Discovery of Jacksons Vanity, Section 1 · Chapter 2
CHAP. II.
Concerning two Philosophicall maximes which are sayde to leade us to the acknowledgement of one infinite, & incomprehensible essence.
FROM leight shewes we come to solid discourse, at least we are promised such. The principles wherof are two, termed springs & founteynes, that they may be the fitter, for the baptizing of Atheists, (so you speake) as they are fitt enough for the confirminge of Christians. The first is, Whatsoever hath limite or boundes of being hath some distinct cause, or author of beinge. This is taken for a proposition knowne of it selfe; yet are the termes very ambiguous, as namely the terme limite or boundes. In one place you professe that beginninge of beinge is one speciall limit of being. Newe I confesse, that in this sense, the proposition is evident thus, Whatsoever hath a beginninge, hathe a cause therof distinct from it selfe; because nothing can have a beginninge of beinge without a cause; Neyther can any thing give beinge unto it selfe. And therfore, if all thinges in this World are acknowledged to have had a beginninge; it must be acknowledged that they had a Maker which is God. But that this World hathe had a beginninge hathe not bene acknowledged by all: Nay the Learned est Men that ever were out of the Church of God, as Aristotle and his Followers, have utterly denyed the World to have had a beginninge as you well knowe; And therfore unles, the contrary be prooved, & these Philosophers confuted, we have herby nothing profited in convicting Mens consciences of this truthe by the light of reason, That there is a God; and so are farre enoughe from baptizinge Atheists into the name of God the Father. Much more from baptizinge them into the name of the Father, of the Sonne, and of the H. Ghost. And therfore I am persuaded that your proposition is not delivered in this sense, but rather you extende the word limites or boundes to a greater generalitie of signification, in which sense, you woulde have it supposed, that All thinges, besides God himselfe, have limite and boundes of beinge, not in regard only that they had a beginninge which is questionable, but in regard that they are Entia finita, which is out of question; In like sort the woord being, is of ambiguous signification; For it may be taken, eyther for beinge of essence, or for beinge of existence. The limits of existence or duration are such as wherby thinges are sayde to have a beginninge or an ende; and that at such a time or other.
But the limits & boundes of thinges according to their essence, are such, in respect wherof Entia are sayde to be fini…a, or infinita. Nowe in this latter sense, your proposition hathe bene very questionable, amongst the most learned Philosophers, that have bene. For Aristotle and his Peripatericks never doubted, but that this visible World was finite.
Yet that he did acknowledge a cause of it, is no where evident. Nay he opposethe Plato, & the rest before him, who maynteyned, that the World was made, & so accordingly, that it had a beginninge: wherby it seemes, that he, denyinge the creation of the World, denyed therwithall that the World had any efficient cause. And indeede, whosoever maynteynes, that the world had a beginning by creation, must therwithall maynteyne, that eyther it was made of somethinge, or of nothinge. You will not say that tis a thing evident that the World was made of some preexistent matter, which matter had existence without creation. For that is unto us Christians a manifest untruthe. Therfore you must be driven to maynteyne, that it is a truthe evident of it selfe, that the World was made originally out of nothinge; or at least, that it may be immediately concluded evidently, by a principle, which is evident of it selfe; thus Whatsoever hath boundes of beinge hath bene made, the World hath boundes of beinge: therfore it hath bene made; and seing it was not made of any thing preexistent; therfore it was made of nothing. Now what Wise man will acknowledge this discourse to be evident? considering howe many Learned Philosophers conceaved it to be a thing impossible, that any thing coulde be made out of nothinge; as allso consideringe that the H. Ghost imputethe the acknowledgement herof, not to any naturall evidence, but only unto faithe, as where the Apostle saythe, by faithe we believe that the World was made, so that things which we Heb. 11. 2.see were made foreign, not of things that doe.
2. You proceede to the enlargement of this position, & tell us, that this maxime is simply convertible thus, Whatsoever hath cause of beinge, hathe allso limits of beinge, because it hathe beginninge of beinge: For, omnis causa & principium, & omne causatum & principiatum. There is litle soundnes eyther of Logicke or Philosophy in all this. For to say that a proposition is simply convertible, is in a Logicall phrase, to say, that it is a good consequence which is drawne, from the proposition converted to the convertent, that is to the proposition wherinto the conversion is made. But this is untrue of the proposition convertible, which you speake of. For an affirmative universall cannot be thus converted by simple conversion, but only an Vniversall negative, & a particular affirmative. But I leave your wordes, and take your meaninge; You say it is allso true, that, Whatsoever hath cause of beinge, hathe allso limits of beinge. Nowe bothe this proposition is naught, and the reason worse. For the Sonne of God, Confundunt Graeci Theologi in hac disputatione foreign. Danaeus Censur. in Lumbard. dist. 29.the second person in Trinity, hathe cause of beinge from his Father: for he is begotten of him. And the H. Ghost, hathe cause of beinge bothe from the Father and from the Sonne: For he proceedethe from them bothe. Yet neyther God the Sonne, nor God the holy Ghost, have any limits of their beinge. If you say, the Persons are limited, thoughe the nature of the Godhead be not; I woulde gladly knowe howe the Person of the Sonne, and of the H. Ghost are more limited then the Person of the Father. For of the Sonne and H. Ghost, I knowe no other limitation then this, that the Sonne is not the Father, nor the H. Ghost: Likewise the H. Ghost, is neyther the Father nor the Sonne. And in this sense, the Father is limited as much as eyther. For as the Sonne is not the Father, so the Father is not the Sonne; and as the H. Ghost is not the Father, so the Father is not the H. Ghost. You shoulde have sayde, All thinges that have cause of beinge by creation, have allso limits or bounds of being; Or thus, All thinges that have cause of beinge in time, and not from everlastinge, have limits, and boundes of beinge. Or if you woulde apply it to generation, thus, All things that have cause of being by generation of sinite Agents have limits and boundes of beinge. Yet none of these is to the purpose, save the first. And that first proposition supposethe the creation, which yet is not evident, but unto faithe. So then you see howe weake this proposition is; Yet the reasons you bring for the proofe of it, are much woorse. Your first reason is this, because it hathe beginninge of beinge. Nowe if by limits of beinge, you meane limits of existence, such as is the beginninge of duration, then your proofe is merely identicall. But if you meane by limits of beinge, limits of essence, wherby a thing is sayde to be Ens sinitum, the consequence is true I confesse, but nothing more evident is the conclusion, by this reason, then it was before of it selfe. For that it hathe a cause efficient which producethe it, dothe as well argue a finite condition of the thing produced, then that it hathe a beginninge. Yet neyther dothe the havinge of an efficient cause sufficiently argue, that the effect produced is finite, unles the efficient cause be finite. For to say that a finite thinge coulde produce an effect infinite, is to maynteyne that a cause in workinge shoulde exceede the spheare of his activity. But there is no place for this exception, in case the efficient cause be infinite. And I have Hill. in hic Philosophia Luceppea, Epicurea, Democretica.knowne some inferre herehence that the World is infinite; Otherwise say they, there shoude be no effect of God suitable to the power of so infinite an Agent. And consider; finite thinges are able to produce finite thinges, equall unto themselves, why then may not God being infinite produce something that is infinite? It may be answeared, that the experience of producinge equalls to the producers themselves is true only in the way of generation. And so God allso in the way of eternall and incomprehensible generation producethe a Sonne equall to himselfe, yea, the same with himselfe as touching his nature. But this is grounded upon a mystery of faithe, which hathe no evidence unto reason naturall. For allthoughe by reason & meditation on Gods woorkes we may atteyne to the knowledge of God as touching the unity of his nature, yet can we not therby atteyne to the knowledge of God as touchinge the Trinity of persons. Adde unto this, that diverse have not only believed, but undertaken to proove allso, that God is able to produce that which is infinite in extension, eyther in quantitie continuall or discrete.
