Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable, Section 14
SECT. XIV. Of ſeveral Diſtinctions of Gods Will.
305. MAny diſtinctions of Gods Will are uſed about theſe Controverſies: As, 1. The Poſitive Acts of Gods Will are diſtinguiſhed from his not-acting (or not-willing.) 2. The Poſitive objectively, from the Negative-quoad objectum. 3. The Poſitive from the oppoſitive. 4. The Immanent and the Tranſient acts. 5. The Tranſient efficienter, and the Tranſient only objectively. 6. The Natural and the Free. 7. The Efficient and Permiſſive acts. 8. Beneplaciti & ſigni. 9. Abſolute and Conditional. 10. Effectual and uneffectual. 11. The Decreeing Will and the Preceptive Will. 12. Antecedent and Conſequent. And becauſe you will meet with all theſe, I ſhall tell you in what ſenſe only they muſt be received.
306. I. Of the firſt I have ſaid enough before. Gods free-will hath its free-not-willings, that are no nolitions.
307. II. The meaning of the ſecond is, that God doth poſitively will ſome Beings, and ſome Negatives. If they mean Negative Propoſitions, it's true, but inept; Becauſe thoſe are Poſitive Beings. If they mean in the ſecond branch [Nothings] they cannot prove that God Poſitively at all willeth them. But he oft willeth their Antecedents and conſequents, and occaſions, and he willeth all creatures to be Limited and Imperfect, and ſo Negations muſt needs conſequently paſs upon them: And in that he willeth not-more, and willeth cauſes which may be deficient, men improperly and conſequently ſay he willeth negatively, ne ſint Plura, and the defects. But this is not ſtrict ſpeech.
308. Yet in a Moral ſenſe God is oft ſaid to will Nothings (or Negatives quoad eſſe:) (As that men ſhall not have grace, that they ſhall not live, or not be pardoned, or ſaved, &c.) 1. Becauſe he doth properly and poſitively Will and make that Law which condemneth them to theſe penalties; 2. Becauſe he will have Chriſt poſitively Condemn them to Privative puniſhments; 3. Becauſe he doth poſitively take away ſome of the mercies which tend to ſave them; 4. And he doth freely and penally not-give them that which they are deprived of. So that this Language is not unfit while we ſpeak of Moral Subjects, and of God after our manner. But in ſtrict ſpeech it cannot be proved that any [Nothing] is the proper object of a Volition of God.
309. The opinion of Scotus and his followers is known this way. And ſubtile Albertine To. 1. princ. 4. qu. 4. p. 297. ſaith, that Congruentius dicitur Deum non actu Poſitivo velle negationes,—& Reſp. Deum non See after the Additions of Divine Nolitions.habere actum poſitivum non concurrendi, ſed negationem actus Volendi dare concurſum efficacem: & …uxta hunc modum melius intelligitur quomodo ſe habet Voluntas Dei circa peccatum. Nam Deus non vult peccatum actu poſitivo, ſed tantum negative ſe habet circa concurſum efficacem dandi remedia illa per quae efficaciter impediretur peccatum—Vid. caet.
310. III. The third diſtinction is between Gods Love and Hatred, his Volitions and Nolitions; And this muſt be uſed. But Hatred and Nolition in man have more of imperfection, than Love and Volition, importing ſome-what contrary to us, and either hurtful, troubleſome, feared, or that poſſibly may be ſo. Therefore we muſt confeſs here, that we ſpeak of God with greater impropriety, and muſt diſclaim the imperfection in the ſenſe.
311. But if you would not be abuſed into many errors, ſwallow not the name [Love] and [Hatred] without diſtinction; Leſt the fore-cited reaſon of Pennottus cheat you; viz. [God Loveth a man converted whom he Hated while wicked: Ergo he can decree or predeſtinate a man to ſalvation, whom before he decreed and reprobated to damnation.] And all roſe from this falſhood, that [Love is nothing but the Willing of ſalvation to us] and ſo the ſame with Decree: Whereas Love is alſo, yea, moſt properly a Complacency in Good as Good, and Hatred a Diſplicency in Evil as Evil. Benevolence is ſometime Antecedent and ſometime an effect of this in man.
