Gods Arraignment of Hypocrites, Religious tract 1 · Chapter 2 · Part 3
III. Part, anſwering the places of Scripture that are brought to prooue God the author of ſinne.
Obiect. God decreed the ſelling of Ioſeph into Egypt: Gen. 45.8. Chriſt was crucified of the Iewes, according to Gods decree: Act, 2.23. and 4.28.
Anſ. To decree any thing, hath a ſpeciall conſideration of the end: now Gods ende in both theſe were exceeding good; firſt Ioſeph for a temporall deliuerance in the time of famine, Chriſt for a ſpirituall in the time of ſinne: for the ſinne of their actions, God did onelyonly permit, and wrought it, as before hath bin ſhewed.
Obiect. 2. Prou. 16.4. Rom. 9.17.26. he that creates, and ſtirres vp men to ſinne, muſt needes be the author of ſinne.
Anſ. God determines the end of all mens ſinning, that he himſelfe will be no cauſe, but leaues man to himſelfe; yet ſo as he will limit, direct, and puniſh, whatſoeuer he ſhall doe amiſſe.
Obiect. 3. 1. Sam. 24.1. 2. Sam. 16.10. 2. Kin. 22.20. & 11.37. & 12.15.24. 2. King. 10.30. Iob. 1.21. Eſa. 10. v. 5.15. & 13.17. Ier. 51.1. Ezech. 12.13. Pſal. 105.25. Matth. 6.13. where God is ſaid to impell men to ſinne, and vſe them as inſtruments to produce ſinfull actions.
Anſw. It is one thing to incline the wil, an other thing to make the will euill, and ſo to incline it, that it is not to ſinne, but to iudgement and puniſhment: The Iudge inclines the executioner to put away the malefactor, but if he doe it of priuate malice, it is his owne ſinne: Shemei ſinned in his priuate malice, yet Dauid acknowledged Gods ſecret iudgement. There be three things in the workes of wicked men: 1. motion: ſecondly the foreign, or inordination of that motion; and Gods hidden iudgement: the firſt & the laſt are Gods by diſpenſation; the ſecond by permiſſion; not bare and naked, but firſt in denyall of grace, ſecondly permitting Sathan to worke vponupon them, thirdly by occaſion of ſome good, permitting their euill diſpoſition to abuſe it; but to incline, perſwade, or impell the will to euill before it hauehave any thought or inclination, is a helliſh blaſphemie: the will beeing euill is driuen like a charet of the deuil, and runnes apace, and the Lord in iuſt iudgement blowes vponupon it, and in their running runnes them headlong into hell fire.
Obiect. 4. Exod. 4.21. Deut. 2.30. 1. King. 12.15. Iob 12.16.24. Iſa. 19.14. and 63.17. Ier. 20.7. Ioh. 12.39. Rom. 1.24.26.28. Rom. 9.18. 2. Theſſ. 2.11. God is ſaid to harden the heart, and blind the eyes.
Anſ. God doth this by ſubſtraction and deniall of that grace, which ſhould lighten the vnderſtanding, and ſoften and mollifie the hearts of men: this ſubſtraction is to be vnderſtood of that grace which God might iuſtly hold from man: ſecondly, men beeing hardned in their ſinnes, and blinded in their minds, doe ſtill in creaſe their hardnes by fighting againſt God and his law, as you hauehave heard before.
Obiect. 5. 2. Sam. 12.11. Luk. 2.34. Rom. 9.33. Eſa. 8.14. Eſe. 18.16. & 45.7. Amos 3.6. God in all theſe places is ſaid to doe euill.
Anſ. Here is to bee vnderſtood the euill of puniſhment, which is an act of Gods moſt pure and vnblameable iuſtice.
Here likewiſe in fewe words may we cleare Calvine and other of our orthodoxall writers from Bellarmines calumniations. Caluin and the reſt, ſeeme to digeſt all their iudgement in theſe fewe poſitions concerning Gods ſimple determination of man: Firſt, what he meant to beſtowe vponupon him, to wit, ſo much perfection that both in dutie hee ought, and in reſpect of ability he might if he would hauehave continued in his integritie; and therefore his creation was his happineſſe, and there was found no neceſſitie why he ſhould fall into miſerie: this is the firſt.
The ſecond is, what hee meant to denie vntounto him; to wit, that free confirmation of his eſtate, without which God ſaw he would not continue, but moſt certainely fal away from God his creator: now if God had beſtowed this vponupon him, then had there beene no way for eating and dying, for then would God hauehave kept away the deuil confirmed his wil, put that feare into his heart, whereby he ſhould neuer hauehave departed from him. And that this is the truth, we may ſee it by comparing of our eſtate in innocencie, and in grace: in the eſtate of innocencie God made with man the couenant of workes, and ſo tyed man vntounto himſelfe by the bond of louelove, LoueLove the bond in creation.which he left in mans nature; man brake this bond: hence came in religion, properly ſo called, Faith in redemption.a tying of man againe in a ſecond couenant, not of workes, but of faith: now if this bond were no ſurer then the former, it ſhould argue God of the want of wiſdom: therefore God giuing man this ſecond bond, meant to tie him more infallibly vntounto himſelfe: this feare beeing put into his heart, ſhall make him neuer depart from God. Thus then the Lord intended to denie man ſuch a confirmed eſtate, as now he hath obtained in Chriſt.
