Catholic Theology Plain Pure Peaceable, Section 6
SECT. VI. Of Gods Knowledge, and the Co-exiſtence of the Creature.
88. AUguſtine well and truly ſaith, that fore-knowledge in God, is the ſame with the Knowledge of things preſent: Paſt, preſent and future, through his Infiniteneſs and Eternity, being alike to him, even all as preſent.
89. But this dependeth upon the Indiviſibility of Eternity: in which all the things of time are included, and co-exiſt.
90. Thus ſaith Auguſtine li. 2. ad Simplic. q. 2. Quid eſt praeſcientia niſi ſcientia futurorum? Quid autem futurum eſt Deo qui omnia ſupergreditur tempora? Si enim in ſcientia res ipſas habet, non ſunt ei futurae, ſed praeſentes: ac per hoc non jam praeſcientia ſed tantum ſcientia dici poteſt—Si autem ſicut in ordine temporalium creaturarum, ita & apud Deum, nondum ſunt quae futura ſunt, ſed ea praevenit ſciendo, bis ergo ea ſentit; uno quidem modo ſecundum futurorum praeſcientiam, altero verò modo ſecundum praeſentium ſcientiam: Aliquid ergo temporaliter accedit ſcientiae Dei. quod abſurdiſſimum atque falſiſſimum eſt.
Thus with Auguſtine Nothing is future to God, leſt the after-knowledge of things as preſent, ſeem an addition to the firſt. And if this be true, then futurity had no eternal Cauſe.
91. See more ibid. in Auguſt. to the ſame purpoſe. And li. 15. de Trinit. cap. 7. Et in Pſal. 101. And Gregor. Moral. li. 20. cap. 23. that Preſcience is not properly in God, nor any thing future to him. So Anſelm. opuſc. de Concord. cap. 1. See alſo Arriba Concil. li. 3. c. 11, 12, 13, 14. and Boetius and Aquinas there cited. And à cap. 16. ad cap. 26. the whole Controverſie handled of the co-exiſtence of all things with God in eternity.*Vid. Bonav. 1. d. 36. ar. 1. & plurimos Scholaſt. in 1. d. 8. viz. Tho. q. 2. Cajet. Zumel. Bannez. Nazar. Gonzal. Arrubal. q. 14. hac lin. Vaſquez. Faſol. & Alvarez. de Auxil. l. 2. diſp. 8. & 9. Navarret. Cent. 52. Suar. l. 1. de Scient. c. 7. & 8. Ruiz. de Scient. diſp. 28. Albert. To. 3. Princip. 4. Corol. 2. q. 2. Valent. 1. p. diſp. 2. q. 14. punct. 5. ſect. 1. Alarcon. 1. p. tract. 2. d. 2. c. 8. Tanner. 1. p. d. 2. q. 8. dub. 6. Gillius l. 2. de Eſſent. Dei, tract. 10. c. 15, &c. Arriba in Concil. per plura cap. cum multis aliis. Lychet. in 1. p. d. 39. q. 1. Tuiſſ. de Scient. Med. Bradward. l. 3. c. 51. p. 828. & corol. p. 830.
92. But becauſe Scotus, Durand. Gabriel. Greg. Molina and many others digeſt not this notion, I ſhall open it to you in a moderate and undenyable ſenſe, how things may be ſaid to co-exiſt with God in eternity.
When temporary Creatures are the ſubjects of Relation to God, then God is denominated by extrinſecal denomination as the terminus of that Relation: But when God or Eternity is the ſubject of Relation to Creatures, then temporary creatures are denominated as the termini of the Divine relation. And ſo Eternity (being as Divines conclude indiviſible and tota ſimul quia ſine partibus) being one and the ſame, communicateth ſomewhat of its Name to the multifarious fluid creature, as its terminus: And as the Mutations of creatures in exiſtence and operation thus communicate various denominations to the actions (knowledge and will) of God; ſo Gods Unity and Conſtancy giveth various denominatinos to the creatures. *Card. Sarnan. Concil. Th. & Scoti, p. 22. inquit, Deus per ſuam aeternitatem ſine aliqua ſucceſſione ſui eſt omnibus praeſens: ſed non ſine ſucceſſione rerum. Ideoque omnia quae ſunt, ſuerunt & erunt, coexiſtunt in aeternitate, & habent etiam eſſe cognitum in mente divina. Et ideo bene dicunt & Thomas & Scotus.And ſo, becauſe things when they exiſt, do co-exiſt with eternity, and eternity hath no prius & poſterius, and the Prepoſitions [ab] & [ad] & [ante] & [poſt] have there no true ſignification, therefore it may be ſaid, that as Indiviſible Eternity co-exiſteth with the creature, ſo the creature co-exiſteth with and in indiviſible eternity, and ſo with All eternity, and not with a part.
93. Hence you may ſee how both ſayings may be true; both that Eternity (or God and his Knowledge) ever co-exiſteth with creatures, and alſo that it doth de novo begin to co-exiſt; viz. As God is extrinſecally denominated from the real mutation of the creature related to him; or as the creature is denominated extrinſecally as related to the indiviſible God and Eternity: even as God and the creature are variouſly conſidered towards each other, as the Relate, or as the Terminus.
94. To clear it by a low ſimilitude; When a Rock in the Sea is the Relatum, and the Sea the Terminus, it may be ſaid, [This Rock is the conſtant Companton of the Sea]: And alſo thence, that [The Sea is the conſtant companton of the Rock] the title of Conſtancy being thus mutually uſed, but in a various …enſe. So when the Sea is the Relatum, and the Rock is the Terminus, it may be ſaid, that [The rolling Waves paſs by the Rock as its unconſtant companions] And conſequently, that [The Rock is an unconſtant Companion of the Waves.] So you may ſay, that [the Eternal God or Eternity doth indiviſibly co-exiſt with the temporary creature, or with time;] and thence that [the temporary creature or Time doth co-exiſt with indiviſible eternity.] And yet that [the tranſient creature doth tranſitorily co-exiſt with God] and ſo that [God doth but temporarily co-exiſt with the tranſitory creature]; as the reaſon of the denomination is variouſly fetcht in.
