Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable, Section 13
SECT. XIII. Of Gods Will and Decrees in General.
274. GOds Decrees de futuris and his Will de praeſentibus are in themſelves the ſame, ſave as to the extrinſick denomination from the divers ſtate of the connoted objects.
275. Gods Decrees are not his works in themſelves conſidered, but only That Gods Decrees are not to be taken for a thing paſt and ceaſed, but as a thing ſtill doing, Pennot. li. 4. c. 24. thinketh is the beſt notion to reconcile them with liberty. But ab extrinſeco & Connotative they muſt be denominated paſt; though without change in God. Of this Dr. Twiſſe hath animadverted.when with his executive power, they operate ad extra: and then his knowledge and will are his working, being productive of the effects.
276. As in point of ſimplicity Gods Acts are all One and yet many, that is, One ex parte agentis as his Acts are but his Eſſence; and yet many ex parte effecti & objecti, & inde denominatione extrinſeca; ſo alſo as to their Eternity Gods Acts are all Eternal as they are his Eſſence, ex parte agentis; and yet ſome of them new and temporary, ſome paſt, ſome preſent, ſome future, ex parte effectus, & objecti, & inde denominatione extrinſecâ.
277. Yet I confeſs that it paſſeth my underſtanding to conceive how it is, that the ſame Act is Eternal ex parte agentis, and yet but temporary ex parte patientis & effecti: that God ſhould from eternity do all that ever he doth ex parte ſui to create the world, to redeem, ſanctifie, juſtifie, &c. and yet that nothing ſhould be done by it till lately. Which drew Ludov. à Dola (de modo conjunct. Concurſ. par. 1. c. 2. p. 20.) to ſay, [Probatur Actionem Dei externam ſeu Concurſum in actu ſecundo eſſe actum ab ipſo Deo diſtinctum ex natura rei, ante opus intellectus. Quia Deus non ſolum poterat nihil agere ad extra, ſed de facto per aeternitatem nullum producebat effectum, & de novo incepit operari in principio temporis. Igitur actio Dei eſt omnino diſtincta ab ipſo Deo: Neque dici poteſt actionem quidem Dei fuiſſe ab aeterno, ſed effectum non fuiſſe niſi in tempore; Quia tametſi Virtus, & Potentia agendi, & Principium operationis, eſſe poſſit antequam Cauſa actu agat; tamen Actio eſſe non poteſt quin Cauſa verè agat & producat. Ac impoſſibile eſt Cauſam vere Agere & producere, quin effectus aliquis ab ea producatur & agatur. Nullus autem effectus producebatur à Deo ab aeterno: ergo non habebat Actionem ab aeterno (loquimur de productione ad extra & tranſeunte.) Sane non poteſt Actio eſſe ſine termino & effectu ſuo. Sed Actio eſſentialiter eſt ſui termini productio aut conſervatio, & ne con…ipi quidem poteſt ſine illo: Eſt que prorſus inintelligibile dari productionem aut conſervationem alicujus rei, & non dari actualiter ipſam rem; Eſt que Omnis actio intime conjuncta cum effectu, qui per ipſam formaliter producitur, aut conſervatur; nec ſejungi ab illa poteſt.] And ſo Aureolus.
278. In this alſo we we muſt confeſs that the matter quite tranſcendeth our capacity: And as this is raſh in à Dola, to affirm ſo confidently a thing above him, ſo we muſt not be raſh to affirm on the contrary more than is certain. But ſo far as we may venture, the common way ſeemeth the far ſafer: Becauſe God is unchangeable not only Morally, but Naturally. And this Action as diſtinct from the Effect, is made by him, to be neither the Creator nor a Creature, but a Creating, or moving Act, between both; which is not convenient. And as it is intelligible that God can Velle or Decree ab aeterno, mundum fieri, Petrum juſtificari, &c. in hoc tempore; ſo we are not ſure that God cannot do all that Act from Eternity, which ſhall effect only in Time, by the concurrence of his will. Though I confeſs that the caſe much differeth, between an *Ego quidem fateor noſtram libertatem cum Voluntate Dei facilius conciliari juxta eorum ſententiam qui dicunt, actum volendi & intelligendi non eſſe operationem immanentem elicitam, aut libere additam ipſi eſſentiae; quam ſi dicamus eſſe actum quendam liberum elicitum: Utroqu… tamen modo conandum. Vaſqu. in 1 Tho. q. 23. d. 99. c. 2. And if this will make it eaſie, eaſie it muſt be: For Gods free Volitions and knowledge of things extrinſick are commonly ſaid to be no real additions to his eſſence, but dum unus, ſimplex, immutabilis, plura, & mutabilia ſcit, vult, facit, his will and underſtanding are denominated by relation and connotation as various from the various objects.Immanent Act, (ſuch as nuda Volitio,) which doth nihil efficere, and an Effecting Act. But many conceive that God cauſeth all things meerly by willing them. (Though I ſee not but that will muſt be a Powerful emanant operative will, which is more than meer will.) And we are ſo unacquainted with God, and all Active natures, as that we cannot ſay that Action exparte agentis may not be ſine termino, objecto & effectis. And all Philoſophical Divines agree that God hath no Power out of Act; but an Active power alwayes equally in act, exparte ſui, and ſo is a pure act. Let us (per poſſibile vel impoſſibile) ſuppoſe the Sun to be what it is, and no other Creature to be with it in being: This Sun would in vacuo emitt its motive, illuminative and calefactive radios by Action. And yet nothing would be moved, illuminated or heated by it: There would be no Terminus, and no effect. And ſuppoſe afterward all other Creatures to be made; then the divers Termini and Recipients would make a diverſity of effects, and the various diſpoſition of the Recipients would make that one Action of the Sun, to produce motion in one, light in another, heat in another, ſweetneſs from the Roſe, and ſtink from Weeds, and ſo of other effects. I do but tell you why we muſt not peremptorily deny much more of God.