312. IV. The Immanent and Tranſient acts, I need ſay no more of.
313. V. But Divines uſe to omit the next diſtinction (of Tranſient D'Orbellis in 1. d. 4. Quando quaeritur utrum Electio vel Reprobatio rationem Meritoriam habeant, hoc non intelligitur quantum ad Voluntatem divinam, au… …jus actum, qui eſt Deus: ſed quantum ad tranſitum ejus ſuper ob…ectum; ſeu quantum ad ordinationem ad ipſam Voluntatem.acts) ſo much, that few of them let you know, whether that which is but Objectively Tranſient, be numbred by them with Immanent or with Tranſient acts. Briefly, 1. As Gods Will is the firſt efficient, and with his Wiſdom and Executive Power doth effect ad extra, it is effectively Tranſient, (though Eſſentially Immanent in it ſelf.) 2. But as Gods Will is (as aforeſaid) the Final Cauſe or End of all things, and willeth things only Complacentially, ſuppoſing all that is Complacent to be Exiſtent (in eſſe reali, vel in eſſe cognito) ſo is it only Objectively Tranſient, and not effectively; and therefore by many is numbred with Immanent acts. And as God may be ſaid to know and will the creature in himſelf, and to Love the Idea of it in himſelf, the phraſe is not to be blamed: But as the Creature in it ſelf conſidered by fore-knowledge or preſent knowledge (if we may ſo diſtinguiſh) is the object, it ſeemeth unfit to call the act Immanent, though it do nihil ponere (vel efficere) in objecto.
314. But Gods Will as it effecteth Relations ad extra, is even effectively Tranſient, as well as that which altereth qualities: e. g. his Pardoning, Juſtifying, Adopting acts of Will.
315. VI. *How far Gods Volitions of creatures are free, the ſubtileſt confeſs to be unſearchable. Vaſquez (ut ſupra) in 1. Thom. q. 19. diſp. 80. p. 504. [Licet aſſignemus in Deo libertatem comparatione facta cum objectis & rebus creatis, tamen non aſſignamus ſufficientem rationem ex parte Dei cur nunc actu libero efficaci reſeratur ad has potius quam ad illas; Siquidem Idem omnino manens in ſ…, poterat eas non velle quas vult: Quare cum rem exactius enodare contendimus, difficultatem praedi …am e…adere n… poſſumus.] See more of him before.Gods Natural Volitions are thoſe which ex natura rei, could not be otherwiſe; that is, All his Volitions of his own being and perfections; To which ſome number natural neceſſary objects, in the creatures: As his Volition that Contradictions ſhall not be true; that two and two ſhall be four, or two more than one, &c. His Free Volitions are thoſe which might have been otherwiſe as to the nature of the thing, and as to the power of the Divine will. Such is the Volition of the being of all the Creatures.
316. The Schoolmens contention whether the Son be freely begotten, and the Holy Ghoſt freely proceed, ariſeth from the ambiguity of the word [free;] which I will not trouble you with.
317. Yet all agree that Gods Volitions are all eternall, and therefore eternally neceſſary neceſſitate exiſtentiae.
318. And ſome think it beſt to ſay that they are reſpectively to be called both Neceſſary and Free; Becauſe Gods will choſe that which his wiſdom ſaw was Beſt, and he muſt neceſſarily chooſe the Beſt. But we muſt not be here too bold in our Concluſions.
319. VII. The diſtinction of an efficient and permiſſive Will is no better, nor other, than that of a Volition and no Volition. But to diſtinguiſh the Efficient and Permiſſive Act, implyeth a falſhood, That Permiſſion as ſuch is an Act.
320. Yet Gods Law may be ſaid to have a permiſſive Act, that is, He may declare [This I permit you to do, or leave indifferent] as to political permiſſion. And as to Phyſical permiſſion, I have ſhewed before, that ſome poſitive removal of Impediments, are ſometimes called non impedire, or permiſſion: But permiſſion it ſelf as ſuch is no act.
321. VIII. The diſtinction of Vol. Beneplaciti & ſigni is old and common: But not a diſtinguiſhing the Acts of Gods will, but rather his Volitions from the ſigns of them. For it is his Voluntas beneplaciti that there ſhall be ſuch ſigns.
322. The five ſigns commonly named by the Schoolmen are Praecipit ac prohibet, permittit, conſulit, implet. And the older Schoolmen ſay that theſe are called Gods Will Metaphorically only, yea by a remote ſort of Metaphor, they being not mans will properly but metaphorically Aqu. 1. q. 19. art. 11, 12. Pet. de Alliaco 1. q. 14. A. Voluntas Dei ſumitur Proprie; & tunc ſignat divinum beneplacitum, quod non eſt aliud quam ipſe Deus volens. 2. Impropriè & metaphorice pro aliquo ſigno ejus, &c.only when applyed to man, and accordingly called Gods will. But ſome of the latter ſay that they are proper ſigns of Gods real will. The truth is, they that firſt uſed this diſtinction ſeem to have intended only Gods Government, if not his word alone with the performance of it, by Voluntas ſigni, (of which next.) Indeed the whole ſenſible world and all things in it, is ſome way or other a ſign of Gods will: eſpecially the nature of man himſelf, with the nature of all creatures about him, and the order in which he ſtandeth to them; which is therefore called, The Law of Nature.