95. In like manner quoad locum it may be ſaid, that [the finite creature doth limitedly co-exiſt with God] and ſo, that [God as the Terminus of the creatures exiſtence, doth limitedly co-exiſt with the creature]. But alſo that [the Infinite God doth immenſely co-exiſt with the finite creature] and [the finite creature doth co-exiſt with Immenſity.]
96. †This ſuppoſeth (with Pet. Hurtad. and other Nominals,) that God is Related to the creature, and that Scotus his anſwer to Aquinas reſting on the contrary ſuppoſition, that only the creature is Related, is therefore vain. Aegid. Roman. Quodl. 3. q. 3. pag. 135. Totus decurſus rerum eſt Deo praeſens: Ideo circa hoc non fallitur; ſive ſit neceſſarium ſive contingens: cum infallibilitas divinae cognitionis non det rebus neceſſitarem, n…c tollat à contingentibus contingentiam: Futura ſ…nt praeſentia praeſcientiae Divinae, &c. For this co-exiſtence, ſee Ricard. in 1. d. 38. q. 3. & d. 39. q. 1. a. 1. Capreol. 1. d. 36. q. 1. a. 2. & d. 38. q. 1. a. 2. Ferrar. cont. Gent. 1. c. 66. Caje…. 1. q. 14. a. 13. On the contrary, ſee Alenſ. 1. …. q. 23. in 4. a. 3. Bonavent. 1. d. 39. a. 2. q. 3. Scot. ib. q. 1. Dur. q. 3. n. 12. Greg. q. 2. a. 2. Gabr. 1. d. 38. q. 1. a. 2. Mar…il. in Thom. Vaſ…u. in 1. Th…. q. 14. a. 3. d. 64. r. 3. 4.But note 1. That as the denominations of a univerſal may be better diſtributed and reſtrained by its relation to particulars, than particulars can be denominated like the univerſal; ſo it is here unfitter to give the attribute of God relatively to the creature, than to ſpeak of God as Relatively limited to the creature. And therefore it is more unfit to ſay that the creature co-exiſteth [eternally and immenſely] with God, than that God co-exiſteth [temporarily and limitedly] with the creature in relation. 2. That the moſt proper expreſſion is to fetch the attribute from the Nature of the ſubject, rather than borrowedly from the correlate: And ſo it is fitteſt to ſay, that [The Eternal and Immenſe God doth co-exiſt Eternally and Immenſely with the Tranſitory, finite creature]; And that [the creature doth Tranſitorily and finitely co-exiſt with the Eternal Immenſe God].
97. As Time is no Real being, but the Duration of Beings, which is nothing but their Exiſtence not ceaſing; ſo Eternity is nothing really diſtinct from God himſelf; but it is Gods exiſtence conſidered as having no meaſure of duration, no beginning, no middle, no parts of duration and no End.
98. Eternity therefore is a Notion which may be called Indiviſible and Diviſible in ſeveral reſpects. It is Indiviſible properly and in it ſelf conſidered; for it is nothing but God himſelf as exiſting ſine menſura tempor is perfectly and indiviſibly: But it may be called Diviſible Intellectually (by humane, partial or inadequate conception; not by partition), as it is compared to tranſitory time; and becauſe as mans narrow head muſt know one God ſuo modo by many inadequate conceptions, or not at all, ſo muſt he know Eternity ſuo modo, by conceptions drawn from partible Time.
99. By this much the great Objections of the Scotiſts may be ſatisfied by a Conciliation: They ſay, 1. That which exiſteth not, doth not co-exiſt; nor God with it. 2. That Eternity indeed includeth all Time ſucceſſively as preſent in it; but not future Time. To the firſt I anſwer, 1. That it is granted that Time hath ſucceſſions, and only the preſent Inſtant is: And that which Is not, co-exiſteth not with Eternity: But yet ſeeing Eternity is Indiviſible, it is not part of it that co-exiſteth with one of our Inſtants and part with another; but All indiviſibly with each inſtant. 2. And when it is ſaid, That the Creature exiſted not ab aeterno, if you intellectually divide Eternity into paſt and preſent and future, like Time, it's true: But ſpeaking properly, it is fallacious: For [Ab] aeterno implyeth a diviſion of Eternity, and a preterition of one part, which is commonly ſuppoſed falſe. But if the denomination be ſercht from Eternity, ſeeing it is Indiviſible, you cannot ſay that to day it co-exiſteth with this day, and not with to morrow, for if ever it co-exiſteth, it alwayes co-exiſteth: For, ab & ad, & ante & poſt, & fuit & erit, are words of falſhood ſpoken properly of Eternity (according to the commoneſt doctrine.)
100. And to the ſecond the ſame anſwer ſerveth; Denominating Time in it ſelf, you may ſay that ſome is future, that is, Is not, but Will be, and ſo that it is not In Eternity till it come. But ſetching the Name from Indiviſible Eternity, Future there is a word of falſe importance: There is no Futurity in Eternity. And it Indiviſibly includeth all ſucceſſions of our Time.
101. Yet we lay no ſtreſs on any of this as neceſſary to reconcile our Controverſies: And we readily acknowledge and maintain, that by Extrinſick denomination from its Relation to our ſucceſſive Inſtants, Eternity and God himſelf may have new and various denominations (of which more anon).