Common Places, Part 2 · Chapter 2 · Section 4
Of that which is Voluntarie.
The definition of voluntarie ſtandeth vponupon two parts.55 As touching Voluntarie, the definition ſtandeth of two parts. Firſt (ſaith Ariſtotle) the beginning thereof muſt be inward. Secondlie, the circumſtances muſt be knowne: for if voluntarie be contrarie to that, which is againſt the will; and that which is againſt the will, conſiſt of two parts: then is it neceſſarie, that the contraries to them muſt be placed in the definition of voluntarie. Hervpon we ſée the excellent method of Ariſtotle: for except he had before hand ſhewed the nature of violence and ignorance, he could not ſo eaſilie hauehave defined what voluntarie was. Moreouer, Ariſtotle was the rather mooued to write of theſe things, bicauſe that thoſe things, which are doone of angrie men, or men that are mooued with deſire, are comprehended in the definition of voluntarie. For both the originall of the dooing is in the man himſelfe, which is the dooer, and they doo vnderſtand and verie well knowe the particulars: for they vſe deliberations, and ſharpe iudgement, either to reuenge or to compaſſe that which they deſire: which would not be doon if they were ignorant of the circumſtances. Wherevpon it is concluded, that thoſe things are voluntarie; and that thoſe doo erre, which hauehave thought ſuch things to be doone againſt the will. And what mooued them to thinke, that thoſe things are againſt the will, it may eaſilie be perceiued. They ſawe that it was altogither difficult, Why ſome thinke that angrie and luſting men doo things againſt their wils.to reſiſt thoſe two affections; namelie, anger and deſire, as thoſe which are more violent than the reſidue; and therefore they thought that men are conſtreined by them. Wherefore Heraclitus ſaid, foreign, that is, It is hard wreſtling againſt anger. And Plato in his ſecond booke De republica, ſaith; foreign, that is; Anger is neither to be ſtriuen with, nor to be ſubdued. But if there can be no ſtriuing againſt the ſame, nor that it can be conquered, it ſéemeth to compell, and to make that the actions be doon againſt the will. For which cauſe the ſame Plato in his ninth booke De legibus ſaith, that An angrie man, foreign, that is to ſaie, Is like to one that dooth againſt his will. He ſaith not that he dooth altogither againſt his will, but like vntounto him. And Cato the Cenſor ſaid, that he which is angrie, differeth from a mad man onelie in time. Yea and other men, as Euenus, hauehave béene bold to ſaie, that Wrath is much woorſe than madneſſe. But Plato in his treatiſe of Cratylus, writing of deſire, compared the ſame to a verie ſtrong bond. Wherefore we alſo doubt not, but that theſe two affections are vehement, and of great force; but yet that they are not ſo ſtrong, as they cannot be bridled by reaſon. Which we ſée come to paſſe in temperate men, and thoſe which be indued with méekeneſſe, and other vertues. But yet would I not denie, that thoſe actions are more voluntarie, which be doon without the inforcement of ſuch affects: which neuertheleſſe is no cauſe, that theſe ſhould be excluded from the number of them.
