Gods Arraignment of Hypocrites, Religious tract 1 · Chapter 2 · Part 3 · Section 5

Gods Arraignment of Hypocrites · Religious tract 1 · Chapter 2 · Part 3 · Section 5

p. 95Solution of the ſecond Argument drawne from Gods decree.

The firſt part of the Argument reſting vponupon that Sophiſme of Arminius, is alreadie cleared. To the ſecond, Gods decree not the workes of ſinne, but conuerſant in it, in ordering and diſpoſing.concerning the neceſſary copulation of Gods decree, and ſinne: Firſt I anſwer, they are not cauſe and effect; becauſe Gods decree is an act vponupon ſinne, and therefore ſubiect and adiunct. But you will inquire what neceſſitie is there of the connexion of theſe two parts? I anſwer, Gods decree, and mans fall, doe not make a neceſſarie ſentence, but contingent, yet moſt infallible and true; becauſe it was the act of an infinite wiſdome, that could not be deceiued; and hereupon his iudgement was moſt infallibly p. 96true of mans fall. If an expert Phyſitian ſhould foretell the death of his patient, and were moſt certen of it; muſt it therefore be neceſſarie when it comes to paſſe, Determination no cauſe of neceſſitie.becauſe he foretold it? no; for the truth is the ſame that it was before, onelyonly it is now more euident to others that knew it not: ſo God moſt certenly knew the fall of man and determined of it, euen as the Phyſitian determines of the fit in an ague wherein his patient ſhall die, and farre more certenly: he will not miſſeit a minute of time. Could the deuill tell Saul, yea, and determine of it, To morrow ſhalt thou and thy ſonnes be with me; and yet ſhall not God be able to ſet downe the exact time of mans apoſtacie? And if the Lord hauehave determined the day and houre wherein Adam ſhould die, ſhall he therefore be the neceſſarie cauſe of his death? You will not accuſe the Phyſitian as a murtherer, becauſe he foretold the time wherein his patient ſhould depart; nay, you will ſcarſe accuſe the Deuill, becauſe he ſaid, to morrow; but confeſſe that Saul himſelfe fell on his own ſword: onelyonly this makes vsus ſay the Deuill did it, becauſe he hath bin a murtherer from the beginning. And as God ſaies, Is there any euill of puniſhment in the citie, and I hauehave not done it? ſo dare I ſay, is there any euill of ſinne in the world, and Sathan hath not done it? Therefore I muſt craue pardon to hold a certentie, but no neceſſitie, that man infallibly ſhould fall; yet moſt freely and contingently, but not neceſſarily at all: for neceſſitie is againſt Gods decree. Things neceſſa… neede no decree for their conſequents.God neuer decrees the fire to burne, becauſe if it be fire it is good reaſon it ſhould burne: God neuer decrees man ſhall hauehave reaſon, for if he will hauehave him a man, then it is neceſſarie he ſhould hauehave reaſon: but to decree, in all proprierie of ſpeech, both with God and man, is of things contingent.

Man he decrees vponupon deliberation and conſultation: and the ſubiect matter thereof is ſome contingent thing, which hee would produce or hinder: for if it be a neceſſarie thing, he can neither produce it, or hinder it: man is not a ſtone, he can neuer produce out of this the arffimatiue part, man is a ſtone: God is iuſt, is a neceſſarie truth; let him bring all the arguments he can inuent or deuiſe out of his wit, and yet he ſhall p. 97neuer produce this, that God is the author of ſinne, or vniuſt. Suppoſe an armie of men were comming againſt England, would not the King and his Councill, aſſemble to deliberate and conſult, that they might preuent them? and therefore though the thing be moſt certain, yet it is not neceſſarie: The towne is on fire; if it were neceſſarie it ſhould burne the town, what then ſhould men do crying for helpe? yet it might bee ſome knewe for a certentie, that the towne would be burnt; is it therefore neceſſarie? But you will ſay, eueryevery thing when it is, is neceſſarie that it ſhould be: I anſwer, that this beeing ſhould become exiſtent, was neuer neceſſarie; A thing to bee when it is, is not neceſſarie for the cauſe, but that it is a kind of beeing vnderunder ſome head of entity where it is neceſſarie.yet that this beeing ſhould be ſomething, is moſt neceſſarie. And therfore I admire that though many meane wel, yet they ſhould neuer diſtinguiſh betwixt an an effect, and a ſpecies of beeing. The effect lookes onelyonly at cauſes; now the cauſes of mans fal, were no wayes neceſſarie; either when they were in power to act, or when they did really produce: and therefore as man was a contingent cauſe till he fell; ſo when he was fallen, he was ſtil the ſame cauſe; onelyonly his power was brought into act; and all our diſpute is on this head, as mans fall was an effect.

But now you come and ſay, this effect was neceſſarie; how I pray you? becauſe you ſay, quicquid eſt, quando eſt neceſſarium eſt eſſe: marke your predication, which is of that word eſſe, vponupon quicquid eſt quando eſt: now, what is that eſſe, to quicquid eſt quando eſt? I tell you no effect, but a ſpecies: now the ſpecies of any genus, is a neceſſarie axiome when it is diſpoſed. And therfore that which is exiſting in the world, to be brought vnderunder ſome head of beeing is moſt neceſſarie; for God is the God of order: ſinne therefore, or rather the action of ſinne, (for ſinne cannot hauehave an eſt, though it may hauehave a quando eſt) as beeing referred to the predicament of action, One thing as an action is an example of that order, and another thing as produced into that order.or the catagorie of effects, is neceſſarie; becauſe this action, or this effect, is an example or ſpecies of that generall nature; and with that generall nature he is neceſſarie: hence Logitians call theſe arguments diſpoſed foreign, the ſecond degree of neceſſarie affirmation: but recall theſe actions to their agents, theſe effects to their efficients, and the argument is changed: therefore diſpoſe Adam p. 98and his ſinne together, as cauſe and effect; Gods decree and mans fall as ſubiect and adiunct, and both are but contingent axiomes; the former contingent and vncertaine vntounto Adam, vntill he had committed his ſinne; the ſecond contingent and moſt certaine, becauſe God that decreed it knewe all things, and with whom all time was preſent.

Argument repeated.Further, it is vrged from commiſſion and omiſſion: from commiſſion, becauſe God did concurre to the doing of it, ſeeing it could not be done without him: and beeing the firſt in it, is the principall actor, man but his inſtrument, and that ſo neceſſarily vrged, that hee could not reſiſt God the firſt moouer. From omiſſion, becauſe God did not giuegive him ſo much grace as was neceſſarie to keepe him from omitting his dutie: for if God had concurred with man to this neceſſary act, then ſhould man hauehave done his will.

Anſwered from Gods concourſe with his creatures.Concerning the concourſe and confluxe of Gods grace with man in his operation, is a matter of great difficulty. The ſchoolmen hauehave ſo clouded this point with diſtinctions, that our men hauehave looked for the myſterie of it in them; but euen thereby hauehave beene ſo damped, that they hauehave ſpoken they knowe not what: for my ſelfe, I knowe I ſhall come farre ſhort of that which I aime at, yet leauing the ſchool-men, I am bold to extract what I can from the obſeruation of Gods wiſedome in his creatures; and for the conceiuing of this truth, I lay downe foure generall axiomes.

1. All beeings are from God.

2. They are made of God for an ende.

3. They are made with power to worke for this ende.

4. That they may obtaine it, God hath ſtamped vponupon them his wiſedome.

In theſe fowre, EueryEvery beeing working vntounto his end by the power God hath giuen it, is guided by a rule.I truſt in God to ſhew how God is ſaid in ſome ſort to concurre with man: But a little to expreſſe the propoſitions by ſome examples. God made man, therefore for ſome ende, for ſome end therefore to be able to work vntounto it; and how ſhould he doe this without his guide; and ſome rule of wiſdom muſt be giuen him, which rule is able to guide him in euerie action vntounto his ende: therefore Gods concourſe p. 99or confluxe with his creature is nothing but the ſtamping of this wiſdome vponupon him, whereby he is carried vntounto his Creator, that gaue it him. God hath giuē man a will, this wil of man is for an end, this end is to pleaſe his Creator; that he may pleaſe his creator, he muſt be doing of good, & that he may do good, he muſt attend vntounto diuinity, the rule that God hath giuen him to bring him to this ende: Hence I dare boldly ſay, that the concourſe of this rule, with the facultie of mans will, in eueryevery ſpeciall action, had beene able to make man happie. But let vsus hauehave a fewe more examples, before we come to application and reſolution: God hath giuen man his reaſon, this beeing is for ſome end, this end is bene diſſerere, to reaſon well: now for this end the facultie muſt exerciſe it ſelfe; and that the facultie may exerciſe it ſelfe, God hath ſtamped vponupon mans reaſon the rule of Logick, or diſcerning wel of eueryevery thing that god hath made; for all things were made for man: and therefore muſt God beſtow an eye vponupon him whereby he may ſee all things, and this eie is the eie of reaſon guided by Logicke, ſo that Logicke concurring with my reaſon, is able to make me produce any act, directly carried vntounto his ende. God hath giuen me ſpeech, this is for ſome end, as to ſpeake wel or eloquently; for this ende muſt I exerciſe my ſpeech, and that I may not exerciſe in vaine, he hath giuen me the rule of Grammar and Rhetoricke; which rules concurring with my ſpeech, I ſpeak both truely and eloquently.

