Common Places, Part 2 · Chapter 2 · Section 2
Theſe things which followe are taken out of the like place vponupon the firſt to the Corinthians, at the end of the ſecond Chapter.
31 Now muſt we ſearch out, whether the libertie of the will be taken quite awaie, Againſt Free will.by meanes of thoſe things which we hauehave reherſed. But bicauſe Paule affirmeth, that A naturall man can not knowe thoſe things which be of God: The firſt reaſon. 1. Cor. 2, 14.it ſéemeth a while to be againſt frée will. For if we be not able, through our naturall power to comprehend ſpirituall things; how can it come to paſſe, that we expreſſe them in our actions: ſéeing we ſée by experience, that there is much more buſines and labour in dooing, than in vnderſtanding? And not onelie this, The 2. reaſon.but alſo the predeſtination, or preſcience, ſéemeth to be a hinderance to it. For it ſéemeth that this may be inferred; If God hath knowen all things, before they be brought to paſſe, and can not be deceiued, the libertie of our will is quite gone, and all things happen of neceſſitie. Alſo, The 3. reaſon.the power of GOD, wherewith all things be wrought, cauſeth no ſmall difficulty of this matter: for of ſuch efficacie is the will of God, as Paule to the Romans ſaid; Who is able to reſiſt his will?
Moreouer, the ſcriptures affirme ſinne to be of ſo great force, The 4. reaſon.as by the ſame all things in a maner are corrupted and deſpoiled in vsus: wherfore the ſtrength which is left vntounto will, is verie féeble, the which is not able to doo as reaſon hath appointed. Againe, The 5. reaſon.ſo much is attributed to the grace of Chriſt by diuine oracles, as without the ſame it is ſaid, that we are able to doo nothing, which either may be acceptable or gratefull vntounto God. And ſéeing the ſame is not equallie giuen vntounto all men, it is thought that their libertie is deſtroied; for ſo much as they hauehave not this grace in their owne power. The 6. reaſon.The Mathematicians alſo extoll the powers celeſtiall, and in a maner perſuade, that of them doo depend thoſe things which happen; ſo as there might not ſéeme to be left vntounto vsus the perfect libertie of ſuch things as are to come. The 7. reaſon.Finallie, there hauehave béene ſuch alſo, who would affirme, that there be definite cauſes of things to be doone; Looke part 1. pl. 13. art. 13.the which being ioined one with an other, and tied with a ſure knot, there is brought to them a certeine neceſſitie and deſtinie, which cannot be withſtood.
32 But we néed not ſtand much vponupon that argument, To the firſt reaſon.which was taken frō the force of knowledge; bicauſe it expreſſelie appéereth by thoſe things, which we hauehave alreadie ſpoken, that this libertie is not iudged to be in men not yet regenerate, as concerning works, which be in verie déed good, and doo pleaſe God: wherfore that kind of reaſoning is not to be weakened, ſéeing it ſurelie confirmeth the doctrine of the apoſtle. To the ſecond reaſon.In the next reaſon there is a more difficultie and trouble: for there be few, which can perceiue how the prouidence of God, Few ſee how the prouidence of God can ſuffer anie free choiſe in our will.or (as they terme it) his preſcience can ſuffer anie frée choiſe to remaine in our will. And the place is ſo difficult and dangerous to be dealt in, as manie of the old writers, in reaſoning about this matter, were brought to ſuch a paſſe, as they iudged altogither, that of thoſe things, which be doone, there ariſeth a neceſſitie: yea, and they ſuppoſed, that God himſelfe is held with this neceſſitie. Wherof came a prouerbe, A prouerbe.that God alſo might not withſtand neceſſitie, ſo as he durſt not attempt anie thing againſt the ſame.