56 Ariſtotle ſaith, that none of the reſt of the liuing creatures doo anie thing againſt their wils, no not children. The propoſition is to be confirmed; Thoſe things that are doone by inforcement or by deſire, be voluntarie. That was declared before by the definition. Now are other reaſons added herevnto, whereof the firſt is this; If they were actions againſt the will, neither brute beaſts nor children ſhould doo anie thing of their owne accord; But thoſe doo manie things of their owne accord; Therefore thoſe things are doon againſt the will. The argument is conditionall of the conſequent, taken to ouerthrowe the antecedent. The concluſion is prooued; Bicauſe brute beaſts and children, ſince they be without reaſon, whatſoeuer they doo, That children and brute creatures doo ſome things with their wils, and ſome things againſt their wils.they doo it through thoſe affects. But how abſurd the conſequent is, hereby it appéereth; inſomuch as we ſée, that theſe liuing creatures and children doo certeine things againſt their wils. As when they be ouercome and ſhut vp in anie place: but on the other ſide, when they be looſed and ſet at libertie, they doo manie things willinglie and of their owne accord. They chooſe themſelues meat, when they will they enter into chambers & dens, & from thence, when it ſéemeth good, they go foorth. They defend their yoong ones, they flie to their neſts; and infinite ſuch other things they doo willinglie and of their owne accord. They reioiſe in libertie, and on the other ſide, when they be conſtreined to anie thing, it gréeueth them, and they are not a little diſquieted. Alexanders horſe Bucephalus admitted no man to ſit vponupon him but Alexander, which without doubt he did not by conſtreint. The elephants doo louelove their maiſters, they obeie them, yea they knéele downe when they be commanded. But what ſhould we ſpeake of elephants? Dogs in a houſe doo fawne vponupon their maiſters, but doo barke at ſtrangers; they hunt chéerfullie, they followe thoſe which féed them: & all theſe things certeinlie they doo of their owne accord. Manie things belonging to this matter might be rehearſed of birds, fiſhes, and other brute creatures, which are ſo woonderfull things, and are doone of them with ſo great an inclination; that ſometimes manie hauehave thought, that in brute beaſts there is a will, whereby they chooſe thoſe things which like them moſt, refuſing other things, which doo diſpleaſe them. Yea and ſome men hauehave aſcribed ſome reaſon vntounto them, bicauſe they ſée that thoſe things which they doo, they doo them with great induſtrie. Which we would not grant, albeit as we hauehave ſaid, we muſt affirme, that they doo thoſe things of their owne accord. But and if thou wilt ſaie, that they be called wild beaſts, bicauſe they be led after a certeine violent ſort, we will not denie it; and yet will we affirme, that they are not without an inward appetite, whereby they are mooued: wherefore the actions which ſpring from them, muſt be ſaid to be of their owne accord. And it is no maruell, if Ariſtotle in this matter ioined children togither with brute beaſts: for thoſe alſo, by reaſon of the infirmitie of age, hauehave not the vſe of reaſon, but are onelie mooued with the affects, eſpeciallie with anger and deſire. And yet who will denie, that they doo thoſe things willinglie? They runne abroad, they plaie, they ſkip, they make ſport, and they fawne on their parents. But if they did not things of their owne accord, they ſhould hauehave great iniurie doone them, when they be beaten of their ſchoole-maſters. For what other thing doo they ſéeke, but that they ſhould abſteine from thoſe things, from which they knowe they are able to refraine? The appetite or deſire of two ſorts.And as concerning the appetite, we muſt vnderſtand that the ſame is of two ſorts: for one followeth the ſenſe, and an other the reaſon. Brute beaſts and children are mooued with that appetite, which followeth the ſenſe; howbeit ſuch appetite is not all one in both of them. Herevpon ariſeth the difference; bicauſe brute beaſts are altogither deſtitute of reaſon, and therefore their deſire is neuer obedient vntounto reaſon: but children hauehave reaſon, yet not in act, although in power. Therfore, when through age, reaſon breaketh out into act, their deſire may be obedient vntounto reaſon. We muſt alſo conſider, that this Gréeke word foreign is more large than Voluntarie: for it is extended both vntounto brute beaſts, and to children, vntounto whom Voluntarie dooth not properlie apperteine, ſéeing (if we ſhall ſpeake properlie) they hauehave no will.
