Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable, Section 7

Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable · Section 7

p. 15SECT. VII. Of School Curioſities and Uncertainties about Gods Knowledge.

102. ABout Gods Knowledge Scholaſtical preſumption hath gone ſo far, as that I ſhould rather with trembling fly from their queſtions, than ſeek to ſolve them, if the oppoſition of their curioſity and the defence of truth, were not by them made neceſſary to others, and conſequently ſome conſideration of the thing.

103. Some preſume to tell us, that God knoweth Creatures only in his p. 16own Eſſence, and not in themſelves, which muſt needs be falſe, if the Creatures Aureolus in Capr…ol. 1. diſt. 35.are in themſelves Intelligible: Becauſe Gods perfection importeth the knowledge of all that is intelligible.

104. Others tell us on the contrary, that God knoweth the Creatures Vid. Rad. li. 1. Cont. 29. ar. 1. p. 452. Vid. Tanner. 1. p. d. 2. q. 8. dub. 3. Valent. p. 1. d. 1. q. 14. p. 3. S…ar. de attrib. l. 3. c. 2. & 3. Rad. ib. p. 453, 454. Pet. Aquil. 1. diſ. 35. Lombard. 1. d. 36. Henr. 1. d. 5. Aegid. 1. q. 3. Greg. Arim. 1. q. 1. Gabr. 1. q. 3. a. 3. Ruiz. 1. d. 10. Aluiz. tr. 1. d. 5. & 6. Alarcon. 1. p. di…p. 2. c. 3. &c. Granad. 1. p. contr. 2. tr. 3, 4.only in themſelves, and not in his own Eſſence: But doubtleſs ſo far as they may be ſaid to be in his Eſſence, (which is at leaſt Virtually) they are there intelligible.

105. Scotus with his followers hold that Gods Intellect hath two Objects, one Primary, immediate, and motive, by virtue of which all other things are known; and this is Gods Eſſence. The other ſecondary, mediate, and not motive, but terminative, and ſuch is the Creature; known only in Gods Eſſence, as per aliud prius cognitum in quo continetur, & non per propriam ſpeciem. But here they are at the greateſt loſs.

106. For to the Queſtion, How the Creature is in God, their neceſſary Ignorance bewrayeth it ſelf by their diviſions. It is agreed that all things were eternally in God as in the firſt cauſe virtually and eminently. But ſay ſome, The ſame numerical perfections are in God, as in the Creatures, viz. Infinitely in God, and finitely in the Creatures: But this maketh God and the Creature to be One, and deifieth Creatures.

107. This they are put to, for the ſolving of that great difficulty, Whether God and the Univerſe conjunct contain more Entity or perfection intenſively or extenſively than God alone, and the Worlds Being add any Entity beſides Deity?

108. They that are for the Negative, judge it blaſphemy to ſay, that God alone is Leſs than God and the World; For he ſeemeth not to be of Infinite Entity to whom any thing can be added. The queſtion is not Whether the World add any Divine Being to God, but any Being at all be ſo ſuperadded, as that God is made a Part of the Univerſe. And I confeſs that Pars, and toto minor, are words that I dare not apply to God.

109. On the other ſide, ſaith Rada, Though Intenſively nothing is added …bi ſupr. p. 454, 455. So …radwardin… is hard put to anſwer his Seminator …borum, li. 1. c. 7. p. 184. that ſaith, The number of things to God is ſinite: and to ſinite ſome what may be added: Ergo to Gods knowledge ſomewhat may be added (which drove …aſquez to aſ…rt Infinite intelligibles.) But plainly Gods knowledge is Infinite in knowing himſelf: But not as terminated on finite creatures.to God, yet Extenſively we muſt ſay, that entity and perfection in the Creature is ſo added, as that God and the Creature are More than God alone; becauſe elſe we muſt ſay, either that God and the World are one, or elſe that the World is Nothing, or hath no Being: which is falſe.

110. Who dare venture on either of theſe dangerous conſequences; either that God is but a Part of Entity and Leſs than All, and ſo not Infinite; or that the World is God or Nothing? If we ſhould ſay, that the Entity of the Creature being but Analogical Entity, is no Addition to Gods being, Ens non dicitur Univoce de Deo & Creaturis; as the Sco…iſts deny the antecedent, ſo it hardly ſatisfieth the mind: Becauſe even this Analogical Entity is real poſitive Entity, and not nothing: And therefore though it add not Deity, it ſeemeth to add Entity; and both ſorts to be more than One alone.

111. And if we ſhould ſay, that the World is an Accident of God, (as The wi…ty Dr. Fairſax in his Book of the Bulke of the World, ſaith It is aliquid Dei; and ſo do all men that confeſs a God: and P…t. Hurtado and many others prove that it is no diſhonor to God to have Real Relations, which we call Accidents, as is aſore noted.a mans hair is of a man, ſuppoſing it were voluntarily Cauſed by him); And that it is no imperfection in God to have Accidents, as long as his Eſſence is no Accident, nor Compounded; And ſo that the World is no part of God, Eſſential or Integral; but being an Accident it is no Addition of Entity to God; Becauſe as the word [Man] or [Peter] includeth not only his Parts, but his hair as an Accident, ſo the word [God] may include the World as an Accident: This would be judged novel, bold, preſumptuous, and is not fully ſatisfactory, had it no ill conſequents.