And Hurtado de Mendosa, a Spanishe Iesuite, and a late Disputatione in Philosophiam Vniversam a Summulis ad Metaphisicam.Writer, is most eager in the mayntenance of this. So farre of are your propositions from caryinge evidence in their for heads. Yet you suppose an argument which is very inconsequent. For you suppose, that whatsoever hath cause of beinge hath allso a beginninge, of beinge, and that in time. But this is notably untrue unto us Christians. For the Sonne and Second person in the Trinitie hathe a cause of his beinge, to witt the Father. Likewise the H. Ghost, hathe not only a cause, but causes of his beinge, to witt bothe the Father and the Sonn, for he proceedethe from them bothe; yet hathe he not such beginninge of beinge as you speake of. For bothe he and the Sonne are everlasting like unto the Father. Your second reason is woorst of all, as when you say: For omnis causa est principium, & omne causatum est principiatum. For in the meaning of this proposition causa and principium, are taken for voces synonymae, woordes of the same signification; not signifying two thinges, the one wherof is consequent unto the other. And what sober Scholer would affirme, that omnis causa est principium, as principium signifiethe the beginninge of beinge, wheras indeede it is the cause of beginninge of beinge to its effect, rather then formally to be stiled the beginninge of beinge it selfe. That which followethe of the limits of thinges, more easily or more hardly discerned, accordinge as the cause is founde to be preexistent in time or no, is an assertion as wilde, as the similitude wherby you illustrate it; and all nothing to the purpose, to proove, that whatsoever hathe cause of beinge, hathe allso limits of beinge, thoughe still you proceede ambiguously without distinction, eyther of beinge, or of the limits therof.
For first, where the cause is not preexistent in time, as in things risinge by concomitance, or resultance, yet the effects are as easily seene to be limited, as when the cause is preexistent in time; as for example; the light of the Sunne, and the light of the candle which flowe from those bodies by naturall emanation, was as easily seene to be limited, the first time it was, as after the light is a long time hid from us, and afterward appeares agayne unto us. Secondly, what if the limits be not seene, what I say is that to the purpose? Angells are invisible, yet we knowe, their natures are limited. Thirdly, what thinke you of the World, hathe it limits or no? You thinke (no doubt) it hathe; yet was not God the cause therof preex…stent in time, but only in eternitie. For before the World, no time had any existence. Agayne suppose the Wolrd had bene made from everlasting, which some Scholemen have helde to be possible; in this case, God shoulde have no preexistence eyther as touching time actuall, or as touchinge time possible; Yet I hope that limits of the World, even in that case had bene as discernable to Aristotle, as nowe they are to you. As for the similitude wherby you illustrate it, that rather sheweth howe in such cases when effects doe rise by way of concomitance or resultance, they are hardly distinguished from their causes then how their limits are hardly discernable. Yet what shoulde moove you thus to amplify, howe hard it is to discerne such effects, from their causes, I knowe not. For what hardnes, I pray, is there, in discerninge light to be different from the body of the Sunne that gives it, or from the body of a Candle, or of a Glowewoorme, or of some kinde of rotten wood, or from the scales of some fishes that cast light in the darke? Yet is all this nothinge pertinent to the confirmation, or illustration of the last proposition propounded by you. Howe farre dependance upon a cause dothe inferre limits of beinge upon the thinge dependinge, I have allready spoken; What meant you to distinguishe of the consideration of effects and causes, accordinge to the consideration of them eyther distinctly, or in grosse, unles it be to puzle the Reader as much as you confound your selfe, when eftsoones you manifest that you speake of them bothe as they have causes, which is to consider them only as effects. For that notion alone hathe reference to a cause. But whether this dothe inferre that they are limited, I have allready therupon delivered my minde.
3. Hence you proceede to the solution of newe problemes, and that as a mere naturalist. Why men in these dayes are not Gyants; why Gyants in former times were but men. And the reason you give is, because the vigour of causes productive or conservative of vegetables, of man especially, from which he receavethe nutrition and augmentation, is lesse nowe then it hathe bene, at least before the flood. The latter of your two questions is wilde. For what doe we understand by Gyants, but men of a Gyantlike stature? & is it a sober question to aske, howe it commethe to passe, that men of an huge stature are but men? For suppose men were of never so vast a proportion of parts, as great as the Image that Nabucliodonosor sett up in the playne of Dura, or as great as the Colossus at Rhodes; shoulde not men notwithstandinge be men still? and neyther Angells nor beasts; much lesse eyther inferior to the one or superior to the other. If the heavens were infinite as some conceave that an infinite body may be made by God, yet shoulde those heavens be heavens still, and a body still.
