dependet, ideo poteſt eſſe certa de re contingenti.not our Controverſie: For ſin hath no neceſſitating Cauſe, but free. The ſecond is the ſame difficulty with that in queſtion, viz. How God knoweth that a free undetermined Cauſe (mans Will) will this or that way determine it ſelf? Nothing is knowable to us as certain from an uncertain cauſe; which hath no antecedent reaſon to prove its future ſelf-determination to this more than to that.
144. If we go to the Jeſuites Scientia Media (as it deſerveth not that name, ſo) it is inſufficient to this uſe. For all thoſe circumſtances in which God ſore-knoweth that the will ſhall determine it ſelf, are ſuch as neceſſitate the will ſo to do, or not: If they ſay the firſt, they give away their own cauſe, and the cauſe of Religion (ſpeaking of ſinful Volitions). If the latter, the caſe is ſtill as difficult (and the ſame) as if they had never mentioned thoſe circumſtances or conditional knowledge: viz. How God knoweth that a will ſtill free and not neceſſitated will chooſe ſin rather than duty? For from non-neceſſitating circumſtances it followeth not.
145. If we go the way of Scotus, and ſay that he fore-knoweth it in the determination of his own will de rerum futuritione, either that will is ſuppoſed to be a Cauſing efficient will; or not? If it be, it reacheth not the caſe of ſin, ſeeing Gods will doth cauſe no ſin. But if not, then ſtill the difficulty is the ſame as before, How God that willeth the Event, but cauſeth it not, doth know that his Will ſhall be done? For it is not from the Cauſe to the Effect. To ſay that his own Immutability proveth it, is no proof: For if his Immutability Cauſe not, the Effect ariſeth not from it: And to ſay that his Omnipotency or Abſoluteneſs inferreth it, is no proof, unleſs his Omnipotency Cauſe it. And to ſay that it followeth Logically Neceſſitate Conſequentiae, though not Cauſally neceſſitate effecti vel conſequentis, that what God willeth to be, ſhall be, is moſt certain: And ſo is it from his fore-knowledge (which medium yet the Scotiſts ſay is here inſufficient.) But that is becauſe it is here ſuppoſed that what God ſo knoweth or willeth to be future, he willeth to be future by the cauſation of ſome Cauſe: for he willeth not any thing to be without a Cauſe. Beſides that ſtill ſin is not willed by him to be future at all.*See in Alliaco after cited the notable reaſons by which the Nominals confute Scotus in this opinion (which yet Dr. Twiſſe Praef. ad l. de ſcient. Med. ſaith did firſt invite him to School-divinity.)
146. And here I am to confute the foreſaid reaſon of Rada (recited Theſ. 130.) God, ſaith he, fore-knoweth ſin, in that he knoweth that he decreeth to permit it. And Dr. Twiſs often ſaith, that all confeſs, that Permiſſion certainly inferreth the event of the thing permitted. I anſwer; †This alſo Annatus de Scient. Media cont. Twiſſ. granteth him cap. 5. §. 1. But not as ex ratione permiſſionis, but by hypothetical Connotation, Becauſe we uſe the word Permiſſion about that which aliunde will be if permitted. So that it is a Compound notion, when thus uſed.There is not ſo much as any great appearance of the Truth of the conſequence unleſs limited. To Permit is nothing but non-impedire, not to hinder. And if a thing will come to paſs becauſe it is not hindered, then the world would have been made without God, and man ſaved without God, if he would not hinder it. Try if your work will be done meerly by your not hindering it.
147. Indeed the word Permiſsion is oft uſed as a complicate notion, ſignifying both the permiſsion and the event permitted: But that's nothing to the nature of proper permiſſion it ſelf.
148. A man may be hindered, 1. Morally; and that 1. By Commands, 2. By Threats, 3. By Promiſe and perſwaſion; 4. By Gifts; 5. By terrifying ſtripes on himſelf or others. In all theſe reſpects God permitteth not ſin, but hindereth it by them all.
149. 2. Or a man may be hindered Phyſically. And that 1. By to…al reſtraint and diſabling, 2. Or by leſſer impediments which make not the act impoſſible, but difficult. God doth not alwayes thus hinder ſin, and therefore thus he permitteth it. He doth not diſable the ſinner, e. g. to lie: And he doth not alwayes render it difficult to him. But it followeth not neceſſarily, that this will be done, becauſe it's poſsible; no nor becauſe it is eaſie or not difficult to be done.