112. The only way therefore is to confeſs our Ignorance, and that it muſt needs be that the mind which cannot comprehend Gods Immenſe p. 17Eternal Eſſence, muſt be unable to ſolve ſuch queſtions as imply ſuch a comprehenſion: And it were well if mens experience of their utter incapacity to underſtand ſome ſuch Caſes, would warn them more cautelouſly to meddle with others.

113. The Scotiſts doctrine is laid down by Rada in theſe Concluſions; 1. Deus cognoſcit alia à ſe. 2. Cognoſcit omnia perfectiſſime. 3. Non cognoſcit alia à ſe per repraeſentationem & motionem quam ipſa de ſe faciunt. 4. Creatura non eſt objectum primarium & immediatum Divinae cognitionis. 5. Sed tale eſt Divina eſſentia. 6. Diſtinctam tamen aliorum Vaſquez in …. Thom. q… 19. diſp. 80. Praeſcientia eſt ipſa ſubſtantia Dei, quae aliàs Cognitio eſt creaturarum poſſibilium, additò respectn ſolum rationis ad res futuras; quarum dicitur ſcientia: Ita ut ſ…res futurae non eſſent, Deo quidem deiſſet, praeſcientia, ſed non ſcientia: & ſi res futurae non eſſent, non eſſet in Deo libera Voluntas, quae ſignificatur cum illo respectu libero: eſſet tamen Voluntas Complacentiae, ipſa viz. eſſentia divina cum reſpectu rationis neceſſario ad res poſſibiles. Ita & Ferrarienſ. c. 75.habet Cognitionem. 7. Deus cognoſcit creaturas in ſu… eſſentia. 8. Cognoſcit res in ſe ipſis & propriis earum naturis, ſi fiat determinatio cognitionis ex parte rei cognitae. In all this it ſeemeth to me to be overbold preſumption to conclude, 1. That God knoweth not the Creature immediately: And the reaſon he giveth is as bold, quia tunc vileſceret Divinus intellectus. None of this can be proved, though I preſume not to aſſert the contrary. Yet it ſeemeth to us that the Creature is Quid intelligibile in ſe immediate, and that it is the perfection of God to know all that is intelligible, and not a vilifving of him. As it is no vilifying of his Power to make every thing as it is. The Creature no doubt is not the Primary intelligible object: But whether it be not Immediately Intelligible in ſe is the doubt.

2. And it ſeemeth to me a preſumption to ſay, that elſe the Creature would move the Divine Intellect, and that God as the object moveth his own Intellect as agent; For Moving ſignifieth Cauſing, and there is in God (ſay all Divines) no Effects, and therefore no Cauſing of them; and ſo no ſuch moving.

114. It is alſo an agitated Controverſie with them, Whether it be Gods Eſſence as ſuch which the Creatures are Repreſented and known in, or in his Knowledge it ſelf as ſuch? They that are for the former ſay, that the Creature is repreſented in the Divine Eſſence before it is known (as in a glaſs) becauſe the object is preſuppoſed to the act: ſaith Cajetan, the Cajet. 1. p. q. 14. art. 5.Ruder ignorant ſort thus imagine. The ſecond opinion is thus delivered by Rada, Res non continentur in Divina Eſſentia ut prior eſt cognitione Rad. li. 1. contr. 29. art. 2. pag. 460.actu & formaliter; nec ibi repraeſentantur actu & diſtincte. 2. Creaturae in Divina Eſſentia non prius habent eſſe repraeſentatum actu & formaliter, quam intelliguntur. 3. Creatura (formaliter loquendo ſecundum Scot. in 2. d. 1. q. 1. lit. H.quod aliquid dicitur formaliter intelligibile) non prius habet intelligibile quam intelligatur; ſed per intellectionem habet primum eſſe actuale & formale, & proprium expreſſum & repraeſentatum. And their ſimilitude is, that as mans mind doth not preſuppoſe ſecond notions (Genus, ſpecies, &c.) but make them, ſo doth God the Creature as intelligible intelligendo.

115. This leadeth them to another doubt, Whether the Creatures have from Eternity an eſſe reale diſtinct from Gods Eſſence? Where Henrie. ſaith that they have a true eſſe reale eſſentiae, at non exiſtentiae, becauſe Henr. (refor. Scoto. in 1. d. 36.) quodlib. 8. q. 91 & q. 4. 1 & …. Scot. 1. d. 36. Vid. Th. Waldenſ. de antiq. fid. l. 1. c. 8. cont. Wicleſ.omne poſſibile eſt ens reale; & eſt in genere, &c. Thus do men play with the notions of their own brains. Scotus confuteth this by ſeven arguments, which is eaſily done.

