Common Places, Part 2 · Chapter 2 · Section 3
Of Voluntarie and Not voluntarie.
41 Ariſtotle in his firſt booke of Ethiks treateth at large of that which is voluntarie, Out of the Commentaries vponupon Ariſtotles Ethiks.and of that which is not voluntarie: the reaſon whereof is, bicauſe praiſe, diſpraiſe, pardon, and ſometimes merciemercy be voluntarie. The argument is taken from the conſequents. Praiſes and diſpraiſes ſerue vntounto morall knowledge; for as commendable maners and actions are to be deſired, ſo thoſe which are blame-woorthie are to be auoided. Howbeit, ſuch praiſes and diſpraiſes cannot be iudged of, vnleſſe we knowe whether they be doon with a willing or vnwilling mind. Further, he added another cauſe; to wit, that this doctrine is a part of the ciuill facultie, wherto belongeth the making of lawes. And lawes ſet foorth rewards and puniſhments to the obſeruers and tranſgreſſors of them: it is néedfull therefore that they knowe which be voluntarie things, and which be not voluntarie. Whether lawes may command things not poſſible to be performed.For men that be vnwilling, doo not obteine rewards; and they which ſinne by compulſion, ſhould not ſuffer puniſhments. Some wreſt this reaſon of lawe-makers herevnto, as though they ought to regard this, that they command not thoſe things, which of neceſſitie muſt be doon, nor thoſe things, which are vnpoſſible to be doone; but onlie thoſe, which be in our owne power: and that therefore it behooueth them to knowe what is the nature of voluntarie and not voluntarie. I knowe in verie déed, A definition of lawe.that this is the definition of lawe; that It is a reaſon commanding honeſt things, and calling backe from things that be diſhoneſt. But that which theſe men auouch, to wit, that it commandeth things which be poſſible, I would onelie grant it as touching ciuill laws, but not of diuine laws: for thoſe require things that be vnpoſſible, eſpeciallie in reſpect of the ſtate of nature, corrupt & defiled. Howbeit, Ariſtotle vſed not this reſon; he onlie touched theſe things which I hauehave mentioned of puniſhments & rewards. Whether the affects of the mind be voluntarie or not voluntarie.But whie did he ſpeake of the affects, ſince thoſe be not voluntarie, but are naturallie planted in our minds? The Gréek ſcholies anſwer; that, albeit as touching ſubſtance and root they be of nature, yet may they ſome kind of waie be called voluntarie, inſomuch as by vſe & exerciſe they may be inlarged or repreſſed. Or elſe we will anſwer, that Ariſtotle made mention of both, of affects I meane and of actions; but voluntarie muſt onelie be referred to the actions. The which thing being doone, it will alſo belong vntounto the vertues, which are conuerſant in the affections: for thoſe alſo are gotten by actions, which when they be right and commendable, muſt be accounted voluntarie. Morouer, whie dooth Ariſtotle ſaie, that ſomtime pardon, ſomtime merciemercy muſt be ſhewed? Bicauſe we doo not alwaies take merciemercy on them whom we pardon; for a man in defending himſelf, killed him which ſet vpō him; he did it not willinglie, he is forgiuen, but we take not pitie on him.
To knowe which is voluntarie and which not voluntarie, may ſerue to the moderating of puniſhment due by lawe.42 But how the knowledge of that which is Voluntarie and Not voluntarie, may helpe to moderate the puniſhments which laws appoint, it may many waies be ſhewed. They which hauehave committed anie thing againſt their wils, or of compulſion, are not puniſhed: And in the ciuill lawes there be verie manie titles, which prouide remedie in the caſe of ignorance or compulſion: euen as they doo likewiſe concerning thoſe things which be doone for feare, and by craftie colluſion, and touching them which be vnderunder 25. yéeres of age, &c. Alſo he that is taken with madneſſe or frenſie is forgiuen; yea and a mad man, although he kill his father; ſhall not be puniſhed. The lawes of God quit the hewer of wood, Deut. 19, 5.which by chance and not willinglie ſhall kill an other, bicauſe perhaps the axe might flie out of the helue, and certeine cities were appointed for refuge. Alſo Plato in his ninth booke of laws, ſheweth that manie things are to be forgiuen, where the will did not conſent. So as it greatlie auaileth lawe-makers and iudges of the lawe, bicauſe of giuing puniſhments and rewards, to knowe what is doone voluntarie, and what is not doone voluntarie. We will ſpeake firſt of Not voluntarie: for in this matter the priuation ſéemeth to be better knowen, than the thing it ſelfe. By darkneſſe is the light better knowen, and ſickneſſe dooth make the goodnes of health the more manifeſt. The definition of not voluntarie.This definition of Not voluntarie appéereth by the reckoning vp of the parts thereof, ſo that it is rather a diuiſion than a definition; albeit that iuſt and full diuiſions hauehave ſometime the place of a definition. And we then chéeflie vſe them, when that which is common to the parts, can not be expreſſed by anie one certeine point thereof. Howbeit we muſt vnderſtand, that it is called Not voluntarie, of theſe two formes or kinds, which be of one ſignification: for euen that which is doone violentlie and vnwittinglie, is not voluntarie. And we prooue, that the diuiſion of theſe two parts is rightlie made: for Voluntarie, which is contrarie to Not voluntarie, ſtandeth of two things; of knowledge, and deſire. Firſt we muſt knowe that which we muſt deſire, then are we ſtirred vp therevnto by a motion of the deſire. But either of theſe two may be hindred: ignorance taketh awaie knowledge, and violence letteth the deſire. For good cauſe therefore be theſe two put contrarie to that which is voluntarie. Violence is defined what it is after this maner; It is a vehement inforcing, which either not at all, or verie difficultlie can be abidden. But ſome man will maruell, how two things may be ſet againſt one: for againſt Voluntarie is ſet that which is doone by violence, and alſo that which is doone vnwittinglie. Herevnto we anſwer, that there is but one ſet againſt one: conſtraint or Not voluntarie, is ſet againſt willingneſſe or voluntarie. But this vnwillingneſſe or not voluntarie, is afterward diſtributed into two parts: for it is one thing that is doone by violence, & an other which is doone by vnſkilfulnes.