Neyther dothe it followe, that therfore those Gyants were men still, because the matter of nutrition and augmentation was finite & limited. For thoughe they had bene turned into Woolves or other beastes, the matter of nutrition had bene limited still; yet in such a case, they had ceassed to be men. As touchinge the stature of men so much lessened in these dayes in comparison unto former times; I no way like the reason therof assigned by you. First because it caryethe no evidence with it, & you give no light unto it, but barely suppose the truthe of it. Secondly because you limit it, in comparison of the like causes before the flood; As if there were no Anakims knowne since the flood. Of late yeares in the place where I dwell, hathe bene taken up the bone of a mans legge, broken in the digging of a well, the bare bone was measured to be two and twentie inches about, in the calfe, and the spurre about the heele was founde allso, & that of a very vast proportion. It seemes the whole body lyethe there. If King Iames were alive, and heard of it; it is like enoughe that out of his curious and Scholasticall Spirite, wherby he was caryed to the investigation of strange things, he woulde give order that the body might be digged up, & the parts to be kept as monuments of the great proportion and stature of men in former times. As touching the stature of men in these dayes what dothe Capteyne Smith write by his owne experience of the Sasque Sahanocts, borderers Voyages a discoverye of C…ptayne Iohn Smith in Virginia.upon Virginia on the Northe; He professethe they seemed like Gyants to the Englishe; One of their wero…nees that came aboord the Englishe, the calfe of his legge was 3. quartars of a yard about, and the rest of his limbes answearable to that proportion. Sure I am the siege of Troy was since the flood; and Homer writinge of the stone that Aeneas tooke up to throwe at his enimies calleth it
foreign
foreign.
And he was litle acquainted with Noahs flood, that sayde Terra malos homines nunc educat atque pusillos. Thirdly in these dayes some are very lowe, some very tall of stature in comparison; yet the vigour of causes nutritive and augmentative is the same to each. So in all likelihood both before the flood and after, such difference was founde.
The Spyes sent by Iosuah to take a viewe of the land of Nub. 13. 34.Canaan, having seene the Sonnes of Anak, seemed in their owne sight but as grassehoppers in comparison unto them.
Yet the vigour of foode and nourishment was the same to both. Farre better reasons might be alleaged, if I mistake not, of this difference; and withall I see no reason to the contrary, but that men might be of a great stature in these dayes, as in former times, and that by course of nature; if it pleased God to have it so. But I have no edge to enter upon this discourse, it is unseasonable, and I desire rather to deale with you in matter of Divinitie, and especially to encounter you in your Arminian Tenets. The question followinge, why vegetables of greatest vigour, doe not ingrosse the properties of others lesse vigorous, is a senseles question.
For whether you understande it of vegetables in the same kinde, or of a diverse kinde, it is ridiculous. As for example. Woulde any sober man enquire after the cause, why that vegetable which is of the greatest heate, hathe not the propertie of such a vegetable, that is of lesse heate? Or why that which is vigourous in heate, hathe not the propertie of that which is vigorous in colde, or in any other disparate qualitie? Nay why shoulde any man expect a reason why different kindes of thinges have different qualities? Is it not satisfaction sufficient to consider, that they are different kindes of things, and therfore no merveyle if they have different properties? The cause herof derived from the vigour of that which propagates is very unsound; For that which propagates, and that which is propagated is of the same kinde, and consequently of the same propertie. And the question proceedes equally as well of the one as of the other. If you shoulde aske how it comes to passe, that man is not so intelligent a creature as an Angell; it were very absurde to say the reason is, because the Father of a man was not so intelligent as an Angell, and therfore he coulde not propagate a man as intelligent as an Angell; least so he shoulde propagate a more intelligent creature then himselfe. I say this manner of answeare woulde give little satisfaction. For the question was made of man, not of this man in particular, but of mankind, which comprehendes the Father as wel as the Sonne. And agayne, the Sonne may be more intelligent then the Father, though not after the same manner intelligent as the Angells are. The followinge question is as litle worthe the proposinge as the former. For what hostilitie is to be feared betweene the ayre and the water? But you make choyse to instance in the hostilitie betweene the earthe and the water, as a matter of dangerous consequence. You demaunde the reason why the restles or raging water swallowes not up the dull earth. I had thought the earthe had bene fitter to swallowe up water, then water to swallowe up earthe. For suppose the Sea shoulde overflowe the Land, shoulde it therby be sayde to swallowe it up? Then belike the bottome of the Sea is swallowed up by the Sea. And by the same reason, the Element of the Ayre swalloweth up both Sea and Land, because it covereth them; and the Element of fire in the same sense, swalloweth up the Element of the ayre. And the heavens swallowe up all the Elements, for as much as they doe encompasse them. Every Naturalist conceaves, that it is not out of any hostilitie, that the Element of water is disposed to cover the earth, but out of inclination naturall, to be above the earthe, beinge not so heavy a body, as the massie substance of the earth is; And we knowe it is withdrawne into certeyne valleys by his power who jussit subsidere valles, as the Poet acknowledgethe, who was but a mere naturalist, & that in commoda… habitationem animatium, that the earthe might become a convenient habitation for such creatures, in whose nostrills is the breathe of life; of whome the cheife is man, made after the likenes and image of his maker, and made Lord over his visible creatures. The last question is worst of all, and all nothinge to the purpose, but mere extravagants. What sober man would demaund a cause, why the heavens doe not dispossesse the elements of their place? might you not as wel demaunde, why the fire dothe not dispossesse the ayre, and then why it dothe not dispossesse the water? & lastly why it dothe not dispossesse the earthe of her seate? which is as much as to say, why is not the heaven where the eartheis, and the earthe where the havens are? wheras every man knowes, that the more spacious place, is fitter for the more spacious bodies; and the higher places more agreable to lighter bodies, like as the lowest place is most fitt for the body of the earthe. To say that the nature of the heavens, hathe not so much as libertie of egresse into neighbour elements, is as if you shoulde say, that light thinges have not so much as libertie of mooving downewards, nor have heavy thinges libertie of moovinge upwardes. Yet there are cases extraordinary, when a certeyne universall nature mooves them contrarily to their speciall inclinations, for mayntenance of the integritie of the whole, and for avoydance of all vacuity. I see no reason for that other assertion of yours, that nature cannot sett boundes to bodies naturall, but rather is limited in them. What thinke you of the soules of men, doe not these as other soules prescribe limits unto the matter? Materia prima was accoumpted in Zabarell. de materia prima.our Vniversitie, to have dimensiones in determinatas, and that it receaved the determination therof from formes, but by the operation of Agents, in their severall generations. I confesse nature it selfe is but the effect and instrument of God, who is the God of nature as well as of grace. But yet whether every thinge that hathe boundes of nature, as the World hathe, dothe herby evidence and inferre the creation therof, is such a question, wherin Aristotle and his followers did peremtorily maynteyne the negative; and the Scripture it selfe do the impute unto faithe, our acknowledgement of the Creation.