279. Preſcience with Predefinition or Decree do not inferr cauſally That the Potentia executi…a ia Deo is principium abſolut… p…oximum agendi ad ex…a, See …ennot. l. 3. c. 13. n. v. & A…uin. 1. d. 45. a. 3. ad. 2.that neceſſity of the event as predetermining premotion doth: Becauſe they do (alone) nihil ponere in objecto. So that if it could be proved that God doth eternally Decree or will the event of ſin, and mens damnation abſolutely, it would not prove (alone) that he is therefore the cauſe of them. It is not therefore the Predetermination of bare Decree which we lay thoſe conſequences on, but efficient predetermination.
280. Lombard, d. 45. well concludeth That even that free-will of God by which he willeth, decreeth, and loveth the Creature, is his eſſence: Bradwardine l. 3. c. 5…. p. 8…9. argueth that Gods will de creandis, was antecedently free; and yet concomitantly and conſequently neceſſary, and both immutably from Eternity.But yet the Name [Amor Petri, odium peccati, &c.] ſignifieth not his Eſſence as ſuch, but his Eſſential will as denominated from the created or humane object.
281. Therefore it cannot be inferred hence, that God is a Creature, becauſe he Willeth or Loveth the Creature: Becauſe his Loving it denominateth his Eſſence as terminated on or connoting the object, and not as in it ſelf ſimply.
282. It is not fit or lawful to ask after any Cauſe of the Will of God; Becauſe it is the firſt cauſe of all things elſe, and hath nothing Superiour or antecedent to Cauſe it; And God is abſolutely independent, and is not to be called the Cauſe of himſelf.Ruiz who ſaith that Gods will hath a final cauſe, meaneth but a final object, as he confeſſeth. A Tree is a paſſive recipient cauſe of the Termination of the Suns calefacient act and of the …ffect as received: but not of the act ex parte ſol….
283. Even the Acts of Gods free-will or Decrees, have no Cauſe even in God himſelf; no more than thoſe called Neceſſary. For we muſt not ſay that any thing in God is an effect.
284. Yet as Gods Acts are oft denominated by Connotation from the object, (which in man is a conſtitutive Cauſe of the Act, loco materiae,) ſo extrinſick objects may be called The Cauſes (but rather the Objects) of God Will, Love or Knowledge, not as his Eſſence, but only as ſo denominated by that Connotation of the object.
285. Theſe diſtributions of Gods Volitions in Number, and by ſpecifying objects, and individuating objects, which are called material conſtitutive cauſes of the act, are all according to humane weakneſs; in us who know God but enigmatically, and in a glaſs: But yet if any man uſe ſuch words in a broader manner than we think fit, before we cenſure and condemn him we muſt hear his ſence explained. For all that ever we can ſay of God is improper, analogical, yea metaphorical; And it is but in degrees of impropriety that all words about Gods attributes and actions differ; For (as is oft ſaid) no man hath formal proper conceptions of any thing in God. If God ſhould not ſpeak to us in this improper language of our own, he muſt not ſpeak intelligibly to us, unleſs he create another underſtanding in us. And he himſelf in Scripture uſing ſuch language of himſelf, alloweth us to uſe it, while we profeſs to diſclaim aſcribing to God any of the imperfection which it ſeemeth to import.