43 And as touching violence, That the originall of that which is violent, is from without.Ariſtotle ſaith that the beginning of the motion thereof muſt be outward: for thoſe things which be mooued by an inward beginning, are mooued naturallie, not violentlie. But ſome cut off the latter particle which Ariſtotle hath in that place, ſo as that which ſuffereth or dooth, bringeth not anie helpe to that beginning. Howbeit, thoſe which ſo ſaie are deceiued: for as we perceiue of a wracke that is made in a great tempeſt, the beginning thereof is outward; namelie, there be winds, waues, and ſtormes: but the wracke would not be, vnleſſe that the ſhipmen themſelues would take out of the ſhip thoſe things which are to be caſt awaie. And they which vnderunder a tyrant, are forced to doo things that be ſhamefull, they hauehave the beginning of their actions from without; namelie, the commandement of the tyrant: but yet thoſe things would not be doone, if they themſelues would not yéeld to the dooing of them. Wherefore it appeareth, that theſe things hauehave their beginning outwardlie; yet neuertheleſſe that they bring ſome helpe therevnto. Others thinke, that [Dooing] is there added in vaine: for if the beginning be an outward motion, then ſhould it be enough if he were named a ſufferer: for that which is mooued, ſuffereth, but doth not. We anſwer; It maie well be, that the ſelfe ſame things which are mooued violentlie, Whether thoſe things that are moued violentlie, may alſo themſelues hauehave a doing.maie alſo hauehave a dooing, as inſtruments: for a ſtaffe mooued by vsus, doth alſo mooue a ſtone. And in ſome thick throng, where men be preſſed, when a man is there choked, he is cruſhed by thoſe which ſtand about him; ſo as they are ſaid to thruſt againſt him, although they thruſt not of their owne accord, but are driuen by others, and inforced by the reſt of the companie. The examples brought by Ariſtotle are ſuch, as one of them is of a liuing creature, when againſt our wils we be caried awaie by men, in whoſe power we are. Another is of things which hauehave no life, as when we be caried with the wind whither we would not, which oftentimes happeneth to them that be ſailers. If anie ſhall demand, whether voluntarie & without conſtraint, be all one: we will anſwer, Whether voluntarie and without conſtraint, be all one.that without conſtraint extendeth further than voluntarie. For without conſtraint, agréeth euen to things that be without life, but ſo doth not voluntarie. Neither is it required, that the firſt beginning ſhould be a motion in vsus: for our knowledge commeth of an outward obiect, albeit that the ſame motion, wherewith the ſenſe is brought to paſſe by the obiect, is of another order. The beginning whereof Ariſtotle ſpake, is the cauſe; yet not anie cauſe ye will, but onlie the efficient cauſe. And that is vnderſtood to be the ſame, which is enough to mooue by it ſelfe.
44 There is mooued a queſtion, as touching certeine actions, which ſéeme to be as it were meane, Whether thoſe that ſeeme to be meane actions, be voluntarie, or not voluntarie.and it is doubted whether they be voluntarie or not voluntarie. And the queſtion propounded may either be ſimple, or of two parts. It is ſimple, if thou ſhalt ſaie; Whether be thoſe things voluntarie, which are doone for the feare of greater euils, rather than the obteining of ſome good & honeſt thing? And they declare that ſuch a thing happened vntounto Socrates, who would not obeie the thirtie tyrants, which required of him to kill a certeine citizen of Athens: which he would not doo, when neuertheles they threatned him, that they would kill his father and children. And this they ſought, to the intent they might make him to be a companion and partaker of their moſt cruell purpoſes. The queſtion alſo (which liketh me better) might be of two parts; namelie, whether thoſe things be voluntarie things, which are doone for feare of greater euils; or for the obteining of ſome honeſt thing, which otherwiſe would not be doon. As if a lie be ſpoken, which in his owne nature is filthie; it is doubtfull whether it be voluntarie or not voluntarie, when it is made for the defenſe either of his owne life, or the life of another man. Alſo adulterie is a ſhamefull thing, which no man of himſelfe ſhould chooſe: but if one, for the ſlaieng of a tyrant, ſhould, to win fauor with the tyrants wife, hauehave carnall copulation with hir, that by hir he might hauehave a readie waie to kill the tyrant; the queſtion is, whether that adulterie ſhould be called voluntarie. And all we knowe what great paines merchant men doo take, what things the ambitious ſort, and thoſe which delight in pleaſure, doo endure, that they maie enioie their ends. And they would not abide thoſe things which they doo, vnleſſe it were for their commoditie. Wherefore it is doubted, whether thoſe things be voluntarie. But if anie man doo doubt which be called great euils, Which he called great euils.let him looke on thoſe things which be their contraries, & he ſhall ſée that there be greater good things; namelie, life, chaſtitie, libertie, and godlines: and he ſhall perceiue that death, breach of chaſtitie, The leſſe euils are choſen for auoiding the greater.bondage, vngodlineſſe, and ſuch like, are the great euils: which things be ſo gréeuous, as manie times ſome ſhamefull things are committed for the auoiding of them.
