The Sum of Christian Religion 2, Part 1 · Subpart 6 · Section 3
3 What is like or common, and what diuerſe or different in the libertie of will, which is in god, in Angels, and man.
Common to men and Angels with God, to wil a thing without conſtraint.THeſe two things are common to God, and reaſonable creatures, that is, Angels & men, that they doe things vponupon deliberation and aduiſe, and will without coaction thoſe things which they hauehave conſidered and thought of: that is, Their wil being by nature fit to will the contrary or diuerſe from that which it doth wil, or alſo to differre & forbear the action, doth incline to the other part of it owne accord, and by a proper force which is within it. For it is ſaid of God, Pſal. 115. He hath done all things, which hee would. And of men, Mat. 23. Hieruſalem, how often would I hauehave gathered thy children, and ye would not?
The differences of our liberty of wil, and Gods. 1 God knoweth al things of himſelfe, perfectly, perpetually.But the differences alſo of this liberty in God and in the creatures are to be conſidered. The firſt is, in the vnderſtanding. God vnderſtandeth and knoweth all thinges of himſelfe perfectly and perpetually; neither can any ignorance of any thing, or any error of iudgemēt, fal into God at any time. But the creatures know neither of themſelues, neither all things, neither the ſame at all times, but at ſuch time, and ſo much, as is reuealed vntounto them. Who hath knowen the mind of the Lord? Of that daie and houre knoweth us man. God giueth vnderſtanding. Neither is there any thing which is not manifeſt in his ſight. He illighteneth eueryevery creature. To behold all things which are infinite, requireth infinite power and wiſedome, which is proper to God alone. Mention is here made of the vnderſtanding, becauſe a thing not vnderſtood is not either deſired or refuſed.2 His will dependeth of none but himſelfe: ours of him. The ſecond difference is in the will. The wil of God is gouerned or moued, or depending of no other cauſe, but of it ſelfe. The wils of Angels and men are ſo the cauſes of their actions, that neuertheleſſe they are carried by the ſecret counſell of God, & his power and efficacie, which is euerie-where preſent, to the chooſing or refuſing of any obiect: and that either immediately by God, or mediately by inſtrumentes, ſome good, ſome bad, which it ſeemeth good vntounto God to vſe, ſo that it is impoſſible for them to doe any thing beſide the eternall decree and counſail of God. And therefore the woorde foreign, that is, to be abſolutely his owne, at his owne will, and in his owne power, agreeth moſt properly vntounto God, who perfectly and ſimply is his owne, and at his owne will. But of the creatures, more rightly is vſed foreign, that is, voluntarie and free, which worde the Apoſtle vſeth to Philemon, verſ. 14. Heb. 10.26. 1. Pet. 5.2.
That God is the firſt cauſe of his actions,God the firſt cauſe both of his owne actions and ours. Pſal. 115.3. Dan. 4.52. Gen. 29.7. Exod. 3.16. Act. 2.23. and 3 17. &c. and 4.17 &c. the Scripture doth declare. He hath done whatſoeuer he would. Who according to his wil worketh in the army of heauen, and in the inhabitants of the earth. But that the wils and counſailes of the creatures depend of God who is aboue them, theſe and the like ſpeeches doe proue. The Lord ſhal ſend his Angell before thee. Go and gather the Elders of Iſrael together. Him being deliuered by the determinate counſel and fore-knowledge of God yee hauehave ſlaine. I know that through ignorance ye did it. and, But God hath fulfilled theſe things: and, Herode and Pontius Pilate gathered thēſelues together: to do whatſoeuer thine hand, and thy counſel had determined before, to be done. By theſe and the like places it is manifeſt, that all ſecond cauſes, as they were created of God, ſo are they ruled of him as their firſt, ſupreme & ſoueraign cauſe. But the wil of God dependeth on no one of the creatures, becauſe then a ſecond cauſe ſhould be put before the firſt cauſe. And as God hath not any efficient, ſo neither hath he any mouing or inclining cauſe without him. Moreouer God ſo ruleth and guideth the wil of his creature, that he doth not draw or enforce it, but bend and encline it, that is by obiectes repreſented to the mind he effectually moueth, affecteth, and allureth the wil to wil that which then the mind iudgeth good, and refuſe that which ſeemeth euil: ſo that the wil it ſelfe alſo vponupon deliberatiō going before, & a voluntary aſſent folowing chooſeth that, which God wil & ſheweth to be choſen.