116. But their next doubt is greater, Whether the Creatures have from eternity an eſſe intelligibile & cognitum diſtinct from Gods eſſence? What the eſſe Cognitum is, whether it be ens reale or rationis or quid medium? Scotus is the Author of this notion of eſſe cognitum as an eſſe formale & proprium quod creatura habet diſtinctum ab eſſe ſuae Cauſa; in quo in Divino intellectu creaturae ipſae per intellectionem producuntur; e. g. Lapid…m in eſſe cognito producit, ſicut intellectus noſter ſecundas intentitiones p. 18facit, & ita rebus ipſis eſſe cognitum tribuit: nam ſicut lapis viſus per viſionem habet eſſe viſum, ita lapis cognitus per cognitionem eſſe cognitum habet—ſed ut primum ejus eſſe, per quod eſſe formale habent—Imo eſſe rerum Poſſibile in eſſe cognito fundatur. Who can read ſuch Scot. 1. d. 43. l. D. & d. 36. l. M. Rada l. 1. Cont. 29. art. 3. p. 466.preſumptuous aſſertions of the unknown mode of Divine Intellection without dread? And what a dance and ſhew is here made of meer words, while a Creature that is no Creature, is ſaid to have an eſſe which is no eſſe (of them) and ſo confeſſed? For (though Cajetan and others miſtook him,) Scotus confeſſeth that this eſſe congnitum non eſt ens reale, nec medium Vid. Rad. ib.inter ens reale & rationis, ſed eſt ens rationis purum, & omnino nihil, contra ens reale diſtinctum, ita, quod nullatenus aliquid realit at is habet. And is not here then a preſumptuous play with words? Scotus thus explaineth it. If Caeſar were annihilated, and the ſtatue of him remained, Scot. 1. d. 36. q. uniclit. G.Caeſar would have an Eſſe repraeſentatum in the ſtatue, which is neither an eſſe eſſentiae vel exiſtentiae total or partial. And ſaith Rada, Ex his manifeſte colligitur eſſe cognitum Creaturae in Deo ſecundum Scotum eſſe Rad. ubi ſup. pag. 467.omnino nihil, prout nihil opponitur enti reali ſive eſſentiae ſive exiſtentiae,—& non magis eſſe nihil Chimaeram quam hominem in eſſe cognito, quia utri que ineſt negatio totius entis. And indeed the eſſe repraeſentatum Caeſaris is nothing but the modus ſtatuae, which per modum ſigni is apt to bring the ſhape of Caeſar to the beholders imagination. And 1. Can they prove any ſuch Modifications of God? 2. And if they can, ſhould they ſo abuſe words as to call that modus Intellectus Divini, an eſſe primum formale creaturae diſtinct from God? The ſum of the Scotiſts opinion is thus expreſſed by Rada Eſſe cognitum creaturae eſt Ib. p. 468,ens Rationis, ſolum habens eſſe in intellectu Divino objectivè, ſicut ſecundae intentiones in intellectu creato—ſed res in eſſe cognito non eſt objectum motivum ſed terminativum ſecundarium. 1. As if God had any objectum motivum! 2. Or as if we poor mortals knew that God hath entia Rationis! Though we confeſs that we may ſo ſpeak of him after the manner of men; if we confeſs the great impropriety of the ſpeech.

117. From hence ariſeth another Controverſie, Whether to Gods underſtanding the Creatures, there be neceſſarily pre-required in him diſtinct relations to the objects? which I will not trouble you with their agitation of.

118. But the great Controverſie is of the Divine Idea's; eſpecially Whether the Creature as in Eſſe cognito be a Divine Idea? Aquinas denyeth it, **Aq. 1. p. q. 15. art. 1.and ſaith that an Idea is the Divine Eſſence as imitable by the Creature. Scotus, Gabr. Ockam, Gerſon, &c. affirm it. Aquinas his opinion † Scot. 1. d. 35. q. unica. & 36. Gabr. 1. d. 35. q. 5. Gerſon l. vit. ſpir. animae. Lect. 2. Corol. 12. See in Pennot. l. 3. c. 9. p. 114. &c. the four different opinions about. Idea's, and the doubtfulneſs of them.is thus opened by Cajetan, Rada and others, 1. Idea non ſignificat ſolum fundamentum imitabilitatis. 2. Nec tantum reſpectum imitabilitatis. 3. Sed utrumque. 4. Eſſentia Divina cognita ut imitabilis à Creatura per modum exemplaris eſt Idea. 5. In Deo eſt idearum multitudo. 6. Multitudo ide arum in Deo non eſt multitudo rerum reipſa inter ſe, & ab eſſentia diſtinctarum. 7. Nec multitudo rationum formalium, ſive rerum formaliter diſtinctarum. 8. Sed eſt multitudo rationum intellectarum. 9. Non diſtinguuntur ratione per actum intellectus creati. Idearum multitudo eſt multitudo rationum à Deo intellectarum.

