Gods Arraignment of Hypocrites, Religious tract 1 · Chapter 2 · Part 3 · Section 3
The obiections againſt our Diuines, concerning Gods decree.
Obiect. 1. That they make the will of God euill, it may thus be preſſed; Voluntas mala dicitur a volitione mala, volitio mala eſt quae fertur in obiectum non debitum: obiectum non debitum eſt malum; ergo, volitio mala eſt, qua quis vult malum, & qua vult malum fieri: diſtinctly, that will is euill, whoſe act of willing is euill; the act of willing is euil, which is carried vponupon an vnlawfull obiect; Vell… ma… velle melur… … ſunt idem.now an vnlawfull obiect is nothing but euill: All this is laid vponupon our Diuines, to attribute it to God; which ſeemes thus to be prooued; He that wills ſinne to bee, or that it may fall out, either whereby he may ſport himſelfe, as Nero did when he had ſet Rome on fire; or elſe that he may vſe it for ſome good ende, as he that bids a man take poyſon that he may ſhew his art in curing him: or another ſteale that he may couer the naked, or feed the hungry, is all one as to will the ſinne it ſelfe. The truth of this is thus cleared; to will ſinne to bee, or exiſt, or happen, is all one with ſinne it ſelfe: For firſt, what is the beeing of ſinne, but ſinne it ſelfe; & what is the exiſtence of ſinne, but that it exiſts from that beeing; & this exiſting or ſtanding out of the cauſes of his beeing, what is it but the euent? ſo then as God wills ſinne to bee, exiſt, or happen; ſo he wills ſinne it ſelfe: God as he loues not ſinne, ſo he loues that ſinne ſhould not be, exiſt, or happen: he wills againe that ſinne ſhould be, exiſt, and fall out for his glory: & with as good reaſon may he be ſaid to will ſinne for his glory: ſo that no difference is, or can be giuen, betwixt the willing of ſinne, and ſinne to be, exiſt, or fall out. If it ſhall be reſolued; God wils, non impedire peccatum, ſed permittere peccatum, that is, Diſtincta ſunt ….not to hinder and ſtop ſinne, but permit it to be; this will not free the ſpeech; for theſe three things are diſtinct, firſt to will ſinne not to be, that is, to hinder it that it ſhall not bee: ſecondly, to will it to be, or fall out: thirdly, to will to permit it, or not to hinder it. The two former are affirmatiue acts, & work for the willing or not willing of the thing: the third is a negatiue act, willing but not working; this permiſſion in willing, is an act; but in working a negation; firſt not to hinder others in their libertie and power: ſecondly, not to helpe, but yeeld the whole carriage of the ſinne to themſelues, and their owne free wills, yet hereby explorare, to trie and prooue what they would doe: and ſecondly vponupon his euill doing, to make way, that for euill doing, the Lord might doe well, and become mans greater benefactor. Againe, to will ſinne for a good end, is no excuſe of this euill: non ſunt facienda, imo nec volenda mala vt eueniant bona: we muſt not doe, nay not ſo much as will euill, Velle. perp…rare.that good might come thereof: for the firſt ſinne is to will; the ſecond to doe: and he ſinnes that wills euill, though he does it not.
A third conſideration to excuſe the point is, how ſinne can be the obiect of Gods will: Here it is ſaid of our Diuines, that ſinne in his cauſes and circumſtances, foreign, wholly conſidered, hath a double reſpect; one to man as ſinne, another to God decreeing it as good: but this ſeemes alſo with a dry finger to be defaced, it needs no waſhing, for it waſheth away it ſelfe: ſeeing all Gods conſiderations of ſinne, are of ſinne as it is ſinne: he permits it, not as good but euill, yet his permiſſion is good: he puniſheth ſinne as ſinne, he forbids it as ſinne, he forgiues it as ſinne: he decrees his permiſſion; and this comming betwixt ſinne and Gods decree, giues him libertie to produce what good he can out of it, not qua bonum, as good, but as ſinne and euill: the reaſon is good, euerie thing hath his beſt conſideration according to his definition: And thus much from Gods will to the obiect.