3 It appertaineth as well to the vnderſtanding as vntounto the will, that God as he vnchangeably knoweth all things,3 God determined all things which he will from euerlaſting and wil them vnchangeablie▪ we determine what we wi…l in time, & many times change from that which we fi…ſt determine. ſo alſo hath determined from euerlaſting, and will vnchangeablie al thinges which are done, as they are good, & permitteth them, as they are ſins. Now as the creatures notions and iudgements of thinges, ſo alſo their willes are chaungeable, ſo that they will that, which before they would not, and will not that, which before they woulde. For ſeeing that al the counſels of God are moſt good, moſt iuſt, and moſt wiſe, he neuer diſliketh, correcteth, or changeth them, as often-times men doe, when as they doe perceiue themſelues to hauehave determined anie thing vnaduiſedly before. Neither doth God depend on their ſecond cauſes, either motions, actions, or mutations, or doth aduiſe according to them, as doth the creature: but himſelfe beeing the firſt cauſe, al the actions of al creatures depend on him. For he doth not, as men, take aduiſe concerning the end, by viewe of meanes or things antecedent leading thereunto, but according vntounto his decree concerning the end & conſequent he doth decree & ordaine the means & antecedents: that is, God woorketh not thereafter as hee ſeeth the ſecond cauſes to woorke, but he cauſeth or permitteth the ſecond cauſes ſo to worke, as he himſelfe hath decreed and purpoſed to woorke. Hither appertaine thoſe ſayings, Num. 23. God is not as man, that he ſhoulde lie. Mal. 3. I am the Lord, and change not.
The vnchangeablenes of Gods purpoſe taketh not away the libertie of his will.Obiection. Hee that can not change his counſaile and purpoſe, hath not free-will. But God cannot change his counſail and purpoſe, which he hath once appointed. Therefore his will is not free. Firſt we deny the Maior. For not he, which doth not change his purpoſe which hee hath once appointed, hath not liberty of wil, but he which could not purpoſe any other thing beeing let by ſome external cauſe. But the liberty of god conſiſteth not in the change of his wil or purpoſe, but in this, that God will all thinges whatſoeuer hee will, altogether with his will, and of himſelfe, and could hauehave hadde otherwiſe decreed, or not decreed all thinges, which hee decreed from euerlaſting of the creation, preſeruation and gouernment of things, according to theſe ſayings, Matthew, 19. Luk. 18. With men this is impoſſible, but with God al thinges are poſſible. Theſe and the like ſayings ſhew, that God hath ſo appointed from euerlaſting with himſelfe the creation of things, and the gathering & ſauing of his church, not, as if he could not hauehave not don this, or not hauehave appointed it otherwiſe, but becauſe ſo it ſeemed good to him: neither muſt men ſeeke anie ſuperior cauſe thā his wil of al his diuine works which he exerciſeth in his creatures; neither is there any other neceſſitie to be found in them, than which dependeth of the moſt free appointment of god himſelfe. For as to reſolue of ſuch a purpoſe as is to be changed, ſo alſo to change it either to better or to worſe, is rather ſeruitude or bondage, than freedoome and libertie: For it proceedeth of ignorance or impotencie. For they change their counſels and purpoſes, who either or in taking them, or are not able to perfourme the counſaile which they hauehave taken. But to reſolue of ſuch a purpoſe, as might alike either hauehave beene decreed or not decreed, and which after it is decreed, is neither changed nor to be changed at any time, this is perfect and diuine libertie. Nowe God whatſoeuer he hath decreed, could either not hauehave decreed it at al, or hauehave decreed it otherwiſe. And that he changeth not that which he hath once decreed, the perfectnes of his nature, euen his infinit wiſedome and goodneſſe is cauſe thereof. For moſt wiſely and rightlie doth he decree all thinges, & constantlie perſisteth in that which is good & right. Wherfore the immutability in god doth aſwell not diminiſh his libertie, as his immortalitie, & other things which are proper vntounto his diuinitie.
