Discovery of Jacksons Vanity, Section 1 · Chapter 1
CHAP. I.
YOVR first Argument is not like to strike your enimye with any great feare or despayre. Arguments weake or weakely prosecuted, weakneth the cause maynteyned, strengthenethe the cause oppugned. And first it is not handsomly caryed, thus If every particular generation hath causes, then all generations have some cause; implyinge that every generation hath many causes; all have but one. But cary it howe you will, it is not capable of any sound inference. It is true, Every generation hath his cause: therfore all generations have causes; But what causes? only the same causes, which every one hathe a part, aggregated together. For as you make an aggregation of particular generations; so the cause of this aggregation, inferred, can be but an aggregation of the particular causes of particular generations. So that nothing at all is concluded here hence distinct from the praemises, much lesse the being of the Godhead herby evidenced. Then your second inference is as wilde, when you adde, Otherwise all shoulde not be of one kinde or nature. For there is no congruity in affirming the whole by aggregation, to be of the same kinde or nature with every particular. For every particular is unum per se consistinge ex actu & potentia; But the whole by aggregation is unum per accidens, consisting of many particulars (each wherof is unum per se) heaped together, not by any naturall union vnited into one. As we doe not say the bushel of corne is of the same kinde with every particular grayne, as allso it cannot be sayde to be of a diverse kinde in any congruitie, allthough there were diverse kindes of graynes therin; But rather an heape of graynes, whether of the same kinde, or of diverse kindes. Agayne you propose your argument, not only of the generation of Man, who is of one kinde, but of all generable bodies, who are well knowne to be of diverse kindes, & therfore why should you accoumpt it any absurdity, for all these to be not of one kinde or nature? Furthermore, when you make shewe of such an Inference as this, All must have some cause, otherwise they be not of one kinde or nature, you doe herby imply, that All, that have some cause, are in a fayre way to be of the same kinde or nature, which upon consideration you will finde to be utterly untrue. For all creatures have some cause, yet are they not any thing the more of one kinde or nature; Allthoughe they have not only some cause, but the same cause allso, namely God. Like as though thinges have different causes, yet it followeth not that they are of different kindes: As all mise are of the same kinde, though some are bred equivocally, some univocally; so of lise and diverse others. For although Averroes were of opinion, that mise bred equivocally, & mise bred univocally, by generation were of different kindes, & therupon maynteyned that such as were bred equivocall, did never propagate their like by generation; yet I doe not thinke you are of that opinion, it being contrary to manifest experience. And to us it is manifest (who believe the creation) that the first creatures were not produced by way of generation, yet did propagate their like, & were of the same kinde with creatures propagated from them. But Averroes was an Atheist even amongst Arabians, & denyed all creation. I am sory, you are so unhappy in defend…nge truthe, especially such a truthe as the being of God; but th… best is, that truthe needethe no mans defense. I hope you will proove nothing more happy in defending errours. Yet I deny not, but that the greatest Divines doe conclude that there is a first cause (that is God) because the progresse from effects to causes, & from causes inf…rior to causes superior cannot be infinite. According wherunto your argument should… have proceeded thus. In generations, as of th… Sonne by the Father, the progresse upwardes cannot be infinite. Therfore at lengthe, we must ascend to th… first of Men, as Adam, who was not borne by generation of Man; (for then he had not bene th… first) but otherwise; and in like sort of the generations of all other thinges, that they had their beginninge from some superior cause, to their owne natures; which supreame cause of all, we accoumpt to be God. But yet I thinke you are not ignorant, that some Schoolemen maynteyne the world might have bene everlastinge, and that by creation; in which case there shoulde be an infinite progress… in generations; unles as Aquinas in his reconciliation of seeminge contradictions in Aristotle, In Opusculis.to praevent an infinite number of immortall soules hence ensuinge devisethe, that thoughe the World had bene from everlastinge, yet shoulde it not be necessary that there shoulde have bene an infinite number of Men deceased, because saythe he, God coulde have praeserved the first Man from generation, & propagation of his like, untill some five or sixe thousand yeares agoe: so you shoulde take some such course to praevent an infinite progresse in naturall generations. But I meane not to put you to any such shifts. For I holde creation from everlastinge, to be a thing impossible, and that the impossibility therof, may be made evident by demonstration; and accordingly that fiction of Aquinas before mentioned, to be of a thing merely impossible allso. So that in fine, this argument of yours, though with litle