57 Moreouer, whereas ſome which were againſt Ariſtotle, affirme that thoſe things which are doone by anger or luſt, are doone againſt the will; then it would followe, that either all ſuch things ſhould be doone againſt the will; or elſe that good things are with the will, and euill things againſt the will. Howbeit, neither of theſe things may be granted. But this did Ariſtotle ouerthrowe, and ſaith; Is it not a ridiculous thing to affirme, that theſe things are doone with the will, and thoſe by conſtraint and againſt the will; ſéeing that ſhamefull acts, which are doone through anger or luſt, hauehave no leſſe the ſelfe ſame beginning that honeſt acts hauehave, which procéed of the ſelfe ſame affects? No doubt but thoſe things, which hauehave all one beginning, muſt be accounted of the ſelfe ſame order. And further he ſaith, as touching anger, that this, by the lawe of honeſtie and iuſtice is required at our hands, that we ſhould be angrie againſt ſome; namelie, againſt vices, and againſt wicked men, whom vnleſſe that priuate men ſhould rebuke, and magiſtrates ſhould puniſh, they were to be blamed. Alſo there be manie things, which if a man doo not deſire, and by great indeuour procure to himſelfe, it is a great offenſe; as for example: health and doctrine. Shall we therefore ſaie, that the lawe of honeſtie and iuſtice dooth require of vsus, things to be doone againſt our will and by conſtraint, and ſuch things as we are not able to performe; or from the which we are not able to abſteine? This would be abſurd as touching ciuill lawes. And againe, whatſoeuer things are doone againſt the will, they bring gréefe and ſorrowe with them. But thoſe things that are doone through anger and luſt are delightfull, ſo farre is it off, that they bring trouble and heauineſſe with them. As concerning luſt, there is no doubt thereof. But as for anger, it may be doubted, bicauſe Ariſtotle in his Rhetoriks intreating of thoſe things which bring pleaſure, in deſcribing the affection of wrath, bringeth in the verſe of Homer, which ſaith, that Anger vntounto Achilles was euen as honie that melted vnderunder his toong. Neither indéed is anger anie other thing than a deſire of reuenge. Moreouer (ſaith Ariſtotle) what difference is there betwéene thoſe things to be doone againſt the will, which are according vntounto reaſon, or which be wickedlie doone according to wrath, ſith either of them are things that may be auoided? This reaſon ſemeth to ſtand on the nature of ſinne: for ſéeing that ſinne conſiſteth in thoſe things, which ought or can be auoided; and that this eſtate is found as well in thoſe things, which are doone amiſſe by reaſon, as in thoſe, which are naughtilie doone of anger with a deſire; they ought to be both called voluntarie. Why then are theſe things, rather than thoſe other, accounted of the aduerſaries to be doone againſt the will?
58 And as concerning humane affections, Ariſtotle dooth thus argue; Bicauſe the vnreaſonable affections, which we hauehave, be humane, and thoſe be humane affections, which doo ariſe of anger or deſire, therefore are they alſo voluntarie, and are doone without conſtreint. For whatſoeuer is humane, is voluntarie. But there is no man will ſaie, that deſires and angers be not affections in the minds of men, euen as reaſon is in the ſelfe ſame men. Wherefore, if actions, which flowe from reaſon be humane, bicauſe reaſon is a part of our mind; ſo likewiſe ſhall thoſe be humane, which procéed from anger or deſire. For the powers of anger, and of deſire, be in the minds of men. It may happen that this will be obiected; to wit, that The actions which be of anger or deſire, procéed from the part vnreaſonable. True it is (ſaith Ariſtotle) but yet theſe be powers of an humane mind, and therefore ſhall the acts procéeding from thence be humane. And theſe powers, although by eſſence they hauehave no reaſon, yet are they partakers thereof, and may be ruled by the ſame: which thing commeth not to paſſe in brute beaſts. Againe, theſe affections and actions are the firſt beginnings doone with the will; for they may be reſtreined by the will. And it ſtandeth not with them, as it dooth with the power that nouriſheth and increaſeth, which worketh euen whether we will or no. And therefore we conclude, that it is abſurd to affirme, that theſe things are doone againſt the will, or by conſtreint.