119. The Scotiſts think Auguſtine of their mind, and give us their ſence in theſe concluſions, of Rada, 1. Ideas, hoc eſt, rationes in mente Divina Auguſt. Quaeſt. l. 83. q. 46. Scot. 1. d. 35. q. unica. Rada l. 1. cont. …29. art. 5. p. 497, 498, &c.collocatas tam Graeci quam Latini tradiderunt. 2. Idea non eſt Divina eſſentia ſecundum ſe & abſolute ſumpta. 3. Non eſt quid aggregatum ex eſſentia & reſpectu imitabilitatis. 4. Non includit in ſua ratione reſpectum rationis nec tanquam aliquid ſibi eſſentiale, nec tanquam p. 19modum intrinſecum. 5. Idea in mente Divina eſt ipſamet creatura cognita. And Scotus his definition is, Idea eſt ratio aeterna & incommutabilis in mente Divina, ſecundum quam aliquid eſt formabile extra tanquam ſccundum propriam rationem ejus.Vid. Durand. in 1. d. 36. q. 2, 3. De Ideis vid. …tiam Bonav. 1. d. 36. q. 1. Richad. m. 1. d. 35. q. 4. Aquil. Scotel. in. 1. d. 36. q. 1. (who ſeemeth dubious of his Maſters doctrine.) pag. 240. & q. 2. Vide diverſitatem opinionum de qu. Quorum ſunt Ideae.

120. By this you ſee how widely they are diſagreed what an Idea is in God: And yet they conclude (as Rada ib. p. 480.) neminem niſi his intellectis ſapientem eſſe: Nam quamvis Deus Opt. Max. ex cognitione ſuae eſſentiae ſit Infinite ſapiens, ac proinde ex cognitione Idearum non efficiatur ſapientior intenſive, attamen ſi Ideas, quarum ratio incommutabilis eſt, ignoraret, non eſſet Omniſcius. Et Art. 3. p. 470. he ſaith, [Deus eſſe nequit ſine Ideis.] We all grant that without the Knowledge of all things Intelligible, God cannot be, nor be Omniſcient. But the name of Idea's is fetcht from mans mode of Intellection, which is ever conjunct with ſomewhat of Imagination or ſenſe; which alſo ſeemeth included in our notion of Ideas, which therefore are uſually called Images or Species. And as we are moſt certain that Intellection in God both in the form and mode doth ſo Infinitely tranſcend and differ from humane Intellection, as that it is not the ſame thing; ſo we are very unfit in this woful darkneſs to talk ſo peremptorily of things unknown, and to conclude that God hath not a more perfect knowledge of things, than by Idea's, or any thing fitly ſo called. The world therefore ſhould not be troubled with ſuch preſumptions.

121. The next doubt among them is of Future Contingents, Whether and how they are known of God. That they are known of him is paſt doubt: But how is the great difficulty. Aquinas his mind is thus expreſſed by Rada, Concl. 1. Futura Contingentia prout ſunt in ſuis cauſis indeterminatis, Rad. ibid. art. 3. p. 494.ſolum conjecturali cognitione cognoſci poſſunt. 2. Futura contingentiae in ſeipſis poſſunt certa & infallibili cognitione cognoſci. 3. Deus non cognoſcit praeciſe futurum contingens, prout eſt in ſuis cauſis indeterminatis. 4. Deus cognoſcit futura contingentia ut praeſentia in ſua reali & actuali exiſtentia, quae eis convenit extra ſuas cauſas. 5. Deus certa & infallibili cognitione praeſcit futura contingentia.

122. The mind of Scotus he thus expreſſeth, after many notes and diſtinctions. 1. Deus cognoſcit omnia futura contingentia quoad omnes Id. ib. ad. pag. 504.conditiones exiſtentiae eorum, ſic, quod quaecunque eis in tempore contingenter inſunt, perfecte ab aeterno attingit. 2. Deus non cognoſcit certo & determinatè futura contingentia per hoc quod ſunt ſibi in aeternitate praeſentia. (Should I here recite you the reaſons by which he and other Scotiſts and Dr. Twiſſe do propugn this aſſertion, and thoſe by which Cajetan and many Thomiſts do oppugn it, I ſhould tire you. It ſhall ſuffice to ſay that both ſides talk in the dark of that which is utterly above mans reach). 3. Certitudo Divinae eſſentiae reſpectu omnium quantum ad omnes conditiones exiſtentiae, non habetur per ideas. (This alſo is on both ſides tediouſly diſputed in the dark). 4. Qui noſſet cauſas naturales futurorum, etiam eorum quae neceſſarias cauſas habent, ut Solis, Lunae que defectiones, non proinde infallibilem eorum notitiam aſſequeretur, niſi determinationem divinae voluntatis circa hujuſmodi eventus cognoſceret. (That's true, becauſe they are all but dependent ſecond Cauſes). 5. Deus cognoſcit futura contingentia certo & infallibiliter; quia Divina eſſentia ut ratio cognoſcendi repraeſentat divino intellectui rem determinate futuram ex determinatione divinae voluntatis. And this is Scotus his way, which Dr. Twiſſe propugneth.