A licence of the Poets.Through this libertie of theirs, the poets went further, and ſaid, that manie things be doone, euen whether the gods will or no. And Homer brought in Iupiter to be ſad, and to lament the neceſſitie, or deſtinie, by the force whereof he was let from remoouing death, which approched vntounto his ſwéet ſonne Sarpedones. And he maketh Neptunus to take verie gréeuouſlie… the chance of his ſonne Cyclops; of whom he being ſtirred vp with a luſt to reuenge, would hauehave driuen Vlyſſes altogither from home, and complaineth, that this was not granted to him by deſtinie. And in Virgil, Iuno dooth no leſſe outragiouſlie bewaile; bicauſe ſhe had kept wars ſo long togither with one nation, and yet could not remooue (as ſhe deſired) from the coaſt of Italie the Troian nauie. But we Chriſtians doo not in ſuch ſort ſpeake of God: for we hauehave moſt certeinlie learned out of the holie ſcriptures, that there is nothing vnpoſſible to God; and we are taught by Chriſt himſelfe, that althings are poſſible vntounto God. And our faith, after the example of Abraham, Rom. 4, 20.dooth chéeflie cleaue to this perſuaſion; that God can doo whatſoeuer he hath promiſed. Neither muſt we conceiue in our mind, Chriſt was not deliuered to the croſſe againſt his fathers wil.that Chriſt was either condemned vntounto the death, or forced to the croſſe againſt his will, or his father not willing. GOD would theſe things to be doone, not being led thereto by an ineuitable neceſſitie; but by a ſuperabundant & excéeding charitie towards men. So the ſcripture teacheth vsus, which ſaith; Iohn. 3, 16.So God loueth the world, as he gaue his onelie ſonne, &c. And vntounto the Romans it is written; Rom. 8, 23.Which ſpared not his owne ſonne, but gaue him for vsus all. Chriſt himſelfe by the ſame louelove, was mooued to die for vsus; and he taught vsus, Iohn. 15, 13.that A greater louelove than this can none hauehave, that one putteth his life for his friends. And thereby he ſhewed himſelfe to hauehave excéeded the meaſure of mans louelove; bicauſe he would ſuffer death for his enimies. And that he willinglie, and of his owne accord tooke death vponupon him, he ſufficientlie declared; when in the laſt banket (which, according to the Paſchall cuſtome, he kept with his apoſtles) he ſaid; Luke. 22, 15.I hauehave earneſtlie deſired to eate this paſſeouer with you.
33 By theſe places we perceiue, that the Lords death was throughlie foreknowne, and vnderſtood, and did in no reſpect infringe the libertie, either of Chriſt, or of the father. Therefore Cicero, otherwiſe a verie learned man, is greatlie to be woondered at: Auguſtine againſt Cicero.againſt whom Auguſtine, in his fift booke De ciuitate Dei, eſpeciallie in the ninth & tenth chapters, earneſtlie diſputeth concerning this queſtion. The controuerſie dependeth vponupon this, that in the latter booke De diuinatione, all things are refelled, which were brought by Quintus, Ciceros brother, in the former booke. And Cicero indeuoreth by all meanes, to ouerthrowe all predictions of things to come, and of the preſcience of God. Therefore Auguſtine affirmeth, that the Aſtrologians had reaſons, which were better to be borne withall, than his: bicauſe, though they attribute ouermuch vntounto the ſtarres, yet they take not awaie all diuination and preſcience. Auguſtines example of a PhyſicianAnd a certeine Phyſician (as the ſame Auguſtine declareth in his booke of confeſſions) being a graue man, and one that deteſted Aſtrologie; when he was demanded, how it came to paſſe that Mathematicians did propheſie ſo manie truths, he durſt not (contrarie vntounto all hiſtories and experience) denie euerie diuination; but he anſwered, that a certeine deſtinie was ſpred ouer things: and he affirmed, that it was not incredible, but that reaſonable ſoules did after a ſort féele it. Surelie there is nothing to be found more repugnant, If he be God he foreſeeth things to come.than of the one ſide to affirme God to be; and on the other ſide to take from him the preſcience of things to come. The prophet Eſaie would theſe things to be ſo firmelie knit togither, as he ſaid; Shew vsus what things ſhall come to paſſe, Eſai. 41, 23.and we will declare you to be gods. But that Cicero had ſmall knowledge, and no good iudgement of God; it appéereth by his booke, which he intituled De natura deorum: wherein, diſputing vnderunder the perſon of Cotta, he ſtriueth vtterlie to take awaie the nature of God.
