Gods Arraignment of Hypocrites, Religious tract 1 · Chapter 2 · Part 3 · Section 4
The reſolution of the former arguments.
To the firſt argument from Gods will, that he wills the being, exiſting, and euent of ſinne: I anſwer by this diſtinction, that there is a double being, Gods willing of ſinne to be, is not the beeing of ſinne.exiſting, or euent of ſinne; in regard of a double cauſe: Firſt, that which man giues vntounto it, proceeding from his free-will, and this is none of Gods: the ſecond is from God, and that is an exiſting, beeing, and euent which God will draw out of ſinne; and this is not ſinnes beeing, exiſting, or euent; but Gods: therefore when they ſay, God wills that ſinne ſhould be, that is, he wills a beeing out of ſinne; firſt, his owne glorie: ſecondly, a better good then otherwiſe man could hauehave knowne: and this fiat, ſit, eueniat, exiſtat, (which be the words of our Diuines) is good: and that this is their meaning it is cleare: for ſay they, God wills ſinne to be for his glorie; now ſinne in his owne nature is againſt his glorie; therefore he cannot will the being of ſinne: for then ſhould he will againſt his glorie; but he wills ſome euent, beeing, or exiſting, which he knowes will make for his glorie. Secondly, God wills ſinne to bee, exiſt, happen, from man onelyonly; but that is the firſt beeing of ſinne, as the ſinnefull action lookes at the ſinnefull man, whereof you heard before, that a ſinnefull action was onelyonly in ſenſe an action, done by a ſinnefull perſon. But you will ſay, how ſhould this be done without ſinne? I anſwer, here God is firſt ſaid to permi…it to be done: ſecondly to worke it by accident: but you will ſay, comes any thing to paſſe becauſe God permits? yes, therefore it comes to paſſe, becauſe God will permit; for that which God will not permit, cannot come to paſſe; and this hee doth moſt willingly: Now when God permits in this ſort, he is ſaid not to concurre with the worker of the thing; but leaues him freely to himſelfe: & this is that deſertion which our Diuines ſpeake of; for if God ſhould hauehave concurred to hauehave produced in man the act of not willing ſinne, and hauehave confirmed him in the contrarie, then man ſhould not hauehave fallen: and this is that which Caluin affirmes, that God gaue Adam poſſe quod voluit, ſed non velle quod potuit: that is, to be able to doe what he would, but not to will that which he had power to will: therefore that not impedition, permiſſion, or deſertion, was a cauſe why he did not will; but none why he did will that which he did will. But you will obiect, that not to will was a ſinne, and God was the cauſe of that: I anſwer, it is both a ſinne, and no ſinne: a ſinne when it flowes from a will that is immediately bound vntounto it, therefore the very not willing was in Adam a ſinne of omiſſion: but that not to will, which Adam might hauehave willed, did not bind God at all: for God was not bound to make Adam to will: God might with-drawe himſelfe from that willing, which Adam doing ſinned againſt God: Adam was bound to doe it actually; and God was only bound by the law of creation, and his owne wiſdome to giuegive him ſufficient power that he might doe it: Man was bound actually to obedience, but that God ſhould bring forth the act was not neceſſarie.God was not bound vntounto the act of willing Adam to ſtand: now both the will and deed are from God, and therfore where God denies the deed, he is the cauſe why the deed is not: as if I denie to helpe an idle man, which hath power to goe; I am the cauſe, why he is not helped, and for want of my helpe he will not goe; that he would not goe, it is a fault in himſelfe; and if he goe backeward, it is alſo his fault. If a friend ſhould ſay vntounto me, I will not go vntounto ſuch a place, except you will goe with me: I anſwer him peremptorily, I will not goe with you: now that hee is not gone withall, I am the cauſe; but that he himſelfe would not goe, it is his fault; and if he promiſed his iourney, he alone hath broken his word. God ſaies, I will permit ſinne; and man ſaies, Lord then I both can, and it is my will to doe it; wel, go too man, and trie the iſſue; but Lord wilt thou not binder my being tempted by the deuill: no, man, I will not doe it: why then Lord I and the deuill will conſent together to ſinne againſt thee: well, trie your freewill: ſo then, Gods permiſſion is a not impedition; this not impedition is a deſertion, not of his power to the power of the creature, for in him we liue, moue, and hauehave our beeing: but of his will to the will of the creature; and therefore the wil of the creature becomes his own wil; by his own will he turnes from God, & ſo he turnes it vntounto himſelfe; for he will be like God: therefore I dare boldly ſay, that the not willing of Adam, was frō God, becauſe he would not giuegive the deed; and that deed beeing denied, man did the contrarie. The anſwer to the diſtinction of non velle, velle permittere.But dare thou, O man, diſpute with God? I could not doe otherwiſe: yes, thou would not doe otherwiſe: for thou hadſt power inough; and that I held my act from thee, I did it according to my good pleaſure, to glorifie my ſelfe more in thy fall, then in thy creation.
