Gods Arraignment of Hypocrites, Religious tract 1 · Chapter 2 · Part 3 · Section 1 – Section 2
Reaſons obiected to make God the author of ſinne.
Obiect. 1. Becauſe whereof God is the cauſe, thereof he is the author; but he is the cauſe, becauſe eueryevery poſitiue act or beeing is from God; and ſinne is of this nature: which I ſhew in the firſt ſinne. 2. in originall ſinne, which ſprings from that. 3. in ſinnes of omiſſion and commiſſion, the fruits of originall. 4. Firſt ſinne obiected.from the ſubiect. 5. from the nature of habits. From the firſt finne, becauſe no circumſtance, or manner of eating the forbidden fruit, is the ſinne; but the very action it ſelfe: becauſe that is forbidden in ſubſtance, and not in circumſtance. 2. Originall.Originall ſinne is not a meere priuation, want, or defect; but alſo an inclination, and pronneſſe to all euill: therefore it is ſaide to raigne in our members, carrie vsus headlong to all impietie, and worke mightily in vsus. 3. In ſinnes of omiſſion and commiſſion, Omiſſion. Commiſſion.firſt becauſe God doth not onelyonly know that he wil permit, but alſo he is reſolued that he will not co-worke with men and angels, to the producing of a neceſſarie act: and therefore by conſequent omits: and againe, he knowes that he will not co-operate, to free men and angels from an act that is forbidden, and ſo by conſequent doth commit. 2. a greater difficultie is this, ſeeing that ſinnes of commiſſion, and omiſſion are diſtinguiſhed: And therefore in commiſſion, there muſt be ſome thing beſide omitting of that which is commanded; and that can be nothing but doing: and therefore the difference can be nothing but ſome poſitiue act: neither is the ſubſtance of this act one thing, and the deformitie an other: but the act it ſelfe, which ſhould not be done, is out of forme, order, and rule, and is repugnant to the rule of righteouſneſſe: therefore this kind of ſinne beeing poſitiue, hath a poſitiue cauſe: neither is the will of man, onelyonly the cauſe of it, but God alſo, euen of the deformitie of it, as well as the ſubſtance; ſeeing the deformitie in a ſinne of commiſſion, is nothing els but the very ſubſtance of the act which is done, but ought not to be done.
Fourthly, The ſubiect of ſinne.from the ſubiect: euerie ſinne is in that ſubiect out of which the goodnes is expelled, and therfore though it hauehave not formam vel materiam conſtitutiuam, tamen eſt in ſubiecto vnde receſſit habitus, that is, though it hauehave no matter or forme for his beeing, yet it comes into that ſubiect where goodnes was, and poſſeſſeth his roome; therfore is more then merum ens rationis, a conceit of the braine: and beeing ſomething, extra conceptum intellectus, more then the worke of reaſon, is beeing, and therefore from God, from whome all beeing is.
5. Habits obiectedLaſtly, it is an habit, and they be qualities, and eueryevery qualitie is beeing, therefore from God. Theſe and ſuch like, are arguments that the wittineſſe of corrupt reaſon, may make againſt God, that is ſo pure and holy, that he can no waies be a God that willeth any iniquitie.
Anſ. 1. The firſt argument is anſwered by this diſtinction: to eate of the forbidden fruit, is either a naturall act, or a morall act; A naturall act, a morall act.as a naturall act, it is no ſinne: and this is the very beeing of that action, and in this God worketh: the ſecond, which is a morall act, is not abſolute, but relatiue and reſpectiue to the diuine law of God; and this was onelyonly mans act, which did refuſe to giuegive his reſpect, and due obedience to this law.
2. Anſ. To the ſecond I anſwer; originall ſinne is conſidered either materially, or formally. Materially, according as all the faculties of man are ſet a running: and this is poſitiue, and from God, that carries all things with reſtleſſe motions. The formalitie is the foreign, or exorbitation and wheeling awrong of all the faculties: and this is done either by the freewill of man, or the law of God; that beeing oppoſed, as an enemie puniſhed man, and by his abuſe, turned him out of the way of righteouſneſſe: and therefore as a iuſt iudgement of God, the ſinne is called a puniſhment, and ſo beeing: againe, working out of mans will as in concreto, is likewiſe called beeing, by reaſon of his ſubiect who giues him power to worke, and is inclined by it: but the meere formalitie, and the ſinne in abſtracto, conſidered without the ſubiect, and in oppoſition to vertue and goodnes, is meere nothing.