123. Here Scotus ſuppoſeth things to lye in this order in the Divine Scot. Quodlib. q. 14. Liter. S. & T.Intellect, [1. The Divine Eſſence moveth the Divine intellect to know it p. 20ſelf, and all that is formally in it. 2. To the ſimple Intellection of all that is Intelligible, as abſtracting from exiſtence, or any order to it. 3. To the knowledge of all neceſſary copulations, which are known by connexion of terms, and this naturally and neceſſarily before the wills determination: becauſe they are not True becauſe God willeth it, but antecedently formally of themſelves. But not ſo to the Knowledge of contingent copulations, &c.] How eaſie were it to open much uncertainty and figment in theſe bold aſſertions?Vid. Rad. ib. p. 497, 496. Vid. Ruiz de Vol. Dei diſp. 16. ſect. 5. p. 173. Citing abundance of Schoolmen as holding etiam nunc poſſe Deum efficere ut non voluerit aut praedeſtinaverit nec praeſcierit; and ſome ſaying yet more, nunc eſſe poſſibile per potentiam abſolutam, ut non fuerit facta revelatio de futuris Dei operibus. Is not this profane boldneſs with the moſt holy God?

124. And here a great deal of diſpute there is about the Liberty of Gods will, and the nature of contingency. Some Thomiſts, (whom our Weſtminſter Aſſembly follow, but it ſhould not have been put into a Confeſſion of faith) ſay that nothing is to be called Contingent in reſpect of God. But the Scotiſts contrarily ſay that there could be no contingency if it were not firſt from Gods free will: and that he freely and contingently made all the world: All Actions being either naturally neceſſary or contingent; And if God had made all of natural neceſſity, they had been eternal.

125. And here they ſay that Gods will hath firſt a Liberty of contradiction, (to will or not will.) 2. And a Liberty to divers objects, (which I call of competition or compariſon) yea and to will contrary objects by the ſame act. 3. But not a Liberty to contrary Acts (Velle & nolle) becauſe that would be mutability.

126. And here many maxims are uſed by them as ſufficient to anſwer all objectors, which yet are ambiguous or uncertain themſelves. 1. One is, that God receiveth not the certainty of his Knowledge from the Creatures: And therefore if their preſent co-exiſtence in eternity were proved, it would no whit clear the doubts, or help the Thomiſts, who are here at a loſs for a ſufficient anſwer. My buſineſs is to ſide with neither, but to deterr the Reader from the preſumption of both parties; and to that end, to open the uncertainty of what they ſay. And ſo it is enough to anſwer, that As the Creature in being is no addition to Gods being or perfection, ſo to Know the Creature is not any addition to Gods Knowledge or perfection; but only the terminative acting of his perfect Knowledge ad extra. And that their word [Receiveth] hath a falſe ſuppoſition. For God Receiveth no Knowledge (though mans knowledge be partly Receiving); but the Infinite Light of his Intellect is emitted knowingly to the Creature. So that Gods knowledge may be terminated on Creatures, and thence denominated This or That knowledge without Reception.

127. Another maxime is that of Auguſtine, Non aliter facta quam fienda novit, and no new mode of Knowledge is to be imagined in God: which both ſides make uſe of. To which I ſay, that nothing can be called Gods Knowledge, but either his Eſſential Intellection, or the termination of it on the Creature. The firſt is never changed: But the ſecond, ſay the Nominals, is but an extrinſick denomination of it from the various terminating objects: And whether you will call them terminations, or Relations, or denominations, they may be New and various (of which more anon) without any change or variety in God: even as the Sun is not changed by the various Receptions or terminations of its influx here below.

128. **See the marginal citation, ſect. 16. out of Pet. Alliac. Cam. who giveth three reaſons againſt Scotus his making Gods Volition to be the reaſon of his knowing future contingents, 1. Becauſe it falſly ſuppoſeth priority and poſteriority in God. 2. Becauſe it maketh Gods intellect in primo inſtanti to be neutral de futuritione, and ſo in that inſtant daretur medium in contradictione. 3. Becauſe it falſly ſuppoſeth one Act of God to be a medium & ratio of another. Therefore he concludeth, 1. That the caſe is unſearchable. 2. But moſt probably Intellectualis & aeternus Dei oculus eſt quaedam Intuitio quae immediate ſuper quamlibet rem actualiter vel potentialiter exiſtentem ſimul fertur: Ideo tam circa futura quam praeſentia vel praeterita omnium contin…entium veritatum certum habet judicium: & divina intuitio eſt talt immenſum judicium.Another maxim is, that God knoweth things even Intuitively eternally in himſelf (his Will) when they exiſt not. Anſw. As Abſtractive and Intuitive are words ſignifying the divers modes of Gods knowing things, they are but preſumptuous figments, for ought I ſee; It being paſt p. 21mans reach to know the mode of Divine intellection, more than above the reach of a bird or beaſt to know the mode of ours. But as we may more eaſily and ſafely diſtinguiſh and denominate Gods Knowledge from the objects, ſo we may well ſay, 1. That he knoweth not that Creature to exiſt in nunc temporis which doth not ſo exiſt. 2. And that eſſe Volitum is not eſſe exiſtens. And therefore to know the former is not formally to know the latter.