Thirdly, that God did foreknowe moſt certainely, In things poſſ… ble, but not to be done, there is a bare preſcience: but … things poſſible, and to be do… both preſcie… and purpoſe.what would fall out, vponupon the beſtowing of ſuch benefits onelyonly, & the denying of others; namely, ſinne and Apoſtaſie: neither was this in their indgement a preſcience, preſuppoſing no purpoſe nor decree; for then would not God ſo hauehave beſtowed, and denied, except according to that proportion he had intended a further end in man. For I would aske this queſtion; Why did God beſtowe ſo much as was ſufficient to ſet him in ſtate of happines, and denie him that which ſhould hauehave confirmed him in the ſame, except he intended a further ende by his fall? conſider well the ends of man, and we muſt now vponupon the euent, be conſtrained to graunt a further ende, then either Papiſts or Lutherans do profeſſe. For I conſtantly affirme, Man hath a more generall end then that of creation, fall, or redemption.that it is blaſphemie to ſay, that the ende of man, as created, was any thing but happineſſe; neither from thence ariſeth any other demonſtration; Man, qua creatus, as created, is in no intention but happines: come to his fall, and then againe I ſay, homo qua lapſus, eſt miſer tantum, man as fallen, is onelyonly to bee conſidered as miſerable: as redemptus, or redimendus, onelyonly ſub ſalute, or ſaluandus, where then is the ende of man? As man, generally conſidered, electus or reprobus, elect or reprobate, theſe be the moſt generall: and here onelyonly reprobation and election, is foreign, truely firſt and primarily: i… all the reſt, gratia huius, for this cauſe; therefore happines of creation, miſerie of the fall, ſaluation by Chriſt, are ſubordinate and come vnderunder it. Indeed I confeſſe that election and reprobation hauehave their manifeſtation to the creature, onelyonly in redemption, and in that part which is the application of it vntounto the church in generall; here onelyonly both angels and men, knowe and feele their ſtate of election; and on the contrarie, reprobation is there to be ſought for of the wicked.
But Bellarmine ſaith, A defence of Calvin.that Calvin denieth Gods determination, decreeing what ſhall be, to depend on his preſcience, & that in all things his preſcience preſuppoſeth his purpoſe and decree. For anſwer whereunto wee muſt conſider, whether there goe any preſcience in God before his will (I meane according to our apprehenſion, Whether the Lord vnderſtand or will firſt.and as things are reuealed to vsus, out of God in his workes) my reaſon is this, becauſe if the Lord vnderſtand it, then it is a poſſible beeing: now I preſſe my argument, that eueryevery beeing, whether poſſible to be, or alreadie exiſting, is demonſtrated from his will; for his will makes things to be, or poſſibly to be; therefore if a thing muſt be before it can be vnderſtood; and to be, howſoeuer conceiued, yet is from Gods will that giues all beeings, either in poſſe or eſſe, I knowe not what can be, that firſt comes not from his will. But wiſdome according to ſobrietie is commendable, and in high myſteries it is good to goe with the current of our beſt approoued diuines: therefore according to the way troden before me, Intelligentia diuina.I anſwer: There is a double preſcience, one ſimplicis intelligentiae, and another diuinae viſionis; the firſt is of all thoſe things that are poſſible, and which vponupon any ſuppoſed condition may be; as was the preſcience of God, whereby he foreknew, that if in Tyrus and Sidon thoſe things ſhould be done, which afterwards were done among the Iewes, they would repent: this doth not preſuppoſe the decree of God, but extendeth to many things God doth not decree, nor purpoſe to be, as it appeareth in the example propoſed. The other is of thoſe things onelyonly which hereafter ſhall bee, and this alwaies preſuppoſeth ſome act of Gods will: for ſeeing nothing can be, vnleſſe ſome act of Gods will do paſſe vponupon it, at leaſt not to hinder the beeing of it; and thus nothing can be foreſeen, as beeing hereafter for to be, vnleſſe ſome decree of God paſſe vponupon it: Of this kind of preſcience, Caluin ſpeaketh, and not of the other; it was not conſidered what it was poſſible for the creature to doe, or what he would doe beeing ſo created, and left vntounto it ſelfe: this may well be ſaid, to preſuppoſe no decree of God, or determination what he would doe: for if it had pleaſed God, he might hauehave turned the poſſibilitie to another end and iſſue; but the truth is that other, to wit, what hereafter ſhall be, which though it be future and therefore contingent, yet to God it is moſt certaine, with whom all future things are preſent: and therefore beeing to be done, was moſt certainely decreed; and whatſoeuer is done and come to paſſe, wee may abſolutely conclude it was Gods will, euen long before it happened; therefore Calvin rightly affirmeth, that Gods foreſight of the entrance of ſin, preſuppoſed his decree, that it ſhould enter.