The Apoſtles, many of them vnlearned, ſpake languages, The Apoſtles ſpake tongues by the rules of Grammar.and that as Grammatically and Rhetorically as euer did Tully or Demoſthenes; and God did that for them immediately, which others come vntounto by long practiſe. Now how did God concurre with them? ſurely no otherwiſe then by the true rules of art, immediately taught them of the holy Ghoſt.

The ſunne in the heauens runnes his race with ioyfulneſſe; and if you aske me by what concourſe of God; I anſwer peremptorily, by no other then the rule of naturall Philoſophy, which God created with the ſunne. That this may a little the better ſhewe it ſelfe, conſider that all beeings beſides himſelfe were made of nothing for himſelfe: in all theſe things, God p. 100can but hauehave the reſpect of two cauſes; the firſt is efficient, the ſecond finall: hence God is called Alpha and Omega, the firſt, and the laſt, the beginning and the ende: and hence hee can giuegive a beeing vntounto things, but not his owne beeing; and ſo his beeing muſt be out of creatures, and therefore muſt other cauſes be giuen by him, The efficient & the end giuegive to the effect, but not themſelues, matter and forme giuegive all they hauehave.which cannot onelyonly giuegive a being, but their owne beeing: and theſe be two, matter and forme: the wood and forme of a table are in the table it ſelfe; but the carpenter onelyonly giues a beeing of efficiencie, and not himſelfe: and thus God made all his workes ſtand out from himſelfe, to himſelfe, and that with their matter and forme: and thus all the creatures became beeings from God, not onelyonly of that eſſe, that God gaue them, but alſo of that eſſentia which gaue beeing, and his owne beeing, that ſo in themſelues by the forme extending it ſelfe ouer the matter, qualities and faculties beeing araiſed, it might hauehave power to act and worke not only for the glorie of his creator, but alſo for that ſpeciall good which God ſawe in all that he had made, when he ſaid, they were good, yea, and very good.

Hence I would entreat theſe obſeruations; Firſt, that eueryevery creature owes vntounto God, Acceptum referre in cauſis, effectis, ſubiectis, adiunctis.firſt his beeing: ſecondly, his nature from that being, (for natura eſt res nata:) thirdly, all his welbeeing; becauſe all theſe they came from God either mediately or immediately.

Secondly, obſerue that the whole glorie of the creature, is the glorie of the Creator: becauſe the glorie of a thing lies eſpecially in his end, which ende is an indiuiduall companion of matter & forme, which matter and forme were giuen of God.

Thirdly, all things in the creature, are depending vponupon the Creator; the beeing, nature welbeeing, eupraxie, vertue, actions, and life it ſelfe: in him we liue, mooue, and hauehave our beeing.

4. The end of eueryevery thing is neceſſarie.Obſerv. If all depend vponupon God, then are all gouerned by him; firſt becauſe a thing dependent workes mutably; yet the end of this mutable nature is neceſſarie: and therfore muſt he be guided by him that is immutable vntounto the end. Hence obſerue, that the ende which God hath appointed his creature is neceſſarie, though the creature it ſelfe bee contingent p. 101and mutable. And this hath deceiued our Diuines, not diſtinguiſhing betwixt Adams fall, and the ende: the ende is neceſſarie, yet the action and agent were both mutable: the reaſon is, becauſe it is abſolutely impoſſible to conceiue any action, but it is for ſome ende: the ende is eſſentiall to the action, but the action it ſelfe beeing dependent, was contingent, and ſo was the agent.

Obſerv. 5. The ſame … dom that … gouernesThe ſelfe-ſame wiſdome that produced the creature, gouernes him beeing produced. Firſt, becauſe for the ſelfeſame end, he is both produced & gouerned: to be for an ende, and not to be gouerned to that ende, are foreign, incompatible. Therefore mutually affirming or denying, graunt the one, and graunt the other; denie the one, and denie the other. Secondly becauſe it is not onelyonly the part of a wiſe man, to produce his worke, but alſo to direct it to his ende; therfore moſt abſurd to denie it of the wiſeſt. Thirdly, becauſe it is impoſſible, that a thing ſhould be produced by one wiſdome, and gouerned by another: thus things would not ſerue the ende of their creation, but another.

Obſerv. 6. According to this wiſdome, eueryevery nature worketh, and to this he ought to obey. Reaſon. 1. Becauſe they are Gods effects: and therefore obeying the cauſe, muſt needs obey the wiſdome that ordered the cauſes: ſinne therefore beeing nothing, obeies not God, neither any ſinner, as he ſerues ſinne. Secondly, this wiſdome carries to the ende; and eueryevery thing obeies his ende, and inclines, bends, and bowes vntounto it.

Obſerv. 7. This obſequie or obedience of the creature, is the foreign, or true impreſſion of this producing and gouerning wiſdome. This firſt wiſdome is the foreign, The gouernement of the Creator. & the obedience of the creature.or liuely ſeale that ſtamped that marke vponupon the creature: therefore the ſtampe is the liuely effigies, or impreſſion of that firſt wiſdome: and the obſequie or obedience of the creature, is nothing but to imitate his gouernour. A familiar example of this, you may ſee in the ſeale, and the impreſſion vponupon the waxe: the ſeale leaues his marke, and the marke is a plaine repreſentation of the ſeale, though the ſeale it ſelfe could be ſeene of none but p. 102him that ſtamped his marke vponupon the waxe. The waxe ſets forth the creature, the ſtampe the obedience, and the ſeale Gods wiſdome: and this is that Idaea which is ſo much dreamed of, whereof the creature is not capable; yet the reflexion of it, may be in the creature. As for example; ſixe or ſeuen men may ſee their faces all in one glaſſe, yet the glaſſe is farre leſſe then any one of their faces: for the naturall face of a man can not be put into the glaſſe, but the image of his face reflected, and that in moſt liuely proportion: ſo Gods face no man can ſee, yet his backe parts may be ſeene, Exod. 33. now this face, as I may ſay, of Gods wiſdome, beeing ſtamped vponupon his creatures, carrie them in all their motions to their ends appointed of his Maieſtie. Theſe things beeing well conceiued of, wee finde two things moſt neceſſarie to concurre to the producing of any act. … and ….Firſt, facultie or power, which God giues the creature, when he giues them beeing: 2. a rule of Gods wiſdome, to bring that facultie into exerciſe, and ſo carrie it along vntounto his ende. The rule is the principall cauſe, the facultie the inſtrumentall, or miniſteriall cauſe to ioyne with the principall: neither alone can doe any thing, but both together can doe any worke that the Creator would hauehave to be done. To come then to our purpoſe: God created man a reaſonable creature, indued with two moſt excellent qualities, will, and vnderſtanding: ſo that man was made able to vnderſtand his Creator, and will him as his onelyonly good. Yet man could not actually will God, except God had giuē a rule to hauehave taught him ſo to doe: the Lord bad man louelove him with all his heart, ſoule, minde, and ſtrength: and then to louelove his neighbour as himſelfe. And for the effecting of this, he gaue him a perfect rule of righteouſnes, to ioyne with his will in the performance of any dutie; neither did God withhold this rule from him at any time: and therefore God gaue man by creation power to will, and rule ſufficient for to hauehave taught him how to will: ſo that neither for power, or act, any thing was wanting.