A ſecond thing that they impoſe vponupon our men is, Contradiction put vponupon Gods will.that they make God in his will contradict himſelfe; to will ſinne to bee, and to will ſinne not to bee, are contradictorie: theſe cannot differ reſpectiuely, but foreign & integris eſſentijs, ſimply and in their whole beeing: if there be any difference, then either of the will it ſelfe, or the act, or the obiect; not of the will, for firſt he cannot will it, voluntate beneplaciti, with his ſecret wil; for that alwaies wils the beſt: nec voluntate ſigni, with his reuealed will; for we are ſure his law forbids it: neither with both together; for then if the one ſhould will it, then likewiſe ſhould the other; but we are ſure that Gods reuealed will hateth ſinne, and the very beeing of ſinne; therefore no will in God that would ſinne to be, and not to be. Againe, for the act of his will, we ſay it is threefold in the creatures, firſt, foreign, that is, according to his good pleaſure: this God approoues, effects, and is delighted with it; and that can no wayes be carried to two contrarie obiects, as to will ſinne to come to paſſe, and to will it not to come to paſſe. The ſecond act is, foreign, Gods diſpenſation; and this belongs to prouidence, where God wils no euill thing to happen, yet vponupon the accident will he diſpoſe of it: A careful maſter of a family wills not euill to happen in his houſe, yet he is carefull to diſpoſe of any euill accident; and this hath nothing to doe with Gods deeree. The third action is, foreign, and here it is true, that God does permit ſinne; but to permit ſinne, comes farre ſhort of willing ſinne to be: and for the obiect that is moſt certaine, that the verie tearmes are contradictorie, to will ſinne to be, and to will it not to bee: wherefore finding neither contrarie wills to bring forth contrarie acts, nor contrary acts about one ſubiect, nor one ſubiect to be applied to contrarie acts, we conclude, to will ſinne to bee, and not to be, to defend contradiction.
Thirdly, they make Gods will to hauehave euil effects, as to incline to finne, to harden not onelyonly by deſertion, but actiuely, and poſitiuely, yea to impell, conſtraine, command Sathan and wicked men to conceiue, plot, and attempt miſcheife. nay more, efficaciter procurare, effectually to procure that they perform the ſame, &c. And thus much concerning the firſt argument, drawne from that which they ſeeme to impoſe vponupon Gods will. I will produce the reſt of the arguments, and then I will reſolue them.
2. Obiect. The ſecond generall argument, is from Gods decree: that which makes Gods decree an effectuall cauſe of ſin, makes God himſelfe the author of ſinne, but this ſeemes to bee done by our Diuines: …um effi…ax pe…mfirſt, becauſe they make Gods decree of ſinne not a bare permiſſion, and then muſt it needs be the other, which is effectuall: for betwixt the permiſſiue decree of ſinne, and effectuall, there is no meane; and therefore either the one or the other: and that they make it not the permiſſiue, it wil appeare if we conſider theſe three things, primo, quod deus vult vt fiat, E…ficere, impedire, p…mttere.hoc efficaciter efficit: ſecundo, quod vult vt non fiat, hoc efficaciter impedit: tertio, quod neque vult vtifiat, neque vult vtmon fiat, hoc permittit creaturae: that is, that which God would hauehave to be, that God effecteth: ſecondly, that which God will not hauehave to be, that he effectually hindreth: thirdly, that which he neither would to bee, or not to be, that he permits vntounto the creature. Now our men will not hauehave Gods decree to bee of this third kind, and therfore muſt it be one of the former; not the ſecond, for if God ſhould will to hinder ſinne, then it could not be; and if the firſt, to will ſinne to be, then muſt hee needs effect it efficaciter, and ſo an effectuall decree.