How theſe things agree with the holie ſcriptures.59 Now let vsus ſée, how theſe things, which we hauehave here treated of, doo agrée with the holie ſcriptures. Ariſtotle ſaid, that he would treat of Voluntarie, and Not voluntarie; bicauſe praiſes and diſpraiſes, rewards, puniſhments, and merciemercy, doo accompanie thoſe things which be voluntarie. Pſa. 111, 3.Euen ſo, in the 111. pſalme, the faithfull are praiſed, bicauſe they be a willing people. Matt. 19, 12.Alſo Eunuchs are commended, not thoſe Eunuchs which are ſo become through violence, or be ſo borne; but they which ſhall willinglie chaſten themſelues for the kingdom of heauen ſake. Deut. 19, 5.An hewer of wood, which by chance killeth his fellowe, is forgiuen; bicauſe that action was not voluntarie. Matt. 8, 29.The deuill is conſtrained to ſpeake a truth, is compelled to depart from them which were poſſeſſed; but yet he deſerueth no praiſe or rewards at all. Num. 22, 31Balaam is of the angell compelled by the ſword, that he ſhould not curſe the people of God; he hath no praiſe at all, bicauſe he did it not willinglie. The definition of violent, as it hath an outward beginning, ſo doth it not giuegive anie helpe, as a thing that worketh or that ſuffereth. And it declareth, that originall ſinne is no violent thing, bicauſe it is an inward corruption in vsus: and we further it by that naughtineſſe, which dailie we adde therevnto. But and if anie man will ſaie, that we are without knowledge and vnderſtanding, when the ſame is gotten; and that it commeth by occaſion of the firſt naughtie motions of our mind wherein is giuen no choiſe or deliberation: we anſwer, that thoſe things which Ariſtotle ſaith, muſt be vnderſtood as touching morall and actuall doings: for theſe ſinnes did not he knowe. Howbeit, this ſufficeth vsus, that ſuch things cannot be called violent, ſéeing they hauehave their beginning from within. Alſo we grant, that there be mingled actions; and we affirme that they ought to be reckoned among thoſe which be voluntarie: and therefore the holie ſcriptures doo exhort vsus vntounto them, perſuading vsus, that wée muſt indure anie thing, rather than to run into ſinne. Paule ſaith; We muſt neuer doo euill, Rom. 3, 8.that good may come of it. Acts. 5, 29.We muſt rather obey God than men. Matt. 10, 38 and 16, 24. Matt. 10. 39.And we are called To take our croſſe and to followe the Lord. And he is ſaid, to hauehave found his ſoule, which hath loſt the ſame. Neither hath the deniall of a mans owne ſelfe anie other reſpect. Theſe actions be of the mingled ſort, bicauſe no man would chooſe theſe things, except by chance: but theſe things we will and we doo, partlie to auoid ſinnes, and partlie to be ioined vntounto the Lord.
Howbeit thou wilt ſaie, that theſe things hauehave an outward beginning; wherfore they be rather violent. For vnleſſe the Lord did theſe things in vsus, none of vsus would doo them. We grant, that the beginning, whereby our wils are changed, is from without: but our wils being changed by the ſpirit of God, are inward vntounto vsus, and at their commandement we are mooued vntounto theſe actions, and therefore they ought to be called voluntarie, for they are not doone of God without vsus. Yea and we be praiſed and diſpraiſed for theſe mingled actions: for Chriſt ſaith, that He will denie before his father, Matt. 10, 33thoſe which ſhall denie him before men. Neither (ſaith he) will I be aſhamed of him, which is not aſhamed of me before men. And they in verie déed are commended, which for Chriſt his ſake do ſuffer gréeuous vexations; Matt. 5, 10.Bleſſed (ſaith he) are they, which ſuffer perſecution, for theirs is the kingdome of heauen. In ſuch things as theſe (ſaith Ariſtotle) is pardon giuen. As when Dauid, that he might not be ſlaine, feigneth himſelfe before king Achis, 1. Kin. 21, 13to be mad. But there be certeine things, which we ſhould neuer be led to commit. And what be thoſe? They be ſinnes. And it is an old ſaieng; Vſque ad aras; that is to wit, Sauing a mans conſcience and religion. Iob is an example vntounto vsus, who in aduerſities could neuer be driuen, either by the reprochfull ſpeaking, or bragging of his wife, to blaſpheme God. And they which are driuen vntounto theſe things, ſo farre is it off, that they find merciemercy, as they rather fall from the hope thereof: as in the epiſtle to the Hebrues, it is ſaid of them which departed frō the knowen truth. So did it happen to Spiera the Italian, & to thoſe which ſlew themſelues, when they had abiured the Goſpell. Ariſtotle propoundeth two things verie hard. The one is, what a man ſhould ſuffer for anie thing. The anſwer is eaſie; We muſt ſuffer anie thing, rather than we ſhould depart from Chriſt and his holie commandements. Matt. 16, 26.What auaileth it a man if he gaine all the world, and ſuffer loſſe of his owne ſoule? Matt. 10, 28Feare ye not them which kill the bodie, but are not able to kill the ſoule, (ſaith the Lord.) Of the other difficultie we hauehave experience in our owne ſelues: and we often ſée followers which onelie beléeue for a time. Againe, The ſpirit is readie, Matt. 26, 41.but the fleſh is weake. But on the other ſide, we comfort our ſelues, bicauſe All things are poſſible to him that beleueth. Mark. 9, 23.And Paule ſaid, Phil. 4, 13.that He was able to doo all things through Chriſt, which ſtrengthened him. Iuſtlie moreouer did Ariſtotle reprooue them, which thought that honeſt and iuſt things are voluntarie; but affirmed, that diſhoneſt things are not voluntarie: for we muſt not thinke ſo in anie wiſe. Rom. 7, 18.Paule ſaid; I know that in me, that is, in my fleſh, dwelleth no good thing. Yea, and if we hauehave anie thing that is good, that muſt be altogither tranſferred vntounto God. For vntounto the Philippians we read, Phil. 2, 13.that It is God which worketh in vsus both to will, and to performe.