Let vsus ſee then how theſe two things concurred in mans firſt fall. How rule and facultie meet together in the firſt fall.The deuill comes in the ſerpent, and he beginnes to withdraw man from his rule, knowing if man and woman p. 103had ſticked cloſe thereunto, ſinne ſhould hauehave had no entrance. He beginnes firſt to propound a queſtion, that ſo he might bring the woman to diſpute with him: and the queſtion is made about the rule of obedience; Hath God indeed ſaid, Ye ſhall not eate of euerie tree of the garden? To this the woman anſwers, firſt by affirmation, we eate of the trees of the garden: ſecondly, by negation, from the ſentence of the law, of the fruit which is in the mids of the garden God hath ſaid, not onelyonly I, The diſpu… on of the … man and … deuill.but neither I nor my husband muſt eate of it; neither ſhall ye touch it: and to the prohibition, ſhe laies the curſe, leaſt ye die. So then the rule would hauehave made his part good againſt the Deuill, and hauehave taught the woman to hauehave holden this concluſion againſt all the deuills arguments. The deuill replies againe vponupon the woman; and firſt he begins to take away that which might feare her in breaking the law, yee ſhall not die at all: and then to her negation, brings a teſtimonie, firſt from God, God doth knowe: ſecondly, from contradiction to the law, when ye ſhall eate therof: thirdly, a threefold reaſon to perſwade them to that act of eating: firſt knowledge, your eyes ſhall be opened: ſecondly, the meaſure of this knowledge, it ſhal make you like God himſelfe: thirdly, from the kinds of their knowledge, knowing both good and euill. As yet no hurt was done.

Let vsus now ſee how the Law concurres in the next, The con… of the …and we ſhall eaſily ſee both Gods and the lawes confluxe with Adams fall. The 1. act of the woman, was approbation of the deuills reaſons; ſo the woman: heres conſent againſt both God & the law. The 2. act was ſeeing; here God concurred naturally, and that by the rule of nature in optickes: neither was this the breach of that rule, but preſently the will wheeles or turnes it ſelfe vponupon the obiect, and ſaies the tree was good; and that approbation was alſo good, for the tree was good by Gods creation: but this goodneſſe did ſo affect the will, that Gods law muſt be forgotten: and the tree beeing made good for that which the law forbad, to wit, that it was good for meat, when before out of the ſentence of the law, ſhe had ſaide, the law and God himſelfe hath ſaide, ye ſhall not eate; and to ſay it was good for meate, was a direct affirmation againſt p. 104both God and his law, and ſo could not hauehave their concourſe: and this was her internall iudgment. The next, is her externall iudgment, in regard of the tree obiected to her eyes, in theſe words, and that it was pleaſant to the eyes. Now this was no where forbidden, but that they might looke on it: and it may be ſhe ſaid too much, when ſhe added, we may not touch it: yet this likewiſe is made a ſinne, for after the will is ſpoyled, then all the other members become ſinnefull. It is not ſimply a ſinne to looke on a woman, for ſo much as to ſee is done by the concurrence of a rule of Gods wiſdome; but in that it is to luſt after a woman: and ſo here the eye looking vponupon this tree, is made ſinnefull, becauſe inwardly ſhe luſts after it: and that is expreſſed in the next words, when ſhee ſaies, a tree to be deſired: and the ende of that, is to get knowledge. This ende is good, but will not iuſtifie the action; becauſe the very eating for this end, was expreſſely forbidden. The 3. act, is taking of the fruit thereof; neither can this ſimply be condemned: for it might be they might hauehave gathered the fruit: and I am thereunto perſwaded, becauſe this tree, as well as the reſt, was for man: and ſome good vſe might hauehave beene made thereof. … of … con…ing the firſt ſinne.The 4. act, And did eate: neither here am I of Arminius minde, that meant ſubtilly to croſſe an argument in M. Perkins, by affirming that the very act was forbidden. The natural act was good, but onelyonly the morall act which was respectiue, and in reference to Gods law; that onelyonly was ſinnefull. The 5. act, And gaue alſo vntounto her husband: this was likewiſe a ſinne, ſeeing God had made her a helper vntounto him, to become his ruine; this was the breach of charitie.

The laſt act, and he did eate: To this ſome might reply, but how could this bee a ſinne, ſeeing he was ignorant of it? to which I anſwer; … preſent … in ….Firſt, I doubt not but by that excellent knowledge he had, he was able vponupon the very ſight thereof to know that it was the fruit of the forbidden tree: God brought him the beaſts of the field, and he named them according to their natures: he knewe his wife when ſhee was brought vntounto him: theſe were farre more difficult, then to know eueryevery ſeuerall fruit in the garden, ſeeing they are ſo eaſily diſtinguiſhed by p. 105many outward appearances; therefore queſtionleſſe he knew the fruit. But then you will obiect, man was more fooliſh then the woman; for ſhee did it by ſtrong perſwaſions: and he without any more adoe vponupon his very wiues giuing it, did eate thereof: alas, neuer thinke ſo. But how then was he tempted? ſurely, I thinke it was not a new diſputation betwixt his wife and himſelfe; that as the deuil had dealt with her, ſo ſhe might deale with her husband: for if Adam had been abſent all the while of that communication, and then the ſerpent, and the deuill in the ſerpent had been departed, that Adam would ſo ſoone hauehave yeelded vntounto her motion. Secondly it is ſaid, that as ſoone as ſhee deſired it, ſhe tooke it, and did eate: if this was done in the place where ſhee ſtood, then aſſuredly her eyes would hauehave been open, to hauehave ſeene the offence, before ſhe could hauehave brought Adam vntounto it. Thirdly, if ſhe muſt firſt hauehave plucked the fruit, and then hauehave carried it to Adam, and laſtly hauehave diſputed with Adam for the eating of it, it had been too long a time, for a woman with child in ſinning, and longing for an apple or a figge, (or what elſe the fruit was) to hauehave ſtaied her appetite ſo long: and therefore as I doubt not but ſhe preſently are it, ſo preſently her husband yeelded too; and ſo both their eyes were opened together.

But you will ſay, did Adam ſtand by all the time of their diſputation? I know no other meaning of the text, but that it ſhould be ſo: and therefore Adam was exceedingly too blame to ſuffer his wife to hauehave ſuch communication with the ſerpent; hee ſhould hauehave ſhut him out at the firſt entrance; for God ſet him to keepe the garden, that no beaſts ſhould come in it. Now tell me, I beſeech you, what concourſe Gods law had in mans fall, and the ſelfe-ſame is my iudgement that God had in it: Now the lawe ſtood at hand, to hauehave ioyned with man, to hauehave brought forth his obedience vntounto God, and hauehave kept him from all ſinnes of omiſſion; but man would not heare the voice of the lawe, but of the deuill againſt the law, therefore no maruell if he fell. So then the Lord concurred by his law; I will vſe the word of Arminius, quantum decuit, yea, and quantum oportuit, as much as was ſeemely, and as much as p. 106was expedient: and this none of our Diuines denie, if I may ſpeake it bona venia, with the good liking of all Arminians: ſo that God withheld none of this grace from him: but as I ſaid before, the deede of his will, or that velle quod potuit, which was not of ſuch abſolute neceſſitie; neither wanted man any concourſe, if he had been as good as his meanes were.

But you ſay further, Gods will no irreſiſtable motion to mans …ill.the motion was irreſiſtable, and ſo man was no faultie cauſe, ſeeing he could doe no better. Alas, had they all thoſe free actions in ſinne, and yet did nothing proprijs voluntatibus? I ſee nothing at all done by them, but was done moſt freely. But then you ſay, the will of God might hauehave beene fruſtrated: Alas, ſenſleſſe creatures! when the Apoſtle ſaies, who hath reſiſted the will of God at any time? is moſt certaine in very reaſon it ſelfe: for the ſuperiour cauſe, can neuer ſuffer of the inferiour cauſe: therefore if mans will ſhould goe about to reſiſt or fruſtrate the will of God, it were euen againſt reaſon it ſelfe; for then ſhould Gods wil ſuffer of mans will. And againe with Arminius, God forbid it ſhould be otherwiſe, but that conſilium Deiſtaret, that Gods counſell ſhould ſtand: and therefore God hath an irreſiſtable will: and if that, then the motion of his will is alſo irreſiſtable; if this, then man cannot reſiſt it, and if he cannot reſiſt, then is hee mooued irreſiſtably to ſinne: Fiue propoſitions to explaine how Gods will cannot be reſiſted.ſtay, there the conſequence is falſe. I know you will graunt me theſe fiue propoſitions, and I know no more that our Diuines defend: firſt, that Gods will is the ſupreame cauſe: ſecondly, that Gods will cannot ſuffer: thirdly, that none can reſiſt it: fourthly, that his motion is likewiſe irreſiſtable: fiftly, that neither men nor angels can reſiſt it. But tell mee how you can prooue your conſequence, therefore man in ſinning followes Gods irreſiſtable motion; I know no ſuch conſequence, either in the Scriptures, or our men; for eueryevery motion of Adam and the woman were moſt free, and they followed moſt willingly their owne motion. But you will ſay, God decreed this motion; true, yet no cauſe thereof: for he decreed man ſhould be the cauſe of it himſelfe. But could this be done, and yet God be no cauſe thereof? yes aſſuredly; for you are deceiued of Gods decree, by putting p. 107it into the thing, when it is in himſelfe. And here I will cleare vntounto you another way, that God takes in his decree then you imagine.