How deteſtable things are oftentimes doone for the ſcaping of death, may eaſilie be knowen. Cato ſlew himſelfe, bicauſe he would not come in ſubiection. Regulus, leaſt he ſhould breake his faith, returned vntounto his death to Carthage. Virginius rather ſlew his daughter, than he would ſuffer hir to liue violated and a bond-woman. And manie ſuch like things hauehave the holie ſcriptures. Gen. 19, 8.Lot rather offred his daughters to be defloured; than he would ſuffer his gheſts to hauehave iniurie doone vntounto them; on the other ſide, his daughters rather defiled themſelues by inceſt with their father, Gen. 19, 31.than that the world ſhuld want [poſteritie.] Abraham to ſhun death commanded Sara to ſaie that he was hir brother, Gen. 20, 2.and put hir chaſtitie in open danger. In like maner Iudith, with the danger of hir chaſtitie, Iudith. 10, 11, and 12.went to Holophernes for the deliuerance of hir people. We diſpute not here whether theſe things were well or wickedlie doone, but we onelie ſéeke whether they ought to be called voluntarie, or not voluntarie. And there is a great difference betwéene wicked men, which either to flatter tyrants, or elſe bicauſe they be delighted in ſhamefull and euill works, offer themſelues of their owne accord to doo theſe things: and betwéene others which for honeſtie ſake cannot be induced to commit theſe things, vnleſſe there be laid before their eies great and moſt gréeuous calamities, or elſe great rewards. And thou maiſt heare of ſome, which hauing propoſed ſome great good vntounto themſelues, will ſaie, that for the obteining thereof, they are conſtrained to attempt anie thing. And on the other part it is alſo ſaid of manie (that whereas they cruellie oppreſſe the people, and beare rule for their owne ſakes onelie) they are conſtrained by tyrants to doo that which is wicked. And at this daie there be a great ſort which fall awaie from the chriſtian truth, being conſtrained by the moſt cruell perſecution of tyrants. There is alſo brought a ſimilitude of the caſting foorth of things from a ſhip, which is doone when the tempeſt of weather conſtraineth; not that this ſerueth anie thing at all vntounto maners, but that by the euidence of the matter, that which is now in queſtion, may the better appéere.
45 Theſe actions, which we hauehave rehearſed, are mixed actions: That ſome actions be both voluntarie, and not voluntarie.for in reſpect that they may be omitted, and are not of ſuch neceſſitie as they muſt in anie wiſe be doone, they ſéeme to be Voluntarie; but in reſpect no man could chooſe them for themſelues, they ſéeme, Not voluntarie; but rather drawe néere to the nature of thoſe things that be voluntarie, bicauſe in them is a certeine compariſon of euill things. Two euils are propoſed; to wit, either pouertie with the loſſe of goods, or elſe with thoſe goods a preſent death: the will chooſeth the leſſe euill, and coueteth to auoid the greater. Therefore when the will doth his part in thoſe actions, theſe things cannot chooſe but be called voluntarie. Beſides this, Ariſtotle in his Rhetoriks admoniſhed, that the leſſe euill hath the conſideration of the good, and is greatlie to be wiſhed for, ſince that which is deſired, is good: and there is no doubt, but it is the will that chooſeth the end. But the end of theſe actions whereof we diſpute, is applied to the conſideration of the time. For ſince the ſafetie which the mariners wiſh, cannot be had, except by caſting their goods into the ſea, the will doth chooſe that caſting of them awaie. Wherefore the time in all this matter muſt be conſidered, I meane not that time which is paſt, or to come, (for before that chance, no man would chooſe theſe doings; & afterward when the mariners hauehave eſcaped, they are ſorie and diſcontented in their mind for thoſe things which were caſt awaie:) but the matter muſt be iudged of, according to the preſent time, while it is doone. And therefore, ſince there is then made a choiſe, and that the matter is called into deliberation, and that the originall of the dooing is in the dooer of it, who either may doo it, or maie not doo it; thoſe things are ſaid to be voluntarie. As touching the action, we cannot iudge in generall, but we muſt hauehave a reſpect to the circumſtance of the time. And yet ſimplie theſe things are called, Not voluntarie, bicauſe for themſelues no man would deſire them: but neuertheleſſe, ſince they be not conſidered ſimplie, but are to be deſired in this reſpect, and he that deſireth them, is not without knowledge (for he knoweth what he doth) and his will or deſire wherby he chooſeth theſe things is preſent) therfore be they actions Voluntarie. For all things muſt be iudged of according as they be doone; and doone they cannot be, but at a certeine time, and therefore they muſt be iudged according to that time, and not as they are apprehended by reaſon, for ſo are they, Not voluntarie. For while they be conſidered of ſimplie, they are ſet aſide from the conſideration of time. Neither is it to be doubted, but that herein commeth the conſent of the will: for thoſe things would not be doone, vnles the will would giuegive hir aſſent. True indéed it is, that no man would thoſe things for their owne ſakes, but for ſome other thing: but yet this cauſeth not, but that they be Voluntarie. If they were violent, the dooer would not inferre anie inforcement therevnto: but the originall of the doing and of the aſſenting therevnto is in him that is the dooer, and therefore may chooſe whither he will doo it or no. Séeing therfore theſe be called relatiues and are referred vntounto the will; they muſt not be iudged of ſimplie, but according to the reſpect they hauehave vntounto the will. Wherfore ſince the will (as hath béene declared) hath place in thoſe things, they muſt be called, Voluntarie.
