The Sum of Christian Religion 2, Part 1 · Subpart 6 · Section 1 – Section 2
1 Of the word, Liberty.
Libertie from bond & miſery.THere is one kind of liberty from bond and miſery. And this ſignifieth a relation or reſpect, that is the power or right, or ordering either of perſon or thing, made either by ones wil or by nature, to deale at his owne arbiterment or motion according to honeſt Lawes, or order agreeable to his nature, and to enioy commodities conuenient for him without inhibition or impediment, & not to ſuſtaine the defects & burdens or encomberances which are not proper to his nature. So is God moſt free, becauſe he is bound to no man. So the Romanes and the Iewes were free, that is, ſtoode not charged with ſuch gouernementes & burdens, which a mā might want without any ſwaruing from iuſtice. So are we made free by Chriſt from the anger of God, and euerlaſting death, & leuitical ceremonies. So a Citie, field, houſe is free from ſeruitude, danger, or any burden. So a birde is free in the aire. Wherefore vnderunder libertie in this ſenſe is comprehended, as a ſpecial vnderunder his generall, ciuill libertie, which is a right or ability for a man to doe and diſpoſe of himſelfe and his affaires at his owne pleaſure, according to honeſt and good lawes. Wherefore this libertie is oppoſed to bondage and ſeruitude. Of this there is no queſtion in this place: becauſe it is a greed vponupon, that we are all the ſeruantes of God; for we are all obliged by his Lawe, either to obey him, or to ſuffer puniſhment, if we do not obey: neither is it put in our wil or pleaſure, to obey, or not to obey; to ſuffer, or not to ſuffer puniſhment. For our will, will many things freely, the liberty of performing whereof notwithſtanding wee hauehave not, either ſome prohibition, or other impediment hindering vsus from it.
2 What is the liberty of will.
THere is another libertie, of will, which is a power, right, or ability proper vntounto a reaſonable nature, to will any thing, to chooſe or refuſe any obiect, repreſented vntounto it by the vnderſtanding, and to mooue it ſelfe (by an internall cauſe of motion, that is, which hath in it ſelfe a cauſe of moouing it ſelfe) by her owne proper motion, (beeing apt to will or not to will, and beeing without an externall cauſe) without anie constraint or violent impulſion from any external cauſe, the nature of the wil remaining still entire and free to doe this or that, or alſo to ſuſpend, forbear and differre any action. Theſe ſixe thinges therefore concurre to conſtitute and make the libertie of wil.
1 An obiect, whether that be any end propoſed, Six things required to liberty of will.which ſtill is conſidered as good, or the meanes, whereby the end is come vntounto. 2. The mind knowing and vnderstanding the obiect. 3. The will alike and equally apt to chooſe or refuſe the obiect repreſented vntounto it. 4. The will dooing one of the two vponupon former deliberation. 5. Doing it of her ſelfe, or hauing the cauſe and beginning of her motion internall and without her: and this is to doe by her owne and proper motion. 6. Not being conſtrained by any external agent.
Furthermore, that which is endewed with this facultie or abilitie, is called free, that is, dooing as it ſelfe will without conſtraint. For that is ſaide to bee a free agent, What is ſaid to be a free agent.which, whether it bee mooued of it ſelfe onelyonly, or alſo of ſome externall cauſe, yet notwithſtanding hath ſuch an internall cauſe of the action which proceedeth from it, as thereby both it is apt to this motion; and it ſelfe moueth while it is moued, that is, is moued by an inward cauſe to doe after this or that manner, ſuffering no force or conſtraint thereto of anie externall agent. Wherefore an agent doeth not ceaſe to bee free and voluntarie, albeit it bee mooued of an externall cauſe, ſo as it bee not conſtrained, and hauehave in it ſelfe not onelie a Paſſiue, but alſo an Actiue Originall and cauſe of the action which it woorketh. Nowe that which is voluntary is oppoſed to that which is violent or conſtrained, That which is voluntarie may be neceſſary but not conſtrained. Neceſſarie is more general than conſtrained, & therfore agreeth to more than doth Conſtrainedbut not to that which is neceſſary. For God and the bleſſed Angels are neceſſarily and alwaies good, yet not conſtrainedly, but with moſt free will. For that is ſaid to be conſtrained, which hath only an externall beginning and cauſe of motion, and not alſo an internal, wherby it may alſo moue it ſelfe to do on this or that manner. Wherefore the difference betweene conſtrained and neceſſary is to be obſerued, as alſo between contingent, and free. Conſtrained is in reſpect of neceſſary, as a ſpecial in reſpect of his general. For whatſoeuer is cōſtrained is neceſſary, but not whatſoeuer is neceſſary is conſtrained. So*Contingēcie is oppoſed to Neceſſitie: and thoſe things are ſaide to be done contingently, which are not neceſſarily don, but might in reſpect of their owne nature as well not hauehave beene doone Contingent in reſpect of free is as a generall in reſpect of his ſpeciall. For whatſoeuer is free is contingēt, but not al that is contingent is free. And as that which is conſtrained may be alſo contingent, but cannot bee either free or voluntary: So that which is neceſſary may be voluntary, or free: & contrariwiſe, that which is voluntary may be neceſſarie, but cannot be conſtrained.