3. Anſ. To the third, this muſt be anſwered; Firſt, Firſt for omiſſion.that God gaue both men and angels ſufficient for the eſtate of their creation, to make them able to ſtand, yet not ſo much that they ſhould be confirmed to ſtand: therefore if God had not co-operated in regard of the firſt, he had ſinned in omitting and committing; but for the ſecond, it was not neceſſarie that God ſhould co-operate and confirme them in their eſtate of goodneſſe. To the ſecond difficultie, Secondly commiſſion.the Doctors of the Church of Rome hauehave made it, and affirme it: aReſpectu peccati commiſſionis duplex eſt deformitas, prima carentia rectitudinis debitae ineſſe voluntati elicienti actum quem non habet: ſecunda eſt ipſe actus elicitus quem deus prohibet.Occam in ſent. lib. 3. queſt. 12. ſaies there is a double deformitie of the ſinne of commiſſion; firſt, the want or priuation of that rectitude which ought to be in the will, making his owne choice of an action which he ought not: ſecondly, the very act that is drawne out of this will, is a deformitie forbidden of God: ſo then beſides the wills deformitie, the act it ſelfe is a deformitie. Other Diuines vnderſtand, by the deformitie found in ſinne, the want of rectitude, or omiſſion of due circumſtances: and thereupon ſay, there is no cauſe of it, but priuatiue onelyonly: but Occam vnderſtandeth (as you hauehave heard) by the deformitie of a ſinne of commiſſion, the act it ſelfe done without due circumſtances, without which it ſhould not be done; and ſo ſeeketh a poſitiue cauſe of it. If any of our Diuines ſhould hauehave affirmed this, how would Bellarmine hauehave handled them, and imputed ſtraunge and outragious blaſphemies againſt them. bCameracenſis in lib. ſentent. lib. 1. q. 13. art. 1. & q. 14.Of this opinion are many other of their Doctors, as may well be ſeene in Cameracenſis. cHugo de S. vict. erud. theol. de ſacram. lib. 1. part. 4. cap. 12. & 13.cScotus l. 1. diſt. 41. q. Vnica ſola permiſſio aliculus actus, & certitudo de permiſſione non facit certitudinem de illo actu, quia opportet habere aliquā cauſam effectiuā: igitur ex hoc quod deus praeſcit ſe velle permittere Luciforum peccare, ex hoc inquam ſolo non videtur quod ſciat Luciferum peccaturum, ſoluitur haec obiectio, quia deus non ſolum ſcit ſe permiſſurum, ſed etiam ſcit ſe non cooperaturum ei ad actum neceſſarium & per conſequens onuttet; & ſcit ſe cooperaturum ad ſubſtan iam actus prohibiti ſine debitis circumſtantijs, & per conſequens committet.Scotus another great doctour ſaies, Gods bare permiſſion of ſome action, and certitude of his permiſſion, makes not any certitude of that action; becauſe it ought to hauehave ſome effectuall cauſe: therefore for as much as God did foreknow that he would permit Lucifer to ſinne, from this it could not be that the obiection of Lucifers fall ſhould be anſwered; ſeeing that God doth not only know it, but alſo knowes that he will not co-oporate with him to the producing of a neceſſarie act; and therefore withdrawing, he omits as well as Lucifer: for how ſhould Lucifer but omit, when the firſt cauſe withholds his influence, and againe the Lord that he will co-operate to the ſubſtance of an act forbidden; and therefore it followes that God commits it. What blaſphemies would theſe be in the mouthes of Calvin, and others? yet good diuinitie in the ſchooles of Rome. But thus they expound themſelues, that God worketh, decreeth, and willeth the deformitie that is found in the ſinnes of commiſſion, not by his antecedent will, whereby he worketh things out of his owne liking, but by his conſequent and conditionall will, whereby preſuppoſing the purpoſe of ſuffering his creature to auert and turne from him, he ſtill intendeth to mooue, impell, and carrie them forward, though beeing by their owne fault out of the way, hee carrieth them thither whither they ſhould not goe: firſt, ſay they, by ſubſtraction of grace, vponupon the withdrawing whereof he ſawe the creature would turne from him, he purpoſed to ſuffer the ſinne of auerſion or omiſſion to enter: ſecondly, this purpoſe beeing preſuppoſed, and foreſeeing that which would follow vponupon it, in his conſequent and conditionall will, he poſitiuely decreed the other, which is of commiſſion. Man by creation was made to ſeeke an infinite good, and louelove it infinitely; which if he omit to ſeeke in God, then muſt he needes commit the contrarie, and ſeeke it in himſelfe: for ſo God decreed, that man not continuing to adhere vntounto him, ſhould fall into ſelfe-louelove, pride, and all euills of that kind. All this might bee borne withall, ſaue onelyonly they make deformitie of the eſſence of an action, which cannot be borne withall: for indeed it is ſo farre from agreeing with an action, that he will not ſuffer him to take vp any dwelling in him: and therefore I prooued before in expoſition of thoſe words [Theſe things haſt thou done] that no action was the ſubiect of ſinne; and therefore well might the action be cauſed of God without all fault of his. But to anſwer the doubt. 1. They differ, in that omiſſion is a morall defect, but commiſſion is a morall act; the one is not doing morally that which is commanded, and the other is a morall doing of that which is forbidden. 2. The one lookes at the law, as commanding, but denies his act; the other at the law, as forbidding, and yet performes his act. Now the will of God is poſitiuely carried vntounto neither of both; but permiſſiuely to the creature, and accidentally to the effect. Yet you will obiect; then God permits that which he wills not, and if he will it not, how can it be done? Here I dare not be ſo bold as our Diuines are, though I thinke we hauehave all one meaning; that Gods will is firſt carried vponupon his permiſſion; ſecondly vponupon the thing permitted: As his will is carried vponupon his owne permiſſion, he wills that abſolutely, and by an affirmatiue act, but as vponupon the thing permitted, it is non impedire, not to hinder it; and that is actus negativus. And this muſt be taken notice of, becauſe Gods will muſt hauehave ſome thing to intercede, and come betwixt it ſelfe and ſinne: for a will immediatly carried vponupon ſinne, is alwaies ſinnefull: therefore permiſſion comming betwixt Gods wil, and ſinne, frees God from the action of ſinne.