4. Nowe we come to the scanninge of your second Principle, Heb. 1….Whatsoever hathe no cause of beinge, can have no limits or boundes of beinge. This in part hathe evidence of truthe thus, Whatsoever hathe no efficient cause of beinge, the same hathe no beginninge of beinge. But if it proceede of limits of essence, or of qualitie, or of quantitie, it requires helpe of reason to make it good. For as many as denyed the World to have a beginninge, denyed as it seemes, that it had any cause of beinge; and thought the beinge therof to be by necessitie of nature. Yet did they maynteyne that the World had limits of quantitie, and qualitie. For they maynteyned that Infinitum magnitudine was absolutely impossible, as Aristotle by name. By your distinction followinge, of diverse wayes wherby beinge may be limited, you make no mention of limitation by havinge a beginninge therof; which yet hathe bene the cheife, if not only limit, which hitherto you have mentioned.
Agayne, why shoulde you make but two wayes, confoundinge the limits of quantitie, with the limits of intensive perfection in every several kinde. It were too much in my judgement to confound limits of quantitie, with limits of qualitie, which yet are both accidentall. But most unreasonable it seemes to confound eyther of these with intensive perfection of every severall kinde. But howe will you accommodate the members of this distinction to the former proposition? Allmightie God hathe no cause of beinge; therfore he hathe no limits of beinge. Nowe, I pray, apply this to the members of your distinction concerninge the kinde of limits of beinge. Is he without limits in number? why then belike he is numberles. Yet indeede he is but one and can be but one in nature, and in persons can be but three, & must needes be three. Is he without limits in quantitio, and so infinite therin? But in very truthe he hathe no quantitie at all. Is he without limits in qualities, not materiall (for such are not incident to him) but spirituall, & so infinite therin▪ Are there no boundes of the degrees of his goodnes: why but consider, in God there are no degrees, no qualities at all.
As touching perfections created therof indeede, we have severall kindes, but none such are to be found in God. Only because God is able to produce them, therfore they are sayde to be eminently in God, thoughe not formally. But the like you may say as well of any materiall attribute, as of spirituall. For God can produce all alike. Therfore all are eminently alike in God. Of thinges visible the most perfect, you say, are but perfect in some one kinde. It is true of invisible creatures as well as of visible; but this kinde is to be understood of a kinde created. But you may not say, that God is perfect in all such kindes, but rather in none of them. For that were to be perfect in imperfections. Gods perfection transcendes all created kindes, and he is the Author of them, producinge them out of nothing. They that maynteyne the World to have bene eternall, maynteyne it to have bene so, by necessitie of nature. And all such would peremtorily deny, that it was possible for the World not to have bene; and therfore in this discourse of yours it would have becommed you rather to proove the contrary, then to suppose it. Howe the Heaven of Heavens shoulde be accoumpted immortall I knowe not, seing they are not capable of life. And seing deathe properly is a dissolution of body and soule, immortalitie must consist proportionably in an indissoluble conjunction of the body and the soule, which is not incident to Angells (much lesse to Heavens) which have neyther bodies nor soules wherof to consist. Neyther dothe Seneca, in the place by you alleaged, speake of Angells, in my judgment, but rather of the Species of thinges generable; particulars, thoughe subject to corruption, beinge inabled for generation, and therby for perpetuation of their kindes, and consequently for the mayntenance of the World, and that for ever. It is well knowne that the Platonickes, thoughe they maynteyned the World to have a beginninge, yet denyed the matter wherof the World was made, to have had any beginninge. Of the same opinion were the Stoicks. Their common voyce was, De nihilo nihil, in nihilu… nil posse reverti, & accordingly they might well conceave, that God might be hindered in his operation, by reason of the stubbornes and churlishnes of the matter; & so the censure of Muretus upon such Philosophers, I conceave to be just. Yet by your leave, I doe not thinke, that any creature, capable of immortalitie, in what sense soever applyable to Angells as well as unto men, can be made immortall by nature. Yet I doubt not, but God can make creatures in such sort immortall by nature, as that no second cause can make them ceasse to be. For it is apparant, that God hathe many such, as namely the Angels and soules of men. Yet still their natures are annihilable, in respect of the power of God. Neyther can I believe, that to be immortall in Senecaes language, was to be without beginninge. For I doe not finde, but that the Stoicks together with Plato, conceaved that the World had a beginninge. But in this respect he calleth them eternall, (I shoulde thinke) because the World, together with the kindes of thinges therin conteyned, subject to corruption and generation in particulars, should have no ende, and that by the Providence of God. We believe that nothinge is absolutely necessary, but God. But Aristotle believed the World allso to be everlasting without beginninge, & of absolute necessitie. For that the World shoulde be created originally out of nothinge, all Philosophers helde impossible, and that the matter shoulde be everlastinge, and of absolute necessity, wherof the World was to be made, that seemed impossible unto Aristotle, and that upon good reason. The creation therfore is to be justified against Philosophers by sound argument, and not avouched only by bare contestation. That which followethe, we Christians are apt enoughe to believe, but you take upon you to convict Philosophers of the truthe of them by evident reason; this I say you undertake, but proove not. You say, that the most strong and perspicuous way of inferringe the existence of God, is by this, that all thinges are originally derived from him, and made by him. And indeede, let it be prooved, that the World had a beginninge of beinge, and it will be manifest therby, that there is a God, to witt, the Maker of the World. But you have not yet prooved against Philosophers that the creation of the World is to be acknowledged. Nay this kind of argument (which I acknowledge to be the most pregnant and illustrious) you put of till another time, and to another discourse of yours, and yet all that you have to say dothe but harpe upon this, though herein you doe but fumble, and proove nothinge, supposing belike, that feeding us with expectation of some perfourmance of yours, this way herafter, we shoulde be the more willingly drawne to beare with the imperfection of your discourse here. Yet had it bene farre better for your credite in my judgement, to have wholy passed it over according to your project mentioned at the first, then thus slightly to dispatche it.