Moreouer free Arbiterment differeth from the libertie or freedome of will. Arbiterment is as the*The concrete is that which ſignifieth the ſubiect together with ſome accident or qualitie or eſſence in the ſubiect: As arbiterment ſignifieth not wil only, which is the ſubiect, but wil chooſing or refuſing, which is an accident of the will. The abſtract is the accident or quality or eſſēce in it ſelfe, which doth not withall in ſignification implie the ſubiect. concrete, & ſignifieth the will it ſelfe, but, as it chuſeth or refuſeth a thing, the iudgement of the vnderſtanding going before. Wherefore it comprehendeth both faculties or powers, to witte, both the iudgement of the minde or vnderſtanding of the obiect, and the will either receiuing or refuſing it. Nowe freeneſſe or libertie is as it were the abſtract, that is, the qualitie or maner of doing, proper vntounto the will. Free arbiterment therefore is a facultie or power of receiuing or refuſing, (without constraint, by proper motion & aptitude to either part) that which the vnderſtanding aduiſeth to bee choſen or refuſed. Or, it is the iudgement it ſelfe and wil in a creature endewed with reaſon, chooſing or refuſing any obiect repreſented vntounto it by the vnderſtanding. And this faculty or power of the ſoul is called Arbiterment, in reſpect of the mind, ſhewing vntounto the will an obiect to be choſen or refuſed: And it is called free in reſpect of the will. 1. Becauſe the will doth of her owne accorde followe the iudgement of the mind and vnderſtanding. 2. Becauſe it is by nature equallie fit to receiue or refuſe. 3. Becauſe it mooueth it ſelfe by her owne proper motion, either hauing within it ſelfe, or rather being it ſelfe the beginning and cauſe of her own motion, to chooſe or refuſe any thing that is obiect vntounto it. 4. Becauſe in this election or reiection it ſuffereth no impediment, and no force or conſtraint of anie externall agent, whether that bee God, or the diuel, or men, or anie thing elſe whatſoeuer.
And this is it, which they ſay, to do any thing vponupon deliberation or aduiſement going before. which manner of dooing is proper vntounto the will. For this is the difference betweene a nature agent, and a voluntarie; The difference betweene a naturall agent and a voluntarie.that the naturall cauſe is ordained or appointed, or fit and apt to one certaine manner of woorking, neither can it forbeare working, if the obiect be preſent whereon it ſhould woorke: as fire cannot but burne a bodie put vntounto it, if it bee of ſuch matter as wil take fire. But the will is able and apt to chooſe or refuſe contrarie or diuers obiects, or to forbeare and differ the choiſe thereof: as a man may hauehave a will to walke, or not to walke, or may differ his wil of walking. To doe therefore anie thing with free arbiterment and will, is, to doe vponupon a fore-deliberation, according to the will of god, ſometimes ſimplie, and ſometimes in ſome reſpect onelie: and againſt it alſo ſometimes in ſome reſpect, but neuer ſimplie againſt it. For the libertie of woorking is not taken away in any creature, if God be ſaid ſo to rule & bend their wills, that they be not inclined any other way than whither god will hauehave them inclined, either ſimply or in ſome ſort. But free arbiterment is a faculty or power of working vponupon deliberation, and without conſtraint, or rather the very wil it ſelfe ſo woorking.
Wherefore if the name of free arbiterment be ſo taken & expounded, as hath beene ſaid;The name of free arbitermēt may be tolerated in the Church, though it be not vſed in the ſcriptures. albeit it be not vſed in the Scriptures, yet maie it be tolerated & borne-with: becauſe both the deſcription thereof, ſuch as was euen nowe deliuered, agreeeth with the Scripture, and the auncient writers hauehave alſo vſed the ſame name. But if it be taken for ſuch a will of free working, which excludeth all action and woorking of the firſt cauſe guiding, inuiting, and bending the creatures wils, whither it ſelfe liſteth, ſuch a free arbiterment cannot bee admitted. For example ſake: Abimelecke abſtaining from Rebecca, and the Iewes crucifieng Chriſt, both did it with free arbiterment: becauſe thoſe forealeaged conditions, which make free arbiterment, did agree vntounto both: neither yet could they at that preſent doe otherwiſe than they did, God ſo guiding & directing the ir wils.