The Sum of Christian Religion 2, Part 1 · Subpart 6 · Section 4
4 Whether there be anie libertie in vsus, and what it is.
THat there is libertie of will in men, it is proued, 1.Gen 1.26. Eccl. 15.14. & 15. Becauſe man was made to the image of God. And free-will is part of the image of God. 2. By places of ſcripture. Let vsus make man in our image, according to our likenes. God made man from the beginning, and left man in the hand of his counſel. 3. By the definition of that libertie, which agreeth to man. For man worketh vponupon deliberatiō, that is, freely, knowing, deſiring, and refuſing this or that obiect. And becauſe the definition agreeth vntounto man: therefore alſo doth the thing which is defined agree vntounto him.
1 Obiect. If there be in man libertie of will, The doctrine of Originall ſinne not ouerthrowen by that libertie which we hold to be in man.the doctrine of original ſinne is ouerthrowen: for theſe are contrarie, not to be able to obey God, and to hauehave libertie of will. Aunſwere. They are not contrarie: becauſe we hauehave libertie to wil and do good, onelyonly in part, to wit, as we are regenerated by the holy ſpirite, but not in whole, and full, neither in that degree, in which before the fall we had it, and ſhall hauehave it in the life to come. Againe, although the vnregenerate are onelyonly able to wil thoſe thinges which are euil; yet they will them vponupon deliberation, without conſtraint, euen by their owne proper and inward motion: and therefore freely.
Abilitie to chooſe as well good as bad, is not neceſſarily ioined with free-will.2 Obiect. He that hath not ability to chooſe as well good as bad, hath not free will and arbiterment, But man hath not ability to chooſe as well good as euil. Therefore he hath not free will. Anſw. The Maior conſiſteth of a bad definition of free will. For the liberty of reaſonable creatures conſiſteth in the iudgement and deliberation of the mind or vnderſtanding, and in the free aſſent of the will, not in a power to will as well good as euill, or contrarie. The good Angels by reaſon of the wiſedome and rightnes of their iudgement, and of the great and conſtant propenſion or readineſſe of their will to that, which they knowe to bee good and right, cannot will euill and vniuſt thinges, but onelyonly thinges good and honeſt; and yet notwithſtanding they moſt freely chooſe and doe thoſe thinges which are iuſt. Right ſo, men by reaſon of their inbred ignoraunce, and corrupt iudgement of thoſe thinges which are to be done, and of the ende, as alſo by reaſon of the ſtubbornnes and frowardnes of their will, can will onelyonly thoſe thinges which are euill: which alſo they followe and purſue with exceeding willingnes and pleaſure, vntill they are regenerated by Gods ſpirite.
3 Obiection. That is free, which is ruled of none other but of it ſelfe onelyonly; The will of man is ſeruant to ſin, and yet inclineth to ſinne freely.or which is bound to none. Mens will is not ruled of it ſelfe onelyonly, but of another, and is bound to the law: therefore it is not free. Aunſwere. The Maior is true, if it bee meant of that libertie which is in God, but falſe being meant of mans libertie. For, man to be ruled of none, is not libertie, but a ſhamefull barbaritie, and a wretched ſlauerie. But the true libertie of the creature is, to bee ſubiect vntounto honeſt and iuſt lawes, and to obey them: It is a power of liuing as thou wilt, according vntounto the law of God.
4 Obiection. That which is a ſeruaunt and in bondage is not free. But our will is a ſeruaunt and in bondage. Therefore our will is not free. Aunſwere. There is an ambiguity in this reaſon, or it affirmeth that to bee ſimplie ſo, which is but in ſome reſpect & ſort ſo; or the concluſion fetcheth in more, than was in the premiſſes. That which is in bondage, is not free, that is, not in that reſpect or conſideration, as it is in bondage. Our arbiterment or will is in bondage, to wit, vnderunder ſinne. Therefore it is not free, that is, from ſinne, which it is not able to ſhake off by any force which it ſelf hath, except it bee freed and deliuered by the grace of God. But hereof it foloweth not: therefore ſimply no way it is free. For it is free, as touching the obiects repreſented vntounto it by the vnderſtanding: becauſe it chooſeth or refuſeth them being once knowen, or ſuſpendeth and forbeareth her action, by her owne and proper motion, without conſtraint. The ſumme of all is: We graunt the concluſion, if free bee taken for that, which hath abilitie to do thoſe things which are good and pleaſing to God: for ſo farre is it in ſeruitude vnderunder ſinne, and hath power onelyonly to ſinne: but wee denie the whole, if free bee taken for voluntarie, or deliberatiue, which chooſeth the obiectes repreſented vntounto it by voluntarie motion, not conſtrained or forced thereto by any externall agent.