5. But you have not yet dispatched it as it seemes. Nowe you beginne to dispute the creation of the World; but your phrase in expressinge it, is very incongruous, as when you suppose Philosophers to maynteyne, that the roote of incorruption in the heavens, can brooke no limits of duration, but must be imagined without ende or beginninge. Now Philosophers maynteyned (and they only were the Peripatetickes. For Aristotle ingenuously acknowledgethe in his bookes de Caelo, that all Arist. de caelo. lib. 1. cap. 11. conti. 102.that went before him, supposed the heavens to have had a beginninge) that the Heavens were without beginninge and without ende, not that the roote of incorruption in the Heavens (as you speake) was without beginninge and without ende. For of any such roote of their incorruption he disputethe not; and I verily thinke, that herin, affecting to phrasifie, you speake you knowe not what. Now this he maynteyned, in opposition unto those, who feyned the World to have had a beginninge ex praejacente materia; which matter had no beginninge. And Aristotle concurringe withall that went before him in this, that nothing coulde be produced out of nothinge, and opposing them in the point of matter praejacent, drewe up his Tenet to this pitche, that the World had no beginninge. As if he had disputed thus; If the World had a beginninge, it must have its beginninge eyther ex aeterna materia praejacente, or no. But not ex aeterna materia praejacente, as he laboured to proove, therfore if it had a beginninge, it must be of nothinge; Now all granted that ex nihilo nihil sit; whence it followed that it coulde have no beginninge at all. And truly, I am of opinion, that his Tenet was more sounde then his opposites; and that with better reason it may be maynteyned that the World had no beginninge, then that the matter or Chaos rudis indigestaque moles, wherof the World was made, had no beginninge. Now that Principle wherin they all agreed, nothinge can be made of nothinge, they thought to be evident of it selfe, and such as needed no proofe.
Yet Averroes in his commentaryes upon the bookes of Aristotles Metaphysickes, gives a reason of it, disputing thus. Lib. 12.If the World were made, and that of nothing, then it was possible to be made before it was made; which we willingly grant. Now saythe he I demaunde, in what subject this possibilitie was? And withall telleth us that Ioannes Grammaticus made this answere, that it was in Agente, which Averroes takes up in scorne, but confutes it not. Now Grammaticus his answeare rightly understood is fayre and full; not meaninge that any possibilitie or power passive was in God; but that there was an active power in God so allmighty as inabled him to make a World out of nothinge, & consequently was foundation sufficient to denominate the World possible to be, before it was; not by any physicall possibilitie, which allwayes requires a subject really existent, to support it; but only Logicall, which is nothinge els but negatio repugnantia, which is appliable to non ens. For that which is not, may be denominated possible to be, in case there be an active power existent sufficient to produce it. But to proceede; against the opinion of Philosophers you dispute thus, If the Heavens can brooke no limits of your duration, such as are beginninge and ende, why shoulde it brooke limits of extension? as it dothe. For the heaven is supposed by them to be finite in extension. For answeare wherunto I say the reason is manifest. For an infinite magnitude actuall is impossible, and admits manifest contradiction as Aristotle hathe disputed the point at large. But to be without a beginninge of duration, they conceaved to be nothing impossible. Nay rather to the contrary, to have a beginninge out of nothinge, all of them conceaved that to be a thing utterly impossible. And albeit in other cases they helde motion, magnitude, and time to holde exact proportion, yet those cases were nothing to this purpose.
And wheras you say duration is a kinde of extension; implyinge therby, that extension is the Genus to magnitude and duration, as unto two species comprehended by it, I take this to be untrue. I judge rather, there is no univocall notion common to duration, and magnitude; thoughe this be litle materiall. But if you can shewe that it implyethe as great contradiction that the World shoulde be everlastinge, as that it shoulde be infinite in magnitude, then you should speake home indeede to the purpose. And I professe I make no doubt but the demonstration of the one may be as evident, as of the other: but that is a taske, which you have not hitherto perfourmed. And whosoever undertakes it, is like to finde opposites enoughe. For there want not Schoolemen, that Biel: in 2. sect. dist. 1. q. 3. a Scot there answeareth. Gandavatia his arguments proo ving the impossibility of the World to be from everlasting.maynteyne the possibilitie of bothe, namely bothe of the everlastingnes therof in duration without beginninge; and of the infinity therof in extension. And one thoughe no Schooleman, hathe adventured to proove that the World is actually infinite, sayinge that otherwise, there were no effect suitable enoughe, to so infinite a cause and agent as God is:
Yet I feare not any of these colours, but am persuaded that each is impossible, and that the impossibilitie of eache may be demonstrated, and the reasons to the contrary evidently refuted. But you hitherto have rather begged what you undertooke to proove, then prooved it. Yet you proceede, sayinge thinges caused are allwayes limited. But you shoulde have prooved, that thinges of limited essence are allwayes caused, and have a beginninge of their duration. So that this your proposition is nothing to the purpose, were it true. But neyther is this proposition allwayes true, as hathe bene shewed in the example of the persons in the Trinitie. And yet on this point, which is neyther universally true, nor at all to any purpose, you insist liberally in your followinge discourse.