129. Yea it is here diſputed Whether there be indeed any contingency Read the diſpute of Pet. Alliac. Camerac. m. 1. q. 11. ar. 3. R. S. and Gregories and Okams and his own opinion, about the poſſibility of Gods not knowing what he knoweth, and that it is in the power of the Creature to make God not to have known them, and much more ſuch like. I confeſs I tremble to read (not the falſhood but) the boldneſs and preſumption of ſuch diſputes, as fearing they are prophane.or not (which the Doctrine of Hobs and the Dominican Predeterminants muſt needs exclude, which make all events to be neceſſitated by God). The Reaſons againſt it are, 1. Whatever God fore-knoweth muſt neceſſarily be: but he fore-knoweth all that will be: ergo—2. All things future are from eternity determined in Gods will to one part of the contradiction: ergo neceſſario erunt. 3. All the acts of the Creatures will is to be done, by the phyſical efficient neceſſitating inſuperable predetermination of God the firſt cauſe: ergo, there is no place in ſuch neceſſity for contingency (which is a poſſe tendere ad eſſe vel non eſſe.)

130. Many and different anſwers are given to theſe, and thoſe of the Thomiſts and Dominicans are moſtly ſhuffling and vain: But plainly and briefly, 1. Gods fore-knowledge, 2. And his meer will, when they are not joyned efficiently with power, or a will de efficiendo, do no whit at all Cauſe or neceſſitate the effect or event, or ponere aliquid in objecto. It is only a Logical neceſſitas conſequentiae in ordine probandi that ariſeth Vid. D'Orbellis in 1. d. 38. dub. 1. Bonaventur. and (ſaith Dr. Twiſs) all the Schoolmen ſay the ſame.from them, which conſiſteth with contingency, and not a phyſical neceſſity in ordine eſſendi as from a Cauſe, called conſequentis, or effecti. And, 2. Gods Knowledge and Will rather prove contingency; For he doth not only know and will hoc futurum, but hoc contingenter futurum: Therefore it will be. 3. And the laſt argument from neceſſitating predetermination I ſhall elſewhere confute, and ſhew their contradiction who ſay that God doth predetermine the thing contingently to come to paſs.

131. But it cannot be denyed but that Gods will is from Eternity determined about every contingent event: And therefore that Neceſſitate exiſtentiae the determination of it is eternally neceſſary: And therefore that which we call Its Liberty is but the perfect manner of its determination, as Bradwardine confeſſeth.

132. But what is all this ſtir about? The great buſineſs of all is to ſhew how God fore-knoweth ſin. For ſaith Rada, It's eaſie (from Gods Ibid. ar. 3. p. 503.Volition) to ſhew how he knoweth things that are not ſin: but how knoweth he ſin from eternity, ſeeing this was never in eſſe volito? And Vid. 1. d. 36. q. 1. a. 2. Bonav. ib. q. 1. a. 3. Durand. ib. q. 1. Cujet. Bannez, Zumel. Rip…, Gonzal. M…lin. Vuſqutz, Arrub. Faſol. Aluiz 1. p. q. 14. a. 10. Tanner. 1. p. disp. 2. q. 8. dub. 8. Granad. 1. p. Cont. 2. d. 5.here the way of the Scotiſts proveth utterly inſufficient. Dr. Twiſſe and Rutherford and ſome Dominicans ſay, that God fore-knoweth it, becauſe he Decreed to Cauſe all the Entity of the Act with all its circumſtances from which the form of ſin is but a reſulting relation. But this ſubverteth Religion. Rada ibid. and Twiſs oft ſay, he Decreeth to permit it, (and that it ſhall come to paſs ipſo permittente, ſaith Twiſs:) Qu… permiſſio (ſaith Rada) non accipitur in communi, ſed pro eo quod eſt permittere Ibid. art. 3. p. 503.de facto deficere & in peccatum ruere ſubtrahendo efficacia auxilia quibus poſitis non foret peccatum. Quare haec eſt bona conſequentia quantum ad illationem prcaiſe; Deus permittit aliquem peccare hic & nunc de facto: ergo, peccat: ergo, valet conſequentia, Deus voluit ab aeterno permittere ut Petrus peccaret de facto tali & tali occaſione oblata: ergo peccabit: Dixi quantum ad Illationem praeciſe. Quia quantum ad Cauſalitatem non eſt bona illa conſequentia **Vid. Ruiz de ſcient. d. 17. Gr. Valent. p. 1. disp. 1. q. 14. punct. 7. Alarcon. 1. p. tr. 2. disp. 3 & 4.. But to paſs by their ſuppoſition of Gods knowing conſequences by argumentation, I ſhall confute all this anon.