And ſurelie, it is to be lamented, that ſo notable a man is to be charged with that, which the pſalme of Dauid aſcribeth vntounto fooles: for there it is written; Pſal. 14, 1.that The fooliſh man hath ſaid in his hart, There is no God. VponUpon what occaſion he appointed thoſe parts in the dialog vntounto Cotta, which was a biſhop; I doo not well vnderſtand: vnleſſe perhaps he conſidered, that none in a maner are to be found, which both more fréelie ſpeake, and woorſe doo eſtéeme of God, than they doo, to whoſe truſt are committed ceremonies and holie things. And bicauſe it was not hidden to Tullius Cicero, that it is a verie odious thing to profeſſe an opinion, whereby God ſhould be denied: therefore, when he had diſputed as much as he thought good; in the end of his booke he ſhewed his opinion, yet in the behalfe of Lucius Balbus; and ſo, as he ſaith to Velleius, that the opinion of Cotta is to be allowed. Cicero was a man verie ſtudious, as well of all kind of learning, as ſpeciallie of the ciuill lawe. And whereas he thought, What draue Cicero ſo earneſtlie to ſtand with free will.that the ſtate of mans dooings ſhould be ouerthrowne, if frée will were denied: and he not knowing by what meanes this libertie might be reteined, with a preſcience of things to come; he rather yéelded, that Gods wiſedome ſhould be taken from him, than that we ſhould be depriued of the fréedome of our will.
Wherevpon it may be gathered, into what darkneſſe and obſcuritie of things the ſinne of the firſt man hath driuen mankind: for what a madnes is it to go about to throwe GOD, the creator of all things, out of the fortreſſe of his wiſedome, Selfe-louelove is the originall of impietie.that thou maiſt preſerue man? This is that ouer ſelfe-louelove, which euerie-where in the ſcriptures is condemned: we would that all things ſhould periſh, rather than our ſelues. This dooth not godlineſſe require. Wherfore we, which be taught by the ſpirit of God, declare that both muſt be confeſſed; namelie, that both God dooth foreknow all things, and alſo that the fréedome of our mind (as we hauehave ſhewed before) muſt be reteined. So doo the holie ſcriptures inſtruct vsus, wherein we read; Rom. 8, 29.Whom he foreknew, them hath he predeſtinate to be made conformable to the image of his ſonne: and that We were choſen by God before the foundations of the world were laid. Epheſ. 1, 4.In them doo we learne, that The heares of our head euerie one are numbered: Matt. 10, 29. and 30.that The little ſparrowes light not without the will of our heauenlie father. And ſéeing we iudge, that God dooth all things rightlie and iuſtlie; we cannot thinke that he dealeth without reaſon and vnderſtanding.
34 But go to, let vsus more néerelie conſider the maner of Ciceros reaſoning. Ciceros maner of reaſoning.If (ſaith he) things to come are certeinlie knowne before, things among themſelues ſhall hauehave ſome certeine order: and forſomuch as nothing is doone without a cauſe, of neceſſitie alſo it ſhall be granted, that there is an order and knitting togither of cauſes. Whereby will come to paſſe, that all things, which be doone, be doone of neceſſitie; by which meanes iuſt and wholſome lawes ſhall periſh: and no admonitions or rebukings will be left, neither can there be anie place for religion or praiers. Wherefore thou muſt chooſe, whether of theſe two euils thou wilt: either that there is diuination, and preſcience of God; or elſe to maintaine the frée power of mans will. Both togither cannot be had, they be repugnant one with another, as he thinketh. Wherefore vntounto him it ſéemeth altogither neceſſarie, that one of theſe be mainteined and defended; and that the other be refuſed, as falſe and vnprofitable. Which deliberation being taken, Auguſtine.as Auguſtine no leſſe wittilie, than godlie ſaid; Cicero, otherwiſe a verie prudent man, while he coueteth to make vsus frée, maketh vsus impious and wicked perſons, who ſhould rob God of the knowledge, which he hath of things to come.