accuratenes proposed by you, is drawne from the creation; which kinde of argumentation in the Praeface you seemed to put of, till another time, yet in the first place you have fallen upon it, ere you are aware. Bradwardine writinge against the Pelagians, layethe downe two suppositions as the ground of all, wherof Summa de causa Dei, contra Pelagium. Nullus est processus insinitus in Entibus. Deus est summ. perfectus & summ. bonus, tantum quod nihil perfectius vel melius esse potest.this is the second, that there is no infinite progresse in entities; but that in every kinde there is one supreame. The other is that God is most perfect and good in such sort as nothing can be more. And least he should seeme to suppose this without all proofe, one argument & but one he produceth to prove this. And the proofe is to this effect: It implyeth no contradiction to say, such a one there is; therfore it is necessary, that such a one have beinge, & it is impossible there shoulde be no God. If any Man deniethe the Antecedent, it behooveth him to shewe, wherin the contradiction dothe consist. And it is very strange, & so strange as incredible, that for the best nature to have existence, it shoulde imply contadiction. As for example, we finde these manifest capitall degrees of perfection amongst entities corporall. Some liave only beinge, some have beinge & life allso; some have beinge, life, and sence; some unto all these adde reason allso. Nowe that nature which includes bothe being & life, is of greater perfection, then such, as have beinge without life, and it is no contradiction for such natures to exist. Agayne that nature which includes bothe beinge, life, and sense, is of greater perfection, then that, which includes only beinge and life, without sense, and it is no contradiction for natures of such perfection to exist. Agayne, that nature which besides all these, in the notion therof includes reason allso, is of farre greater perfection then the former, and it implyeth no contradiction, for natures of such perfection to exist… Lastly, there are besides all these, natures purely spirituall, which we call Angells or Intelligences, of farre greater perfection, then natures materiall & corporall, & it implyethe no contradiction, for natures of such perfection to exist, as the Philosopher hathe demonstrated the existence of such substances abstract from all materiall concretion: Why then shoulde it imply any contradiction, for a nature of greater perfection then all these to exist, unles they are supposed to be of greatest perfection, even able to make a World out of nothinge; and consequently to be of a necessary beinge themselves. For if possible not to be, howe is it possible, they shoulde atteyne to beinge? Not of themselves; For that which is not, hathe no power to give being to it selfe. Nor of any other; whether of a nature superior or inferior. Not of any of inferior nature. For a Man cannot possibly produce an Angell, neyther by generation, nor by creation. If by a superior; this is to acknowledge, that there is a nature existent superior in perfection, unto Angells. And if Angells had a necessary being; then seinge they are of a certeyne number, their number allso must be necessary; Nowe if it implyeth no contradiction, that God shoulde be, it is most necessary, that he is and must necessarily be granted, that he is. For being supposed to include greatest perfection, if he had no being, it were impossible he shoulde have beinge; seing nothinge can bring it selfe from, nothinge to beinge, neyther can ought els produce him. For if any thinge coulde, then that, whatsoever it were, shoulde be of greater perfection then he. This is the argument of Bradwardin. And the same was the argument of Aquinas long before, and but one of the five wayes, which he takes in the proofe of this. The first way & more manifest, as he Aquin. 1. qu. 2. art. 3saythe, is that which is taken from the consideration of motion; wher hence he concludethe that we must at lengthe ascend to one who moovethe, and is not mooved, & that is the first moover, which (saythe he) all understand to be God. The second is drawne from consideration of the nature of the cause efficient. For (saythe he) we finde even in insensible thinges an order of efficient causes, one subordinate to another, wherin he supposethe there cannot be an infinito progresse; & secondly, that nothing can be the efficient cause of itselfe. Hence it followeth (saythe he) we must ascend & rest in one supreame efficient, which acknowledgethe no efficient of it, and that all understand to be God. The third way is that, which hathe bene allready prosecuted, from the consideration & comparison of thinges possible, with thinges necessary. The fourthe is from the degrees that we finde in thinges, as some thinges are more or lesse true, more or lesse good, more or lesse noble; whence he concludes, that somethinge must be acknowledged to be most true, most good, most noble, & that to be the cause of truthe, goodnes, & perfection in all others, as fire is the cause of all heate. And that which is the cause of all others, we acknowledge to be God. The first and lastis drawne from the governement of the World, & the consideration of the order of thinges amongst themselves; whence he concludethe, there is some thinge that orderethe them, and that must be God.