323. Phyſical Permiſſion is no poſitive ſign, nor of a poſitive will (as For this read Alliaco ib. further after cited: And his citation of Gregor. that Voluntas beneplaciti is respectu complexi Volitio, proſecutio aut fuga, Aut ſimplex complacentia & diſplicentia, & eſt ipſe Deus praeter connotationem.afore opened:) But Legal permiſſion may be.
324. The diſtinction between praecipit and conſulit would be vain, but that Aqu. and ſome others expound conſulit by Perſwading. For God counſelleth to nothing but what is Beſt; and that which is Beſt, precept (even natural) maketh it our Duty to chooſe: But Precept going before and Making Duty, Perſwading-counſel may come after and urge us to perform it.
325. Gods Voluntas ſigni & Bene-placiti are never contrary properly taken: Nor doth he give us any falſe ſigns of his Will; And therefore his word is alwayes true: But there are many things which ignorance miſ-judgeth to be a ſign of ſome Divine Volition, which they ſignifie not; and ſome dark ſignes which are not eaſily underſtood. If men miſtake Gods works or word, the ſign was not falſe, but their expoſition of it. But of this next.
326. IX. Dr. Twiſſe uſeth inſtead of this the diſtinction of Volunta… Beneplaciti & Praecepti. His ſence is Right, but the terms are too narrow. … ſi… ſeu praece…, … di…tur du… … …. 1. Q… ita ſit q… per tale ſignum vel prae…p… ſignatur ad intentionem praecipientis: Et ſic ſemp…r impl…r. Nam p…r tale praeceptum ſignificatur aliquid debere fieri à Cr…atur…: & ita eſt: Aliter tale ſign…m non eſſ…t verum. 2. Quod ita ſit vel …iat ſicut per tale praeceptum ſignatar de…ere fieri: & ſic non ſemper impletur. Pet. de Alliaco 1. q. 14. F.T…e true Diſtinction is of Gods Will of Natural Things and Events as ſuch, and his Will de Debito vel Jure as ſuch: His will as it is the Fountain of Nature, and as it is the fountain of Morality or Right: O… his Will of Natural Events and his Law.
327. This diſtinction is of Greater and more Neceſſary uſe to us than any of the reſt; yea ſo great that it is included in the firſt principle of Religion and morality; and is underſtood (diſtinctly or more darkly, but really) by all Chriſtians and moral agents.
328. The diſtinction is fetcht from the objects: The common object of the one being Nature as ſuch, and of the other Debitum or Jus as ſuch.
329. As Gods Will de Naturalibus is his Bene placitum; and the effects of it are the ſigna ſubſequentia, and propheſie a prognoſtick of the effect; ſo Gods will de Debito is his Beneplacitum, ſignified by his Law and Judgement.
330. Though the word [Law] be uſually taken more narrowly for only [Statute eminent Laws] yet I here take it general…y; And it is [The Governing Will of a Rector ſignified, conſtituting or confirming Right (or Dueneſs) from and to the Subject; or A Rectors conſtitutive Determination of Right; or, The ſign of a Rectors Will conſtituting Right.]
331. God being moſt Great and Wiſe and Good, and mans Creator, and thence our Ab…olute ſupream Rector, his Will muſt needs be the fountain of all Morality and Right.1. Sicut Divina volunt as in g…re cauſae e…ici…is eſt prima … cauſa, ſic ipſ… in ge…ere …eg… obligantis eſt p…ima …ex ſeu Regula. 2. Sicut divina voluntas eſt efficiens cauſa quia vult aliquid eſſe vel …: ſic ipſa eſt …ex obligatoria quia vult aliquid ad aliqualiter eſſe vel non eſſe tereri. 3. Sicut divina Voluntas eſt …ex perfectiſſima rationalis creaturae, ſic Lex Chriſti vel doc…rina eſt ſignum perfectiſſimum volu…tis divinae. Pet. All…. Camer. in 1. ſe…; …. 1. … Dei ſigni non ſemper impletur. 2. Voluntas …en…placiti antecede…s, non ſe… per impletur. 3. Volunt…s beneplaciti conſtque…s ſemper impletur. Prohibiti… …et non ſignat Deum Nolie efficaciter illud fieri quod prohibet fieri. Idem 1. q. 44. F. De praecepto & prohibitione ſ…t… patet quod quilibet ten…tur ſe conformare univerſaliter tali Voluntati—D…ri obligationem, non eſt proprie l…quendo effectus o…ligationis …; ſed te…ri ad implendum eſt …jus e…tus. Idem ib. …. H.