Secondly, I…editio dei & euentus ſunt cauſa & e…fe…tum.the point is thus further vrged; quod Deus non impedit, ideo euenit quia Deus non impedit; & quod non eſt, ideo non eſt, quia Deus vult non eſſe: that is, Gods not impedition, or hindrance, and the euent that follows vponupon it, are coupled together, as the cauſe and effect, and that immediatly: therefore if our Diuines hold that man falls, becauſe God doth not hinder it, then muſt they needes make Gods not impedition, or not hindring, an energeticall or operatiue effecting of the euent, exiſtence, or beeing of ſinne. And this is further to be preſſed vponupon our Diuines, by the conſideration of a double ſinne; one of commiſſion, and another of omiſſion: the one de vetito, of the thing forbidden, and that is commiſſion; the other de praecepto, of the thing commanded, and that is omiſſion. Now not to hinder a ſinne of commiſſion, is by our Diuines, to concurre to the very act, which cannot be done of man without ſinne; yea and God is ſaid ſo to concurre, that he is the firſt cauſe of that act, man the ſecond; God moouing man, and in that ſort, that man neceſſarily muſt followe Gods power in moouing him, and ſo of neceſſitie muſt produce this act: and therefore the commiſſion is principally laid vponupon God. Againe, not to binder a ſinne of omiſſion, is (by their ſentence) not to giuegive man that grace whereby he might be kept from the ſinne of omiſſion, or made able to performe the contrarie: therefore God concurring to the firſt, and denying his grace to the ſecond, muſt needes commit and omit, that which man commits and omits. Nay more then that, not onelyonly a concauſe, but a ſole cauſe; becauſe man can not reſiſt the motion of the firſt cauſe, and therefore cannot offend following an irreſiſtable motion, ſeeing hee could not ſinne propria voluntate, but by Gods compulſion. Here then it ſeemes that the decree is effectuall, 1. becauſe not barely permiſſiue, and 2. becauſe they make the not hindring ioyne with the euent, as a neceſſarie cauſe.
But here they diſtinguiſh, firſt of the neceſſitie of conſequence, and the neceſſitie of a cauſe, or the reaſons themſelues; as if I ſhould ſay, a man is a lyon, then the conſequent is neceſſarie, that he hath foure legges; yet the reaſons or parts are not neceſſarie: for it is neither neceſſarie that man ſhould be a lyon, or foure footed. But the anſwer may be infringed, that the conſequence is either of a propoſition, or a ſyllogiſme: and then the conſequence which is the concluſion, followes by way of cauſe: as for the example, if a man be a lyon, then he is foure footed, is a neceſſarie conſequence: but now aſſume; a man is a lyon, this is contingent, yea falſe; and will neuer ſuffer the conſequent to be concluded. But in Gods decree they make it alſo to aſſume and inferre the concluſion, and therefore a cauſe. As for example; That which God hath decreed, comes to paſſe; but mans fall is decreed; therefore it comes to paſſe. Here Gods decree, can hauehave no other force of reaſon to preſſe the concluſion, but a cauſe.
Secondly they anſwer, that the antecedent beeing granted, and from thence the conſequent concluded is cauſall, when there comes no middle cauſe betwixt them: but God decrees that man ſhould fall by his free-will, comming betwixt the fall, and Gods decree thereof. But this is no anſwer: for ſo mans free-will, came betwixt the Deuils temptation, and the yeilding thereunto: and ſo the Deuill ſhould be no cauſe of mans fall: this then is but a ſhift.
Thirdly they anſwer, that God may will that man ſhould fall, and yet man might fall by his owne free will. The anſwer is ouerturned, becauſe a man might hauehave fallen infallibly, and freely: but neceſſarily, and freely, can neuer ſtand together. Infallibilitie is in reſpect of Gods infinite diuine preſcience: but neceſſitie is of the thing done, Infallibilitas eſt …ognitionis imnustibilitas rei.which is immutable; and immutabilitie takes away all contingencie in the thing, and conſequently libertie: ſo then neceſſitie, contingencie, and libertie, can neuer ſtand together.
Fourthly, they anſwer, per deſertionem nempe ipſius, & non collationem neceſſary ad cauendum peccata auxilij: vnde ſequitur hominem neceſſariò peccare, that is, by deſertion of him, and not collation of neceſſary helps to beware of ſinne, man fell neceſſarily: But this will not ſalue vp the matter, becauſe God gaue the lawe, therefore it was neceſſarie that he ſhould affoard man all neceſſaries to obey him; otherwiſe the tranſgreſſion might be giuen vntounto God: but they will ſay, that Gods deſertion, had mans free will to come betwixt it and the fall: but to that it may be replyed, then man deſerued that deſertion. But the queſtion is, whether man could wil ſuch a thing or no; if it be ſaid he could, then hee ſinned freely; but againe how could he will this? if it be anſwered, he could not, then ſurely God made him will it: if he could, then what was the cauſe of it? ſurely they defend that God did forſake him, before he willed to bee forſaken, in that he forſooke to giuegive him that grace which ſhould hauehave kept him from ſinne.
