Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable, Section 12
SECT. XII. Of Scientia Media.
255. AFter this Digreſſion about our Will and Powers as the objects of Gods Knowledge and Decrees, I return to the Doctrine de Scientia Media. And that God knoweth from Eternity the truth of all conditional propoſitions that are true, is paſt all doubt, If we may ſuppoſe that God had eternal propoſitions. No doubt but he knoweth now that ſuch propoſitions are true [If ſuch Cauſes be put, they will or will not produce this or that as the effect.]
256. But if it be an Imperfection to have mental propoſitions to know by, and God knoweth not by them, but only knoweth them as the inſtruments and way of humane knowledge, (For no doubt but he knoweth all that's ours,) Then it muſt be ſaid that he had from eternity, but the foreknowledge of the Creatures conditional propoſitions. And who can well determine this?
257. And this will lead the arrogant diſputers to other enquiries no leſs difficult, Whether it be only or primarily the Propoſition it ſelf as ens rationis humanae or as the Thought of mans mind which God knoweth, or the res ab homine cognita, that is, futurition it ſelf? And if the former, How God knoweth them to be True? If the latter, How he knoweth futurition?
258. And here inextricable difficulties will ſtill ariſe before them, Whether to have the notion of futurity, be not a part of the Creatures imperfection? Whether God know not all things as preſent? Whether [Nothing] be properly Intelligible in it ſelf? Whether it be not only Propoſitions de nihilo that are known, and not the ipſum nihil, (ſuch as futurition is?) Whether to aſcribe ſuch knowledge of [Nothing] and ſuch notions or propoſitions to God, be to aſcribe perfection or Imperfection to him?
259. If we may or muſt ſay that God from eternity fore-knew our Propoſitions of future contingents, which are Conditional, yet we muſt not ſay or think that his knowledge quoad actum is conditional, ſo as that the Creatures * Nic. D'Orbellis ſaith, Communiter diſtinguitur triplex cognitio Dei, viz. approbationis, viſionis & intelligentiae. Cognitio approbationis eſt tantum Bonorum: Cognitio Viſionis eſt corum quae ſunt, fuerunt, vel crunt: Cognitio intelligentiae ſeu ſimplicis notitiae, eſt omnium quae poſſunt eſſe. Hujuſmodi autem cognitiones non differunt ſecundum ſe; ſed ſecundum diſtinctionem connotatorum. Et Bonavent. 1. d. 38. dub. 3. Dicendum quod in nobis notitia ſimplex & notitia beneplaciti dicunt diverſas cognitiones; & diverſos modos cognoſcendi—A Deo autem una tantum cognitio eſt. Sed illa una facit Deus, quod homines multis. Et …o illa una dupliciter ſignificat—ſtate is the condition of Gods Knowledge in it ſelf: But only that the object is a conditional propoſition, ſpeaking the Condition of the event fore-known: From which Gods Act is denominated conditional only denominatione extrinſecâ, not as an Act, but as This act.
260. We deny not but God may be ſaid as truly to know the truth of hypothetical as of abſolute propoſitions; If one be the object of his Knowledge, the other is: Which proveth the hypothetical propoſition to be leſs perfect than an abſolute, but not Gods knowledge of it to be leſs perfect.
261. Nor doth Gods fore-knowledge that Adam will ſin in ſuch circumſtances, make his underſtanding depend on the Creature, but only to be terminated on the Creature as an object: And ſo it doth in all Acts where the Creature is the object: This objection therefore belongeth alſo to the diſpute, Whether God know any thing but himſelf? or out of himſelf?
262. The ſeigning God to have in himſelf ſo many acts of knowledge, really diſtinct, and to lye in ſuch an order, is intolerable, ſeeing God is moſt ſimple. But by extrinſecal denomination, his Knowledge may by us, through our weakneſs and neceſſity, be diſtinguiſhed according to its reſpect to diverſity of objects, by inadequate conceptions: But on that pretence to feign many needleſs diſtributions, is profane,
263. They that think it a good confutation of ſcientia mediae that Non decreta non ſunt futura; therefore no futurition can be known but as Decreed, do err much in the antecedent, (For it is falſe that ſin is Decreed) and are either erroneous or uncertain in the concluſion, (For God fore-knoweth ſin ſo far as it is intelligible.)