332. It is not the Will in it ſelf that is a Law, nor doth any Immanent act oblige us, or conſtitute Duty: But it is Gods Will as ſignified. And therefore Lex aeterna is an improper ſpeech.
333. Tilenus and others who think it fitter only to diſtinguiſh Quid Deus ipſe vult facere, and Quid à nobis vult fieri, do but hide and not open the truth: For the terms ſeem to expreſs the Event in both, and diſtinguiſh not of Event and Duty. Whereas if God Willed the Event of what he commandeth us, as he doth of what he effecteth, it would be done. And he doth alſo by his Abſolute Decree, Will many things to be done by us, which his Law commandeth not. Such as are many meer Natural actions, quas à nobis vult fieri.
334. Morality being but Modality and Relation of Natural Entities, the Acts or Habits themſelves commanded and forbidden are quid Naturale in themſelves conſidered, and ſo far are under Gods will de naturalibus; But it is only the Debitum or Jus that is conſtituted by his Legiſlative will.
335. Though Gods will de Naturalibus muſt operate by real efficient efflux, yet his will de Debito effecteth by meer ſignification or notification to the ſubject.
336. Legem facere vel ſignum dare is an act of Gods will de quodam naturali vel eventu: (For the ſignum is aliquid naturale.) But per ſignum facere Jus is that which is proper to the Governing or Legal Will.
337. If we will denominate Gods will here ab origine, It is, 1. Antecedent to the Creature, (ſuppoſed;) And that is his Creating will. 2. Suppoſing the Creature in Being; and that is, 1. His will as Proprietary and Actor of all things; And that is his Moving and Diſpoſing will, of Events. 2. His will as Governour (Morally) And that is his Morally Ruling will. 3. His will ut Amator & Finis; And that is his Beneficent and felicitating will. And among theſe it is his Regent will which I am treating of. And though his Law as making Jus, be the firſt and chief part, yet his Judgement as it decideth, and his Execution as it giveth every Man his Right and Due, is included.
338. It is not Gods will without the ſign (as is ſaid) nor the ſign without his will, but the ſign as notifying, and his will as notified that is a Law, and Jus the Effect: Gods will is the principal Cauſe, and quaſi Anima Legis; and the ſign is the inſtrumental Cauſe, and quaſi Corpus.
339. The Sign re…pecteth theſe things, 1. The matter due. 2. The dueneſs or right. 3. The will of God concerning or conſtituting it. 4. The mind and will of man to whom this is ſignified.
Or, 1. Gods will as the Efficient of Right. 2. The matter and form of Right as Conſtituted. 3. The mind and will of man as the terminus.
340. Theſe ſigns of Gods will are, 1. Natural, called the Law of Nature: which is the Natura & ordo rerum, eſpecially ipſius hominis as before deſcribed. 2. By extraordinary Revelation. The latter have the great advantage of plainneſs, ſignificandi rem praeceptam. The former hath the fuller evidence of its Author and Original that it is indeed of God. Both are his Laws to man.
341. La…, Judgement and execution (the three parts of Government) differ in that, 1. Law maketh the Debitum or Jus; 2. Judgement determineth It is of great uſe for a Divine who handleth Gods Laws to underſtand the nature of Laws in genere (as Suarez in praeſ. de Legib. ſheweth; which Book is one of the beſt on that Subject that is extant among us.)of it by dec…ſive application; 3. Execution diſtributeth according to it.
342. The Jus vel Debitum, inſtituted by the Law, is twofold. 1. A Subditis: What ſhall be Due from the Subjects: the Debitum Officii. 2. Subditis: what ſhall be Due to the Subjects: viz. 1. Antecedently to their merits (which is 1. The act of our Governing Benefactor. 2. Or a Divider: ſuch was the Law for dividing the Iſraelites inheritances.) 2. Conſequently; which is by the Retributive part of the Law (commonly called the Sanction,) which is 1. By the Premiant part, what Reward ſhall be due: 2. By the Penal, what Puniſhment.
343. Accordingly Laws have ſeveral parts: 1. Precept and Prohibition, making Duty: 2. Retributive, 1. Premiant, 2. Penal; called Gods Promiſes and Threats: 3. And ſubſervient or accidental; 1. Narratives Hiſtorical, Chronological, &c. 2. Pure Donations: 3. Propheſies; 4. Doctrinal, 5. Exhortatory, 6. Reprehenſive, &c.