286. On theſe terms not only Various Volitions are aſcribed to God in Scripture, and exteriour cauſes of them, (as John 16. 27. the Father Loveth you, becauſe ye have loved me, and believed, &c.) *So Gen. 22. 16. & 26. 5. Prov. 1. 24. Luke 11. 8. & 19. 17. Gal. 4. 6. Eph. 5. 6. 1 Sam. 28. 18. 1 King. 9. 9. & 11. 34. & 20. 42. 2 King. 10. 30. 2 Chron. 34. 27. Pſal. 91. 14.But alſo Fear, Affliction, Grief, Hatred, Repenting, Rejoycing, &c. Deut. 32. 27. Iſa. 63. 9. Gen. 6. 6. Pſal. 5. 5. Gen. 6. 7. 1 Sam. 15. 11. Joel 2. 13. Jer. 15. 6. Hoſ. 11. 8. Zeph. 3. 17. Jer. 32. 41, &c. and exteriour cauſes of them.
287. That which is to be underſtood by all theſe, is 1. That man is ſo far the Cauſe of the Effects of Divine Volitions, as the Diſpoſitio receptiva, may be called a Cauſe. And I before ſhewed in the inſtance of the effects of the Suns Influx, how great a hand the various Diſpoſitiones materiae receptivae have in the diverſifications of effects. 2. And that Gods Volitions themſelves are hence relatively denominated.
288. Therefore we muſt ſay, that Gods electing Peter and his rejecting Judas, his Love to Peter and his hatred of Judas, are not in ſpecie the ſame act of his will; nor his Loving Peter, and his Loving Paul the ſame Numerically; As his knowing of Peter to be a Saint, and his knowing Judas to be a Saint, is not the ſame numerical act of knowledge; Though as they are Gods Eſſence, all are but one. And we muſt ſay that he Loveth one becauſe he is good, and hateth another becauſe he is evil; and he juſtifieth men becauſe they believe, and condemneth men becauſe they believe not; that he forgiveth a ſinner becauſe he repenteth, &c. Though Gods Will have no efficient Cauſe.
289. Thoſe Volitions of God which are but Immanent as to Efficiency, but Tranſient Objectively, are ſome of them to be denominated as before the thing willed, and ſome as after. The Will of effecting is before the thing willed: The Will ut finis, or Complacency and Diſplicency (as alſo Intuitive Knowledge of the thing as Exiſtent, eſtimation, approbation, reprobation of it) the Will of Continuing, modifying, altering, perfecting, deſtroying, ſuppoſe the exiſtence of the thing willed in eſſe objectivo. And ſo many Volitions may be denominated as beginning in time, as connoting the objects. †Pennottus li. 4. c. 24. p. 235. confidently argueth, that becauſe God can Love him that he hated or Loved not, he can therefore Predeſtinate him whom he reprobated, or change his decrees without any change in himſelf. I anſwer, 1. I grant that God can Love a Saint whom he hated as a ſinner before, and ceaſe hating him without any change ſave relative and by extrinſecal denomination. 2. But his inference ſeemeth to me falſe and dangerous, unleſs he had meant it of executive Election and Reprobation which he doth not. For 1. Proper Love and Hatred connote an Object as exiſtent, and by ſuch connotation are named: And his fourth ſuppoſition is falſe, that Love is nothing but Gods Will to give a man life Eternal. For the formal Act of Love is Complacency: And the Velle Bonum is another thing, as I think an effect of Love; or at the moſt another act of Love. And we deny that any abſolute. Velle bonum alicui is ever changed, though diſplicence be changed: Becauſe it is the ſame with Decree. 2. And the reaſon why the ſaid Decree or Volition (if abſolute and proper) may not be denominated changed is, becauſe it maketh its own object, and ſo ſuppoſeth it not pre-exiſtent, and dependeth not on it denominatively: And therefore it would inferr God to be mutable, to change it; But it is not ſo in the other, which as to the Relation and Name followeth the Mutable creature; as doth Gods Knowledge of preſent exiſtents and preteritions as to denomination and connotation.And it is no more wrong to Gods Immutability ſo to name them, than to his ſimplicity to name them many and divers.
290. And in this ſenſe it is no more wrong to Gods Immutability, to ſpeak of Him as being before in Potentia only as to ſuch Relative denominations. As the Rock in the Sea hath not yet that proximity to the Wave which a twelvemonth hence will touch it, and yet is not therefore mutable: Or as you are yet but in potentia to the termination of his Relations who will paſs about you, before and behind, on the right hand and on the left. So God was but Potentially the Creator and Redeemer of the World from Eternity. Though as to any real paſſion God hath no paſſive power.
291. In this ſenſe of relation to the objects and effects, it is that we conceive of Gods acts of Knowledge and Volition in a certain order of nature, as one being before and one after another; Though not as they are Gods Eſſence.
292. Yet becauſe the uſe and truth of words or names, is their ſignification of Things as indeed they are, and we ſhould put no name on any creature, but what is adapted to notifie it aright to mans underſtanding; we muſt much more be afraid of putting any cau…eleſs, unmeet, unneceſſary names of reality or diſtinction on the Will or Acts of God.