And we muſt diligentlie marke, that his arguments make no leſſe againſt the foretellings of our prophets; than they impugne the diuinations of the Ethniks, whereof he at that time diſputed. Wherefore thus I thinke beſt to anſwer his curious reaſons. Let vsus grant him what he would; to wit, that for the eſtabliſhing of Gods preſcience, we agrée that there is a certeine and determinate order before GOD, It is granted that before God is a neceſſitie of cauſes & things.as well of things, as of cauſes. But that which he bringeth in at laſt; namelie, that all things will therefore come to paſſe of neceſſitie; that will we denie. For though there be an order of cauſes appointed, yet dooth it not followe therof, that there cannot be ſom cauſes found among them, which may kéepe their libertie, or (as they call it) their contingence. And in this point Cicero ſéemeth to erre more than the Stoiks: for he, Cicero erreth more than the Stoiks.to ſaue the libertie of man, would that all order of cauſes, and foreſhewing of things to come, ſhould be vtterlie taken awaie; which things take ſo ſure hold of the nature of God, that the ſame being ſpoiled of them, it cannot ſéeme to conſiſt. But the Stoiks, bicauſe they would take nothing from the nature of GOD, The Stoiks remoue our will frō the order of cauſes.doo bring in their deſtinie: and that our entire and perfect will may hauehave a place, they altogither remooue the ſame from the order of cauſes ioined togither.
35 But here let vsus ioine iſſue with him, that we may ſtedfaſtlie denie, that the knowledge of GOD dooth nothing at all hinder our will; although it comprehend the things which are to come: for neuer ſhall the will of man bring anie thing to effect, vnleſſe GOD hauehave both foreknowne it, and wild it to be brought to effect. When he ſhall knowe before hand, that to morrowe I will either runne or read; indéed I ſhall runne and read, yet not driuen thereto of anie neceſſitie, but (as they ſpeake) contingentlie: for as farre as belongeth to my ſelfe, I might doo neither one nor other. But if thou vrge further, and ſaie; Yet neuertheleſſe thou ſhalt doo it, in ſuch ſort as God knew that thou ſhouldſt doo it. I grant: but thereof it followeth not, that I could not otherwiſe doo; bicauſe we doo not alwaies that which we can doo: nay rather, manie things might be doone, which in no wiſe be doone. Manie things might be doone, which are not doone.And in that I ſhall read or runne, it procéedeth altogither of my owne choiſe: for of all things it is moſt in our power, to will, or not to will. Wherfore when they ſaie; Bicauſe God knew before, that thou wouldeſt read or runne; Therefore of neceſſitie thou ſhalt read: we muſt demand of them againe, whether vnderunder the name of neceſſitie, they meane a compelled and a repugnant will.
Two ſorts of neceſſitie.For if this be their mind, that we vtterlie denie: bicauſe it may be, that God foreknew that I would doo ſome thing, and that neither vnwillinglie, nor with a conſtrained mind; but that I would doo it willinglie. But if by neceſſitie, they meane that this ſhould in anie wiſe be doone of me, we will not denie it: for ſo much as the controuerſie now is, not of the thing which is doone, or is not doone; but the diſputation betwéene vsus is onelie of the maner and forme of dooing. Admonitions, lawes, and praiers are not taken awaie.Neither (as he thought) are admonitions, lawes, rebukings, or religious praiers taken awaie: theſe things doubtles will be of force, and that more frequentedlie than he could perſuade himſelfe; bicauſe God not onelie hath mans ſafetie in his foreknowledge, but alſo he comprehendeth in his vnderſtanding, the waies and meanes, whereby he will helpe them. Wherefore if we ſhall perceiue our brother to hauehave néed of the remedies, which we hauehave héere mentioned, we muſt boldlie vſe them: for they hauehave ſo farre foorth appéered, as God before hand knew, and would, that they ſhould be profitable. Neither muſt we deſiſt from our dutie, although it may be, that all mortall men would affirme that we labour in vaine. For we muſt followe the lawe preſcribed vntounto vsus, and not the ſecret preſcience of God, whereof we hauehave no ſuertie what he hath decréed of things to come.
And ſéeing the preſcience of God is not the nature, or (as they terme it) the eſſence or being of our mind; we muſt giuegive iudgement of the actions which procéed from the ſame, according as they ought to be eſtéemed by the nature of the mind and will; and not by that which is placed out of the ſame. Wherefore, ſéeing the nature of will is, that it is mooued, neither vnwillinglie nor by conſtraint; it cannot be excluded from it by anie outward means. Our will can neuer be conſtrained.It may ſooner be aboliſhed not to be at all, than that the violent action can be taken there from: euen as thou maiſt eaſilier ridde anie of vsus from being men, than when we be men to make vsus that we ſhall not be furniſhed with a reaſonable ſoule; for it followeth immediatlie, that the ſoule being abandoned of reaſon, he cannot anie longer be a man.