344. Though Debitum vel Jus facere, be the formal operation of a Law; (which is to be Fundamentum Relationis) yet the Act of the chief parts (preceptive or penal) is commonly called Obligation: And ſo many ſay that obligare aut ad obedientiam aut ad poenam is all the action of a Law. But Obligare is a Metaphor, and therefore in diſpute to be laid by, or to give place to the proper terms: And the Premiant act is not properly called obligation; nor the penal act, ſave in a ſecondary notion, as he is …bligatus ad poenam ferendam, if judged, who is firſt Reus poenae, or to whom it is made Due by the Law.
345. The …bligation aut ad obedientiam aut ad poenam is not of equality in the disjunctive. As if God were indifferent which we choſe: But it is primarily ad obedientiam, and but ſubſerviently ad poenam as a means againſt future diſobedience, and a ſecuring the ends of Government, in caſe of ſin.
346. But the Preceptive and the Premiant parts, are each chief or final in ſeveral reſpects: God Commandeth us a Courſe of Duty or Right action to this end, that we may be Happy in his Love. And he promiſeth us firſt, and giveth us after in foretaſte, this Happineſs, to draw us to Duty.
347. But here is a wonderful inſeparable twiſt; and in the main an Identity. God Ruleth us as a Father, or Regent Benefactor: All his Benefits are Free-gifts, as to the Thing and Value; But given 1. In an Order. 2. And the reſt as means to the ultimate. In which reſpects they are a Reward, or means to it. His very Law is a Gift and a great Benefit. Duty is the means to keep his firſt Gifts and to receive more. The very doing of the duty is a receiving of the Reward; the object of duty being felicitating. (As if feaſting or accepting offered wealth or honour were our work.) Holineſs is happineſs, in a great part. And in our End or ſtate of perfection all will be one: To Love God, Rejoice in Him and praiſe him, will be both our duty and felicity, means and end, as it were, in one.
348. Whereas ſome ſay, that if there were no Law, ſin would deſerve puniſhment, it is an errour: For it is due only by Law. But it's true Of all the following diſtinctions, note theſe words of Bonavent. in 1. d. 4…. a. 1. q. 1. Volunt…em D…i Antecedentem ſ… Conditionalem, poſſibl…e … non impleri:—at conſequentem & abſolutam nequ… …uam. S…un…um Da…ſc. Voluntas ben…p…aciti …t …apl. Antecedens ſeu Conditionales & conſequous, qua vult quantum in ſ… eſt omnium ſalutem; & alſoluta ſive conſequens, qu… determinate vult aliquid q…d no…it certitudin …. Intelligendum … n…llam Dei Voluntatem p…ſſe ſuperari aut caſſari; Aliquam tamen poſſe non imp…eri (…t antecedentem) Aliq…m ut conſequentem impoſſibile …ſſe no… impleri, … impedi…i:—Non …tiam poſſibil… eſt Voluntatem Dei caſſari: Nam caſſam di…itur aliquid dum pri…tur e…ectu p…io ad quem eſt: Voluntas aut… nullo privatur eſſeciu ad qu…m eſt p…p…ie. Nam quod dicitur quod Deus vult omnes homi…s ſalvos fieri quant…m in ſ… eſt, haec Voluntas non connotat ſalutem; nec proprie eſt ad effectum ſalut…s: ſed connotat ordinatio…m naturae, ſive natur…m ordinabil…n ad ſalut…n. … ni…il plus eſt di…re Deus vult iſtum ſal… fieri quantum in ſe eſt, q…m De… placuit dare iſti …ram per quam poſſet p… …ire ad ſa…u…em; & quod Deus para… eſſet ju…re, ita quod ſalus non deficit prop…er deſe…tum à p…nte Dei. Therefore it connoteth alſo all the helps which God affordeth men.that it's due by the meer Law of Nature, without any ſuperadded Poſitive Laws.
349. Gods will called Legiſlative, or Governing is ever fulfilled in ſtrict ſence, that is, So much as is Gods part and the Laws part to do, is ever done: e. g. God ſaith [Perfect obedience, &c. ſhall be Adams duty] and it is done: It is his Duty whether he will or not. He ſaith [To ſteal ſhall be ſin] and it is ſin. He ſaith [He that believeth ſhall have right to Juſtification and Glory, and he that believeth not ſhall be Filius mortis, that is, Death and Hell ſhall be his Due] and ſo it is. Thus ſtrictly all Gods Will is done.