Laſtly, there commeth nothing betwixt Gods deſertion, and mans willing of it; if ſo, then either God or man muſt be the cauſe; not man, becauſe he ſuffers it, therefore God: and indeede they confeſſe, that peccatum eſt merum conſequens decreti, a meere conſequent of Gods decree, nothing interceding, muſt neceſſarily be a cauſe. But they anſwer, this cauſe is deficient: for deſertion is but the taking away, not concurring: but this deficient cauſe was a neceſſarie cauſe, why Adam ſhould fall, becauſe he could not otherwiſe eſcape it. And thus much from the Decree; now I come to mans will impelled to ſinne.
Obiect. 3. That man is compelled to ſinne, Nece…e of Gods decreeit is firſt prooued from the decree; graunt the decree, and then man could not abſtaine from the act of ſinne; if he could, then might he hauehave fruſtrated Gods decree: De… … of ….but that is impietie once to thinke; conſilium enim deiſtat. Secondly, that which makes the wil to looſe his libertie, muſt needes compel the will: the libertie is gone, becauſe it is not free ad oppoſita, but muſt needes incline it ſelfe to one thing, and that neceſſarily. Neither are we here to conceiue coaction or violence; for the will hath two motions, one of nature, another of libertie: libertie is taken away, when the will is carried with his naturall motion; this is ſpontaneus aſſenſus, a natural willing, which is alwaies of one thing. To be happie, is willed of all, but neither by violence, or freedome, but natural inclination; for no man wills miſcrie. Therefore Gods decree takes away his libertie, but not his aſſent, to mooue naturally which way God would hauehave it. And though it be not conſtrained, yet can it not reſiſt, neither indeede would it reſiſt, for this determination. Neceſſitie and libertie cannot ſtand together.Thirdly and laſtly, neceſſitie takes away all libertie, becauſe all libertie is in contingent things. What libertie hath a man ouer the fire, or any immutable thing? Againe, libertie is alwaies with conſultation: now conſultation is in things contingent. What man will conſult whether the fire burne? and ſurely God and man vnderſtands one truth, how then ſhould I conceiue that neceſſarie to God, which muſt be contingent to me? Contingencie and neceſſitie can neuer ſtand together. And to ſay Adam fell contingently, and yet neceſſarily, is an impoſſibilitie. The principle of neceſſitie is immutabilitie, not infallibilitie. Certitude makes infallibilitie: that which is certen, is infallible: Time changeth not nature.and ſo may a contingent thing be certen. Neither muſt we meaſure the thing by time: for time is not of the eſſence of any thing, but a thing adioyned to all created beeings. Now then, time paſt, preſent, or to come, change not the nature of any beeing, but diuerſly qualifie him. Was the thing contingent before it fell out, then why ſhould it be of the nature of neceſſitie when it is come to paſſe? hath the time preſent made it otherwiſe then it was in time paſt? Define me Adams fall; was it not an apoſtacie from God his Creator? this is one thing, and is neuer changed: now neceſſitie followes the nature of things, and not of time in things. You graunt it contingent vntill it came, was not this a truth? and truth I am ſure, pronunciat vti res eſt, pronounceth as the thing is: will you then make truth pronounce one thing before the thing was, and another thing when it is? is the nature changed, becauſe the time is varied? then farwell all truths, and that common axiome, which is no more common then true, That definitions of things, are not onelyonly to be conceiued in the preſent time, but alſo paſt and to come.