Firſt, Gods decree ariſeth from his efficiencie, The nature of Gods decree.and omnipotency: and is generally nothing elſe, but ſententia definita in conſilio ſuo ab aeterno de rebus faciendis; that is, Gods definitiue ſentence in his eternall counſell, concerning the making of all things. And that it riſeth from omnipotencie and efficiencie it is plaine: for in that he did it, we ſay he could doe it, and ſo decreed it: and the ſentence muſt bee of ſuch things as are within his power; ſo that election is nothing but the choiſe of a thing, and decretum the decree, nothing but the ſetting of it done definitiuely: the word is of decerno, to ſee a ſunder, and verie fitly ſignifieth this determination of God: ſententia, ſentence, though the Lord doth all things ſimul, and ſemel, at once and together, in reſpect of himſelfe, yet to vsus he ſhewes it, as if he did it peditentim, ſtep by ſteppe, and that with great and long determination: therefore a ſentence where his will and power giuegive in their verdict, and ſay, ſic ſentio, ſo I iudge. The third word definita, or definitiua, definite or definitiue, is the determination or defining of a thing inter cancellos, within his bounds: in conſilio, con & ſalio, where many things leape together, or concurre to make vp one ſentence: ſo that a man is as it were diſtracted about the compoſing of them, the Lord did it without all diſtractiō; yet were there many things that the Lord brought together: Eterno, eternall, becauſe it was long before any thing was exiſtent: de rebus faciendis, it is of matters to bee done, and not of things alreadie done; Properties in Gods decieefor that is more properly ordination: the ordering and ranking of euerie worke brought forth according to his eternall decree. Out of this breakes forth his conſtancie, in performing euerie thing by deede, that hee hath decreed; not that God is tied thereunto, but rather the thing to bee done is tied vntounto him, and his good pleaſure: ſo that ſtoicall deſtinie is not thereby brought in, but true conſtancy. 2. Veritie, in performing it according to his word: for ſo is verum, quod pronuntiat vti res eſt, that ſaies as the thing is: yet here we are to inuert, quando p. 108res eſt vti pronuntiat, that the thing is, becauſe he pronounceth it: Conſtanti teſt qua conſtanter decretum eſſicit, veritas eſt qua dicretum eſſi it ſ…cun lum vor…, ſide eſt qua ſiat dictum.for Gods pronunciare, to pronounce, is before the thing; and God pronounced what ſhould become of euerie thing, long before they exiſted. The third is ſides, fidelitie, which is in performing the thing according to his promiſe. A conſtant decree as he effects it, moſt true as be effects it according to his word, and moſt faithfull as he keepes his promiſe: conſtancie, truth, and faithfulneſſe, bee three effects of Gods decree.

If from the effects, we inquire of the manner of the cauſe: we muſt needs confeſſe it was neither by nature, nor neceſſitie, or any chance and fortune, but by counſell: and therefore counſell beeing the manner of Gods working, could not be conſidered as the genus of Gods decree, but as it belongs ad cauſam illius eſſicientem, to the efficient. Eph. 1. God works all things, ſecundum conſilium voluntatis ſuae, according to the counſell of his will. And therefore Gods counſell is his deliberation of bringing eueryevery thing to paſſe after the beſt manner. So then by his decree appeares his counſel, and his counſell makes his decree to bee wrought moſt willingly, and moſt wittingly: therefore his decree of ſinne muſt be moſt willingly, and wittingly performed: otherwiſe it ſhould be no decree: therefore fecit, Order of conſequence in … d…cree.qua potuit; qua potuit, decreuit; qua decreuit, conſuliò fecit; qua conſulto fecit, gloriam ſpectauit; qua gloriam ſpectauit, ſapientiae viſum eſt; qua ſapientiae viſum eſt, bonum fuit; qua bonum fuit, abſolute voluit: God did the thing as hee might do it; as hee might doe it, ſo he decreed it; as he deereed it, ſo he did it by the beſt counſell; as by the beſt counſell, it reſpected his glorie; as that, it ſeemed to accord with his wiſedome; as that, it was good; and as good, he abſolutely willed it. Surely with men in giuing counſell, plus vident oculi quam oculus, the more counſell they giuegive and the better; but it is not ſo with God; for he ſees all things ſimul & ſemel, together and at once: now when we ſpeake of deliberation, we muſt vnderſtand it more humano, according to our capacity, that the Lord takes the beſt way to effect any thing. Obſerue further, that the Lord when he is ſaid to be cauſa conſilio, a cauſe by counſell, muſt p. 109needes hauehave his ende and ſcope ſet before him; and this muſt be of all things: and what is that but his glorie. Counſell therfore intends the glorie of God: Glorie the fruit of vertue.for as God is the beginning of all things, ſo he is the ende of all things. Now glorie is called the ende of God, by a metanimie of the adj. for ſubj. becauſe it is properly the fruit that follows vponupon vertue intellectuall or morall: in a word, all his goodneſſe. Exod. 33. Moſes cries to God, that he would ſhew him his glorie; God makes anſwer, What Gods glory, verta… or goodneſſe. are.that the glorie which Moſes can ſee, is the going of his goodnes before him, whoſe backe parts he might ſee, but for the face of it he could not ſee, and liue: this goodneſſe breakes forth in the proclamation, Exod. 34. And that goodnes is nothing but the appearance of his moſt abſolute vertues, eſpecially iuſtice and merciemercy: the reaſon is, becauſe theſe ſhine in the creatures: and ſecondly, becauſe the ende thereof is to ſet forth his glorie. As his counſell had a ſcope, ſo it had ſome forme of working, which we call the Idaea of all things. A builder of an houſe, firſt conceiues in himſelfe the worke he intends to produce, then ſecondly he lookes againe vponupon his worke wrought, and ſees how it anſwers his firſt intended forme; the painter eyes the naturall face, and from that ſtamps by drawing, limming, and colouring the expreſſe image thereof, and then he lookes vponupon his worke to ſee how it anſwers the patterne. The firſt knowledge we call direct, the ſecond indirect, or reflexed: ſo in God there is firſt of all the Idaea and plat-forme of all things, and this is in God moſt direct, who ſeeing in himſelfe all things, knows how to make all things out of himſelfe: How God in knowing differs from man.and theſe may well be called Gods plots, which he hath formed and faſhioned in himſelfe. Now this wiſdome of God differs from mans, becauſe his idaea or plot is firſt in the thing; becauſe he doth nothing primarily, but by imitation and obſeruation of that wiſdome which he hath ſeene God lay open before him in his creatures: now Gods is firſt in himſelfe, and then in the things. Secondly, in man his plot is but a forme in his head, diſtinct from his beeing; but in God both the forme of his working, and himſelfe are all one. Thirdly, there is in man an Idaea or forme of working, before he worke the thing in p. 110geneſi, that is, before he compoſe any thing according to his firſt conceit, which is not before, but after himſelfe: but Gods, is neither before, nor after himſelfe: and therefore we muſt not looke firſt for Gods Idaeas in things, and then in God; but firſt in God, and then in things.