You should proove, that whatsoever hath limits of extension, the same allso hath beginninge of duration: which yet I deny not to be a truthe, and demonstrable, but of the demonstration herof, your discourse hathe fayled hitherunto. When you argue thus, It is as possible to put a newe fashion upon nothing; as for any thing that is, to take limits, or set forme of being from nothinge. You corrupt the opinion of your opposites and not refure it. For they that maynteyne the World had no beginninge, doe allso maynteyne, that it tooke no beginninge of the limits therof: And as they doe not say, the World tooke his beginninge from nothinge; so neyther doe they say, that the World tooke the beginninge of his limits, or tooke his limits or forme from nothinge. Nowe you, by this forme of your dispute, doe instruct Atheists howe to discourse against the creation of the World, thus; If God made the World out of nothing, then he put a newe fashion upon nothinge: But it is impossible that any newe fashion shoulde be put upon nothinge; therfore it is impossible that God shoulde make the World out of nothinge. Nowe in this Syllogisme the minor is most true. For not any thinge can consist of nothing as the matter and of a fashion, as the forme therof. But the consequence of the major, is most untrue. For when we say that God made the World out of nothinge, our meaninge is not that nothing was the matter wherof the World was made, but only that it was the terminus a quo, not materia ex qua. As much as to say God made the World, wheras nothing went before, neyther had God any matter wheron to woorke when he made the World. And Philosophers affirminge that the World had no beginninge, doe therwithall deny that the World tooke eyther being or limits from any thinge. You turne their negative into an affirmative, so to corrupt their opinion, in steade of confutinge it. They thought, it needed not any thinge to give it beinge or bounds of beinge, least they shoulde be driven to affirme that somethinge coulde be made out of nothinge: wheras they had rather maynteyne; that the world ever had existence by necessitie of nature. Neyther did they maynteyne, that the world tooke limits or beinge from it selfe any more then from any other, which you devise and impute unto them, in steade of convictinge their Tenet of errour, by force of argument, in the way of naturall reason which you undertake. And therfore havinge so weakely disprooved the everlastingnes of things limited, you doe therby betray the weakenes of your proofe of Gods illimited condition from the everlastingnes therof.
6. And yet as if you had confounded all the Philosophers that ever lived, in the point of creation, you proceede magnificently to suppose, that the conceyte of beinge without limits is essentially included in the conceyte of beinge without cause precedent, which if it were true, then were it a truthe per se notae, and consequently the creation of the world evident of it selfe even to common reason, seinge it is supposed to have limits. And agayne your discourse is so fashioned, as if Philosophers maynteyned that the world tooke beginninge of it selfe, which is untrue and indeede a thinge evidently impossible, namely that any thinge shoulde take beginninge of it selfe. And indeede if a thinge coulde give beinge to it selfe, it might give what it lusted to it selfe, if so be it had a lust, which the Elements and Heavens have not: Yet those Aristotle maynteyned to have bene from everlastinge, not that they gave beginninge to themselves, but that they tooke no beginninge from any thinge. The reason wherof was, because they coulde not conceave, howe any thinge coulde be made out of nothinge, a thing contrary to all naturall experience: upon which kinde of ground your selfe but erst builded your discourse, when you sayde, thinges caused, as induction manifestethe; are allwayes limited and moulded in their proper causes. Yet notwithstandinge upon this fiction, of a thing able to give beinge to it selfe, you dilate at large.
I grant, that upon this fiction nothinge coulde restrayne it from takinge all bodily perfection possible to it selfe, in case it had power to give beinge to it selfe. But never any Philosopher maynteyned, that it had power to give beinge to it selfe. For they that maynteyned a Chaos precedinge the production of the world, maynteyned that out of this Chaos, God produced all thinges, and not that the Chaos or ought els gave being to itselfe. And Aristotle that denyed such an eternall Chaos, & maynteyned the world had no beginninge, was farre from maynteyninge that the world gave beinge to it selfe. Secondly I answeare, that thoughe it shoulde thus receave all bodily perfection possible, yet this shoulde not be infinite, and without limits as you woulde have your Reader to suspect without proofe, and indeede unles this be imagined, tis nothing no the purpose. The reason why in this case, it shoulde not be infinite, is this; because all bodily perfection possible is but finite, as they conceaved, and therin conceaved nothing amisse. So of quantitie or qualitie, the impossibilitie of eyther to be without measure in bodies, whose perfection is only finite, is a sufficient hinderance from takinge eyther quantity or qualitie without measure. In like sort, let Vacuitie (as you speake) be left free to give it selfe full and perfect act; let it take all possible perfection, yet since all possible perfection of bodies, is supposed to be only finite, it will not followe that the perfection taken shall be without limits: which yet you must proove, otherwise your discourse is of no force to proove, that whatsoever hathe n… cause of bringe distinct from itselfe, is without limits. Allthoughe the Philosophers that maynteyned the world or matter therof preexistent to be without beginninge, driven herunto, because they conceaved not how it was possible, that any thinge shoulde be made out of nothinge; yet did they never maynteyne that the one or the other gave being to it selfe. Yet this fiction you pinne upon their sleeve, to supply the weaknes of your discourse. Much lesse coulde it enter into any sober mans conceyte, that they gave power to a Vacuitie, to give it selfe ful and perfect act, seinge Vacuitie is starke nothinge; which the Chaos was not, but a materiall thinge, thoughe merely passive and nothinge active. But as for vacuitie that is neyther active, nor passive, as being starke nothinge. And yet to this you adde a further solecisme in this your fiction; as when you suppose this vacuitie to have power to assume eyther bodily substances or spirituall; which the Chaos had not, no not so much as in capacitie, being wholy materiall, wheras spirituall substances are immateriall. And yet, I confesse as you give unto that which is nothinge power to assume which it list, eyther bodily or spirituall substances; it may well be sayde that nothing hathe power indifferently to assume eyther or both of them. This I propose by way of an universall negative, not by way of a particular affirmative as you doe, making the terme nothing, to be the subject in your propositions, and not an universall signe only. Yet all thus assumed (as you speake) shoulde be but finite; because all possible perfection besides the nature of God it selfe, is but finite. Therfore I say it shoulde be but finite, if any thinge at all; which caution I doe put in, because upon due accoumpt, it will be founde, that the summe of all this, in a good sense, will proove to be no more, then just nothinge. For suppose, nothing dothe assume bodily substances; agayne suppose, nothinge dothe assume spirituall substances; put this together, and adde nothing to nothing, and see whether the totall will proove to be any jot more, then just nothing. You proceede further, and tell us that while we imagine it without cause of existence or beginninge, no reason imaginable coulde confine it, to any set place of residence or extension, why rather in the center, then