264. The ſenſe of the queſtion de Scientiae Media, is not de conditionatis Vide Pet. à Sanct. Joſ. Disp. 4. Sect. 1. p. 465. de Scient. Med.neceſſari…s, as [If the Sun ſet, it will be night] Nor yet of ſuch conditionals as are meerly diſparate, and have no kind of dependence or connexion, as [If Peter dye quickly, John will live long:] But of ſuch conditionals, as have ſome reaſon of the Connexion, and yet leave the will in an undetermined power to act or not. But we know no difference between theſe ex parte Dei Scientis, but only denominatione extrinſeca ex parte objecti.
265. Much leſs dare we conclude with them that Gods knowledge See all this modeſtly and judiciouſly handled by Fr. Zumel Disput. in Tho. p. 1. eſpecially his Concluſ. 6. p. 127. And Ockam 1. d. 38. q. 1. Et. Greg. Arim. ib. q. 2. a. 2. Et Gabr. Biel ib. qu. 1. a. 1. Et Ant. Cordub. quaeſt. q. 55. dub. 10.of Conditionals is in God before his will to concurr, or that they exiſt; For we are not acquainted with ſuch priorities and poſteriorities in God, except by ſuch denomination.
266. Methinks it is but ſumbling to ſay with Pet. à S. Joſeph Suav. Concord. Diſp. 4. p. 484. A nemine dubitari quin ad cognitionem futurorum ſub conditione, neceſſarium ſit aliquo modo decretum divinum; cum n…hil poſſit eſſe futurum ſive abſolute ſive ſub conditione, niſi Deus ut prima Cauſa dut abſolute, aut ſub conditione velit ad iſta concurrere. At See the ſhort anſwer in Pet. à S. Joſeph. Suav. Concord. p. 576.the firſt look this ſeemeth to be ſpoken of the cauſe of futurition, or of the knowledge of it: And if not, the Decree ſeemeth mentioned to no purpoſe: For futurum tantum ſub conditione, is not as ſuch futurum; For the condition ſuſpendeth the futurition: A conditional propoſition de futuro is as true of that which will never come to paſs as of that which will. And if they mean that God Decreeth e. g. that Judas ſhall ſin if he be ſo and ſo tempted, it will lay the cauſe of Judas ſin more on God in their own apprehenſion, than their Cauſe or the Truth will bear. For if God Decree that unneceſſary Cauſes ſhall certainly effect the thing (ſin) let them take heed of the conſequence.
267. I could never ſee how the Doctrine de ſcientia media doth at all Pennot. l. 4. c. 23. ſaith, 1. Scientiam Mediam maxima cum probabilitate defendi poſſe. 2. Hunc modum reconciliationis (decretorum cum Libertate) principaliter & immediate non inniti Scientiae mediae, ſed ſolum remote: quia principaliter illa non ponitur in Deo ad conciliandam arb. libertatem cum Div. decretis: ſed ut Deus provide & ſapientiſſime omnes actus, maxime liberos diſponere poſſit; & dirigere ad opt. fines.ſerve their turn: ſeeing they uſe it to ſhew how God knoweth that Determinately, which he foreſeeth but in Conditionibus ſine quibus non, or in unneceſſary and not determining cauſes. And their own anſwer ſignifieth nothing more to the purpoſe, but that God can know future contingents by the Infinite perfection of his underſtanding, which is moſt true. But that he knoweth them ever the more for the ſuppoſition of circumſtances, they never prove. Therefore the doctrine of Gods knowledge of ſuch Conditional propoſitions, and contingents as ſo circumſtantiated, ſeemeth True materially, (that They are the Objects of Gods knowledge;) but falſe efficiently as if they were any Cauſes of his knowledge, (which hath no Cauſe;) but only extrinſecal denominaters of it in that act: And it ſeemeth uſeleſs and needleſs to their purpoſe.