And here I beſeech you, take notice of the abſurditie of many Diuines, and groſſe ignorance, concerning the point of Election and Reprobation, expraeviſa maſſa corrupta, that it needs muſt be of man in the eſtate of his ſinne: and ſo make Gods Idaea, or the plot of his counſell, whereby he decreed, to be firſt in the things, and then in God; which is cleane contrarie. Indeede we vſe to ſay you ſtand there, therefore I ſee you; and not I ſee you, and therefore you are there: but in God it is contrarie: God ſaw Adam to fall, and therefore be fell. Againe, preſcience can not be properly in God, ſeeing God directly ſees all at once and together, and therefore can not ſee one thing before an other: yet as God lookes vponupon the creature, one thing is ſaide to goe before an other; and this may be tearmed preſcience: but this is that ſecond knowledge of God, which we call indirect: and here all things are ſeene of God, as they are the images of his wiſdome. For if he ſee all things in himſelfe, then muſt he needes ſee all things out of himſelfe indirectly; the reaſon is, becauſe whatſoeuer God ſees directly it is himſelfe: and therefore the creatures beeing not himſelfe, he ſees them indirectly. The Schoole-men ſpeake much of this ſpeculum trinitatis: for, ſay they, Angels & Saints ſee in God, otherwiſe then by the creatures, and therefore are able to know any thing. It is true God can reueale, yea and hath reuealed, not onelyonly vntounto Saints in heauen, but Apoſtles and Prophets, many things that neuer came by the way of the creature: yet we muſt conceiue that the Lord did irradiate and ſhine vponupon their vnderſtanding by an other image then his owne: and therefore it was diuine reuelation, by working vponupon their vnderſtandings an Idaea or plot of knowledge which is out of himſelfe. As God is ſaid to view all principles, that is, the ſimple beeing of things, he is called an intelligent, wiſe, and vnderſtanding God: 2. the truth of theſe things: and p. 111this is Gods omniſcience, for the preſent, God fore know ledge.or preſcience for future: and neither of both are idle ſpeculations. Therefore Gods knowledge, or foreknowledge, beeing of truths, and truths are to pronounce as things are, and things are, becauſe God doth pronounce them to be: therefore God vſeth to ſay, I know you not, I doe not acknowledge you. Againe, the Lord knowes the way of the righteous, that is, works it, approoues it. And therefore it is not according to the Papists, whome the Lord foreknew would doe good; or the Lutherans, whome he knew would beleeue; or others, whome he knew would not fall: but his will and knowledge goe together.

I can as well ſay, God had a will to doe all things that were poſſible, as well as a preſcience: for his will was omnipotent as well as his knowledge; and therefore hee could as well, if it pleaſed him, to will any poſſible thing to be, as to foreknowe it to be: yet this I am ſure of, that a thing poſſible, and now come to paſſe, was as well willed of God, as foreknowne of God. And though I would bring no ſtrange opinions, yet this ſeemes to be reaſonable, that whatſoeuer God knowes, it is either ſomething or nothing: now ſomething is immediately demonſtrated from his will: this thing is, becauſe God willed it, for his will is the cauſe of all beings, & not his knowledge: therefore to vsus in any beeing, we muſt firſt take notice of his will, and then of his knowledge. Man is fallen, this is the will of God, and not his meere foreſight: for things done, can neuer be reſolued into an higher cauſe then his will: and for nothing, that is alwaies vnderſtood per oppoſitum ens, by his contrarie, which is ſome thing.

Now becauſe further we find in the creatures, No diſcourſe in God, yet in his creatures, one reaſon puls in another.prius & poſterius, a firſt and a ſecond; ſo that here we conceiue of God, as though he did diſcourſe of one thing from another. The truth is, he ſees them ſimul and ſemel, yet becauſe for our capacitie he hath ſaid, he hath antica, poſtica, a face, and back parts; and his back-parts are reuealed vntounto vsus by a prius and poſterius, a firſt & a laſt, we giuegive ſapience vntounto God, which is of all cōcluſions, and diductions from their true fountaines. Againe, becauſe p. 112the Lord hath ſet an order, and contriued eueryevery thing moſt fitly and conueniently for time, place, and perſon, we call him a prudent God. And as he hath moſt ſubſtantially effected all things, we call it great art and skill. Now all this cannot be, without the good will and pleaſure of our God, which reſpecting himſelfe, makes himſelfe the chiefe good: and therefore he made the world, for no neede he had of it. Secondly, in reſpect of the creatures bearing his image, they were all of them good, yea and very good: if all were done, foreign, by his good pleaſure, or according thereunto; then is God the moſt free agent, becauſe firſt moſt abſolute, foreign, propriè: and therefore Arminius blaſphemes againſt God, in ſaying that God doth worke moſt neceſſarily, becauſe he hath no libertie of will, as well to euill, as to good: for, ſaies he, that which is onelyonly vntounto good, hath no freedome, but neceſſitie thereunto. He knows not, that liberum arbitrium, free-will, belongs to counſel; and that cauſe that can worke by counſell, hath free will. For arbitrium, belongs to reaſon; liberum, to will: and therefore free-will, Free-will, a wit and a will, or a …lling wittines.is nothing but a willing wittineſſe, and that is counſell. To doe willingly, is the worke of the wil; and to doe wittingly, is of the wit, or vnderſtanding.

Thus then you hauehave heard the concourſe of God with his creature; the creature depending, muſt be gouerned; beeing gouerned, muſt obey; obeying, muſt obſerue his rule; and yet beeing mutable, may leaue off to giuegive due reſpect vntounto it: and this, non attendentia, makes him ſlippe out of Gods way into his owne, as may plainly be ſeene by the firſt ſinne, where the Law offered his concourſe, but man denied his.

Againe, you ſee how God doth decree in himſelfe; and therefore firſt we are to know, that God in decreeing, follows no creature, directa cognitione: ſecondly in manifeſting his desree, it is done cognitione indirecta, firſt generall, in his creation; for from his efficiencie and omnipotencie, potuit, he could reueale it: hence in reſpect of himſelfe, being meere acts, he could not hauehave any ſuch attribute; for potuit, may be, or could be, can neuer be ſaid of him that euer was actu: therfore muſt it reſpect the things that may be, & may feele the act of God: p. 113hence qua potuit, efficit, as he could bring them forth, ſo he did it moſt effectually. Now becauſe omnipotencie, and efficiencie, reſpects both poſſe, and efficere, to be able, and to doe; Conſtanter, ver…, ſideliter.and what God can doe, and will doe, that muſt he needs decree, conſtantly, truely, and ſaithfully. Now becauſe this decree of God, cannot but be brought to paſſe after the beſt way and manner: therefore muſt he decree by counſell; if by counſell, then muſt the ſcope be prefixed; therefore muſt the ende of it manifeſt his glorie; therefore all his goodneſſe, therefore his vertues, which are his attributes; and if them, then his iuſtice and merciemercy. To doe by counſell, is to hauehave ſome expreſſe forme of working, the plot whereof makes eueryevery thing agreeable to his counſell: this plot ſeemes good vntounto his wiſedom, and this the Lord wills, and that with a moſt free will, arbitrio iudicij, libertate voluntatis, wit and will.

Out of theſe grounds we eaſily anſwer the doubt, Application to the doubt.that God did neither omit or commit any thing in mans fall: he did not omit, for the rule was at hand, and mans facultie to doe well was ſufficient: the concourſe was not in man, therefore did he omit, denying the law that due reſpect that it challenged. I told you before, that neither the law alone, nor the facultie alone was able to produce the act of obedience; therefore the law alone could not do it: not that it was an vnſufficient rule, but becauſe man would not practiſe this rule. Now you know it is ſaid to be impoſſible vntounto the law, not in regard of it ſelfe, but in regard of vsus that cannot concurre with it, to that righteouſneſſe which it exacteth, which we might hauehave done by creation. For commiſſion it is plaine, that the Lord did no otherwiſe concurre with mans fall, then the law did; which you hauehave heard in explication of the cauſes of the firſt tranſgreſſion, was no cauſa perſe, but cauſa per accidens, and therefore an vnblameable cauſe. If man will ruſh againſt it, what fault can he finde with the lawe, if it doe miſchiefe him? Hee that takes a ſword by the poynt, is ſure to wound himſelfe, which if he had taken by the handle, might hauehave been vſed both for defence, and offence. But it is further replied, the motion of man to finne followed Gods motion, which was p. 114irreſiſtable: True it is, the will of God is irreſiſtable when it is oppoſed; and therefore in reſiſting the will of God, he followed an irreſiſtable motion; in oppoſing the law of God, he ſuffered his owne ouerthrowe. So that reſiſtentia, beeing only of enemies, that ſuffer mutably, and God beeing ſine paſſione reſiſtentia, without paſſion or reſiſtence, and therefore cannot be reſiſted. Then your meaning is this, that man was a reſolute enemie to ſinning, and fought with God about this action; but God would hauehave man to ſinne, and ſo man ſhould not reſiſt. But alas, it was cleane contrarie, Gods will was not to hauehave man to ſinne, and mans will was to ſinne; and therefore hee fought againſt Gods wil, yet could he not reſiſt Gods will, or falſifie the leaſt of his decrees.