Secondly if any man vrge, that it is a point of liberty, not onlie to reſolue of anie aduiſe what he will, but after he hath reſolued to bee able either to followe it, or to change it: we vnderſtand by thoſe things which hauehave beene alreadie ſpoken, that this doth agree to the creatures, which may or in their purpoſes, and therefore ſtand in need of changes & alterations: but not to god, who can neuer er, and therefore requireth no change of his purpoſe. Laſtly, if they reply, That not to be able to alter a purpoſe once vndertaken is a defect of abilitie or power, & therefore againſt the libertie of God: we anſwere that the antecedent of this reply is true, if the change of it be impoſſible by reaſon of ſome impediment, comming from ſome external cauſe, or by reaſon of defect of nature, or ability: but the antecedent is moſt falſe, if the impoſſibilitie of change proceed from a perfection of that nature, which is not changed, & from a wiſedome and rightneſſe of that purpoſe which is vnchangeable, and from a perſeuerance and conſtancy of the will in that which is good and right, after which ſort it is apparant to be in God.
Gods directing of out wil taketh not away the l… bertie thereof.But againſt that, where it was ſaid, that the wils of all creatures are ſo guided by God, that neither they are able to will, what hee from euerlaſting hath not decreed, neither not to will, what hee hath decreed for them to will: more queſtion is vſed to bee made. 1 That which is ruled by the vnchangeable will of God, doth not woorcke freelie; The will of Angels and men is ruled by the vnchangeable will of God. Therefore either it hath no libertie, or the choiſe which it maketh is not tied to the will of God. Anſwere wee make to the maior by a diſtinction. It is not a free agent which is ſo ruled by God, as it hath no deliberation and election of his owne. But that which GOD ſo ruleth, as hee ſheweth the obiect vntounto the vnderſtanding, and by it effectuallie mooueth and affecteth the will to chooſe it; that dooth notwithſtanding freelie woorke, albeit it bee inclined, at the becke and will of GOD, whither hee will hauehave it. For to woorcke freely in the creatures, is not to woorcke without anie ones gouernment, but with deliberation, and with a proper and ſelfe-motion of the will, although this motion be elſewhence raiſed & ruled. Wherefore it is not the immutabilitie and operation of the diuine will and prouidence, which is againſt this libertie, but a priuation and conſtrainte of iudgement, which is an impulſion or a motion proceeding not from an inwarde cauſe or facultie, but onelyonly from an outwarde cauſe, beſide or againſt the nature of that which is mooued. Nowe ſuch an impulſion falleth not into the will: but God moueth it, leading and bringing it on as it were by obiects, to chooſe that which he will. For the facultie or abilitie and power of the will cannot be brought into act, that is, to ſhewe and expreſſe it ſelfe, without an obiect; and, We are, liue and mooue in God, Acts. 17. But to bee mooued of no other cauſe but of himſelfe onelie,Neceſſity taketh not away liberty of will in vsus. this is exceeding and infinite perfection and libertie, agreeing to God alone, which the creature cannot deſire, much-leſſe arrogate and challenge vntounto it ſelfe, without notorious blaſphemie.
Further it maie eaſilie be ſhewed, that the neceſſitie or immutabilitie, which ariſeth not from conſtraint, but from the nature of the will, or from the commotion of it ſtirred by other cauſes to chooſe or refuſe an obiect thought of by the mind, doth not at al withſtand or hinder the libertie of will.