This last argument is, that which Raymund Sebond dothe In his Theologia naturalis. In Prologo.so much dilate & insist upon. And wherof he is very confident, like as of the successe of his undertakings in generall; as namely to make a Man a perfect Divine, within the space of a monthe; and that without any knowledge to prepare him, so much as the knowledge of Grammar, & yet he shall not be proud of it neyther.
Vasquius further telleth us, that Aegidius was of opinion, Vasq. in 1. disp. 20. cap. 3.that this truthe, that there is a God, is a truthe knowne of it selfe. And albeit Thomas Aquinas denyethe it to be a truthe per se notam quoad nos; Yet in it selfe he professethe that it is Aquin. 1. q. 2. art. 3.per se nota for as much as the predicate is included in the very nature of the subject. And to my judgement it seemes allso to be so quoad nos, if it be duly consid…red & pondered what we understand by God, to witt the most perfect nature of all others. Nowe howe is it possible, that that which is more p…rfect then all others, shoulde not have beinge? And every man knowes that, that which hathe beinge, is more perfect, then that which neyther hathe, nor can have beinge, (such as is the nature of God, if it have no beinge.) For according to the Proverbe, a live Dogge is better then a dead Lyon.
In the next place you inquire, wherunto you shall liken him? This indeede was the second thinge you proposed to be inquired into. But in what congruitie to a Philosophicall, or Theological discourse, I leave it to others to examine. I will be content to summe up the accoumpt of what you deliver, rather then to argue the unseasonablenes of such a discourse. Thoughe nothing can exactly resemble him, yet som… thinge, (you say) can better notify howe farre he is beyond all resemblance, then others. But truly, what you meane herby is a mystery unto me. I shoulde rather thinke, the incomprehensible nature of God is not to be manifested by way of resemblance, drawne from inferior thinges. That he is the cause of all thinges dothe better represent the nature of God, then the resemblance of him to any thinge; especially consideringe, what cause he is, to witt an …fficient cause of all thinges, and that not univocall but equivocall; & consequently such as comprehendes all thinges eminently, but in perfection without comparison beyond them. For comparison hathe place only betweene things agreeinge in kinde, or in proportion. But God and his creatures agree in neyther. This I confesse may drawe to admiration. As the Philosopher, who beinge demaunded what God was, required three dayes libertie, to put in his answeare; and at three dayes ende, required three more, & at the ende of these, three dayes more, giving this reason of his reiterated demurring upon the matter; because the more he gave himselfe to th… contemplation of the nature of God, the farther he found… himselfe of from comprehendinge it, but wheras you adde, that such admiration will more & more enlarge our longinge after his presence: I doe no way like eyther your collection, or the phrase, wherby you expresse it. For as for the presence of God; of the very apprehension therof we are not capable in this World, but by faithe. Neyther can any naturall admiration arising from naturall inquisition after the nature of God, & consideration of the fruiteles issue therof, drawe men to a longing after that presence of God which they knowe not. Bothe the knowledge of the presence of God, and a longinge desire after it, I take to be a woorke of speciall grace, and not any woorke of nature; upon the power wherof I finde you doa…e too much in all your writings.