350. But in the ſecondary remote ſence every ſin violateth the Will of God, by breaking his Law: For when he ſaith [Obedience ſhall be thy duty;] we uſe to ſay, It is Gods will that we ſhould obey him: And ſo when we do not obey him, we are ſaid to Violate his will. But this is but metonymically: For that which is Gods will indeed is but that we ſhall be bound to obey (whether we do or not:) And the event, whether we ſhall or not de facto, is not at all determined by the Law.
351. Therefore if it were proved that God did Decree one thing, and command the contrary, it would not prove two contrary wills in God; nor is there any great ſhew of a contradiction in it. For to ſay [I forbid Judas to hang himſelf] and [I decree that he ſhall hang himſelf] are no contradictions; It is but to ſay, [It ſhall be his Duty to preſerve his life] and [Eventually he ſhall not preſerve it.] All that is a mans Duty doth not come to paſs: And to determine of Duty, is not to ſay, It ſhall come to paſs. Otherwiſe Gods word were falſe whenever man ſinned. Nay in reality, Auguſtine (truly) judged that by Gods Law Hell was Due to Paul unconverted, and yet then he was a choſen Veſſel, and God Decreed to ſave him. He thought that Perſeverance was the Duty of ſome that after fell away, and that Heaven was their Due on condition of perſeverance till they fell away, (though not preſently to be poſſeſſed;) and yet that God decreed that ipſo permittente eventually they ſhould fall away and periſh.
352. If a King made a Law that no man ſhall murder another, and yet knoweth that a certain Traytor that hath broken Priſon, is like to fall into the hands of ſome Thieves or Enemies that will kill him, If he be ſecretly willing that he be killed by them, it is no contradiction: The Law maketh it their duty not to Kill; But it ſaith not, that they ſhall not de eventu, by way of Prognoſtication.
353. But yet indeed God never doth command an act or forbid an act; …nd yet Decree that the ſame Act immediately commanded ſhall not be …one, or that the act directly forbidden ſhall be done. Becauſe ſin is a thing …hat God cannot decree or will, (of which anon.)
354. But the effect of the commanded or forbidden act is ſometimes ſaid …o be commanded or forbidden: And this may be contrarily decreed of God. And men that think not truly of the matter, think that this is to Decree a thing forbidden, and ſo they err by ſuch confuſed thoughts. E. G. Gods command is that I ſhall relieve a poor man, and not let him fa…iſh; and that I ſhall heal the ſick, &c. and yet God may decree that this …oor man ſhall be famiſhed, and this ſick man dye; And yet no contradiction. For indeed [Relieving] in effect, is but the End of the Act which is commanded me, and not the act it ſelf: I am bound to offer him …elief: But if one cannot take it, and another will not, yet I have done my duty: And ſo in the other inſtance. So God commanded Abraham …o ſacrifice his Son, and yet decreed that he ſhould not be ſacrificed; And …his without any contradiction. For the act that under that name was commanded Abraham, and made his duty, was not actual eventual ſacri…icing. (For then it had been a duty to reſiſt the Angel and do a thing …mpoſſible.) But to conſent and endeavour on his part to ſacrifice his Son: which he did. So the preſervation of our own and others lives is commanded us by God, and yet at the ſame time mens death decreed: Becauſe the thing indeed commanded, is not Preſervation as it ſignifieth the effect and ſucceſs, but only Preſervation as it ſignifieth our true endeavour. So the Jews were forbidden to kill Chriſt, and yet God decreed that Chriſt ſhould be killed: For the thing forbidden them was their own Conſent and wicked act: But the thing that God willed and decreed was only the effect, without any Will of their Act that cauſed it (unleſs in genere actus,) but only a permiſſion of it. Men of groſs brains that cannot diſtinguiſh and judge accurately, may blaſpheme God in their ignorance, in a caſe that to a diſcerning judgement is very plain.