268. For I confeſs I think that we need no more, and are capable of no more to ſatisfie us, how God knoweth any thing Intelligible, than to ſay, By his Infinite perfection. Man knoweth by Reception ab extra, but ſo doth not God. And if the Queſt. How doth God know this, ſuppoſe extrinſick efficiency or reception, it is blaſphemous! And I confeſs I hear men diſpute How God knoweth? with horrour as I hear men curſe and ſwear and blaſpheme: knowing how uncapable ſuch Moles as we Mortals are of underſtanding the intrinſick manner of Gods knowledge; And I deteſt the very queſtion, and am but perſwading others to deteſt it thus underſtood.
269. Much more do I think it arrogant preſumption in thoſe that diſpute pro ſcientia media to ſay that God Can no otherwiſe know future contingents. As Annatus de ſcient. med. p. 85. contr. Ab omiibus con…ſ… eſt, nullam veritatem fugere intellectum Di…inum: ac proinde propoſitiones de fu…ris contingentibus, &c. Blank. de Concord. lib. cum Decretis. 1. Theſ. 49, 50, 51—Twiſſ. D. 1. c. Secluſa Scientia Medi… non remanere in Deo praeſcientiam abſolutam futurorum contingentium. Et cap. 6. Secluſa Scientia Media non poſſe praedefiniri à Deo liberas creatae voluntatis actiones. O Man! O Worm! Who art thou that in caſes ſo unſearchable dareſt aſſert a non poſſe upon the Almighty God thus in the dark!
270. And it is no leſs arrogant in the adverſaries of Scientia Media, ſuch as ſome of our own, and the Scotiſts who dare ſay that God Rada …i …pr. (who was one of the Congregation where it was diſputed before P. Clem. 8. and was againſt it; as Pet. à S. Joſiph and others tell us.)cannot know future contingents, but in the predefinition and decrees of his own will. As if we had ſeen into all his Powers and Acts, who dwelleth in the unacceſſible light. Whereas we know little of the ſmalleſt of his works.
271. And as audaciouſly do the Dominicans plead that God cannot otherwiſe know our future free acts, but by decreeing by immediate identificate premotion to predetermine them as the total firſt efficient cauſe. Nothing can be more certain than that we know not How God knoweth, who ſcarce know How we know our ſelves.
272. He that hath read but one half what is ſaid upon this ſubject by Zumel, Ripa. Gonzal. Faſol. Arrub. Aluiz, Alarcon, Alvarez, Tanner, Ruiz, Greg. Valent. Suar. Molin. Cantarel. Navar. Curiel. Cabrera, Maſcaren. Verdu, Fonſeca, Mendoz. Leſſius, Diotalev. Moncaeus, Theophil. in Theolog. Natur. Aegidius Conink, Pennottus, Petr. à S. Joſeph, Annatus, Twiſſe, &c. yea or but any two Contenders, and is not convinced that they talk preſumptuouſly of things which are unknown above their reach, Non d…ſunt ex noſtris qui ſcientiam mediam aliquate…us agnoſ…unt, inquit Strangius l. 3. c. 13. p. 675. naming even Gomarrus, Walaeus, and Lud. …ocius, as alſo Jacob. Martinius and other Lutherans: and are we further from Arminius than Gomarrus was?doth not think reverently enough of God, nor knowingly and humbly enough of man: And he that doth but weigh the difficulties which Durandus his third opinion caſteth in the way, and doth but try to ſolve well all Lud. à Dola's Queſtions, Part 1. cap. 9. p. 96, 97, &c. and to anſwer well all his arguments againſt the uſefulneſs of Scientia Media, Part 2. and againſt the truth of immediate phyſical Predetermination, Part. 3. and againſt Identificate Concurſe (as to evil actions) Part 4. may ſoon find that much of theſe matters are ſo far above us as to be nothing to us, and unfit to be thought neceſſary to our Peace and Concord.
273. The old doctrine of Gods Previſion, and this de Scientia Media, in all that is within our reach come all to one: And they erre that hold it to run pari paſſu, equally about Good and Evil. God fore-knoweth not evil Acts becauſe he willeth them, or the futurity of them, nor becauſe he decreeth to predetermine the will to the act in ſpecie which is ſin: But he willeth to effect that which is Good, and may ſo far know it.