Fourthly, Gods foreknowledge and purpoſe in ſinne, Sinne … dec… that God might … niſ…vponupon the beſtowing of ſuch benefits of his rich & abundant goodneſſe, was not that man ſhould fall, that he might puniſh, but that man ſhould freely make his choiſe; vponupon which choiſe the Lord both knew and purpoſed, that his iuſtice and mercy ſhould be manifeſted: yet for all this it will not followe, that the Lord ſhould purpoſe the entrance of ſinne originally out of his owne liking, that he might hauehave matter of puniſhment, Bel…arm… falſe expoſ… of Calvin.as Bellarmine moſt iniuriouſly chargeth Calvin to affirme; but the ende of his purpoſe of beſtowing ſuch benefits onelyonly, and no other, notwithſtanding his foreknowledge what would fall out, if ſo he did, was, that he might ſhew his merciemercy and iuſtice, in ſauing and condemning whome he would. Therfore it is idle in Bellarmine to followe this argument of the ſeuerity of iuſtice; as though Calvin ſhould any where affirme, that when God thought of creating man, the firſt ende that God purpoſed, was the ſeuerity of his iuſtice, and the riches of his merciemercy: and that this purpoſe was before and without reſpect vntounto the preſcience of any thing, that afterward might or would bee in man; and that becauſe there was not any thing wherein he could ſhewe merciemercy and iuſtice, vnleſſe ſinne did enter: therefore ſecondly, he purpoſed that ſinne ſhould enter; ſo that firſt hee purpoſed to puniſh, before he ſawe any cauſe; and then purpoſed the entrance of ſinne, that there might be cauſe; which is no leſſe excuſable from iniuſtice, cruelty, and tyrannie, then if he ſhould purpoſe to puniſh, and ſo doe without any cauſe at all: therefore he concludes, that the firſt originall and ſpring of ſinne, is from the will of God, according to Caluins opinion. Anſwer to Bellarmine for his falſe imputation vponupon CalvinBut he is eaſily anſwered, out of that which hath beene ſpoken concerning Calvins iudgment in this point: for he doth no where ſay, that God did purpoſe the manifeſtation of his merciemercy and iuſtice before all preſcience, but onelyonly that which is named preſcientia viſionis, which alwaies hath Gods decree going before it. The poſſibilitie of a thing is, before God decree it to be, and ſo God knowes it ſimplici intelligentia: but that this thing poſſible ſhal be, the Lord decrees it before that bare knowledge that it ſhall come to paſſe.
Secondly, Calvin denies not all p…eſcience before his decree.Caluine doth no where pronounce, that ſimply and abſolutly the ende wherfore God purpoſed to make man, was the manifeſtation of the ſeueritie of his iuſtice, and the riches of his merciemercy, or that he might ſaue ſome, and condemne others; but that firſt he meant to beſtow vponupon man as much as was ſufficient to make him perfect: fecondly, there was ſomething he meant to denie him, How God ſh…w…d his iuſ…ce and mercywhich beeing done, God knew he would fall: therefore in the third place, beeing aſſured that he would fall into ſinne and apoſtaſie, made his ſinne and apoſtacy a way to a greater good, then the world otherwiſe could euer know: fourthly, his purpoſe was not earatione, to bring in this former good, but for this former good, God was content that man ſhould fall; yet without any imputation to God, ſeeing he gaue him all that could be required by the eſtate of his creation. And ſurely againſt this, neither Bellarmine, nor any other can except: indeede he heapes vp infinite teſtimonies and reaſons againſt him, and other Diuines.
Therefore ſeeing the matter is ſo waighty, and that reaſons are brought both to diſhonour God, and bring a blaſphemous report vponupon his faithfull ſeruants, I will according to mine owne apprehenſion, obiect that which may be obiected, either from appearance of reaſon, or from teſtimonies of the writings of our beſt Diuines. And the rather I will doe it, becauſe Bellarmine triumphs in nothing more then this, That Gods does not onelyonly, permit the wicked to doe much miſchiefe, and the godly to ſuffer an hard meaſure at their hands; but alſo doth praeſidere ipſorum malis voluntatibus, eoſ que regere & gubernare, torquere ac flectere in ijs inuiſibiliter operando: that is, does not onelyonly ſuffer them, but alſo placeth his regiment in their euill wils, rules them, gouernes them, nay doth wreath, bend, and bow by working in them inuiſibly. This is more then to impell, which is the worſt word, that he can ſnatch out of our writers. And therefore ſeeing all Diuines runne ſo much to Gods ordering of ſinne, and Bellarmine makes it as Delph…cus gladius, Apollos ſword, to cut aſunder all Gordian knots, I will the more liberally inſiſt vponupon it, beeing ſo direct with my text.