355. *Of which ſee Amyraldus againſt Spanhem. de Grat. Univerſali.The next diſtinction of Gods Will, is into Abſolute and Conditional; which ſome Divines uſe and others condemn, and ſay that God hath no Conditional Will. The common anſwer which moſt Schoolmen and other Papiſts agree with the Proteſtants in, is, that there are Conditions rei volitae of the event of the thing Willed, but no Conditions of the act of Volition in God. As Aquinas ſaith of Cauſes, †De Vol. Conditionali, & authoritatibus & rationibus pro eadem Vide Ruiz. de Vol. Dei, diſp. 20. But his aſſertion that [Una creatura eſt Ratio movens tanquam objectum materiale (ſecundario) ut Deus velit aliam producere] is a fiction, though he lay his ſtreſs on it about the ordo decretorum. For movere is cauſare, and nothing doth cauſe or move God to act. There are Rationes effectuum & eorum ordinis: but none of the efficient Acts of God in him: If you ſay, It is abſurd to ſay, that God had no Reaſon to will the creation of this world rather than another: I anſwer, That is an Act of efficient Wiſdom, above all Reaſon: But to fetch Reaſons from the object, and thereby to be moved to Act, is the part of the imperfect creature. Reaſoning properly is below God: much more to be moved by extrinſick objective reaſons: Yet on this Ruiz diſp. 24. layeth a great fabrick; and ſo men may draw twenty Schemes of Gods Reaſonings as they variouſly fancy.Deus vult hoc eſſe propter hoc; non autem propter hoc vult hoc. 1. There are both Cauſes and Conditions of the event willed of God. 2. Denominatione extrinſeca ex connotatione objecti his Will is hence called Conditional; meaning but a Volition of Conditionals.
356. That God willeth Conditions, and Conditional Propoſitions, and Grants, is paſt all controverſies. For he willeth his own word, which is his work: But his word hath conditional promiſes and threats: And as his word alſo may be called his will, he hath a Conditional will, becauſe a Conditional word.
357. Gods eternal Omniſcience proveth, that at no inſtant he had a will properly Conditional quoad actum: Becauſe he that at the ſame inſtant fore-knoweth whether the Condition would be done or not, muſt needs have his will to be thereby abſolute. But yet if it had pleaſed God to ſuſpend the Act of his own Volition, upon a humane Condition, it would not have expoſed him at all to the charge either of mutability or dependence: which is very clear. For 1. It is preſuppoſed his Will as Voluntas & Eſſentia is unalterable, and is not that of which we ſpeak. 2. But only his Volition as terminated on this or that object, and ſo as haec volitio ab objecto denominata. 3. And his efficient Volition, and Power is terminated on objects in time, without mutation in God. 4. And N. B. that God doth ſuſpend his own Poſſible Volitions in many caſes; As he doth Not will to make more Worlds, more Men, more Suns, more Laws, &c. than de facto he will make. 5. And it is no more defectiveneſs in God to ſuſpend a Volition for a time, than thus to do it for ever. 6. And it is no more Dependence on the Creature to Terminate his Volition only on a qualified ſubject (performing the Condition) than to terminate his Efficient Power and will on ſuch or ſuch a qualified ſubject. As e. g. He terminateth his Omnipotent Concurſe for Generation only on the materia ſeminalis recte diſpoſita; He concurreth to burn by fire, &c. And if his Acts effectively Tranſient may be terminated only and temporarily on diſpoſed objects, If he did ſo in acts Objectively Tranſient, and did freely not-will the damnation of man till he had actually ſinned, but ſuſpended his will freely till then, and then de novo terminated it on the ſaid qualified object, I ſee no ſhew of Dependence or Mutability. For I oft cleared it before, that the termination of Gods Knowledge, Will or Power on any particular Object, is in him no addition to its eſtence; And doing it de novo, is no change in him but in the Creature only; no more than it would be a change in the Sun or its active Emanations, if a thouſand new creatures newly receive its Influx and are moved by it variouſly according to their ſeveral Conditions. Yet I have before given reaſons why incipere jam praedeſtinare is more incongruous language.
358. I put in this only to deprecate the blind uncharitable cenſures of diſſenters in this point, who think that Gods Volitions are New and Conditional and ſuſpended, quoad actum hunc ad hoc objectum; and cry out, It is blaſphemy, and maketh God mutable and dependent. I am againſt their opinion as well as you as to Conditional Acts: But falſe charges prove you not to have more truth, but leſs love and ſobriety than others.