To the fourth obiection, I anſwer, that priuations are either conſidered as oppoſites with their habits, or as adiuncts with their ſubiects: in the firſt conſideration, the habite is that which doth affirme it ſelfe to be exiſtent, or in nature may be exiſtent: the priuation cleane contrarie, denies this to be in nature, nay worſe then that, ſhewes that he is expelled from ſuch a ſubiect, which now makes him appeare, as though he were the Lord of the houſe, and beare the full dominion. As life is a naturall thing, death comes and ſaies, there ſhall be no life in this ſubiect; and when life is gone, the ſubiect makes death appeare, as though he were the commander of lifes habitation: night comes and ſaies, where now is light? and becauſe no man can ſee the light, he is faine to giuegive darkneſſe a good word, and ſay he hath poſſeſſed the circle of the world: yet neither will the world confeſſe he hath receiued any beeing by darkneſſe, or the ſubiect of life any further exiſtence by the preſence of death. Therfore he is neither being in himſelfe, or giuing being to his ſubiect, but taking away a being: yet becauſe the ſubiect into which he is receiued, by reaſon that he alwaies lookes vponupon his adiunct, giues him the denomination of beeing, as long as he reſts with him; yet in his ſimple nature the neuer can be ſo conſidered, but as a meere tyrant to beeing and eſſence; which agree ſo ill, that if the one come, the other muſt be gone. And this is the reaſon why originall ſinne is ſaid to raigne; which could not be, but for our members which giuegive him leaue to ſtay with vsus. The Ivie hath no roote or exiſtence from a proper principall of life, but moſt louingly embraceth the Oke, and for all his ſtrength, the Ivie will eate out his heart, ſecretly, and bring him to death: ſo ſinne hath no roote of his owne, yet moſt familiarly be cloſeth with our nature, and eateth out the heart of all goodnes within vsus, and ſpeedily bringeth vsus vntounto miſerie.
For the laſt obiection: ſinne is called an habit and qualitie, therefore beeing. The anſwer is, as ſinne is habitus in ſubiecto, it hath that name: yet properly, ſinne is no habit: for it is alwaies his negation and oppoſite, therefore can not properly hauehave the name of his oppoſite: yet beeing crept into vertues cloſet, deſires to put on his habit, that ſo he may hauehave the more louelove and welcome; as tyrants when they hauehave gotten the kingdome of lawfull Princes, will be very glad to put on any title that might pleaſe them, whome they deſire to become their ſubiects; and for this cauſe will be content to change their names: ſo ſinne, a meere tyrant, will maske it ſelfe in the habit of vertue, that ſo we may eſteeme the better of him, and willingly ſubiect our ſelues to his vntolerable yoke.
Obiections from the teſtimonies of our Orthodoxall Diuines, whereby they are ſaid to hauehave made God the author of ſinne.
Obiect. 1. The obiection may be formed according to theſe foure heads: 1. from Gods will. 2. from the effect of his will, his decree. 3. from the ſubiect of his decree, man. 4. from the ende, reprobation of man. The argument in generall is thus framed; They which make the will of God euill, his decree (cauſam energeticam) an effectuall cauſe of ſinne, the will of man compelled to ſinne, and his ende euerlaſting puniſhment, without conſideration of ſinne; make God the author of ſinne: but this is defended by our Diuines. I will at large inforce eueryevery obiection, becauſe it is one of the moſt damnable opinions that blaſphemouſly the Papiſts vrge vsus withall.