46 By two reaſons hauehave theſe mingled actions béene prooued hitherto to be voluntarie. That the actions called mixed, be voluntarie, bicauſe▪ for them we are praiſed or diſpraiſed.Firſt, bicauſe they muſt be eſtéemed according to the nature of the time preſent, wherin they be doone; ſecondlie, for that they be in the power of the dooer. For vnleſſe the will ſhould mooue the inſtrumentall parts, in verie déed they would not be doone. There is a third reaſon taken from praiſe and diſpraiſe; Bicauſe men are ſomtime praiſed, and ſometime diſpraiſed in the ſuffering of theſe vile and ſhamefull things; Therefore dooth this appéere to be voluntarie: for praiſe and diſpraiſe ſpeaketh not but of things voluntarie. And Ariſtotle ſaith; that Men are ſometime praiſed or diſpraiſed herein, bicauſe they are not ſo alwaies, as we ſhall perceiue: for otherwhile praiſe is not giuen to theſe men, but pardon is granted them; but on the other ſide (ſaith he) they be diſpraiſed. That ſame particle [On the other ſide] ſignifieth two things: either men will not abide reprochfull things, for the louelove of great and excellent things; or elſe they ſuffer indéed ſuch things, but yet for light and vnworthie cauſes: in which cauſes they are reprehended. Ariſtotle onelie mentioned one of theſe, the other he kept in ſilence. For which good things hard miſhaps muſt be abidden.Theſe great good and honeſt things, for the which men muſt indure gréeuous and hard haps, are iudged to be our countrie, our parents, children, wife, iuſtice, and ſuch like. Zopyrus the Perſian, as Herodotus reporteth, mangled his owne noſe, his eares, and his lips, that he might betraie the citie of Babylon vntounto his king Darius. Vlyſſes (as it is ſaid of Homer) ſuffered his bodie to be beaten, and to be deformed with ſtripes, and apparelled himſelfe in vile clothes, and in that habit, as if he had béene a runnagate ſeruant, went vntounto the Troians, and entring into the citie, throughlie ſpied out the ſame. But on the other ſide, all men diſpraiſe Dolo, bicauſe he reuealed the ſecrets of his owne countrie, that he might not be conſtrained to abide anie torments. What kind of ſhamefull things muſt be abidden for a gret good thing.But it is to be conſidered, that when it is ſaid, we muſt ſometime ſuffer ſhamefull things, that muſt not be referred vntounto wickedneſſe, or vntounto horrible crimes; for thoſe things muſt not be committed for anie maner of vtilitie or honor: but it is onelie ſaid, that thoſe things ſhould ſometime be ſuffered, which hauehave ſome gréefe and reproch. As if a magiſtrate ſhould be bidden to run like a ſeruant through the common ſtréets, or to weare openlie a womans garment: if great preferment, and lawfull commoditie be laid before him, he will not refuſe theſe things. So then, they muſt be verie great matters, for the which the like ſhould be doone, if a man will be praiſed for the ſame. I doo not allow the examples of the Scholies: for when they ſhew, that theſe vile things muſt be ſuffered, they teach that a lie muſt be made, or elſe that there muſt be carnall companie with a tyrants wife, to the intent hir huſband may be ſlaine. For theſe be ſinfull things, neither (as I hauehave ſaid) dooth Ariſtotle ſpeake of them: neither yet can ſuch things be commended, ſith that praiſes doo agrée with vertues, and diſpraiſes with vices. There be ſome found of ſo abiect and vile a mind, as they ought for iuſt cauſe to be diſpraiſed; ſith for a iuſt and honeſt matter they will not ſuffer anie thing at all. So are ſoldiers diſpraiſed, which forſake their ſtation, and they that without conſtraint doo yéeld vp caſtles and ſtrong holds. And in like maner are they diſpraiſed, which are readie to doo anie thing, rather than they will be compelled to paie anie ſumme of monie.
47 And it appéereth euidentlie inough, whie Ariſtotle ſaid; that Sometime praiſe dooth followe the ſuffering of gréeuous things, bicauſe this commeth not to paſſe continuallie. That praiſe dooth not alwaies folowe them that ſuffer greeuous things.For ſometimes, neither praiſe nor diſpraiſe doo in that reſpect happen vntounto them which ſuffer reprochfull things, but they are pardoned. And this happeneth, when [by reaſon of theſe things] a man dooth that which becommeth him not: as when tyrants doo threaten thoſe things, or elſe they ſhall light vponupon vsus, vnleſſe we ſuffer ſuch reproches, as are beyond the power of mans nature: there Ariſtotle ſaith, that we pardon him. It is offered vntounto men, that they ſhall be burned, or be cut in ſunder: there, if they yéeld, either in diſcloſing of ſecrets, or in ſuffering of anie vile thing, they are pardoned. And ſome thinke, that in thoſe caſes it is lawfull to make a lie. Ariſtotle addeth, that neuertheleſſe there be certeine things, Certeine things whereto a man muſt not ſuffer him ſelfe to be conſtrained.wherevnto no man ought to ſuffer himſelfe to be compelled: he ought rather to abide anie thing, & when he yéeldeth, he ſhall not be pardoned nor excuſed. Wherefore our martyrs be in the right opinion, who hauehave determined rather to indure anie thing, than to depart from godlineſſe. Ariſtotle bringeth an example out of the tragedie of Euripides; for Alcmaeon was not pardoned, in that he killed his mother; bicauſe ſhe was lead vntounto ſo great a wickedneſſe vponupon a verie light or rather ridiculous cauſe. Since theſe actions, whereof we treat, be mixed (as we hauehave ſaid) of Not voluntarie & Voluntarie: when Voluntarie beareth rule, either praiſe or diſpraiſe followeth them; but if Not voluntarie hauehave the ouerhand, and that a man may ſéeme to hauehave doone the thing againſt his will, he is forgiuen. For thoſe actions which be mixed, are ſo compoſed of two things; as either the one or the other of thoſe things, whereof they be compounded, may ſurmount or ouercome. And rightlie dooth Ariſtotle make exception of gréeuous crimes, which ſhall not be pardoned: for who will forgiue him which condemneth an innocent, which committeth adulterie, which betraieth his countrie, which for the ſharpeneſſe of torments denieth godlineſſe? Theſe things can or ought by no meanes to be excuſed. Anaxarchus, bicauſe he would not pleaſure the tyrant, when he was beaten in a morter with iron peſtles, ſaid: Beat on hardlie Anaxarchus bag. So far was it off that he would change his will, or yéeld vntounto torments. And Zeno in his torments bit off his owne toong, leaſt through the force of gréefe he ſhould be conſtrained to bewraie the conſpiratours. Wherefore there be foure kinds of men, which Ariſtotle ſpeaketh of; the firſt is, of them which are commended in their ſuffering of gréeuous things; the ſecond, of them which are diſpraiſed; the third, of them which obtaine pardon; the fourth is, of them which obteine no pardon.