359. XI. The next diſtinction of Gods Will is into Effectual and Uneffectual. And here he that would ſee a great deal ſaid on the queſtion, Whether God have any uneffectual Will, and whether mans will can fruſtrate it, may ſee too much in a multitude of Schoolmen on 1 Sent. q. 45. & 46. Some anſwer (as D'Orbellis, &c.) that the Voluntas Beneplaciti is Aq. a. 1. Scot. q. un. Durand. q. 1. Bonav. art. 1. Greg. Arim. q. un. ar. 3. Pennot. l. 4. c. 22. Alvar. de Aux. diſp. 32. Ruiz de Volunt. diſp. 18. Gran. de Vol. Dei. Tract. 4. diſp. 3. Suar. l. 4. de Pradeſt. c. 8. Gr. Val. diſp. 1. q. 19. p. 6. Cajct. Nazar. Ban. Zum. Navar. Gonzal. Molin. Vaſqu. &c. in 1. p. q. 19. ar. 6. Ripa. Arrub. Faſol. ibid. Nic. D'Orbel. 1. d. 46. and many other Scotiſts, &c.ever effectual, but not the Vol. ſigni; which yet ſeeing he well explaineth to be only the making of Duty, he might well have ſaid is ſtill effectual to its proper primary effect. Greg. Arimin. (and many others) diſtinguiſh of the will of Complacency and Diſplicency, and that Proſecutionis & fugae; and ſay the latter is effectual, and not the former: which others ſay of the Abſolute Will as diſtinct from the Conditional. The plain truth I have oft opened before: Gods Will is the firſt Efficient, the chief Dirigent, and the Final Cauſe; (in which the three Principles, Power, Wiſdom and Goodneſs are eminet.) 1. His efficient will is ever effectual, and never fruſtrate. Whatſoever pleaſed the Lord (to do) that he did, in Heaven and in Earth, in the Sea and in the depths, Pſal. 135. 6. And who hath reſiſted (this) his will? Rom. 9. 19. 2. His Directing will is ever effectual as to the making of the Law or Rule, and of Due or Right thereby: For ſo far it is efficient of that effect: But it is too oft violated by our ſin. 3. His final will or Complacency is Gods being pleaſed with the Being, or Action, or relation of the Creature, and ſuppoſing it, is not efficient, and therefore not effectual. And I know no need of more upon this queſtion.
360. XII. The laſt now to be named is, The Antecedent and Conſequent. will. This alſo is handled by many Schoolmen, and much uſed by the Jeſuits and Arminians. To paſs by others, Pennottus handleth it propugn. l. 4. c. 21. having firſt ſhewed, c. 20. p. 225. that Chryſoſtom and Damaſcene firſt uſed it. His explicatory Propoſitions are, 1. Vol. Antec. Chryſ. in Eph. Hom. 1. Damaſ…. fid. Orthod. l. 2. c. 29. & cont. Manich. ad …nem.& Conſ. non eſt in Deo reſpectu omnium Volitorum, ſed ſolum reſpectu …orum quae aliquo modo pendent ex lib. arbitrio creaturae. 2. Voluntas antecedens eſt illa qua Deus vult hominis ſalutem quantum in ipſo eſt, & qua illum ad ſalutem ordinat, & media ad ſalutem neceſſaria praeparat, quibus niſi per ipſum hominem ſteterit, ſalutem aſſequatur. 3. Non ſemper Voluntas antecedens & Conſequens circa objecta contraria verſantur, ſed poteſt idem objectum eſſe Volitum à Deo Voluntate tum antecedente tum conſequente. 4. Voluntas antecedens in Deo eſt Voluntas beneplaciti, & non ſolum voluntas ſigni. 5. Voluntas antecedens eſt formaliter Alliaco Camerac. 1. q. 14. D. E. tells you the ſenſe of Thom. Scotus, Ockam, & Gregor. of this diſtinction: and that of Scotus and Ockam is to the ſame purpoſe with what I here ſay of it; including that antecedent Grace which they call ſufficient, which God giveth to perſwade men to conſent. The Schoolmen are diſagreed of the ſenſe of this diſtinction: and not underſtanding it, contend about it. See Ruiz de Vol. Dei, diſp. 19. §. 2, 3, 4, 5. p. 195, 196, &c.& proprie in Deo exiſtens, & non ſolum per metaphoram ad eum modum, quo Voluntas ſigni.
361. I tell you their ſenſe, that I may the better open the plain truth to you, which is as followeth. 1. This diſtinction of Vol. antec. & conſ. is not applyed to God as he is our Creator, or End, nor as he is meer Proprietor or Benefactor; but only as he is Rector, or Moral Ruler of man. 2. As Government hath an Antecedent and Conſequent part, viz. Legiſlation and Judgement (with Execution) ſo Gods Antecedent will is nothing but his Legal will, or his Will as Rector ſignified by his Laws: And his Conſequent will, is his Judicial will, or expreſſed in Judgement; One Antecedent to Mans part (obedience or diſobedience) and the other Conſequent to it. 3. It is moſt certain that God willeth Antecedently all that is in his Law, that is, that all that believe and repent ſhall be ſaved: And that he willeth Conſequently that Judas e. g. and every finally impenitent unbeliever ſhall be damned. For what God doth, that he willeth to do: But God doth himſelf make ſuch a Law, and paſs ſuch a judgement: Ergo he is willing of it.