293. Gods Will is not Appetitus rei deſideratae; for he wanteth nothing.
294. God willeth efficiently all that he effecteth; and finally by complacence, all that is Good.
295. Gods Willing or Loving Himſelf, is Himſelf; or an inadequate Conception of Himſelf as he is. But his Willing or Loving Creatures, is (as is oft ſaid) a relative connotative Conception of Himſelf as extrinſecally denominated, and not as he is himſelf.
296. Gods Will ad extra is Free; And therefore it cannot be ſaid that he Willeth or Loveth ad ultimum potentiae, all that by Power he is Able to Will, or Love, or do: or that he doth all that he is Able to do.
297. Therefore it cannot be denyed that there is in God a Negation of Volition: that is, that he willeth not ſome things which he Could Will. As to have made the World ſooner, greater, with other ſorts of creatures: to have made ſome men better, wiſer, richer, &c. The exterior objects of Gods Will are finite, and contingent beings.
298. Therefore to aſcribe to God a Negation of ſome Poſſible Volitions cannot be charged as making Gods Will to be Idle, or Neutral, or as any Imperfection: ſeeing it is but his free-negation of his own Act, through his perfection.
299. Nor can it be ſaid, that hereby we make God Finite in that his Will is made Finite in Act, which is Himſelf. For his Will is Infinite as it is his Eſſence, and as it Acteth upon Himſelf; though as it acteth ad extra on finite temporary Creatures, it muſt needs be relatively, and connotatively as to the terminus denominated finite: which all muſt hold de re, that think not the World is Infinite. If the Sun were alone in Vacuo, it would be as Great as now it is, and as perfect: And yet as its beams are terminated on this or that recipient Creature, they are more limited.
300. We cannot prove that really God hath any Poſitive Decrees or Volitions of Nothings as ſuch.
301. Therefore none ſuch ſhould be aſſerted by Divines, much leſs pretended neceſſary to be believed, to our Concord.
302. It ſeemeth more allowable to hold the Negative, that God hath no ſuch Decrees; becauſe Nothing is not a capable terminus of a Divine act: And therefore it is a fiction of Scaliger, that [Omnipotentia agit in non ens, ut fiat ens,] Exercit. 365. n. 9. pag. 1074. And ſi entia non ſunt multiplicanda ſine neceſſitate, much leſs Divine acts. Alſo Non-volition is enough to a non-exiſtence or a Nothing; Therefore a Nolition need not be feigned to it: & fruſtra fit per plura, quod, &c.
303. Yet knowing ſo little of God as we do, I dare not boldly aſſert the contrary: But it's enough to know that this muſt not be aſſerted, and built on in our diſputes.
304. How God Willeth future Contingents troubleth the Schools with many needleſs difficulties as well as how he knoweth them. About his knowledge of them, before treated of, there are beſides the Dominicans that lay it on Pre-determination as decreed, and the Scotiſts that lay it on Decree or Will alone, ſeveral other opinions: One is of Ambr. Catharinus de Praed. Sanct. who holdeth that God knoweth not future Contingents, cert… ſub conditione cauſali, but only by conjecture: Becauſe the object is not otherwiſe ſcibile. 2. Vaſquez ſaith, that God cannot know a future contingent meerly contingent, as being not determinate: And that the Propoſition hereof is ever falſe, becauſe it is ſpoken by way of Cauſality and Conſequence, when there is none. 3. Suarez and others ſay, that God knoweth future contingents, even when the Condition is diſparate or of no Cauſality, a true Connexion of the terms ſuffering. Albertinus Princ. 4. To. 1. qu. 4. dub. 1. p. 292. pretendeth to a middle way, viz. 1. That future contingents ſub conditione are certainly known of God, whether the condition be Cauſal or meerly Conditional. 2. But quando Conditio eſt diſparata, non poteſt futurum Contingens ſub illa Conditione cognoſci à Deo. 3. But becauſe there is a Concomitancy between the terms of the propoſitions, ſuch a diſparate Propoſition may be known of God, ſub ratione Concomitantiae.
And accordingly they diverſifie Gods Decrees. To the queſtion, Whether conditional future contingents may be known of God in his Decree, he firſt telleth us of a threefold Decree, 1. Conditional quoad Actum & Objectum, ut [ſi diſcernerem concurſurum cum voluntate creata, ſi talis occaſio occurreret, hoc futurum eſſet.] 2. Ex parte objecti only, (being abſolute ex parte actus.) 3. Abſolute on both parts; I refer you to him p. 296, 297. if you will ſee the deciſion, leſt I perplex and weary you: And for the ſame reaſon paſs by a multitude of other controverſies of theſe men.