Firſt, becauſe this neceſſitie doth not take awaie, This neceſſitie proceedeth frō Gods woorking in vsus, which rather preſerueth thi… libertie. Abſolute neceſſity doth not take awaie in God greater libertie: muchleſſe can a leſſe abſolute neceſſity take away a leſſe liberty in vsus.but effectuateth and preſerueth the iudgement of the minde, & free or voluntarie aſſent of the will, in aſmuch as god doth cauſe & woorke in men both the notions, and election of obiects.
Secondly, Becauſe God, albeit hee is by nature, that is, by exceeding and abſolute neceſſitie good, and hath begotten his ſonne, and had his holie ſpirite from all eternitie: yet will he, not by a constrained, but most free-will, be, liue, be bleſſed and good, hauehave his ſonne and holie ſpirite, and will all his purpoſes and works to be good and iuſt, although it be impoſſible that hee ſhoulde will anie thing contrarie to theſe which hee hath already determined. If then this abſolute neceſſitie of willing things, in God, doth not take awaie euen the greateſt libertie; there is no doubt but that neceſſitie, which is but onelie conditionall, that is, according to the decree and gouernment of god, doth not take awaie that libertie, which agreeth vntounto the creatures, that is, iudgement and election free and voluntarie.
Thirdly,Angels & ſaints in heauen hauehave greater liberty of will, and yet greater neceſſity. The holie Angels and bleſſed men in the celestiall life, euen by our aduerſaries owne confeſſion, are endued with greater libertie of will, than we are in this life. But they neceſſarily wil thoſe things onelie which are right and iust, and hate and abhorre all thinges whatſoeuer are euill and vniuſt; becauſe they are made ſuch of god, and ſo eſtabliſhed by him, and are ſo illuminated and guided by the holy ghoſt, that they cannot otherwiſe will or work: neither by this neceſſitie of willing thoſe thinges which are good and pleaſing to god, is the liberty of will taken away or diminiſhed in them, but rather is encreaſed, and confirmed, as who with al willingneſſe chooſe and doe thoſe thinges onelyonly which are iuſt.
Fourthly, It is ſhewed by many testimonies of ſcripture, Many paces of Scripture cōfirm the neceſſity of thoſe actions, the liberty of which yet both we and our adue…ries acknowledge.that the wils & voluntary actions of good and wicked men, which our aduerſaries mantaine to be and to hauehave beene free, and we alſo, according to the right meaning of this worde Libertie, do willinglie confeſſe, are ſo guided by the ſecret and vnchangeable purpoſe of god, that they neither can nor could either doe or be otherwiſe. Wherefore either ſo many manifeſt places of ſcripture muſt be denied, or openly corrupted; or it muſt be graunted, that one and the ſame action of the will is free & contingent in reſpect of the will, and neceſſary in reſpect of Gods gouernment.
Contingent effects leeſe not their contingencie by reaſon of any neceſſitie imported by Gods decree. The ſame is to be ſaide of the effectes of the will which are in reſpect therof contingent, that is, free, and might as well not bee doone as be done.Fiftly, it is declared by manie places of ſcripture, that all contigent effectes doe retaine their contingencie, which they hauehave from the nature of their cauſes, although they bee done by the vnchaungeable determination of the purpoſe or prouidence of God. But all voluntarie effectes or motions are contingent, in reſpect of the will, which by nature was like able to hauehave doone the plaine contrarie vntounto them. They therefore retaine their contingencie, that is, their libertie (for this is the contingencie of the actions of the will) although they be ſo determined of by gods wil, that there can be no other.