36 But if thou demand yet further, whether it be a matter of neceſſitie, that I ſhall read to morrowe; ſéeing God hath this foreknowen: A neceſſitie vponupon condition may be granted, but not abſolute. Ariſtotle.we anſwer, that vponupon condition, or ſuppoſition, ſome neceſſitie may be granted; but not perfect and abſolute. Wherefore with that neceſſitie, which we grant, the choiſe of frée will may verie well agrée. Moreouer, Ariſtotle in his Ethiks, diſputeth, and that learnedlie (as he dooth all other things) whether the caſting foorth, which is doone in the ſea, when ſhipwracke is at hand, is to be appointed among things voluntarie. And although he there confeſſeth a certeine action, that is mixed with willingneſſe and vnwillingneſſe: yet neuertheleſſe he concludeth, that thoſe kind of actions belong vntounto the voluntarie ſenſe; ſéeing for that time, wherein the ſhipmen be in danger, they will them, and altogither make choiſe of them. And if ſo be that notable Philoſopher doubted not to place willingneſſe in this kind of action, wheras men by a certeine force are tried to conſtraine themſelues, to chooſe that thing, which otherwiſe (if that chance had not béene) they would neuer hauehave doone; then how much rather ſhall not we take willingneſſe from our vſuall and common actions, when we perceiue our ſelues, of our owne accord, and with a mind moſt willing, to doo and indeuour thoſe things, which we thinke good; although we doubt not, but God did long before vnderſtand of the ſame?
And that the neceſſitie of this kind which we hauehave taught to be by ſuppoſition, doth not ouerthrowe the frée power of our will; Chryſoſt.Chryſoſtome doth plainlie ſhew, while he writing vponupon the firſt epiſtle to the Corinthians, & interpreting theſe words; It behooueth that hereſies be, that they which be tried among vsus, 1. Co. 11, 19.may be made manifeſt, ſaith: Not vnlike this forme of ſpéech Chriſt vſed, when he ſaid; Matt. 18, 7.It is neceſſarie that offenſes doo come, but wo be vntounto that man by whom they ſhall happen. Alſo he ſaid to his apoſtles, that It behooued Chriſt to hauehave ſuffered, and ſo to enter into his glorie. Luk. 24, 26.All theſe things in holie matters are ſo to be expounded, as when they be called things of neceſſitie; yet nothing muſt be taken awaie from the nature of mans will. A neceſſitie of the conſequent, not of conſequence.And this among the Schoole-men is woont to be called, A neceſſitie not of the conſequent, but of conſequence.
37 There be ſome which commonlie ſaie, that doubtles theſe diſtinctions helpe vsus nothing at all; if God hauehave knowen before hand of things, thoſe ſhall in anie wiſe come to paſſe. Yes verelie, they are profitable vntounto vsus, and that not meanlie: for bicauſe thereby we vnderſtand, that mans will is not compelled; but that willinglie and without compulſion it deſireth whatſoeuer it will. For otherwiſe I will aſke thée againe, whether thou wouldeſt be ſaued againſt the will and conſent of God? I ſuppoſe not. But if thou wouldeſt be ſaued according to his will, he of neceſſitie is not ignorant of thy ſaluation: for ſo it is ordeined, that none willeth that which he is ignorant of. A ſimilitude.It happeneth vntounto vsus verie often, that we togither behold plaiers; yet dare we not ſaie, that the ſight and knowledge which we hauehave, bringeth anie neceſſitie to them which plaie: and yet, while we ſée them in plaie, it is of neceſſitie, that they doo plaie. Wherefore, as that neceſſitie infringeth not the nature of their will; euen ſo the excellencie of God compelleth not the will of man.