Rom. How God concludes hi… mercy and iuſtice, not ex pr…u…ſa fid…, or ex pec…ato, b…t from the promiſe which was his meere good will and pleaſure.9.19. the concluſion in the 18. verſe is, the manifeſtation of Gods merciemercy and iuſtice; by what argument you ſhal conceiue, if you looke from the 6. verſe: it is drawne from contraries; mans infidelitie, and Gods fidelitie: the infidelitie of man cannot fruſtrate the promiſe of God: firſt, becauſe his promiſe is either generall or ſpeciall: generall, as it reſpects the roote: ſpeciall, as it reſpects the branches: therefore hee ſaith, all are not Iſrael, that is, the true liuing branches, which are of Iſrael, that is, the root vntounto which the promiſe was made, it was made to Abraham, it was made to Iſaac, &c. Abraham the roote, and ſome of the ſeede of this roote, were indeed the ſeede of Abraham; but yet in Iſaac muſt the true ſeed be called: this ſecond promiſe is the effectuall promiſe which muſt ſtand, v. 8. for there be ſome the children of the fleſh, hauing Abraham for their root; but others are the children of God, which hauehave God for their father; and therefore muſt needs effectually be made partakers of the couenant: and theſe ſay the Apoſtle are properly counted for the ſeed: this hee ſhewes, firſt, becauſe of the time appointed, ver. 9. ſecondly, from the paritie of cō ception, Sarah had a ſonne, but the other was by her maide: and therefore no maruell if God ſanctified the true ſeed; the other was baſtardly borne: yet v. 10. the matter was brought to more equall tearmes, euen Rebecca ſhe conceiued by one, euen by our father Iſaac; therefore this conception would admit no p. 115exception for the parents: Nothing either in the parents or children why God ſhould purpoſe one to life, the other to death.but yet it may be the exception is to be made in the children themſelues, therefore v. 11. he proues Gods purpoſe, to exclude all outward or inward conſiderations, that might be found in them: Firſt, from the conſtancy of his purpoſe, that it might remaine: ſecondly, from the forme of his purpoſe, according to election, a ſetled decree: thirdly, from the eternitie of it, yer the children were borne: fourthly, from the deniall of all cauſes out of himſelfe: firſt by an ennumeration either good or euill; it was neither the goodneſſe of Iacob, nor the euill of Eſau, that cauſed the Lord to purpoſe any ſuch thing: ſecondly, from the practiſe of good or euill done; that diſtinction of facta, and facienda, of done, or to bee done, is idle: for the fifth and laſt argument knocks it in the head; which is drawne from the remotion of a falſe cauſe, and the poſition or laying downe of the true cauſe, not by workes, generally done, or to be done; but by him that calleth: if this be the true cauſe, then ſay the other, and you oppoſe Gods call: for workes and Gods call be membra diuidentia, & therfore foreign, ſuch as cannot ſtand together. This cauſe is proued to be the truth; Firſt, by Gods oracle, Gen. 25.23. the elder ſhall ſerue the younger; this is againſt the ordinarie courſe of nature, but God that calleth will hauehave it ſo. Secondly, from a teſtimonie, Mal. 1.2.3. as it is written, I hauehave loued Iacob, and hauehave hated Eſau: that is, I hauehave called Iacob to the feeling of my louelove, and Eſau to the feeling of my hatred: and therefore here by theſe acts we are to vnderſtand Gods appointment.

Againſt this ariſeth the argument of fleſh and blood, The argument of fleſh and blood againſt Gods euerlaſting decree.being not able to diſtinguiſh betwixt Gods appointment, and his actuall louelove or hatred in the creature: therefore verſ. 14. ſurely then there is vnrighteouſneſſe with God: To this the Apoſtle anſwers; Firſt, by a correction, execration, and holy indignation, God forbid. Secondly, from a teſtimonie, Exod. 33.19. God ſaith it vntounto Moſes, and therefore it muſt needes be moſt true: and that is prooued in the verie teſtimonie it ſelfe: Firſt, from the true cauſe of all righteouſneſſe, and that is Gods will: ſecondly, from the libertie of his will, hee is bound to none, and therefore he can iniuſtly depriue no man of any right hee can p. 116claime at his hands: thirdly, eueryevery ſubiect is equall for the receiuing of it, otherwiſe it could not bee, on whome hee would: fourthly, becauſe it is aboue the reach of man, v. 16. it is neither in him that willeth, nor in him that runneth, but in God that ſheweth merci…. But you may obiect, this teſtimonie is imperfect, for it onelyonly prooues that which you hauehave ſaid of election; but this is nothing for reprobation: but marke what followes, v. 17. The example of reprobation, to ſet forth Gods purpoſe, power, and name, which he ſimply willeth.and you ſhall ſee the ſecond teſtimonie for reprobation exemplified in Pharaoh; the ſupreame cauſes whereof, are Gods purpoſe, power, and name; his name is proclaimed, Exod. 34.5, 6, 7. and it is nothing but his glorious attributes; and they are his iuſtice and merciemercy; and therfore the name of his iuſtice is proclaimed on Pharaoh: this name God did purpoſe with himſelfe; and that he might purpoſe, hee had power whereby he might ſhew it on Pharaoh; ergo, qua potuit fecit, & qua fecit & potuit, decreuit, &c. God did it on Pharaoh, and therefore he might doe it; as he did it, and might doe it, he purpoſed and decreed it; as he did that, ſo it was his counſell; this his counſell had no ſcope, but his owne name; this his name was wel-pleaſing vntounto his wiſedome; this his wel-pleaſing made his purpoſe good; and this good, God abſolutely willed: therefore that which he concluded onelyonly of merciemercy, v. 16. in this 19. hee concludes on both merciemercy and iuſtice, hee hath mercy on whom he will, and whome he will he hardeneth: this concluſion plainely ſhewes, that Gods will is the ſupreame and abſolute cauſe, otherwiſe no need why either that obiection ſhould be made, v. 14. is God vnrighteous? or this which followeth, how ſhould men complaine? ſeeing no man can reſiſt his will: to what purpoſe (I ſay) if it had beene for ſinne? but the former is cut off with this reſolution, it is Gods will; and therefore he knowes how to iuſtifie it: and this ſecond is anſwered accordingly as I hauehave ſaid, from the nature of paſſion and reſiſtance: Gods will is the ſupreame, therefore an irreſiſtable will, and void of all paſſion.

Shall the thing forming, As man cannot reſiſt God; ſo God will not reſiſt man, vntill man hauehave offered the firſt reſiſtance.ſuffer or bee reſiſted of the thing formed? or the potter of his lumpe of clay? how much more ſhould Gods will bee reſiſted of man? But what is all this to p. 117Gods reſiſting of mans will? the Lord offered no violence to the will of man in his fall, neither did he himſelfe make any reſiſtance to the temptation, but moſt willingly imbraced it, and gaue as free a conſent as poſſibly could be imagined: and therfore God put vponupon man no irreſiſtable motion. But you ſay, he could not reſiſt the decree of God, &c. True: what then, could be not reſiſt his owne will? it is therefore one thing for man to reſiſt Gods will, and another thing for God to reſiſt mans will. If God ſhould hauehave reſiſted mans will, he ſhould not hauehave ſinned. Therfore the cauſes beeing ſeparate, ſo iudge of the effects; the effect of Gods will is neceſſarie, becauſe it hath the beſt ende; but mans effect was contingent, and had the worſt ende. Therefore God by his decree impoſeth no irreſiſtable motion vponupon the will of man.