48 Ariſtotle ſheweth of two difficult and hard things which happen, Two difficulties about the ſuffring for honeſt things: one commeth from our iudgement, & the other from the infirmitie of our ſtrength.in ſuffering or in not ſuffering of gréeuous and cruell things for an honeſt cauſe. The firſt belongeth to the facultie of iudging; bicauſe we are oftentimes ignorant what things ought to be ſuffered for anie cauſe: whether anie thing muſt be ſuffered in the goods of the mind; whether in the bodie, or in the goods of fortune; and againe, what maner of things they ought to be that we ſhould ſuffer, or that we ſhould not ſuffer. And rightlie dooth Ariſtotle ſaie, that this is ſometime hard to be iudged: for otherwhile, this difficultie dooth not happen. For all men knowe, that wickedneſſe is not for anie cauſe to be ſuffered. But Achilles doubted, whether he ſhould rather hauehave wiſhed for long life (but yet without glorie) by lurking at home; or elſe for famous glorie, togither with ſhort life, by warfaring at Troie. Alſo a ſonne will doubt, whether he ought to hold his peace; or to betraie his father, whom he knoweth to rob his countrie, to enter into the treaſurie by ſecret paſſages in the earth, and from thence to ſteale awaie the common treaſure. In like maner Dauid will doubt, whether he ought to counterfet himſelfe to be a foole; or rather ſuffer himſelfe to be ſlaine of a barbarous king. The cauſe is hard to be iudged: for ſorrowfull things are to be compared with diſhoneſt things; neither is it eaſie for all men to diſcerne betwéene theſe things. And vertue conſiſteth in matters difficult. Therefore from hence come praiſes; or elſe, if we flie from vertue to vices, diſpraiſes. Héere dooth varietie of the circumſtances increaſe the difficultie, which cauſeth that we cannot hauehave certeine rules in thoſe things. The other kind of difficultie ariſeth of the weakeneſſe of ſtrength, not of iudgement; for when we be out of danger or ſorrow, we ſée what is to be choſen, and oftentimes we diſcerne that which is right. But when we come to the féeling and experience of gréefe, paines and torments; we are then of an other mind. Whereof alſo it commeth to paſſe, that when we be in health, we giuegive good counſell vntounto them that be ſicke; but yet we doo not rightlie aduiſe our owne ſelues, when we are ſicke. And they are verie much to be commended, which ſtand faſt in their ſound determination, and in their good purpoſe. And on the other part, they which ſhall fall from their ſound determination, are to be diſpraiſed. Themiſtocles is maruellouſlie commended, who would rather die, than beare armes againſt his countrie. But they on the contrarie ſide are moſt worthie of diſpraiſe, which would rather denie godlineſſe, than to ſuffer torments or death.
Whether thoſe things that be doone for pleaſure or vtilitie ſake be not voluntarie.49 When Ariſtotle had ſet downe two kinds of the things which be Not voluntarie, then he confuted their opinion, which made a third kind of the ſame. For they ſaid, that the wicked actions, which we commit for atteining of pleaſure and profit, are violent: and they made onelie thoſe to be voluntarie actions, which be rightlie conſenting vntounto reaſon. By theſe reaſons they are confuted. The firſt is, bicauſe then all our actions would be violent: for whatſoeuer we doo, we doo for theſe cauſes; namelie, for delectation and commoditie. The ſecond reaſon is, bicauſe that which is violent, is ioined with ſadneſſe: but they which deale for pleaſure ſake, are glad, not ſad; ſo as it appeareth that thoſe actions are not violent. The third reaſon is; that then euerie euill man would excuſe his euill actions, tranſferring his fault vntounto outward things; that is to wit, ſuch as are pleaſant and profitable; and he would ſaie, that he were conſtrained by theſe things: which is a matter to be laughed at. The fourth reaſon; There is no greater cauſe whie theſe men ſhould make themſelues authors of honeſt actions, than pleaſant & profitable things to be the cauſe of ſhamefull actions; bicauſe they hauehave in them ſelues the originall as well of theſe as of thoſe. Bréeflie, if theſe mens opinion were true, there would be no ſinnes nor wickedneſſes of men, which might not be excuſed vnderunder pretence that the ſame is doone againſt their will, or violentlie. The reaſon is alleged; bicauſe all men deale for theſe cauſes, namelie for delight and profit. Which in verie déed is true, if alſo vnderunder the word, foreign, thou comprehend honeſt things: for there be manie, which for honeſtie ſake doo manie things.
But thou wilt ſaie, that the aduerſaries doo not ſo vſe that word, as thereby they hauehave noted onelie delightfull & profitable things. I knowe it. But thus dooth Ariſtotle argue, and ſaith, that They, which will rather blame delightfull and profitable things, than themſelues, which yéeld themſelues ſo readilie to be allured thereby, deſerue to be laughed at. This is it that they are iuſtlie to be blamed for, that they ſuffer themſelues ſo ſoone to be caught by theſe things, and to be called away from iuſt actions. Why ſhould they attribute vntounto themſelues honeſt things, and aſcribe that which is diſhoneſt vntounto outward things; ſéeing that thoſe alſo are in our power? Euen as it appéereth in men that be temperate and continent, which doo ſoone temper themſelues from theſe things. And furthermore it may be woondered at, why they doo not in like maner ſaie, that they are conſtreined by honeſt things; ſéeing that they chooſe them, and ſince thoſe be no leſſe outward, than be pleaſures and commodities. Vndoubtedlie, if we of good right aſcribe to our ſelues honeſt things, the diſhoneſt alſo ſhall belong vntounto vsus: for contraries doo both belong to the ſelfe-ſame generall kind, and are to be meaſured by the ſelfe-ſame rule. Ariſtotle ſéemeth to ſpeake thoſe things againſt Plato: for *In Mnemone.Plato ſaid, that Good men are not made good by nature; as if he ſhould ſaie, they are good by will, and by their owne election. And on the other ſide, of euill men (in his ninth booke of lawes) he ſaid, that they are all and in all reſpects euill; but yet vnwillinglie. But Ariſtotle affirmed, that as well good men as euill are led by their owne accord, and with voluntarie actions. For as well of goodnes as of naughtineſſe there be originals, which doo mooue outwardlie; to wit, things which doo offer themſelues to our vnderſtanding: but ſince they be both in the one and the other, there is an helpe and aid giuen therevnto by vsus, which doo chooſe and diſcerne the ſame.