Some brall at vsus, and ſaie, that this ſimilitude is farre from the queſtion propoſed; bicauſe none at anie time doo behold plaiers, which be not, and plaie not indéed. Whereas it is aſcribed to God, that he hath had a knowledge before hand, of all our doings euen from the beginning: when as yet, neither we, nor anie of our actions appéered to be. To theſe men I might anſwer, that vntounto God all things are no otherwiſe preſent, than they which doo plaie are conuerſant in the fight of them which behold. Let no man laie his owne fault vponupon God.Let euerie one therefore take héed to himſelfe, that he caſt not the cauſes of his ſinnes vponupon God; and when ſuch a kind of cogitation entreth into his mind, let him hauehave reſpect vntounto luſt, voluptuouſneſſe, wrath, hatred, and other perturbations of the mind, wherewith he is ſore diſeaſed; and out of theſe fountaines let him ſéeke for the cauſes of his ſinnes. The Peripatetikes are reprooued.Neither muſt there be much credit giuen vntounto the Peripatetiks in this matter, which denie, that God hath vnderſtanding of particular affaires; leaſt they ſhould ſéeme to thinke, that the mind of God were abiect & vile, if he ſhould drawe his knowledge from fraile and tranſitorie things. This thing is not agréeable vntounto our documents: for we doo beléeue, that God of himſelfe hath a perfect knowledge of all things; neither that he hath anie néed to challenge knowledge elſe-where to himſelfe.
To the 3. reaſon.38 And whereas touching the third point, it was iudged, that the power of God is a hinderance to our will: the argument is neither perfect nor ſtrong. For, although that God by his infinit power, wherewith he is indued, The power of God doth what it wil, but it marreth not the nature of things. Wiſd. …, 1.doth what his pleaſure is; yet doth he ſuffer the ſtate and nature of things to ſtand whole: neither doth he violate them, or wreſt them anie other waie, than the condition of them doth beare. Wherfore it is ſaid in the booke of Wiſdome; that God doth mightilie reach euen from one end to another, and doth pleaſantlie diſpoſe all things: or (as the Gréeke text ſaith) foreign, that is, Profitablie. Which might not be ſaid, if by the high power of God the natures of things were diſturbed. The ſumme is, that God doth here moderate his power in ruling of the world, that he may fitlie applie his action vntounto all maner of things. In the fourth place ſinne ſéemed to be a hinderance to the libertie of the will; To the 4. reaſon.as if it ſo weakened the powers of man, that after a ſort they might be able to doo nothing anie more. But there néedeth not now manie words about this matter; bicauſe there hath béene plentie inough ſpoken in thoſe things which we hauehave declared, how much our libertie hath béen diminiſhed by reaſon of ſinne; and that ſpeciallie as touching verie perfect and good actions, which might be acceptable and well pleaſing vntounto God. Beſides, it hath béen declared, that our libertie is not by this means vtterlie taken awaie; but rather, that there is as yet a great deale of it remaining.
39 Moreouer, concerning the powers celeſtiall, there ſhalbe no great néed to intreate; To the 5. reaſon. Wiſdome ſhall rule in the ſtarres.ſéeing the Aſtronomers doo glorie in their owne bookes, that The wiſe ſhall beare rule among the ſtarres. But and if ſo be that theſe things, which they pronounce, might not be eſcaped, all their gaines would fall awaie: for no man would beſtowe coſt vponupon the ſkill of thoſe things, which he thought he ſhould not be able, neither to auoid, nor change, either by indeuour or ſtudie. Which thing without controuerſie would enſue, if ſo be they ſhould aſcribe a méere neceſſitie vntounto their foreſhewings. By this meanes all praiers, pietie, and worſhipping of God would be taken awaie: for who would praie to God for obteining of anie thing, if he were alreadie perſuaded, that the ſame ſhould not be granted vntounto him? Wherefore Auguſtine ſaid; Auguſtine.They which thus thinke, doo great wrong vntounto heauen: for there they beléeue is a court appointed, The iniuries againſt heauen.wherein are notable acts decréed, which cannot be auoided: the which if it were in the earth, it ſhould néeds be taken awaie. How much leſſe muſt we thinke, that the ſame is doone by God in the celeſtiall parts? I beſéech you what iudgement would be left, if ſo be we did all things vponupon conſtraint?