The reaſon of the Maior in this argument is, for that GOD ſo mooueth the ſecond cauſes, and by them bringeth to paſſe what hee will, that in the meane ſeaſon by his prouidence hee dooth not deſtroy or aboliſh their nature, which hee gaue them at their creation, but rather preſerueth, and nouriſheth it; ſo that as concerning their nature, ſome woorcke contingently, ſome neceſſarily, although in reſpect of the libertie of Gods purpoſe, all woorke contingently, and in reſpect of the vnchaungeableneſſe of his decreee, all woork neceſſarily ſo as they doe. For when GOD by the riſing of the Sunne lighteneth the woorlde, he maketh not the Sunne ſo, as if beeing riſen it did not neceſſarily lighten, or were apt by nature not to lighten: and yet is it in the power of God, either to chaunge the nature of the Sunne, or, that remaining as it is, not to lighten the woorlde: as hee ſhewed in Aegypt, and at the paſſion of Chriſt. In like manner, when the Quailes light at the Tentes of the Iſraelites, and the Rauens carrie meate to Elias, and one Sparrowe falleth on the ground, GOD doth not make the nature of theſe liuing creatures ſuch, as coulde not bee carried elſe-where: and yet that they can hauehave no other motion than that which they hauehave, by reaſon of the will of God interpoſed and comming betweene, the Scripture plainly affirmeth. Whereof it is manifeſt, that as in other thinges which work contingently, their contingency, ſo in the wil the liberty which is giuen it of God, is not taken away but rather preſerued by gods gouernment.
Nowe then, if our aduerſaries in their argument vnderſtand that Liberty which conſiſteth in the deliberation of the minde, and free aſſent of the wil, wee doe not onelyonly graunt, but alſo better mainetaine than they, the liberty of will in all actions thereof: and ſo the Maior of their argument ſhall bee falſe, to witte, that thoſe things which are done by the vnchaungeable decree of God, are not done by the free will of men and Angels. For this libertie the prouidence of God doth ſo not hinder but rather eſtabliſh and confirme, that without this that liberty cannot ſo much as be: for God both keepeth his order which he appointed at the creation by his perpetuall efficacy and operation, and doth inſpire into all by his vertue true notions and right election. But if they challenge a libertie vntounto the creatures depending of no other cauſe whereby it is guided, wee denie their whole argument, as knowing ſuch a liberty of creatures to ſtand againſt the whole Scripture, and that it only agreeth vntounto God. For him alone doe al things ſerue: In him we liue and moue, and hauehave our being: he giueth vntounto al not only life or power of mouing themſelues, but euen breathing too, that is, very mouing it ſelfe.
To the ſame tendeth this Obiection alſo. If the will, The will worketh togither with God, & is not mere paſſiue.when it is conuerted of GOD, or turned and inclined to other Obiectes, cannot with-stand; it is euen meere paſſiue, and ſo woorcketh not at all. But this conſequence deceiueth them, becauſe there is not a ſufficient enumeration, in the Antecedent, of thoſe actions which the will may hauehave, when it is mooued of GOD. For it is able not only to withſtand God mouing it, but alſo of it owne proper motion to aſſent and obey him. And when it doth this, it is not idle, neither doth it onelyonly ſuffer, or is mooued, but it ſelfe exerciſeth and mooueth her owne actions. And yet this is to bee vnderstoode of the actions of the wil, not of the new qualities or inclinations which it hath to obey God. For theſe the wil receiueth not by her owne operation, but by the working of the holy Ghoſt.
The will of man withſtanding the reueiled will of God is yet guided by his ſecret wil, & therefore reſiſting doth not reſiſt.Thirdly they ſay: That which withſtandeth the will of God, is not guided by it: But the will of men in manie actions withſtandeth the will of God: It is not therefore alwaies guided by the will of God. But the conſequence heere faileth, becauſe there are foure termes. For the Maior is true, if both the reuealed and the ſecret will of God bee vnderſtood, ſo that ſimplie and in all reſpects it bee withſtood, and that bee doone, which ſimply and by no meanes it would hauehave done: that which is impoſſible to come to paſſe, becauſe of the omnipotency and liberty of God. But in the Minor the will of God muſt bee vnderſtoode, as it is reuealed. For the ſecret decrees of Gods will and prouidence are euer ratified, and are perfourmed in all, euen in thoſe, who moſt of all withſtand Gods commandements. Neither yet are there contrarie wils in god. For nothing is found in his ſecret purpoſes which diſagreeth with his nature reuealed in his woord: And God openeth vntounto vsus in his Law, what he approueth and liketh, and what agreeth with his nature and the order of his mind: but he doth not promiſe or reueal, how much grace he wil or purpoſeth to giuegive to eueryevery one to obey his commandements.