60 Now let vsus ſée what is to be ſaid touching ignorance. There is a certeine ignorance, after which repentance dooth foorthwith followe, vponupon the perceiuing of the error; and ſometime no repentance at all dooth followe. As touching the latter member, Luk. 23, 34.the Lord ſaith; Forgiue them, for they knowe not what they doo. The ſame thing did Stephan praie. Acts. 7, 60.Among thoſe neuertheleſſe, for whom praier was made, ſome did otherwhile repent, and ſome did neuer repent. Alſo Ionathas taſted honie, 1 Sam. 14, 43being ignorant what his father decréed; and knowing his fathers decrée, he ſorrowed not, but rather was angrie with him. But Paule, when he perceiued his error, ſorowed. In like maner ſorowed they, of whom Peter ſaid in the Acts; I knowe that they did it of ignorance. And that they ſorowed, thoſe words which they ſpeake, doo declare; Acts. 2, 37.Men and bretheren, what behooueth vsus to doo? The ſorowe which followeth, doth not alwaies ſhew that there happened no ſinne; for both they, which crucified the Lord, ſinned; and alſo Paule ſinned: for theſe men were ignorant of that which they ought to hauehave knowne. But if there had happened to hauehave come a certeine ignorance of the circumſtance, which could not hauehave béene knowne; as in Noah, when he was dronken, Gen. 9, …1.who had not ſéene the wine before, neither knew the ſtrength and propertie thereof. And as it happened vntounto Iacob, when he laie with Lea in the place of Rachel: Gen. 29. verſe. 21, & …for both of them were ignorant what to doo, and were excuſed. But he that knoweth not the generall and principall points of the lawes, is not excuſed. Therefore is it ſaid of Paule, in the firſt epiſtle to the Corinthians; 1. Co. 14, 38He that is ignorant, let him be ignorant. And this ignorance, which dooth not excuſe, is ſometime laid vponupon men by God as a puniſhment, while he puniſheth ſinnes with ſinnes. 2. The. 2, 11VntoUnto the Theſſalonians, the ſecond epiſtle it is written; Bicauſe they hauehave not receiued the louelove of the truth, that they might be ſaued, therfore will God ſend vponupon them ſtrong deluſion, that they ſhuld beleeue lies. And in Ezechiel; If the prophet be deceiued, Eze. 14, 9.I hauehave deceiued him. 3. King 22, 20, &c.Alſo Achab was ſeduced by the euill ſpirit, God being willing therevnto. Thus then we ſée what ignorance doth excuſe, & what ignorance doth not excuſe. Ariſtotle addeth, that Thoſe things, which be doone by dronkennes & anger, are voluntarie; the which alſo we do affirme: For as touching thoſe things we hauehave receiued a lawe; Be angrie, but ſinne not. Eph. 4, 25.Let not the ſunne go downe vponupon your wrath. And we forbid to ſaie vntounto anie man; Thou foole. Matt. 5, 22.And as touching dronkenneſſe, it is ſaid of the Lord, Luk. 21, 34.Beware that your bodies be not oppreſſed with ſurfeting and dronkenneſſe. Alſo Paule; Be ye not dronken with wine, wherin is exceſſe. Ephe. 5, 18.Theſe things therefore, which are doone by anger and dronkenneſſe, doo not excuſe; ſéeing theſe things might either not be admitted or be bridled. But that all the wicked and vngodlie ſort are ignorant, though they be not excuſed, the ſcriptures doo euerie where plainelie declare; Pſal. 13, 2.The fooliſh man hath ſaid in his hart, that there is no God. In the ſeuenth chapter of the Prouerbs, verſe. 22.as touching them which are lead with luſt, and with pleaſures; He is led as an oxe vntounto the ſlaughter, and like as it were a foole, which in fetters is led to his puniſhment. Rom. 1.In the epiſtle to the Romans; They which called themſelues wiſe, became fooles, and the fooliſh hart of them was blinded. VntoUnto the Epheſians; Ephe. 4, 17.Ye ſhall not walk as other gentils walke, in vanitie of their mind, being ſtrangers from the life of God, thorough the ignorance that is in them, and the darkenes of their hart. Yea and as Eſaie ſaith, and all the Euangeliſts teſtifie; Eſaie. 44, 18They ſeeing ſhall not ſee, and hearing ſhall not heare; ſeeing they be in the darkeneſſe, they knowe not whither they may go.