50 Now that we hauehave ſpoken of Not voluntarie, which is doone by violence; let vsus ſée what can be ſaid of Not voluntarie, procéeding from them that be ignorant. And firſt Ariſtotle taketh awaie Voluntarie, from that which is doone by ignorance; for nothing, done by him that is ignorant, can be called Voluntarie; ſéeing this requireth a knowledge of that which is doone. But Ariſtotle noteth a certein diffrence of thoſe men, Two kinds of ignorance.which doo anie thing of ignorance: for ſome of them, when they hauehave afterward perceiued what they hauehave doone; it repenteth them: and there be others, which repent them not, but rather confirme that which hath béene doone. Theſe two kind of ignorant men, bicauſe they differ much one from another, doo make diuers forms and kinds of ignorance: and bicauſe they differ one from another in matter, it is méet alſo that they be called by ſundrie names. Wherefore he that repenteth him, after he hath perceiued his error, ſhall be called foreign, that is, One that dooth againſt his will. And he which repenteth him not, ſhall be ſaid to hauehave doone it being not willing: for he reteineth ſtill the name of the generall word; to wit, of Not voluntarie. At the beginning our actions were diuided, that ſome of them are Voluntarie, & ſome Not voluntarie. We began the diſcourſe of the parts of this diuiſion, with that which is Not voluntarie; & that, Not voluntarie, we diſtinguiſhed againe into that which is againſt the will, or violent which is doone by force; and into that which is doone by ignorance. Violent was defined to be that, whoſe beginning is from without vsus, and wherin that, which is the dooer or ſufferer, giueth no helpe therevnto. Now is ſhewed the other part of Not voluntarie, wherby a thing is doone thorough ignorance: and this is ſhewed to be of two ſorts; namelie, with repentance, or without repentance. That which is with repentance, is ſimplie againſt the will; but that which is without repentance, is at the beginning Not voluntarie; but after the acknowledging of the fact, bicauſe he dooth not repent him, he ſéemeth to be ſomwhat, yea to be verie far from dooing of it againſt his will; naie rather, that he hath ſomewhat Voluntarie therein. Theſe things therfore in name muſt be thus diſtinguiſhed. The firſt ſhall be called he that dooth againſt his will, and the other ſhall be called, he that dooth not with his will. Examples of both ſorts of ignorance.Oedipus is ſaid in the fables to hauehave ſlaine his father, and to hauehave married his mother againſt his will: for vnderſtanding what he had doone, he ſo repented him, as he put out both his eies. And on the other ſide, Tiberius racked his hoſt of Rhodes ignorantlie, whom afterward when he knew, he put him to death. Wherfore at the beginning, when he racked him ignorantlie, he did it not with his will; but bicauſe afterward he did not repent him, he could not he ſaid to hauehave doone it againſt his will. And there may be brought another example. He that killeth a man, thinking he had béen a wild beaſt, if he be afterward ſorie, he did it againſt his will. But if anie man, to whom braſen monie was owing, receiueth gold, and dooth not repent him of his error, but rather reioiſeth; he is ſaid to hauehave doone it not willing, but yet not againſt his will. Thus may the reaſon be made; Whatſoeuer is doone violentlie, or againſt the will, it hath ſorrowe or repentance ioined therewith; But not all things that are doon by him, which is ignorant, hauehave repentance or ſorrowe ioined therewith; Therefore all ſuch kind of things are not violent or againſt the will.
51 There is vſed alſo another diſtinction. Another diſtinction of ignorance.It is one thing to doo through ignorance, and another thing for the dooer to be ignorant. They are ſaid to doo a thing through ignorance or vnwittinglie, vntounto whom ignorance is after a ſort the cauſe that they doo. On the other ſide, manie doo things being ignorant, who by reaſon of ſom gréeuous perturbation, whereof themſelues are the cauſe, doo as it were bring an error vntounto themſelues. Theſe things differ as the generall and the ſpeciall kind, as a thing ſpred foorth, and a thing drawne togither. For whoſoeuer dooth a thing through ignorance, is ignorant; but not ſo on the contrarie part, whoſoeuer is ignorant, dooth a thing through ignorance. Herof Ariſtotle bringeth examples, firſt of droonkennes. An example.Manie things are doone by droonken men, wherein they knowe not what they doo; yet are they not properlie ſaid to doo anie thing vnwittinglie, bicauſe they might hauehave abſteined from too much wine: and they which drinke more than is requiſite, did bring ignorance vntounto themſelues. Wherfore ſuch a vice cauſeth not that they ſhould be ſaid to hauehave doone againſt their will. Another ſimilitude is of anger: for they which ſhall be mooued with a great furie of wrath, doo oftentimes not knowe what they doo, but yet they deale not againſt their will: for they ought to hauehave tempered their wrath, and to hauehave atteined vntounto vertue, whereby they might hauehave moderated that perturbation. Which, ſith they would not doo, they are not excuſed of thoſe things, which they through anger did amiſſe. And bréeflie it is ſaid, that ignorance of that kind is the cauſe not of conſtreining the will, but of naughtineſſe; otherwiſe euerie wicked man is ignorant, yet is he not therefore to be excuſed. That euill men be ignorant, this doth prooue it; namelie, that they knowe not what to followe, or what to auoid. For they are beguiled of their owne luſts, for whoſe ſake they are ſo deceiued, as they perceiue not what things are trulie pleaſant, & trulie profitable; and contrariwiſe, which be trulie gréeuous, and which be trulie damnable. Wherfore they are corrupt in their iudgement, and knowe not the nature of the end for the which they worke.