circumference, or eyther rather then bothe. In this you seeme to have reference to that which immediately went before, and that was a vacuitie. And in very truthe upon this supposition, where nowe the center is, nothing was; where nowe the circumference is, nothing was; and in all the bodies betweene, nothinge was. For you suppose a vacuitie of all, and nothing to be, where now there is some thinge. Yet this nothing by your leave, must be confined in reference to the places, where bodies were before or after. And the places where bodies were before, being the same, by your supposition, with the places which nowe are, must needes be finite. For undoubtedly, the space of this whole world, betweene the center and circumference, yea & including bothe, is but finite. But foortwith you relapse to the former iniquitie of your supposition; and in steede of havinge a being without beginninge, which was indeede the opinion of some great Philosophers, concerninge the world, or concerning preexistent matter, wherof the world was made, driven herunto upon supposition, (as of a thinge impossible) that nothinge coulde be made out of nothinge; wherin all agreed, thoughe otherwise of different opinions, nor different only but contrariant allso: I say, from this true state of their opinion, you relapse, to the worlds taking of beginninge to it selfe; which is rather to maynteyne that it had a beginninge (thoughe of it selfe) then that it had none at all; yet this alone was affirmed by them, and not the other. Of which other, namely of takinge beginning to it selfe, imagination only (you say) is the true cause. And therin you say true, but this cause is to be understood of your imagination, not theirs: For they imagined no such taking of beginning to it selfe, eyther in the world it selfe, or in the preexistent matter therof. Yet upon this you founde a newe imagination, of extendinge (forsoothe) its existence bothe wayes, and drawing a circular duration to the instant, where it beginnes; to witt where it beginnes in your imagination not in theirs; for they imagined no such thing. And indeede, he that imaginethe white to be blacke, I see no reason why he may not proceede further and imagine black to be white, and adde unto this a third, to witt, that white is neyther white nor blacke, and blacke is neyther blacke nor white. Of circular motions I have read; but of circular durations I have neyther read nor heard till nowe; well, let us understande it of duration in circular motions. But if you please, imagine time to be circular like the motions of your orbes, and in course of time to returne at lengthe to the beginninge of it. For what els to make of the instant where it beginnes, I knowe not. It seemes by this discourse, that you have seene the gigge, and if your braynes have not runne round, I assure you mine have all most in followinge you. At lengthe you come to a more sober supposition and expression; as when you relate their opinion thus, that the world hathe a true present beinge without any cause precedent. This I confesse is suitable to their opinion whome you impugne; who were driven herunto (as I sayde) because they coulde not comprehende, howe any thinge coulde be made of nothinge. But when you adde, without a superior guide to appoynt it a set course, you something swerve from the right. All maynteyned the world coulde not be made out of nothinge. But all of them did not deny that it had a guide to direct it. The Platonickes and Stoicks acknowledged a divine understandinge to have made the world, but out of a prejacent matter, which they conceaved to be eternall, and to acknowledge no maker. Nowe as they acknowledged a maker, so they acknowledged a Governour, thoughe sometimes hindered in his course, by the stubbornes of the refractary matter, which acknowledged no maker. Aristotle maynteynes allso a first moover, therfore he acknowledged a guide allso. But wheras he acknowledged him to be a necessary Agent (as I conceave) it was in effect as much, as if he had acknowledged, no Governour. But all agreed that the duration eyther of the world, or of the prejacent matter was everlasting for the time past, and that the world shoulde be everlasting for the time to come. To this Plato yeilded. And so conteyned all duration imaginable bothe wayes; namely both for the time past, and for the time to come; but with this difference, that for the time past it was actually infinite; only the duration for the time to come not actuall, but in such sort infinite, as it shoulde never have an ende. Now this consideration openeth a fayre way to a discovery of the impossibilitie of this conceyte of theirs concerninge the eternitie of the world, or the eternitie of time, and that by very evident reason; (thoughe I deny not but men have and may sett their witts on woorke in quashinge the evidence therof; in their zeale I thinke to defend the honour of Aristotle.) For if the world were everlastinge? Paulus Venetus, thoughe zealous to defend the possibilitie herof, yet acknowledgethe it woulde followe, that the part is equall to the whole, nay greater then the whole; and that in so evident a manner, that he hathe no other way to answere it, then by professinge that this maxime, Totum est majus sua parte, is of force only in materia finita, not in materia infinita; which in effect is as much as to say; The world may be everlasting I will maynteyne it, but I forbid any man to dispute against it. For I purpose to deny all maximes that are made use of, in disputing against it; and will be bolde to say that they all have force only in materia finita, and not in materia infinita.
And because seing I have excepted against weake courses of argumentation, in defense of the creation; it may be expected I shoulde substitute stronger arguments in the place of them. I will not spare to addresse my selfe herunto so farre as out of the old store of my Philosophy I have in readines. And yet if thinges be considered aright, there is no necessitie of any such course. For certenly we have no neede of it for the fortification of our faithe, that being built only upon the word of God; and according to that old sayinge: Fides non Grego. in Euangel. hom. 26.habet meritum quoties humana ratio praebet experimentum. And as for Atheists, may we not justly say of them, as Abraham saythe of the rich Gluttous bretheren. If they believe not Moses and the Prophets, neyther will they believe thoughē a man Luc. 16. 31.shoulde rise from the dead. Especially consideringe that the Scriptures suppose (in my judgement) the creation to be acknowledged by generall instinct, actualed by consideration of the course of the world; as where it is sayde, The Heavens declare the glory of God, and the Firmament sheweth his handy Psal. 19. 1. 2. 3.woorke, Day unto day uttereth the same, and night unto night teachethe knowledge. There is no speach or language, where their voyce is not heard. And as is the voyce of the Prophets in the old Testament, such is the voyce of the Apostles in the newe. The invisible thinges of God, that is his eternall power and Godhead, Rom. 1. 20.is seene from the creation of the World, being considered in his workes, so that they are without excuse. And Paul preachinge before the Athenians, in an Vniversitie much addicted to Aristotles Philosophy, yet is bolde to suppose this, as a thinge without his preachinge receaved amongst them, God that made Act. 17. 24. 25. 26.the World, and all thinges that are therin, seing that he is Lord of Heaven and Earthe, dwellethe not in Temples made with handes. Neyther is woorshipped with mens handes, as thoughe be needed any thing, seinge he giveth to all life and breathe & all thinges. And hathe made of one blood all mankinde, to dwell on all the face of the Earth, and hathe assigned the seasons, which were ordeyned before, by the boundes of their habitation. And the being of the World from everlasting, thoughe by creation, doth apparantly limit the power of God thus farre, that he coulde not then have made it sooner. And if God coulde make the creature like unto himselfe in everlastingnes, why not in any thing els, seinge the Apostle, speaking of the Godhead as evidenced by his workes, noteth it to consist in his eternall power. But come we to that manner of demonstration which is expected, leaving such arguments as Mornay prosecutethe, Rom. 1. 