For that threefold act: Non velle eſt impedire, vel non approbare.firſt to will ſinne not to be: ſecondly, to will it to be: thirdly, to permit it; are in ſimple ſignification diſtinct, ſpeaking of an abſolute will, or els they may fall together: the firſt may hauehave a double meaning; for to will ſinne not to be, is either to hinder it from beeing, or els not to approoue it when it is. So then God may be ſaid not to will ſin, when he hinders man from it, and this he did not for Adam: & therfore Iacob. Arminius hath ſinned grieuouſly againſt God, by this diſtinctiō to make M. Perkins blaſpheme againſt God: it is witty I grant, but only with the ſimple: God will hauehave me ſpeake, & I profeſſe againſt all the crew of Arminius defenders, that they do greatly derogate from the Maieſtie of God, and abuſe their wits to ouerturne Gods wiſdom. Marke therefore I beſeech you, the diſtinction of this ſubtill Confuter, whom the world beginnes to flocke after. He beginnes his booke, as though he bare a great louelove to the truth, and the worthy man M. PERKINS, yet his poyſon be ſpits out in coyning diſtinctions to ouerturne the truth, and make him, whome he called a brother, to blaſpheme againſt God.
And that I may giuegive you a taſt of his wit, I intreat you conſider what a flouriſh he hath made in theſe two diſtinctions. Looke the places: the firſt is, Pag. 118. l. 21. Detection of Armintus ſophiſtr…e.Sunt enim tria inter ſe diſtincta, quorum nullum alterum includit, velle vt peccatum non ſiat, hoc eſt velle impedire ne fiat, & velle vt fiat ſeu eueniat, & velle permittere ſeu non impedire. That this is a falſe diſtinction, let the learned iudge: for if this be true, I can prooue directly, that it was impoſſible for ſinne to be: and let the proudeſt Arminian anſwer it, if he can: (I ſpeak in the louelove of the truth, beare with me.) Firſt, I am ſure out of his diſtinction, that he cannot denie but God willed not ſinne to be; now they are his owne words, That that which Gods wills not to be, that he wills to hinder: and therefore if God will ſinne not to be, he wills to hinder it: and what God wills to hinder, that cannot be: and therefore ſinne cannot be. But he is to know, that God wills ſinne not to be, two waies: firſt, non impediendo: ſecondly, non approbando: therefore that which God wills not to be, may be, but yet hated of God, becauſe he neuer approo…ed of it: and ſo God wills ſinne, not onelyonly in hindring of it, but alſo in that he approoues not of it: the one will not ſuffer a thing to be, the other diſtaſteth the beeing of it. For the ſecond member, Arminius rather blaſphemeth.that prooues him to blaſpheme: for whatſoeuer God wills not according to his minde, is hindred of God: therefore nothing can bee but that which God wills: for ſay the thing is, and God would it not; and then you ſay plainely, ſome thing is that God could not hinder: and then where is his omnipotencie? for his poſition is, what God wils not, he hinders. For the ſecond member, that which God wills to bee, is alſo twofold; either effectuall, or permiſſiue; for proprietie of ſpeech wil beare both theſe ſenſes; God wils a thing to be either effectualy, or permiſſiuely: for he deceiues himſelfe, not knowing from whence this diſtinction is taken; The diſtinction of a permiſſiue will, and effectuall is not in the cauſe but effectnot from the cauſe, but effects of one wil diuerſly diſpoſed to diuerſe obiects, as euill and goodneſſe; to goodneſſe his wil is ſaid effectuall, to euill permiſſiue: the efficacie of his wil is manifeſted in the production of a good thing; his permiſſion in the production of an euill: and therefore the ſpeech is proper and familiar to