Let vsus examine the definition of contingencie and neceſſitie. …e definition of contingencyContingencie, is that which is ſo true, that it may be falſe: is this onelyonly for future? no, but thus; may be falſe, or might hauehave bin falſe. I am ſure you will ſay, that mans fall might hauehave bin falſe; for God might hauehave decreed otherwiſe: and therefore marke what you doe affirme, to wit, that God might change neceſſarie truths; then may he make contradictions true. He may make a man, and not reaſonable; fire, but not hote. Let it then be what it will be, if once it might hauehave bin changed, it can neuer be made an vnchangeable nature by time. Achilles might hauehave killed Hector; Saul might hauehave fallen on his owne ſword; Adam might hauehave runne into the finne of auerſion from God. Theſe before they were done, you confeſſe, were contingent: but Achilles hath ſlaine Hector, Saul is fallen on his owne ſword, Adam is become an Apoſtata from God: now the caſe is altered, and they are become neceſſarie. But do you not vnderſtand reaſon? tell me, I pray you; Achilles to kill Hector, Saul to fall on his ſword, Adam to ſinne, what arguments are they in reaſon? ſurely cauſes and effects. Now to kil, and may kill; fall, and may fall; ſinne, and may ſinne, what new inuention hauehave they brought into reaſon? are they not ſtill cauſe a…d effect? A man may laugh, therfore if he bring his facultie into exerciſe, it is become neceſſarie. Surely betwixt a reaſon in potentia, in power to argue, and actu, there is no ſubſtantiall change. The Coryphaeus of Logitians defines an argument, quod eſt ad arguendum affectum, that is, which is affected to argue. All men know, that the power of a thing, is more neere the beeing then the act, and therfore a thing can part with his act, but neuer with his power or facultie. A man doth not alwaies laugh, nay he may alwaies be a mourning Heraclitus, yet he cannot part with the facultie. And if it was contingent for Adam to fall, ſurely beeing fallen the cauſe is not altered, onelyonly that which might be, is come to paſſe: That which I feared, ſaies Iob, is come vponupon me: when he feared it, it was contingent; but now it is neceſſarie: ſtrange reaſon, that for bringing a thing into act, that was in power to the act, or for a little change of time, nature ſhould be altered: fire will be fire whereſoeuer it is, and nature will be nature whenſoeuer it is. Let any anſwer me this one thing; did God intend to create all things neceſſarie, or ſome things neceſſarie, and ſome things contingent? If all things neceſſarie, then let vsus become Stoickes: if ſome things contingent, then I aske when thoſe contingent things were made? did they then become neceſſarie? where is then any contingent thing made of God? EueryEvery thing you ſay is neceſſarie, when it is: therefore when God had made all things, all things were neceſſarie. This kinde of diſcourſe will hold no water: and for my part, away with this neceſſitie. But doe you deſire to know what a neceſſarie thing is? then in a word it is this; The definition of neceſſitie.That which is alwaies true, and neither can, nor could be otherwiſe. To be alwaies true, is common to contingencie and neceſſitie: for God with whome all things are preſent, knew them alwaies to be true, yet not neceſſarie: but here lies the difference, that neither can nor could be otherwiſe. Dare any affirme this of Adam? ſurely then farwell all libertie, and make God the true cauſe of ſinne: for beloued, immutabilitie and neceſſitie are moſt principally in God, and therefore from him: and where you finde them, acknowledge God the author. If then Adams fall was of this kind, it muſt needes be from God. This argument ſhall be cleared, when I come to the anſwers.
4. Obiect. Is drawne from the end; or if you like not that, becauſe may be you will ſay, reprobation is not mans end, but Gods glorie in reprobation: therefore thus I frame the argument: Reprobation is a puniſhment; now our Diuines hold, that God reprobated man without conſideration of his ſinne; therefore he puniſheth man, and yet not for ſinne, which muſt needs be iniuſtice. That it is a puniſhment, I prooue it thus; Puniſhments according to the Schooles, are either poena ſenſus, or poena damni; the puniſhment of ſenſe, lies in ſenſible torments; the puniſhment of the damned, by an Emphaſis, is a ſeparation from God: now reprobation is a ſeparation from God, becauſe it is Gods deſertion of man: thus then if they make Gods will euill, the decree of his will an effectuall cauſe of ſinne, mans will neceſſarily thereunto compelled, and reprobation mans ende (or if you pleaſe) a meanes vntounto the ſame; then will it follow, that they make God the author of ſinne: but all this you ſee prooued; and therefore our diuines make God the author of ſinne. The accuſation is heauie: in louelove therefore vntounto Gods Saints, and the defence of his faithfull miniſters, I will labour to reſolue euerie one of theſe arguments.