To the neceſſarie copulation of Gods decree, The copulation of Gods decree and ſinne is not cauſall.and mans fall, it is to be anſwered, that it is not cauſall. For if you vnderſtand it as a copulatiue axiome, God decrees, and man falls; then the whole axiome is abſolutely affirmed, and the former part doth not pull in the conſequent, but both of them are conſidered as going cheeke by ioule: but their meaning is of a connex axiome; if God decree, then it is neceſſarie that man ſhould fall. Here we diſtinguiſh, betwixt the parts of an axiome, and the connexion; the parts may be contingent, or falſe, where the connexion is moſt neceſſarie. As for example; If he be a learned man, then he reſpecteth wiſdome: the connexion is neceſſarie, if Cicero be an Orator, then he knowes how to speake well: theſe be neceſſarie connexions, but the parts are contingent. Againe, the connexion may be a neceſſarie truth, yet the parts may be falſe: as if a man be a dogge, then he hath the facultie of barking: a man to be a dogge is falſe, or a man to hauehave this facultie, is alſo falſe. God decrees, that was not abſolutely neceſſarie, nay as out of himſelfe, it was contingent: ſo mans fall is likewiſe contingent. Actio interna ſeu formalis, externa ſeu materialis, & coniuncta ſeu foreign.Therefore our Diuines diſtinguiſh of actions. Firſt, there is an internall action, which they call formall; and this is in God himſelfe, eternall, immutable, and neither hath beginning nor ending. And in this ſenſe ſay they, the whole cauſe of reprobation, or election p. 118is in God alone: and this is a moſt neceſſarie truth. The ſecond, is externall or materiall, which is exerciſed vponupon the creature: and this is in time, and limited according to the nature of the creature that receiueth it; and this is contingent. The third is, a complete or perfect action of both, which they call foreign, Extremam admouere manum.a perfect finiſhing of the thing: and this beeing abſolute, and proceeding from abſolute cauſes, is in his conioyned nature, neceſſarie: yet no argument to prooue, that one cauſe ſhould make the other neceſſarie. And therfore the will of God, makes mans will no neceſſarie cauſe of his owne fall. But to this connexion it is formerly replied, that it is not onelyonly ſo in the maior propoſition, but alſo in the minor, and therefore the aſſumption beeing taken out of the maior, and concluding neceſſarily, muſt needes be cauſall; as if God decree, then man muſt fall: but I aſſume, God decrees, and therfore man muſt fall: ſo that Gods decree inferring the concluſion vponupon mans will, as following neceſſarily, muſt needes be a cauſe. The anſwer is, it is a neceſſarie concluſion by way of ratiocination or diſcourſe, but not from the argument it ſelfe; the diſpoſition makes it neceſſarie: but the third reaſon is no neceſſarie cauſe, ſeeing that the action of Gods decree, as out of himſelfe, and in the creature, is externally and materially to be conſidered; and ſo is not neceſſarie, but contingent, temporarie, and mutable: and therefore if it had pleaſed God, it might hauehave fallen out otherwiſe: for eueryevery neceſſarie truth, is an eternall truth. And therefore that which is in time, and not eternall, is contingent, mutable, and alterable.

That which is ſaid to the interceding cauſe, betwixt Gods decree and the fall, Of the interceding cauſe.to wit, mans free will, to exempt God from ſinne, is moſt true: for God did not immediatly worke mans fall. But you obiect, that the remote cauſe is as well ſinfull as the next, becauſe the deuill was the remote cauſe, and yet guiltie of the ſame ſinne Adam commited. A ſpeciall neuerprooues a generall.The anſwer is, when the cauſes are vniuocall, homogeniall, and of the ſame order of working; but in cauſes heterogeniall and equiuocall, which are of diuerſe natures, the remote cauſe is neuer tainted with the ſame fault, that the next cauſe is: As wine is a remote p. 119cauſe, why a man is drunke, yet no faultie-cauſe of his drunkenneſſe: The Goſpell and our Sauiour Chriſt, came to ſend a ſword into the world, but yet were no true cauſes of ſedition and quarrels among men; The Sunne raiſeth putrified creatures out of dead carkaſes; it can harden as well the clay, as melt the waxe: A ſonne deſires the death of his father, ſo doth God; One thing effected of diuerſe cauſes may bee faultie in one but not in another.but the ſonne breaks Gods commaundement, God doth it according to the true rule of iuſtice: a ſonne would hauehave his father liue, God would the contrarie, yet a ſinne in neither. And therfore a remote cauſe is onelyonly guilty of the ſame offence with the next, when they worke all after one forme and manner; otherwiſe the immediate cauſe is the onelyonly author of the ſinne, al the reſt by accident and by abuſe. The Goſpel is the ſauour of death vntounto death, as well as the free will of man, but not eodem genere cauſandi, after the ſame manner of working. Pharaoh hardneth his owne heart, ſo doth God, but the one immediatly, the other mediatly, by the abuſe of mans freewill. Therfore the anſwer is, from the diſtinction of remote cauſes, in vniuocall cauſes the remote cauſe is as guiltie as the next, and therefore the deuills will, In cauſes vniuocall all are guiltie of the ſame crime, but not in equivocall.and mans will working vnivocally, are both in the ſame offence; but Gods will and mans, worke equiuocally, the one, one way, and the other another: and therefore no neede of participation, ſeeing they hauehave no next genus of a cauſe in which they ſhould communicate.

Anſwer to Gods deſertion.To the third euaſion, betwixt infallibilitie and neceſſitie, it is granted that man fell infallibly, but not neceſſarily; except we vnderſtand it of Gods decree in himſelfe, and then the truth was an eternall truth. And in this ſenſe our Diuines hold it; not of any neceſſitie in mans will, therefore it was only neceſſarie in Gods wll, but contingent in mans; yet the truth it ſelfe in the thing, is to God and man contingent, to God moſt certen, but to man vncertaine. For deſertion, we hold that God did not forſake man in any neceſſarie, requiſite for his true obedience vntounto the law, onelyonly he with-held his confirmation of man. If a man were ſet in ſome office for triall of his gifts, is it neceſſarie that he ſhould be confirmed in it? I trow not and therefore this deſertion was of confirmation, and not of p. 120neceſſarie helpes for execution. And here our Orthodoxe writers, when they anſwer to that argument, that iuſtice and merciemercy preſuppoſe miſery, Miſ…rie potentiall, reall, habituall.make anſwer of a threefold miſerie: firſt actuall, which is in ſenſe and feeling: ſecondly habitual, which is in the boſome of a man, but as yet puts not forth it ſelfe: the third potentiall, into which a man may fall: and this they call a miſerie in compariſon: Iob 4.18. Behold, he found no ſteadfaſtneſſe in his ſeruants, and laid folly vponupon his angels: Iob 9.2. Howe ſhould man compared vntounto God, be iuſtified? Habituall and actuall miſerie had no place in man by his creation: but poſſible or potentiall miſerie, was laid in the freedome of his will, which if God had inclined vntounto good, and man ſo determined, then had he come into the eſtate of the bleſſed Angels; and ſo miſerie had been impoſſible, and his eſtate ſhould hauehave been confirmed vntounto him with God for euer; not from the freedom of his will, but from his obedience, and Gods promiſe thereunto. Therefore that deſertion, and not collation of neceſſarie helpe to auoide ſinne, is to be vnderſtood of this third grace; which was not a grace of creation, but a further liberallity, which God might hauehave beſtowed, if it had pleaſed him. But I dare not reſt ſatisfied with this anſwer, becauſe I ſee this third grace was onelyonly to be obtained by the obedience of the creature, that is, if he did the will of God, then would God hauehave beene as good as his promiſe, thou ſhalt liue: therefore in my iudgement, Confirmation of life by creation was to follow our obedience vntounto the ….confirming grace was a ſubſequent grace, to followe obedience, and not an antecedent grace, to goe before it: and ſo the angels obtained it by their obedience, and from their obedience are confirmed: if then without their obedience they could not be confirmed, then muſt confirming grace belong vntounto the law of creation, as well as any other: for what grace ſhould man hauehave receiued by creation, but that which God would hauehave communicated vntounto him by the rule of obedience; doe this and thou ſhalt liue: to confirme him in life, was vponupon his doing.

I anſwer therefore, Deſertion 1. in not rebuking Sathan. 2. In diuiding of the lawe and his facultie. 3. In that God ſuffered man to be diſtracted and did not hold him cloſe vntounto his law in deſpite of the deuill.that deſertion is no cauſe of mans ſinne: but that God was wel-pleaſed to ſuffer the deuill to worke more ſtrongly in the temptation, then mans will ſhould be able p. 121to oppoſe; not for power giuen, but for preſent act: and as in this temptation the law forſooke man, ſo God may moſt iuſtly bee ſaid to forſake him. I hauehave before declared that two things are moſt neceſſary for eueryevery good action, rule, and power; which if both concurre not, the action cannot bee produced. Now the law concurred not, and therefore man was forſaken of the lawe: not actiuely, but paſſiuely; euen as a maſter ſhould promiſe his ſeruant all aide and ſuccour, as long as hee would be faithful; but after he begins to manifeſt the leaſt appearance of his infidelitie, vtterly to caſt him off: ſo Gods law would hauehave vtterly vanquiſhed the deuill; but man proouing vnfaithfull, Gods lawe wholly reiected him. Secondly, if it had pleaſed God, he might hauehave kept the deuill from man, or hauehave aſſiſted his will, that he might neuer hauehave yeelded vntounto the temptation: ſo then, God not giuing the will and the deed, and the law beeing forſaken, no maruell if vponupon theſe deſertions man ſinned: the one had not beene wanting, had not man been wanting vntounto himſelfe: and the preſence of the other was not neceſſarie; neither did God in his wiſedome thinke that it was conuenient: man then had ſufficient, but not abſolutely to ſtand: and this deſertion, or confirming grace, might well bee withdrawne from man. And herein there was no merit of deſertion, except that of the lawe: neither did God make man will any ſuch thing: yet concerning the former diſtinction it may well be ſaid, that Gods election freed his owne from the poſſibilitie of euerlaſting miſerie, and ſo their fall was but a paſſage to a better life: and reprobation on the contrarie ſuffered the reſt to fall, and lie in euerlaſting miſerie. For the other, that mans fall was a meere conſequence of Gods decree, it is falſe in ſimple propoſitions; but in connexion it may be true, where the parts do not force it, but the connexion; as if God decree, then it muſt needes come to paſſe.