ſay, that as God wils a good thing to bee by his effectiue will; ſo he wils an euill thing to be by his permiſſiue wil: and as by efficacie hee is carried towards good things; ſo by his permiſſiue wil he is carried towards euil: & this diſtribution is warrantable, ſeeing diuers effects are carried vponupon diuers obiects, and I vrge him with reaſon. The act of his effectuall will is excerciſed vponupon ſome obiect, which all our men ſay is toward goodneſſe, and neuer bends to euill: therfore in like manner I demand on what obiect is his permiſſiue will carried? ſurely on euill: and therfore God permiſſiuely may wil euil for to be: and ſo in the ſecond member he puts the effectuall willing of ſinne, for both effectuall and permiſſiue; which is a meere colluſion of his reader.
Here can I vrge him againe with blaſphemie, A ſecond appa… blaſphemyif words muſt be preſſed in ſtead of ſenſe: hee that defends whatſoeuer God wills for to be, that he wills it effectually; then God wills ſinne: for on whatſoeuer his will is carried, that he wills; but his will is carried on ſinne: for I aske him on what obiect is his permiſſiue will carried? if he ſay on euill, then he wills euill: but he will anſwer, that is done permiſſiuely: wee grant it, and ſo thinke charitably of him: why then can he not in like manner conceiue of ours. For the third, to will to permit, is to will not to hinder: wee graunt it him; but that may be in either of the former: for firſt, that which God wills not to approue, he may will not to hinder: and ſecondly, that which he wils for to be, he wills not to hinder: yet we alſo here conceiue his meaning, to wit, that not to hinder, is a middle betwixt an abſolute hindering of a thing, and an abſolute willing of a thing; but to will ſinne abſolutely was neuer imagined of our Diuines: neither with all his Logicke and Grammar can he draw it out of them: and therfore as you hauehave found his faithfulneſſe in this, ſo beleeue him in the reſt.
A like place to this you hauehave, Pag. 120. Efficaciter … efficaciter impedere permitter… creaturae.Quod Deus vult vt fiat, hoc efficaciter efficit, adde vel permittit: quod vult vt non fiat, hoc efficaciter impedit, adde iterum vel non approbat: quod neque vult vt fiat, adde tertio ſimpliciter, neque vult vt non fiat, iterum ſimpliciter, deinde conclude hoc permittit creaturae: That which God would hauehave to be, he effectually brings to paſſe, or adde I pray you, permits: that which God would not hauehave to come to paſſe, he effectually hinders, ſtay a little and adde, or approoues not: for the third, that which God neither wills to be, you muſt meane ſimply, nor wills not to be, that alſo ſimply, and then you may conclude, he permits vntounto the creature.
A ſecond colluſion is out of theſe words, proinde ſic facere decreuit, that is, God decreed ſo to doe: Arminius comes in with a tayle, as though he would ſweepe all to the ground, adde, vel permittere, or ſo to permit. If you pleaſe to ſee a Sophiſter, turne to the 145. Pag. de permiſſione in genere: Permiſſionem ad genus actionis pertinere ex ipſa vocis flexione eſt notum, &c. Permiſſion, ſaies he, belongs to the predicament of action, and hath no neerer cauſe, or immediate then the will; not ſcience, power, or abilitie, though theſe be required in him that muſt permit. No man permits any thing, but he knowes what, & to whom: againe, he muſt hauehave power, authoritie, and will to doe it. It is very ſtrange, if all theſe be true, and yet God ſhould doe nothing in his permiſſion: and therefore to doe, and permit, may well agree. If he meane, to doe iniquitie, then the obiect hath limited the act; and ſo we denie it God, and that moſt iuſtly.