Painters (you say) can more exactly expresse, the outward lineaments of thinges, then we their natures. Painters expressions are in colours; our expressions are not so, but rather in woordes. And what a wilde comparison is it, to compare thinges so heterogeneall in exactnes. But though the expression of the one fayle in exactnes, in comparison of the other, yet the delight taken therin (you say) needes not: And thus you plot to make the love of God a woorke of nature, wherunto the naturall conceptions of him, though nothing exact, by meanes of the creature may leade us. These conceptions of yours, are in my judgement as farre from truthe, as from pietie. The frequent ebbes & flowings of Euripus, may cast a Philosopher into admiration, not comprehending the reason of it, yet bringe him nothing the more in love with it. Angells are of very glorious natures, & in a manner quite out of the reach of our reason, bothe touching their being in place, their motion, their understandinge, & the communicatinge of their thoughts, & exercising of their power; yet all this bringeth us never a whit the more in love with them. Impressions of love are wrought only by the apprehension of goodnes in the object, which alone makes thinges amiable; as a beautifull picture affecteth the sense with pleasure and delight. But nowe I finde, that from the impression of love, you slip I knowe not howe, to the impression of truthe: & this I confesse, delightethe some mindes of purer metall; as Aristotle speakes of the delight that a Man takes, in the demonstration, wherby it is prooved, that the Diameter in a squate, hathe no common dimension with the sides of it, or that a triangle hathe three angles equall to two right. Especially if the conclusion be rare & long sought after but not founde, as the squaring of a circle receaved as knowable in Aristotles dayes, thoughe not knowne till of late, as Pancirolla writes & Salmuly in his commentaries upon him, about 30. yeares before that time. Yet some speculations may be as vayne as curious: as to proove, that two Men in the World there are, that have iust so many hayres on their head one as another. But to make a rayne bowe in the ayre, & by ocular demonstration proove the truthe of that which reason concludes, namely that as often as a raynbowe appeares in the cloudes, though it seeme but one, yet indeede there are as many, as there are Men that beholde it, because it discoverethe a secret of nature, very curious and nothing vayne. For it is the glory of God to hide a thinge, and it is Prov. 25. 1.the glory of a Kinge to finde it out. And seeinge God hathe Eccle. 3. 11.set the World in Mans heart, thoughe a Man cannot finde out the woorke that God hath wrought from the beginninge to the ende; yet it is good to be doinge, & to discover as much as we can, especially such as have a calling herunto. But to proceede, you put your Reader in hope of great matters by your perfourmances, namely to have a sight of some scattered rayes, of a glorious light, which Saints have in blessednes; and to this purpose to elevate us, to a certeyne Horizon, whose edges and skirts shall discover this. Thus you phrasify the matter gloriously, & prosecute your allegory in allusion to the brightnes that appeares in our Horizon after the Sunne set. But surely that Sunne did never yet rise upon us, and when it dothe, surely it shall never sett. And I much doubt, least the glory of your phrases proove to be all the glory we are like to be acquainted with before we part.
Hence you proceede to a rule of Decorum in all resemblances, that so you may make way to betray your learninge in Hieronymus Vida his Poetry, passinge his censure upon a comparison of Homer, wherin he compares Ajax retiringe from the Troians unto an hards kinned asse, driven with batts or staves out of a corne fielde, by a company of children. The comparison is justified by Vida, but thought not fitt to be applyed in like sort unto Turnus, unles a Lyon be put in the place of the asse, in the judgement of those courtly times wherin Virgill lived, therby desiring belike to justify Virgill allso. I still attend, when those scattered rayes you promised us, of that glorious light, you spake of, will breake foorthe; But it may be, we are not yet come to the Horizon, whose edges and skirts alone can discover them. But yet to stay our stomachs you tell us by the way; that the Holy Prophets in their courtly Decorum observed in framinge comparisons, are nothing inferior to any Poet, though as good as Virgill & Homer allso. They are something beholden unto you, for your good woord. Your instance is out of Esay 31. 4. Like as the Lyon & yong Lyon roaring on his pray, when a multitude of sheepheards is called foorthe against him, he will not be afrayde of their voyce, nor abase himselfe for the noyse of them: so shall the Lord of hosts come downe to fight for Mount Sion & for the hill therof. I beginne to conceive, this was it you went with childe withall, in casting your selfe upon this digression touching the resemblinge of the nature of God. And because the comparing of Virgill with Homer, is a prety point of humanitie learninge; and you had observed this passage in Scripture suitable to that of Turnus his description in Virgill: to vent this piece of learninge, you have drawne in by the cares a discourse or rather an inquiry, Howe Gods essence is to be resembled, the issue wherof is but this, that the Prophet observes a very courtly decorum, in resembling him vntounto a Lyon.