But among the circumſtances, which being vnknowne doo excuſe, Ariſtotle dooth ſpeciallie reckon vp the end, and Whereabout. And this in verie déed is true. 2. Sam. 15, 9Dauid ſent awaie Abſalom to go into Hebron, but to what end, or to what purpoſe he did it, he could not know: he is excuſed. Alſo Abimelech had an other mans wife, Gen. 20.but he knew not what ſhe was, with whom he was conuerſant: therefore might he ſaie vntounto God, that he did it in the ſimplicitie of his hart, and that it was vnknowne vntounto him. Acts. 8.Alſo, that Simon Magus was baptiſed, the church is excuſed; bicauſe it knew not of his ill and fraudulent counſell. Howbeit, in thoſe ignorances which doo excuſe vsus, if there followe no ſorrowe, we are giltie: we allow not that which is doone. He which ſhot an arrowe, & by thance ſlew king Achab, 1. Kin. 22. 34.if he had béene witting of the déed, he would not hauehave ſorrowed, neither would it hauehave béene perceiued, that that which was doone, was doone againſt his will. Againe, Dauid ſorrowed for the death which followed of Abſalom; alſo of the death of Abner and Amazias: wherevpon it appéereth, that ſuch things happened vntounto him againſt his will and mind. Voluntarineſſe comprehendeth two things; both, that the beginning be from within, and that there be not an ignorance of that which is doon. Originall ſinne hath his beginning from within, and we know, that ſuch a corruption is againſt God and righteouſneſſe, although that of our owne choiſe we call not for the ſame: and therefore it is voluntarie. Yet is it in yong children, where there is a want of knowledge. But this maketh no matter, bicauſe we meane héere, of actuall ſinnes. Neither can Ariſtotle, or morall facultie atteine vntounto that kind of ſinne. That thoſe moreouer be voluntarie ſinnes, which are doone through luſt and wrath, it hath béene ſhewed by diuers reaſons. The which thing we doo admit: for we hauehave receiued lawes concerning either of both vices; Thou ſhalt not luſt. Matth. 5, 22.Againe, we are commanded, that we ſhould not be angrie with our brother without a cauſe. Ariſtotle in his arguments affirmed, that brute beaſts doo things of their owne accord Eſaie likewiſe ſaid; The oxe hath knowne his owner, Eſaie. 1, 3.and the aſſe his maſters crib. verſe. 7.And Ieremie ſaid, that The ſtorke knoweth his appointed time: chapter eight. And the ſame opinion are we of touching children: for in the time of Elizaeus, they were puniſhed by beares. Alſo Iſaac, while he was oppreſſed by Iſmael, was commanded to be caſt foorth by Sara. And further, Ariſtotle affirmeth, that it is required and otherwhile exacted of vsus, that we ſhould be angrie. Pſal. 69, 9.The zeale of thy houſe hath euen eaten me. And Phinees is commended by God, bicauſe he was reuenged vponupon the vnpure fornicatours. And where it is ſaid, that thoſe things, which be doone againſt the will, hauehave ſorrowe ioined with them, Paule to the Romans teſtifieth the ſame; Vnhappie man that I am! Rom, 7, 24.Who ſhall deliuer me from the bodie of this death? But whereas Ariſtotle ſaith, that thoſe things, which are committed through wrath and luſt, and alſo thoſe things, which are doone by the reaſon and will, are to be auoided: this we correct, on this wiſe; That auoided indéed they may be, if Gods grace be applied therevnto: for without the ſame, who can beware of the motions of anger and luſt? No doubt but we may temper our ſelues from outward actions, but theſe motions of the hart are not in our power. Alſo we agrée that they be mens actions, which procéed from luſt and wrath: for euen of them alſo we ſhall yéeld an account.