p. 22133. And here the Thomiſts and Scotiſts have another skuffle, on the Vid. Aquin. 1. p. q. 14. art. 13. ad ſecundam. Scot. … 1. d. 39. q. 4. Rad. li. 1. Co…t. 30. art. 5. pag. 310, 311, &c. See Lychet. Confutation of Cajetan and Ockam at large in 1. p. d. 39. q. 1. fol. 254. ad 268. Leg. Pennot. li. 3. c. 11 & 12. p. 118, 119, &c.queſtion, Whether this knowledge of future contingents and the conditions of exiſtency in God, be Neceſſary in him, or free and contingent? The Thomiſts thus conclude, 1. Si futurum contingens ſecundum ſe, & ſuam propriam naturam conſideretur, neceſſitas nullatenus ei convenire poteſt, ſed ſola contingentia. 2. Si futurum contingens conſideretur ſecundum quod ſubeſt Divinae ſcientiae, eſt neceſſarium abſolute. 3. Haec propoſitio, Deus ſcivit Antichriſtum futurum, eſt ſimpliciter & abſolute neceſſaria: ſed ho… conſequens, [Ergo Antichriſtus erit] non eſt abſolute neceſſarium ſed contingens, ſi ſecundum ſe conſideretur: At ut divinae ſcientiae ſubeſt, eſt abſolute neceſſarium. 4. Scientia Dei reſpectu futurorum contingentium prou… jam ad ipſa eſt terminata, eſt ſimpliciter neceſſaria. And they prove the affirmative thus, 1. Gods knowledge is Immutable: therefore neceſſary. 2. To know future Contingents is Perfection: therefore neceſſary in God. 3. This Can be in God: therefore it neceſſarily is in him.

134. The Scotiſts thus expreſs their ſenſe, (after much explication), 1. Futuro contingenti ſecundum ſuam propriam naturam conſider ato null… neceſſitas conveire poteſt. 2. Futura contingentia, etiam ut ſubſunt Divinae ſcientiae, non ſunt neceſſaria. 3. Futurum contingens, etiam at ſubeſt Divinae ſcientiae, eſt q…oad eſſe ſimpliciter contingens, & ſecundum quid neceſſarium. 4. Propoſitio haec [Deus ſcivit Petrum futurum] ſive ſit de praeſenti, vel de praeterito, non eſt ſimpliciter neceſſaria, ſed ex ſuppoſitione. 5. Praefata propoſitio & omnia futura contingentia, ſunt neceſſaria neceſſitate immutabilitatis. 6. Scientia Dei reſpectu omnium creaturarum quoad eſſe exiſtentiae earum eſt contingens, & ex ſuppoſitione neceſſaria. I recite the words of Rada only, that I may not weary the Reader by referring him to peruſe too many Authors, and becauſe no man better diſcuſſeth the differences. See alſo his anſwers to the Thomiſts arguments, pag. 514. He that would peruſe more, may ſee them named in Ripalda lib. 1. d. 38. Alex. Alenſ. 1. p. q. 23. memb. 3. ar. 4. Thom. cont. Gent. c. 66. Franciſ. Mayro. 1. p. d. 38 & 39. Lychet. 1. d. 39. q. 1.& 37. and may read Aquin. 1. p. d. 38. q. 1. ar. 5. Aureol. 1. d. 38. ar. 1. Ockam & Gabri. ib. q. unic. ar. 2 & 3. Greg. ib. q. 2. Durand. ib. q. 3. Fab. d. 54. Cajet. Naz. Bannez, Zumel, Gonzal. Arrub. Molin. Vaſq. Faſol. m. 1. p. q. 14. ar. 3. Tanner. 1. p. d. 2. q. 8. dub. 3. Valent. 1. p. d. 1. a. 14. p. 3. Suarez li. 3. de Attribut. c. 2. Ruiz d. 10. Bonavent. 1. d. 39. Aquil. Scotell. in 1. d. 39. q. 2. And on the ſame a multitude of other known Scotiſts, &c.

135. Should I proceed to open to you all or half the queſtions about which the Schoolmens acuteſt wits do but dream, concerning the Knowledge and Decrees of God, I ſhould weary my ſelf and the Reader to little purpoſe; If you would ſee what the Thomiſts ſay of theſe, Ripalda will direct you where to find them. And the Scotiſts and Nominals being fewer are ſoon found.ſuch as, An ſcientia actualis aliorum ſit de Eſſentia Dei? An Eſſentia Dei ſit Motivum adaequatum ejus ſcientiae? An Deus cognoſcat creaturas ex ſeipſo, aut ex alio per diſcurſum? An & quomodo ſcientia Dei poſſit dividi in plures? An & quomodo Deus cognoſcat Mala? An & quomodo Deus cognoſcat negationes & privationes? An Deus cognoſcat Entia rationis? An habeat in ſe Entia Rationis? De ſcientia Media. An ſcientia Viſionis ſit cauſa futurorum? An futur a cauſa ſcientiae? An ſcientia ſimplicis intelligentiae ſit cauſa futurorum & practica? An Deus cognoſcat futura compenendo & dividendo? An Deus cognoſcat praeſentia eadem indiviſibili cognitione, qua ipſa praenovit futura? An Deus noverit Infinita ſcientia ſimplicis intelligentiae? An eadem cognitione ſe & creaturas cognoſcat? An exiſtente objecto pro ſolo imperio Voluntatis Divinae poſſit non eſſe in Deo aliquis actus ſcientiae divino intellectui poſſibilis? &c. with a multitude of leſſer queſtions which ariſe in the handling of theſe; And with as many more about Predeſtination, Gods Decrees or Volitions, Predetermination, p. 23&c. I think rather your patience is put to it ſufficiently already.