52 The reaſon may be framed thus; Not euerie euill man worketh through ignorance; But euerie euill man worketh being ignorant; Therefore to worke being ignorant, and to worke through ignorance, are things different. The Maior propoſition is manifeſt; bicauſe euill men (as is ſaid) if they wrought through ignorance, might be excuſed. And that, as is conteined in the Minor propoſition, they be ignorant, we hauehave declared a little before. An ignorance generall, and an ignorance particular.A generall ignorance (ſaith Ariſtotle) excuſeth not. That is called generall, which is not of the circumſtances; but of the whole thing it ſelfe. As if one would ſaie, that he is ignorant that fornication or adulterie be ſinnes; he is not excuſed, bicauſe he ought to hauehave knowen theſe things: nay rather, he ſhall be the more gréeuouſlie accuſed for this ignorance. But a particular ignorance, that is to wit, of circumſtances, excuſeth and deſerueth pardon; bicauſe the circumſtances could not be knowen. Otherwhile ſuch chances fall out, as no man can for certeintie knowe ſuch circumſtances. But contrariwiſe, the generall ignorance obteineth not merciemercy; bicauſe it was in the power of them that are ignorant, to hauehave learned it. Wherefore if they be ignorant, they them ſelues are in the fault, that they knowe not; and they ſéeme to hauehave had a deſire to be ignorant. Againe, if the excuſe of vniuerſall ignorance were auailable, then ſhould no wicked men be accuſed. The cauſe of their error is; that they onlie ſéeke for pleaſure and profit, but neglect vertues and honeſtie: which neuertheleſſe they doo vnaduiſedlie.
Wherevpon Plato in his treatiſe Memnon, dooth verie well expound this. Firſt he taketh this as granted, that there is no man which would be a miſerable and vnhappie man. Which being granted, he addeth, that then there is no man which deſireth euill things; ſince to be miſerable, and to be vnhappie, is nothing elſe, than to be conuerſant in euill things, and to be delighted in them. So then it appéereth, that euill men doo chooſe to themſelues thoſe things that be euill, vnwittinglie. And this error (as ſaith Cicero) we hauehave ſucked togither euen with our nurſes milke. But the reaſon whie this generall ignorance maketh not a man to doo againſt his will, is, for that it hindereth not his chooſing of things, naie rather it is ioined therewith: for ill men chooſe rather to ſteale than to labour, rather to be idle than to exerciſe anie art, rather ſurfeting than abſtinence. It may be, that otherwhile the whole matter may be generallie vnknowen, and ſometime generallie knowen, but vnknowen priuatlie and particularlie. As if anie man ſhall ſaie, he knoweth adulterie to be ſinne; but that he is ignorant particularlie, that this adulterie is forbidden: neither of theſe ignorances is worthie of pardon. But if anie man doo not knowe the circumſtances in generall, and thinke that there is no conſideration to be had of the end, nor of the place, nor of the time, nor of the matter that he is about to doo; whether ſhall this man be worthie of merciemercy or pardon? No verelie: for he ought to hauehave knowen this. And this common kind of perceiuing belongeth to the vniuerſall knowledge, which muſt in anie wiſe be had: but the ignorance of this or that circumſtance particularlie may be excuſed, ſince no man either maie or is able perfectlie to knowe all thoſe circumſtances in euerie particular. Wherefore onelie the ignorance of them maketh the action to be an action doone againſt the will.
53 And bicauſe ſuch circumſtances be of great weight (for they obteine pardon and merciemercy when they are not knowen,) therefore Ariſtotle reckoneth them vp, that they may be throughlie tried out and knowen. They are in number ſeuen or eight: and there is a common verſe of them in the ſchooles;
Who, what, where, whereby:
Wherefore, how, and when.
Theſe are ſeuen, but yet one wanteth, that is, Whereabout; vnderunder which word is ſignified the matter or ſubiect of action. And when it is ſaid of Ariſtotle, Wherein, there be ſignified two things; namelie, place and time. So that, The circumſtances are eight in number.if we will hauehave the iuſt number, there be eight; of which number this reaſon may be alledged. Bicauſe either we reſpect the cauſes of the action, or elſe we conſider the nature or ſubſtance of the action. The cauſe, if it be efficient, then is it named of this circumſtance, Who. If it be the end, then we account it of the circumſtance, Wherefore. Or if it be the matter, then we adde to it the circumſtance, Whereabout. Or if it be as touching inſtruments, or the organs, we referre it to the efficient cauſe [which before we called, Who.] But if ſo be we conſider the action it ſelfe, the nature thereof is expreſſed by the circumſtance, Whereby. But when we conſider the meaſure thereof, then hauehave we the circumſtance of time and place, which we call, When and Where. And laſt of all, we regard the proportion of the maner, which is a thing belonging to qualitie, and is the circumſtance that we named, How. No man (ſaith Ariſtotle) is ignorant of all theſe circumſtances (he meaneth) of them all at once. A man may be ignorant of one or other of them particularlie, but none can be ignorant of them altogither, vnleſſe he be a verie foole: for how ſhall a man hauehave no knowledge of himſelfe? This is not generallie true, bicauſe a man may eaſilie be ignorant of the cauſe efficient. If himſelfe be that efficient, I confeſſe it is the harder, not to knowe himſelfe. But euen this alſo may haplie come to paſſe, that one, ſometimes minding an other matter, may ſtirre a ſhip; and yet marketh not that which he dooth. But that we now ſpeake of, is to be vnderſtood for the moſt part. Howbeit, this ſubtill point falleth not out in things that are morall. The matter is made plaine by examples.