To the third argument, from mans will; I anſwer, Concerning the freedome of mans will.it is not neceſſarie, that the thing which cannot be fruſtrated, ſhould conſtrain men to ſinne: The gates of hell ſhall not preuaile againſt Gods Church, this is no conſtraining of the libertie of the wicked: Rom. 9. the Iewes were cut off; yet v. 6. it cannot be that p. 122the word of God ſhould take no effect: He is ſaid to be fruſtrated of his hopes, that miſſeth of his end; but he that is certaine of his ende, can no wayes be deceiued of his expectation: neither for this purpoſe is it neceſſarie, that the meanes tending thereunto, ſhould be brought in by violence. To be fruſtrated is one thing, to be conſtrained is another; they are indeed both vnderunder a cauſe by accident: yet the efficient is conſtrained in the one to produce his effect, in the other not conſtrained; yet produceth an effect beſide his ſcope and intent: To worke by violence, and …ſtra, differ modo ….they hauehave both of them an externall worker, yet in the one it is neceſſitie, in the other fortune and chance: the one is becauſe of ignorance, and ſo may bee fruſtrated of his intent: but the other cannot hauehave his ſcope and libertie to goe about that which he intendeth. Now with God there is no ignorance, and he cannot worke any thing fruſtrà, or in vaine; and therefore nothing can fall out beſide his ſcope, I meane, that which he intended directly to bring to paſſe: therefore it is chance and fortune that makes vsus giuegive God an infallibilitie of decreeing, not a neceſſitie of performing: it is one thing for God infallibly to bring a thing to paſſe, and neceſſarily.

To the ſecond, The difference betwixt the internall and externall act.libertie is not taken away, becauſe his act is to one thing, therefore obſerue this diſtinction; there is a twofold act, one internall, which is immediately from the forme, acting vponupon his owne matter, and this is eternall, inſeparable, and immutable. But the ſecond, which is more externall, and working on obiects out of it ſelfe, is mutable, temporall, and ſeparable: as for example, the facultie of laughter, as it flowes from the reaſonable ſoule, acting and beſtirring it ſelfe in our bodies, is an inſeparable act; yet that motion which ſhould bee in regard of externall obiects of laughter, is ſeparable; yea, a man may be without it for euer. So then to our purpoſe, that libertie that ariſeth from our wills, inwardly acting, is inſeparable; yet that which ſhould worke vponupon externall obiects, is ſeparable, and God may determine it at his will and pleaſure; and yet let man hauehave his eſſentiall libertie, The externall act is ſeparable.without which the wil is not a will. If then in all naturall things, the externall act, or that which we call the ſecond, be ſeparable, why may not the p. 123will of man be depriued of ſuch an act as this? In ſinne ſurely our will for externall obiects onelyonly flies on euill, yet that firſt act is not taken away, whereby by Gods grace it may be ſet againe, and that in heauen, onelyonly to runne vponupon good: the angels in heauen hauehave their libertie, and yet they are al waies to act good: God is moſt free, yet he hath neither firſt nor ſecond act which may poſſibly be inclined vntounto euill.

Here Arminius for his oppoſition is faine to defend, that God hath no libertie of willing, and angels in heauen hauehave ſuch as they might become deuills: for I am ſure if they hauehave freedome as well to good as euill, then may they will euill: which if he ſhould vnderſtand of the firſt act, then it were moſt true, but they are confirmed in the ſecond act ſtill to cry, holy, holy Lord God of Sabboths. But Arminius ſaies and confeſſeth, that although God by vsus, be defended to take away libertie, which he ſaies is ſecundum motum voluntatis, yet he affirmes, that the naturall motion of the will is ſtill remaning: but neither libertie, nor naturall motion, can ſtand with coaction or violence, ſeeing that both naturâ, and conſilio efficere, to worke by nature and counſell, are cauſes that produce by an internall and innate principle: and therfore free from coaction and violence. And here I admire, that he hath forgotten his Logicke. For the third reaſon: it is true that neceſſitie and contingencie, can neuer ſtand together, but foreign & foreign, wholly and ſimply differ: and therefore I will neuer hold, that man fell neceſſarily: and in that, I conſent with Arminius.

To the fourth obiection, that reprobation is a puniſhment, it is thus anſwered; Reprobation is either a ſimple reiection or preterition, or els damnation it ſelfe. The firſt, is opus voluntatis liberae: the ſecond, voluntatis neceſſariae. The preterition of God, is his moſt free will; but damnation is a neceſſarie act of diuine iuſtice for ſinne and tranſgreſſion: 2. Theſſ. 1.6. that all men are vaſa, veſſells, that is from God, but that they are vaſa irae, veſſells of wrath, that is from themſelues. Gen. 1. all Gods workes were good: Ioh. 8. when the deuill ſpeakes a lie, ex proprijs loquitur, he ſpeakes it of himſelfe, becauſe he is a lyar, and the father of lies: and therefore, when we ſinne, we ſinne p. 124of our ſelues. Yet beſides all this, there is a third, and that is vaſa praeparata, Reprobatio eſt praed imna… non damnatio ipſa.veſſells prepared; and that is from God. So then Gods preterition is no puniſhment, neither is his preparation of a veſſell: but damnation is a puniſhment, and that is neuer without ſinne. Againe, diſcernere and ordinare, differ as a generall and ſpeciall. To diſcerne of any thing, is the whole worke of reaſon; but to ordaine, is a ſpeciall part of reaſon in diſpoſing of all things orderly. So then Gods decree is the foreign, or perfect worke of his counſell concerning man: ordination is that, which à principio ad finem media reſpicit, lookes how to lay things together from the beginning to the ende. Now all this may be done of God in reprobation, and yet makes it no puniſhment. Firſt, that God doth diſcerne or decree by counſell, is reaſon and iudgement; which are no puniſhments, but neceſſarily goe before them: ſo then Gods decree of reprobation, is not the Iayler in the priſon, or the hangman on the gallowes, but the Iudge on the white throne, whoſe putitie tries all things. It is not therefore neceſſarie, becauſe God ſentenceth all things, that he ſhould puniſh them: for this is ſapientis iudicis praevidere, A logicall act and a morall …uffer.non iuſti vindicis punire: ſo then in reaſon to decree, is not the illation of any puniſhment. For the other, ordination which more properly is in the things done, God diſpoſeth of them according to his decree that went before with counſell and deliberation; neither is this any puniſhment: for as decreeing, ſo ordaining are of reaſon and iudgment: now reaſon and iudgment puniſheth no man, for they are logicall acts, but to puniſh is a morall act: and therfore no neceſſitie why we ſhould confound them. So then ſimply to paſſe by, or prepare a damnation by decree, counſell and ordination are no puniſhments at all. But you will ſay, to be forſaken of his creator, cannot but be a puniſhment: Alas you do here miſconſtrue the meaning of our diuines: for they ſay, that election is ad ſupernaturalem gratiam, non naturalem: and reprobatio eſt praeteritio non quoad naturalem gratiam, but ſupernaturalem: that is, election is to a ſupernaturall grace; & reprobation is the forſaking of a man according to this eſtate, not for his natural eſtate, or that wherein he was p. 125created, and ſo God neuer forſakes him; but in the other, he forſakes him, and yet it is no puniſhment, that ſo the Lord ſhould doe: for it is neither a priuatiue euil, or poſitiue vntounto man, Reprobation neither a priuatiue or poſitiue euill.ſeeing all priuations and wants, are of ſuch things as once we had: and poſitiue euills of ſuch, as vexe and trouble vsus. Now to want ſupernaturall grace, was neuer the want of a created man, becauſe he neuer had it: neither by creation could he feele any want of it, ſeeing God had giuen him enough. And thus much of the Arguments.