136. If you ſay that by reciting theſe difficulties, I do but confound mens underſtandings, rather than elucidate the things in hand, I anſwer, If Nic. D'Orbellis in 1. d. 41. a. 2. Poſſet dari una reſponſio generalis ad quaeſtiones conſimiles; quod debilitas noſtri intellectus non ſufficit ad indagandum abyſſum judiciorum Divinorum. Nec mirum: cum ad plenum non valeamus cognoſcere modicae herbae ſeu minimi vermiculi proprietatem. The very ſame hath Bradwardine, though a preſumptuous Schoolman. See alſo Vaſquez in 1. Thom. q. 19. diſp. &c. c. 2. pag. 503, 504. where he fully and freely confeſſeth that our underſtandings are utterly ſtalled about Gods Liberty of Will as related to things future. Nodus hic mea quidem ſententia inſolubilis eſt; vix enim vitare poſſumus circulum in reddenda ratione: Certiſſima ratione inveſtigare poſſumus quid in hac re non ſit: Quid vero ſit, verbo explicari difficillimum, aut pro hoc ſtatu impoſſibile eſt. Qui autem videt Deum, de ejus Voluntate Liberâ quatenus principium liberum eſt futurorum, longe aliter ſentiet, & unico verbo exprimet ſine hiſce relationibus rationis. See the reſt there to the ſame purpoſe. And this is the confeſſion of them all: of which more after.you are loſt in them, I have my end, which is to make you ſenſible how unmeet it is, that the Peace of the Church, and the Concord and Communion of Brethren ſhould at all be laid on ſuch multitudes of difficult and unſearchable things which are many vain, and others paſt mans underſtanding. Shall we call one another by the names of Sects, and reproach our brethren, as for the truth of God, and as if it were for his Glory, till all theſe Controverſies are cleared to us all? I who profeſs them to be beyond my reach, and profeſs my Ignorance of very many of them, am yet cenſured by my Brethren as too Scholaſtically curious for ſo much as naming them, or medling with them; yea, and for deciding caſes which may and muſt be decided: And of all our preſent Miniſters, I am confident there is not one of fifty (if of a hundred) that hath either throughly ſtudied them, or ever will do. Now if the Church muſt have Love and Concord, how will it be had? Of thoſe few (one of a hundred that ſtudy them throughly) ſix men it's like are of three opinions. And what ſhall the ninety nine do that never ſo ſtudied them? Either they muſt know what they never ſtudied, and be in the Right where they underſtand not what they ſay: Or elſe they muſt unite by an Implicit faith. And in whom ſhal that be? If the Church, what Church is it? Are not many Churches of many minds? If of the Papal Church, it hath more wit than to decide ſuch Controverſies; ſo that their Doctors are almoſt Sectaries by diviſions to this day.

137. And if any will dream that the Controverſies between the Calviniſts and Lutherans (or Arminians) and the Dominicans and Jeſuits can be reſolved for either ſide without medling with theſe queſtions, he is a perſon too ignorant to be fit to ſpeak confidently in the Cauſe. Let him but try a diſpute with any able adverſary, and he ſhall be carried to theſe whether he will or not.

138. But if it be one that is ſo confident on either part, as to think that his ſide or opinions are ſo great and clear, as that the contrary are unfit for our toleration, and communion, I muſt be ſo free with him as to ſay, that he bewrayeth ſo great Ignorance and Pride, as make his own fitneſs for communion much more queſtionable. For is it not moſt odious Ignorance, for a man not to know his own Ignorance of ſo many myſteries which no mortals know? And is it not loathſome Pride, for men to be ſo confident of theſe falſe conceits and arrogate to themſelves a knowledge which mans earthly ſtate is uncapable of?

139. And it filleth me with ſhame to find, that (though ſome ſtir hath been lately made againſt the Janſeniſts) yet all theſe Sects (Dominicans, Jeſuits, Scotiſts, Nominals, &c.) can live in communion notwithſtanding their differences, when yet the Proteſtants have proſecuted the ſame differences with all that bitterneſs, which you may find in the Germans Hiſtorians and Divines, (ſuch as Schluſſelburgius, Calovius, and many more) and in the ſad Hiſtory of the Low Countreys, and in Heylin's Life of Archbiſhop Laud, and which you may ſtill hear in all parties, in their ignorant cenſures of one another, by the names of Calviniſts and Arminians. And yet the Church of Rome is juſtly condemned by us for its uncharitable Cruelty againſt Diſſenters, when thus we thereby condemn our ſelves.