God though the mouer of wicked wils, yet not the mouer of the wickednes of the wil….Fourthly, as touching this Obiection: If all motions euen of wicked willes are raiſed and ruled by the will of God, and manie of theſe diſagree from the Lawe of God, and are ſinnes: god ſeemeth to be made the cauſer of ſinnes: The aunſwere is, that it is a paralogiſme of the accident. For they diſagree from the law, not as they are ordained by, or proceed from the wil of god (for thus far they agree very wel with the iuſtice and Law of God) but as they are done by men, or Diuels: and that by reaſon of this defect; becauſe either they doe not know the will of god when they doe it, or are not moued by the ſight & knowledge therof to do it; that is, they doe it not to that end, that they maie obey God, who will ſo hauehave it. For whatſoeuer is doone to this ende, it diſagreeth not from the Lawe: ſeeing the Law doth not but with this condition either commaund or forbid any thing, if God hath not commanded a man to doe otherwiſe. So doth the Lawe of God forbidde to kill anie man, except whome God hath commaunded anie to kil. Who then killeth a man, God not commaunding it, hee out of doubt doth, and offendeth againſt the Lawe. Neither doth God diſſent from himſelfe or his law, when he wil hauehave ſome thing done either by his reueiled, or ſecret will, otherwiſe than according to the generall rule preſcribed by himſelfe in his Law. For hee hath ſuch endes and cauſes of all his purpoſes, as that they cannot but moſt exactlie agree with his nature and iuſtice.
Fifthly they obiect: Libertie which is guided of another can not be an image of that liberty which dependeth of no other, which is in god. But the liberty of mans will, is the image of the liberty, which is in god. Therefore the liberty of mans will dependeth not or is not guided by the will of god. We denie the Maior. For ſeeing that euerie thing which is like is not the ſame with that vntounto which it is like, to conceiue in ſome ſort the libertie of God, it is enough that reaſonable creatures doe woorke vponupon deliberation and free election of will, albeit this election in the creatures is both guided by themſelues and another, in God by no other than by his owne diuine wiſedome. The image of a thing is not the thing it ſelfe: and the inequality of degrees taketh not awaie the image, as neither the likeneſſe and ſimilitude of ſome partes taketh awaie the diſſimilitude of others. Wherefore the libertie of reaſonable creatures both is gouerned of God, and is notwithſtanding a certaine image of the libertie which is in God, becauſe it chooſeth thinges once knowen vntounto it by her own and free or voluntary motion. For as of other faculties or properties, ſo alſo of libertie it is impoſſible that the degrees ſhould bee equall in God and his creatures: whereas all thinges are infinite in God, and finite in his creatures. Seeing therefore wiſedome, righteouſneſſe, ſtrēgth, in the creatures is the image of the vnmeaſurable wiſedom, righteouſnes & power which is in god: a portion alſo of liberty agreeable and competent for the creatures may be the image of the liberty which is in God.
The will is not idle or mere paſſiue when God worketh by it, no more than the ſun, raine and ſuch like inſtrumentes of Gods operation.Sixtly, they ſay, If the creature cannot but doe that which God wil hauehave done, and cannot do, what god will not hauehave done, the wil hath no actiue force, but is wholy paſſiue, eſpecially in our conuerſion, which is the work of god: Likewiſe there is no vſe of laws, doctrine, diſcipline, exhortation, threatnings, puniſhments, examples, promiſes, and laſtly of our ſtudy and endeuour. Wee denie the conſequence: Becauſe the firſt or principal cauſe beeing put, the ſecond or inſtrumentall cauſe is not thereby taken away. For as god lightneth the world, & doth quicken the earth, bringeth foorth corne, nouriſheth liuing creatures, & yet are not the inſtruments of gods working idle, as the ſun, the raine, the earth, husbandmen, & food: So god conuerteth men, ruleth their purpoſes, wils, & actions, that is, teacheth & moueth them to approue & chuſe what he wil, by laws, by magiſtrats, by doctrine, by rewards, by puniſhments, and laſtly by their owne wil, which al he vſeth as inſtruments, not as if he could not without theſe illighten the mind with notions, and incline the wil: but becauſe it ſo ſeemeeh good to him to exerciſe his power by theſe.