Againe, to follow this Sophiſter a little, (and I would ſome would doe it throughly) but ſaies Arminius, to permit, is nothing but not to hinder, and therefore a negatiue act: but where is the negation? not in the will, but in the deniall of the obiect: and therefore we denie not but God hath ſuch a hatred againſt ſinne, that he denies it his good pleaſure; yet wills it: A good confeſſion of Arminius, that to permit is nothing but that God is welpleaſed to let man hauehave his freewill to try him, and of his fall take occaſion of doing the beſt good.and likewiſe by his owne confeſſion in the ſame place ſaies, God is willingly content to put the matter of ſinne to mans free will, yet thereby to prooue him, and vponupon his euill doing, to doe an infinite good: hold thee there Arminius, and that which thou called for at the hands of M. Perkins, we will graunt thee, all louelove and reſpect for the acuteneſſe of thy learning.
But further the argument is vrged; no euill is to be done, nay not ſo much as willed, that good might come thereof. To will euill, or to doe euill, and bring the end as an excuſe, is impious: therefore who ſpeakes in this ſort? Our Sauiour Chriſt ſaith, Doe good to them that curſe you, that you may be the children of your heauenly father. If God doe good for euill, muſt he therefore will euill that he may doe that good? It is true, God wils good out of euill, that is, not to turne euill into a better nature; for heauen and earth will as ſoone meet; but only make it the obiect of his permiſſiue will. Now God can hauehave his will, neither permiſſiue nor effectuall about any obiect, but he will raiſe his glorie out of it: and therefore out of the ruines of ſinne and vngodlineſſe, is he able to build vp his glorie: and this is to will euill, the obiect of his permiſſiue will, for his owne names ſake. I am ſure eueryevery ſlender Logitian knows there is great difference betwixt an obiect, and an effect. If Adam had made euill but his obiect, and neuer hauehave effected it, it would hauehave prooued but a temptation iniected of the deuill, and no ſinne of his. Why then ſhould it follow, if God doe decernere de peccato, exerciſe both iudgement and will about ſinne; iudgement to know it, will to limit it, diſcretion to direct it, and iuſtice to puniſh it. And therefore as the argument from the ende is nothing, ſo from the obiect, that ſinne is alwaies conſidered as ſinne. Let it be graunted, can therefore the excellent wiſdome of God extract nothing out of it? yes: for euill will be in good, and God will ſo ſeparate it from the good, that it can not otherwiſe be but ſome thing ſhould be fined and refined by it; yet ſo, that ſinne ſhall alwaies be nothing but droſſe and dung, ſtubble and ſtraw for hell fire. For the contradiction in Gods will, it is none at all: for in contradiction, the affirmation and negation muſt be of one thing. A man is blind, and not blind, are no contradiction; becauſe the one may be vnderſtood of the eies of the bodie, and the other of the eies of the ſoule; Apius eſt caecus, Apius non eſt caecus, is no contradiction. Therefore God to will ſinne by his permiſſiue will, and not by his effectuall will, make no contradictions. For the laſt branch of this argument; God inclines, impells, conſtraines, as they are naturall acts, adde alſo hardnes, commands wicked inſtruments, and doth effectually procure them to execute his iuſt iudgements; the motion is Gods act ordinarie, the iudgement is Gods act morall, and the ſinne his permiſſiue act. He that ſtrikes againſt God, ſhall be ſo ſtricken againe that he ſhall ſuffer: and therefore as the ſmiths hammar ſtriking againſt his hands, hardeneth them by oppoſition; ſo God the hearts of men, by his iuſt iudgements oppoſing them.