This matter ſome excuſe, ſaieng, that frō heauen is onelie ſignified what ſhall come to paſſe: yet that we be not thereby driuen by anie neceſſitie. And they bring foorth a place out of the booke of Geneſis, Gen. 1, 14.wherein it ſéemeth to be ſpoken; that The ſtarres be put as ſignes. But that place is to be vnderſtood concerning ſeaſons, winds, How a place in Gen. is to be vnderſtood.raines, tempeſts, and ſuch like ſort. But how can they affirme, that in heauen they ſée certeine ſignes of things to come? They ſhall hardlie prooue it, eſpeciallie touching mans affaires. Twins conceiued at one inſtant.For what anſwer can they make of twins, which being conceiued at one time, and hauehave all one aſpect of the heauens; yet (as experience teacheth) the chance and ſucceſſe of them is altogither differing?
Auguſtine.Auguſtine, in his fift booke De ciuitate Dei, and ſecond chapter, is woorth the reading; where he writeth, Two brothers of like affection.that ſometime there happened two brothers to be like affectioned, that when one ſickened, the other alſo was diſeaſed: and when the one recouered, the other was alſo eaſed. Concerning which thing Hippocrates being demanded of his opinion, Hippocrates.made anſwer, that he thoght them to be twins; and that therefore they had the temperature or complexion of their bodie all of one nature. Poſſidonius.But Poſſidonius the Mathematician did aſcribe the whole cauſe vntounto the ſtarres; bicauſe in their natiuitie they occupied all one aſpect of the heauens. But what (ſaith Auguſtine) will theſe men ſaie of twins, and innumerable liuing creatures, which are borne in houres and moments alike; and yet atteine to ſuch diuerſitie of fortunes? Ciceros booke De fato.And Auguſtine witneſſeth, that this example was taken out of Cicero; the which neuertheleſſe we read not in his books at this daie extant, vnleſſe perhaps he found the ſame in his booke De fato, which remaineth amongſt vsus all torne, mangled, and diminiſhed.
To the ſixt.40 Moreouer, deſtinie, which the Stoiks appoint to hauehave méere neceſſitie, hindereth not our matter; forſomuch as we admit not the ſame to be. They ſeuered it from the wils of men, bicauſe they thought that all things would go to naught, if togither with other cauſes they comprehended will vnderunder deſtinie. Howbeit, it ſéemed not good to them, The Stoiks doo not vtterlie ſeuer mans will from deſtinie.vtterlie to ſeuer mans will from deſtinie; ſauing in reſpect of the firſt choiſe, which they would hauehave to be wholie in our will. But whiles we ſhall chooſe anie cauſe that might be vnderunder deſtinie, they would hauehave it followe of neceſſitie; that what things ſoeuer they were, they ſhould be ioined vntounto it. Euen as Euripides ſaid vntounto Laius, that It was frée for him not to procreate; but when he had procreated, then of neceſſitie he ſhould ſuffer euen thoſe things, which Apollo propheſied to be conteined vnderunder deſtinie.
How we put the knitting togither of cauſes.But we, as we declared at the firſt, denie not, but that things are knit togither, as God ordeined, and knew before hand; yet ſo, as the nature and condition of them remaineth whole and ſound. For vntounto whom ſoeuer a thing contingent (as the Schoole-diuines ſpeake) is due, they hauehave the ſame: and to whom ſoeuer neceſſitie belongeth, with neceſſitie they be conſtreined. But in verie déed, grace, which finallie ſéemeth to reſiſt frée will, dooth not take the ſame awaie; To the ſeuenth.but rather helpeth and reſtoreth it. But now we will ceaſe from theſe matters, leaſt we diſpute more curiouſlie of them than beſéemeth chriſtians. Let euerie one followe their owne vocation; and let vsus leaue inquiring, more than is requiſite, about the ſecret and hidden will of God, touching preſcience and predeſtination: and let vsus followe that doctrine of God, which is plainlie laid out before vsus in the holy ſcriptures.
¶ Looke another place of the ſame argument in the addition at the end of this booke. Now we thinke it conuenient to ioine vntounto this diſputation certeine other diſcourſes; namelie, of Voluntarie and Not voluntarie, and alſo of mans choiſe, and ſuch like.