Albeit God was able to hauehave wrought what he would without the will, yet becauſe he will worke by the wil, the working of the will is not in vaine.If they reply, That that wold neceſſarily come to paſſe ſo, which is don, & euen without them, & therefore they are in vain vſed: we deny the antecedent. For although god were able to moue mens wils without theſe, and if he had ſo decreed to doe, men doubtles ſhould doe without theſe, what now they do beeing mooued by theſe: yet whereas god hath once ſo decreed the effects, as he hath alſo appointed their ſecōd inſtrumentall and impulſiue cauſes: that verily ſhal be doone which god wil hauehave done, but yet not without middle and ſecond cauſes, by whoſe means and working comming betweene and interpoſed, god wil bring his purpoſes and decrees to paſſe. Luk. 11. Hee wil giuegive his holy ſpirite to thoſe who aske him. Rom. 8.10. Whom he hath predeſtinated, them hath he alſo called. If they reply again: Although it be grāted that theſe are not in vaine in thoſe in whom god wil ſhew his force and be effectual by them: yet in others who are not moued by them, ther is no vſe of them: we anſwere, 1. Although there were no vſe: yet becauſe that is not knowen vntounto vsus, whom god wil mooue, or not moue, we are to labour in teaching and vrging all, and to commit the euent and fruit of our labour to God, 2. Tim. 4. Preach the word, bee inſtant in ſeaſon &c. Ezech. 3. If thou warn the wicked, & he turne not from his wickednes, he ſhall die in his iniquitie, but thou haſt deliuered thy ſoule. Secondly we aunſwere, the conſequence followeth not from the denial of one particular, to the denial of the generall, or from a not ſufficient enumeration. For although many obey not teaching & admonitions, neither are moued with rewards and puniſhments: yet this vſe is great, that by this meanes their naughtines and ſtubbornnes is opened, and ſo the iuſtice of God made more manifeſt in their puniſhment: Ioh. 15. If I had not done workes among them which none other man did, they had not had ſinne. Rom. 1. God hath ſhewed it vntounto them, to the intent, that they might be without excuſe. 2. Cor. 2. We are to God the ſweete ſauour of Chriſt in them that are ſaued, and them who periſh. Seauenthly: Heb. 9. Externall Diſcipline is called the righteouſnes of the fleſh: Therefore it dependeth on mans will. The conſequence of this reaſon is to bee denied, which doth not holde from the poſition or putting of the ſecond cauſe, to the remouing of the firſt cauſe. For as it foloweth not, the Sun cauſeth day, therefore God doth not: ſo neither doth this folow: the vnregenerate performe outwarde Diſcipline, therefore they doe it, god not cauſing it in them nor ruling and directing them.
8 Obiection. They alleage teſtimonies alſo,How the ſcriptures admit libertie of will. which confirme that men doe euill or good with freewill. As Exod. 35. The children of Iſraell offered free gifts vntounto the Lord. Deut. 30. I hauehave ſet before thee life & death, good & euil, bleſſing & curſing: therefore chooſe life, that both thou and thy ſeed may liue. But in theſe & al the like places only that liberty of mans will is affirmed, which hath beene ſpoken of before, that is, that the will obeieth or withſtandeth the precedent iudgemēt of the vnderſtanding with free and voluntarie motion without any conſtraint: but the gouernement of god is not at all remoued from voluntarie actions. For it was ſhewed before, that this liberty of will doth not ſtand againſt that neceſſitie which by the prouidence of God doth accompanie it.