150. *Rui…. de praedet. Tr. 2. di…p. 12. §. 1, 2. p. 172. ſo defineth Permiſſion as I confeſs ſo it is poſitively decreed: viz. (Increatam permiſſionem Deus non praed…finit) Creata permiſſio ſimul complec…itur qu…rundam rerum productionem & aliarum rerum negationem, quibus poſitis peccatum permittitur. And if by permiſſion they will mean quid poſitivum, it muſt have a poſitive Will and Cauſe; but what's that to the Negative, or meer non impedire? (Thus ſtill all our wranglings ſhall be but about ambiguo…s words.) His reaſon §. 2. is, Permiſſion of ſin is good: 1. Negatio Volitionis eſſicacis qua Deus impediret peccatum. (And he ſaid that permiſſio increata is not decreed.) 2. Negatio motivorum, &c. 3. Prod… ctio & Conſtitutio circumſtantlarum. 4. Generalis concurſus. Anſ. 1. Nothing is not Good: meer Negations are Nothing. 2. Moral Negations or Logical (that is, Denyal and reſtraints) are ſomething, and have a Cauſe. 3. Production and Concurſus are ſomething and have a Cauſe; but ſo is not a me…r non-impedition, which is proper permiſſion.But the Caſe differeth as to permitting of a propenſe agent, and an indifferent agent, and a contrarily diſpoſed agent. To permit a ſtone to aſcend, will not make it aſcend. To permit the Air to move, will not make it move. But to permit a ſtone in the Air to fall, I think with Durandus, is enough to make it fall, ſuppoſing the continuation of the Nature of it and all circumſtances. And ſo is it in permitting ſome ſinners to ſin.
151. But yet here we muſt diſtinguiſh, 1. Between a neceſſary and a free agent, 2. Between Adams ſinning and ours; 3. And between the ſin of a man ſtrongly inclined or but weakly, or that hath many diſſwaſions or but few. 1. Though a bad man be under a moral neceſſity of ſinning in the general, that is, of not living innocently, yet he is not under a neceſſity of committing every ſin that he committeth: nor is it a valid conſequence, He is a bad man: Ergo he will do this, and that, and the other Sin: Becauſe a free agent oft acteth contrary to his habits. 2. And ſome Sinners have ſo great impediments in ſinning, that they ſtand long in aequilibrio before the act. 3. And Adam had no more propenſity to his firſt ſin, than to the contrary: So that bare permiſsion will not inferr the Certainty of all ſin, atleaſt; and therefore will not here ſerve turn.
152. But ſaith Rada, it is not common permiſſion, but alſo a withdrawing of effectual helps againſt ſin. Anſw. 1. God did not ſo by Adam at firſt. 2. But are ſufficient or neceſſary helps alſo withdrawn, as well as effectual? If ſo, then Adam was as much neceſſitated to ſin by God, as he was to dye by Gods withdrawing his Vital influx or ſuſtentation, and it would have been as naturally Impoſſible for him not to ſin, as to live without God. But if not ſo, then while Neceſſary Grace, called ſufficient, is continued, the withdrawing of any other inferreth not a neceſſity of ſinning. But indeed it is an unproved and improbable fiction, that God withdrew from Adam any Grace which he had given him, till Adam caſt it away.
It is therefore no good Illation, Deus permittit aliquem peccare: ergo peccat: unleſs by permitting you mean withholding neceſſary help; which is more than proper permiſſion.
153. And it muſt be remembred that God is far from a total permiſſion or non-impedition of ſin: He alwayes hindereth it ſo far as to forbid it, to threaten damnation to affright men from it, to promiſe ſalvation and all felicity to draw men from it: He tells men of the vanity of all which would allure them to it; And his daily mercies, and corrections ſhould withhold men from it. Only by doing no more, nor effectually changing or reſtraining ſinners, but leaving them to their own choice under all theſe moral reſtraining means, he permitteth ſin.
154. But it is alſo confeſſed, that when by great ſin theſe means themſelves are forfeited, ſome of them are oft-times withdrawn or not given: And ſo ſome are without that Teaching, thoſe mercies or thoſe corrections which others have: But yet they are ſtill under a Law of Grace.
155. And it is ſtill ſuppoſed that God as the firſt Cauſe of Nature, upholdeth man in the Nature which he gave him; and concurreth with it as the firſt Mover and Univerſal Cauſe: And therefore that mans Inclination to Felicity, Truth and Goodneſs which is Natural, doth continue. Otherwiſe it is confeſſed, that Permiſſion would inferr ſin materially, but no ſin formally, if by permiſſion be meant Gods withdrawing Reaſon, Freewill, or executive power.
156. But I eaſily confeſs, that if the Dominicans predetermining Premotion *Or Bradwardines Effective Volition as neceſſary and productive of all that cometh to paſs.in ſinful actions could be proved, that would certainly inferr the event of ſin; And if God decreed ſo to pre-determine the will, ſin may be fore known in that decree. And if Scotus or the reſt had been of that mind, they had never omitted that eaſie ſolution of the Caſe, How God fore-knoweth ſin? But this I have elſewhere confuted, and ſhall add a little here.
157. But firſt (having diſproved all theſe preſumptions of Gods way of fore-knowing future ſin) I ſhall in a word tell you the anſwer which may and muſt ſatisfie us; which is, [That Gods Underſtanding is Infinite, and therefore extendeth by its own perfection unto all things intelligible; But How his underſtanding reacheth them, what Idea's he hath of them, how they are Intelligible to him, with ſuch like, are ſinful preſumptuous queſtions of blind men, who know not their own ignorance. And no manner of underſtanding is properly Divine, which mortals can comprehend.]