Yet by the way take this; If it were not courtly enoughe to compare Turnus to an asse as Homer compares Aiax, but rather to a Lyon; doe you thinke it courtly enoughe to compare the Lord of hosts to a Lyon? And what courtly decorum is observed thinke you when the second comming of Christ is compared to the comming of a theife in the night? Persuade your selfe; the holy Ghost affectes no courtly decorums; his language is allwayes savoury to a gracious spirite, not otherwise. The witts of Virgill & Homer both at the best, savoured but of the fleshe, So dothe not the woord of God. I honour them bothe in their kindes; but I would not have them remembred the same day, wherin we consider the spirituall decorum of the language of Gods spirite.
Well, the childe is delivered, & these panges are over; Now we may expect to be advanced to the Horizon you spake of, for the discovery of those scattered rayes of glorious light, wherwith you inamoured us. But first we are to be acquainted with three sorts of errours out of Austin, in settinge footthe the Divine nature; The first (you say) ariseth from comparing God to bodies, as by sayeng that he is bright or yellowe; the second, from comparing him unto soules; as by attributing forgetfulnes unto him; The third by attributing such things unto him, as are neyther true of him, nor of any other, as in sayenge that he is able to produce, or begett▪ himselfe. Yet you tell us fictions, or suppositions must be used of things scarse possible, wherby to represent God, in default of better. And thus you make way for a fiction of yours, wherby to represent God, & that is of a soule diffused: thoroughe the whole Vniverse. Nowe that Deus was Anima Mundi, was an olde opinion of certeyne heathens two thousand yeares agoe. And what necessitie, I pray, of any such fiction? And withall it is a fiction full of absurditie; considering that a great part of this Vniverse is a World of soules of diverse kindes; and the rest are uncapable of soules whether they are inferior to animate thinges as baser bodies, or superior even to reasonable soules themselves, as Intelligences. And I woonder what you meant by that sory qualification, when you say. You must use fictions of thinges scarse possible; Implyinge that this fiction of yours which here you introduce, is of a thing scarse possible; Wherby you seeme to conceave that this is a thing not absolutely impossible.
Neyther doe I finde any congruitie, why bodies abstract or Mathematicall, shoulde be of fitter capacity to receave this imaginary soule wherby to represent God. Only I confesse, that an imginary body is most fitt for an imaginary soule, but neyther fitt to represent God by. For what vertues, I pray, can you finde in them, fitt to resemble him? Yet you are not at ende of your extractions, thoughe the ende of this Chaptor touchinge Gods resemblance, moovethe us to sende an ende to our expectations, and to looke no more for those seattered rayes of that glorious light you spake of. The childe you travayled with, was Homers comparinge Aiax to an asse, & Virgils comparinge Turnus to a Lyon, & Vida his judgement therupon, and the Prophets concurrence with the witt of the latter, and three errours mentioned by Austin, in resembling the nature of God. And last of all a fiction to this purpose of a thing scarse possible, and that something refined, and the whole put of to further extractions, & all the glory, we were put in hope of, is the glory of a fewe phrases, wherwith you wishe your Reader, seing his cheare, to be merry, for he is wellcome. And thus you have given us a flashe of powder without shot, but not without smoke. Our enterteynment may be better in the chapter followinge.