9 Obiect.What neceſſitie the ſcripture remoueth from voluntarie actions. They bring forth teſtimonies alſo in which neceſſitie is remoued & taken away from voluntarie actions. Leuit. 22. Of theſe ye ſhal offer willingly. Act. 5. Whils it remained, appertained it not to thee? And after it was ſolde, was it not in thine owne power? 1. Cor. 7. verſ. 37. Hee that ſtandeth firme in his hart, that hee hath no neceſſitie, but hath power ouer his owne will &c. 2. Cor. 9. As eueryevery man wiſheth in his heart, ſo let him giuegive. 1. Pet. 5. Feede the flocke of God, caring for it not by conſtraint, but willingly. But theſe ſayinges ſpeake of obligation or binding, which ſomtimes is ſignified by the name of neceſſity, as the freeing from any bond by the name of libertie; as Leuit. 22. Act. 5. partly of coaction, or conſtraint, as 2. Cor. 9. and 1. Pet. 5. or alſo of neede, as 1. Cor. 7. which yet may be referred to obligation or bonde, by which the Parentes are bounde to hauehave regard of the infirmitie of their children. So alſo the power of will in the ſame place ſignifieth the right or power of determining any thing, no obligation or bond hindering it. But the remouing of any obligation or coaction doth not at all take away the vnchaungeablenes of voluntary actions, which vnchangeablenes hangeth on the decree of God. For as well his will, who is not bound, neither by any neede or want conſtrained, is guided and moued by the purpoſe and counſell of Gods prouidence; as his whom either bond or neede conſtraineth to reſolue of any purpoſe. Wherefore the ſcripture denieth not, that the will is moued and ruled by God, when it is not driuen by bonde or want or feare to doe any thing: for there are beſides theſe many other reaſons and cauſes by which God can moue it either to will or not to will.
How in ſcriptures God is ſaid not to will that which yet he will.10 Obiection. They bring places of ſcripture, which teſtifie that men will or doe ſomewhat, God bidding and willing otherwiſe. Ierem 7. Becauſe I hauehave called you, and ye hauehave not anſwered, I will doe vntounto this houſe, as I hauehave done to Sylo. Mat. 23. Hieruſalem, Hieruſalem, how often would I hauehave gathered thy children, euen as the hen gathereth her chickens vnderunder her winges, and ye would not? If then they did that, which God would not; their actions did depend onelyonly of their owne will, and not of Gods. Anwere. It is a fallacie concluding that which is in ſome ſort ſo, to be in all reſpects and ſimply ſo. For God will not the actions of ſinners, as they are ſinnes: But hee wil them, as they are puniſhmentes of ſinnes, and the execution of his iuſt iudgement. Wherefore this conſequence holdeth not: God will not the actions of the wicked, as they are ſins. Therefore ſimply he will not hauehave them to be done, but they depend onelyonly on the will of the wicked. For if God ſimply would them not, they could by no meanes be done. And except there were ſomewhat in them, which did agree with his iuſtice and nature: he would not by reaſon of his goodnes infinite and paſſing meaſure ſuffer them to be done.
If they reply, That God woulde thinges contrarie to thoſe which men doe, as it is ſaide, How often woulde I hauehave gathered thee, and therefore it is done onelyonly by the will of men, whatſoeuer men doe, the ſame anſwere ſerueth: that God would the obedience of all his reaſonable creatures towardes his lawe as concerning his commanding and approouing it. For he requireth it of all, and bindeth all to it, and approoueth it in all, as being agreeable to his nature and puritie: but neither will he alwaies it, nor in all, as concerning his working and grace, whereby they who are directed and guided doe that which God approoueth and requireth. Deut. 29. The Lord hath not giuen you an heart to perceiue, and eies to ſee, and eares to heare, vntounto this day.