How circumſtances do excuſe.What did the circumſtances excuſe Aeſchylus the tragicall Poet? He in a tragedie did ſéeme to reueale certeine ſacred myſteries of Ceres, which thing raiſed ſo great a tumult in the theatre, as he was well néere ſlaine. He fled vntounto the altar of Bacchus, from thence he was brought to the iudgement of the Areopagits: he pleaded his cauſe, he excuſed himſelfe, that he knew not thoſe things to be myſteries; and bicauſe he knew not what he did, he was quit. Alſo an other man made a certeine engine or inſtrument of warre, which did caſt ſtones: the effect whereof when he was minded to ſhew, he diſcharged the péece, and by a ſtroke killed a certeine man: he excuſed himſelfe that he knew not what he did. The circumſtance, Whereabout, which is the matter or ſubiect of action, appéereth by the example of Merope. She laie in wait for hir ſonne, and killed him, thinking that he had béene hir enimie, when he was hir ſonne. Héer the error was in the circumſtance, Whereabout. And this example is ſaid to be in Euripides, in the tragedie of Creſpontes, which is not extant. Sometimes we know not: and that is called the circumſtance, Wherewith; as if a man thinke he runneth with a blunt ſpeare, & the ſame ſhalbe armed with a ſharpe head. Or a man thinking that he dooth throwe a pumice, when he hath throwne a ſtone, whereby ſome bodie is hit, or woounded, or ſlaine. Otherwiſe we are ignorant of the end. A man for health, or for recouerie from ſickneſſe, letteth bloud, giueth a medicine, or lanceth the fleſh, and there followeth a contrarie effect; for either the partie dieth, or he is hurt: the ignorance of the end dooth excuſe him.
Alſo the maner of the action: as when a man dooth a thing and would not, it holds him excuſed. They which contend one with an other, with all the ſtrength of their hands or fingers, (which is a kind of wreſtling) and one mindeth to teach the other, and thinking to ſtrike but lightlie, ſtriketh gréeuouſlie: he is excuſed. Sith that there is an ignorance in thoſe things, that which is doone ſhalbe counted againſt his will, eſpeciallie, if thoſe circumſtances, which are the more principall, be hidden from vsus. And theſe circumſtances be, Wherefore, Whereabout, or Wherein. But Ariſtotle in his example ſéemeth to hauehave omitted the circumſtance of place, and time, [that is, Where and When.] Which is no maruell, ſince they might ſéeme to be knowne well enough, as thoſe which néeded no examples. Neither is it required, that when manie things of one ſort be expounded, examples ſhould be brought of all things. For it ſufficeth, that ſome things be ſhewed ſo to be: for the examples, which make plaine ſome of thoſe things, do ſerue alſo for the declaring of other things. But leaſt there ſhould be found a lacke of them, we ſaie it may be, that ſome man knoweth not that the place wherein he cōmitteth anie euill is holie: & otherwhile alſo the circumſtance of the time; namelie of a feſtiuall daie, or of a holie daie, or of a birth daie, may be vnknowne.
54 If that which is doone againſt the will, ought to be aſcribed to the actions which are doone vnwittinglie, while we be ignorant of theſe particular circumſtances, there is required moreouer, that the error being knowne and diſcouered, the action ſhould be gréeuous, and we ſhould be ſorie for that which happened to vsus vnawares. For if this gréefe ſhould not enſue vponupon it, the action may be called, not voluntarie, yet ſhall it not be againſt the will. But héere it is worth the ſéeing, How ignorance is the cauſe of a thing doone againſt the will.how ignorance can be called the cauſe of a thing doone againſt the will. This is therefore, bicauſe it depriueth vsus of knowledge, which if it had béene preſent, that which is now doone, had not béene committed; or if it had béene committed, it had made the action voluntarie. Wherefore, either it depriueth vsus of the knowledge, whereon voluntarie dooth depend, or elſe it depriueth vsus of that knowledge; which, if it had béene preſent, the action had not followed. And it may be, that he which dooth vnwittinglie, hath ignorance ioined togither with the act which he dooth; What kind of ignorance dooth not excuſe.and yet he is not vnwilling to that which is doone, but rather deſireth it: wherevpon there followeth no ſorrowe afterward, when the thing is knowne.
And this kind of ignorance dooth not excuſe him, nor yet maketh him to hauehave doone it againſt his will. As when a man, thinkeing to kill a hart, killeth his enimie, whom he before wiſhed to hauehave béene ſlaine; and now being ſlaine, reioiſeth, notwithſtanding he then knew not what he did. There is moreouer, a certeine ignorance, which ſome of ſet purpoſe would hauehave: for they deſire and chooſe, that they may be ignorant, leaſt by knowledge they ſhould be withdrawne from ſinning, or from pleaſurs. And this kind of ignorance is greatlie to be accuſed, much leſſe excuſed. There is an other ignorance, which is ſo doone, as a man knowing what is right and méet, when he commeth to the action, neglecteth that cogitation of honeſtie & right; and rather conſidereth his profit and pleaſure. And this commeth to paſſe, either of a vehement perturbation of the mind, or elſe of ſome ill habit. Neither alſo dooth this ignorance excuſe, for he that ſo is ignorant for lacke of conſideration, he dooth not that which he might and ought to hauehave doone. Now and then, ignorance commeth héereof, that a man will neglect to learne, or elſe for that he ſhunneth labour, or bicauſe he vſeth no ſtudie and diligence. For euerie man ought to knowe the generall lawes. Since therefore euen this man dooth not that which he can and ought, he is not to be excuſed. Howbeit, in theſe actions there is ſomething that is Not voluntarie▪ for this ignorance preuenteth actions, or the motion of the will, which motion if it were preſent, knowledge would not followe. The laſt ignorance is that, whereof we treat: this excuſeth, it obteineth pardon and merciemercy; bicauſe the circumſtances are not knowen, and for that after the action, ſorrowe and gréefe doo followe.