20.as namely the novell invention of all Arts and Sciences, as appeares by History, and the like, evidencinge that the World had a beginninge: It is well knowne that the most generall opinion is (even of Aristotle himselfe) that an infinite magnitude or a number actually infinite, is a thing utterly impossible as that which implyethe manifest contradiction. Now let those arguments be well observed, and considered, whether the most pregnant amongst them, may not with as great evidence be accommodated against the everlastingnes of the World, to proove it to be a thing impossible. As for example. One of the most forcible arguments that I have founde to proove the impossibilitie of an infinite magnitude is this. If a magnitude were actually infinite, then it shoulde consist of an infinite number of yards or ells; for if it consisted but of a finite number of them, the whole coulde be but finite. Nowe it is manifest that such an infinite magnitude can consist but of an infinite number of inches. And herehence it followethe, that the number of inches, and the number of yardes or ells in such a magnitude are equall; & herehence it followeth that an inch in this case should be equall to a yarde or …ll; which is impossible, and consequently as impossible it is that there shoulde be any magnitude infinite. In like sort, if the World were everlasting, then the dayes past shoulde be infinite, & not so only but the yeares past shoulde be infinite; and so the number of dayes and number of yeares past, shoulde be equall, and consequently a day shoulde be equall to a yeare; For if twenty dayes were equall to twentie yeares, then certeynly one day shoulde be equall to one yeare. For fi ab aequalibus aequalia demas quae remanent erunt aequalia. Now it is impossible that a day shoulde be equall to a yeare, & consequently it is impossible that the World shoulde be everlasting without beginninge. Perhaps some may say that the same reason might proove as well that it is a thing impossible the World shoulde be without ende. But this is untrue, thoughe at first sight men are apt to be deceaved with a shewe of paritie, where indeade there is no paritie. For thoughe we shall continue as the Angells allready doe without ende, yet herehence it shall never come to passe, that it can be verified of such that they have continued an infinite space of time; but still the space is finite, thoughe with addition of continuance longer & longer in infinitum. But if the World were without beginning, then an infinite space of time were actually past allready, which implyeth manifest contradiction as before hathe bene shewed. Now consider the answere to the former argument, & whether it be of any force. The only: course to weaken it is to maynteyne, that datur infinitum, infinito insinitius. One infinite may be greater then another, to witt an infinite number of yeares past, greater then an infinite number of dayes past. This at first sight seemes to be a madde kinde of answere. For hence it followeth that one infinite can not be admitted, but that therwithall you must admitt an numberles number of infinites. As for example; If there were past an infinite number of yeares, then seinge every yeare conteynes 365. dayes, you must acknowledge that this infinite space of yeares consists of 365. parts, each wherof is infinite. And wheras if the World were eternall, & the space of time past, infinite, then the millions of yeares past were infinite allso; whence we inferre that the space of millions of yeares past being infinite consists of tenne hundred thousand parts, each wherof is infinite, and each infinite part consists of 365. parts, each wherof is infinite allso. And this is the very argument that Aristotle useth in his Metaphysickes to proove that there cannot be an infinite magnitude; for then it shoulde consist ex infinitis, now indeede this they doe grant that streyne their witts to maynteyne the possibilitie of infinitie in magnitude as namely Hurtando de Mendosa in his disputations; A Summatis ad Metaphysicam tract. de infinito.as being necessarily driven herunto. And the like course they must needes take that maynteyne the possibilitie of infinitie in time past. But as for the possibilitie of it in time to come, that is alltogether of another nature, as before I have shewed. Nowe I will clearly overthrowe this answere and proove evidently that an infinite number of yeares is not greater then an infinite number of dayes; and I proove it thus. If upon the position of an infinite number of dayes, there follweth hoc ipso, the position of an infinite number of yeares, then an infinite number of yeares is not greater then an infinite number of dayes. All experience justifieth this. For if upon the position of a quart of measure, followeth the position of two pints, then it is manifest that two pints is not greater then a quart, and so give instance in what you will, it never fayles. Now to the major proposed I adde my minor thus; But upon the position of an infinite number of dayes, hoc ipso there followeth the position of an infinite number of yeares; And therfore an infinite number of yeares is not greater then an infinite number of dayes. The minor I proove thus; VponUpon the position of an infinite number of dayes there shall followe a position of a number of yeares not finite, therfore infinite. Not finite; For if the number of yeares arisinge from the presupposed number of dayes were but finite, then the dayes wherof this number of yeares consists shoulde be but finite; For the dayes shoulde be but 365. times more then the yeares. And a finite number multiplyed by a finite number, can bring foorthe but a finite number. But we have supposed, & the Tenet touching the possibilitie of the Worlds everlastingnes dothe suppose the dayes past, to be possibly infinite. Which yet by this one argument we have demonstrated to be impossible. Consider one argument more. Paulus Venetus maynteynes it is a thing possible that the time past of the World shoulde be infinite; yet to exercise his witt, he disputes against it in this manner in effect. If the time past were infinite, as we all confesse, the time to come may be infinite, then the part shall be greater then the whole, as for example, the time from yesterday upwards shall be greater then the time from this day upwards; which he prooveth thus. The time from yesterday upwards, is equall to the time from yesterday downewards. (This is supposed for as much as all confesse it to be possible that time shoulde be without ende.) But the time from yesterday downewards is greater then the time from this day upwards; therfore the time from yesterday upwards, is greater then the time from this day upwards. The minor he proovethe thus. The time from yesterday downewards, is greater then the time from this day downewards. But the time from this day upwards is equall to the time from this day downewards; therfore the time from yesterday downewards is greater then the time from this day upwards; & consequently the time from yesterday upwards (being equall to the time from yesterday downeward) is greater then the time from this day upwardes; which is as much as to say, that the part is greater then the whole. These inferences depende upon this maxime most evident, that which is equall to a greater, is allso greater. Nowe marke how Paulus Venetus answeareth this argument, which is of his owne devisinge; & his answeare is this; This maxime the whole is greater then his part, hath place only in matter finite, not in matter infinite. A most absurde answere; for it is in effect to forbid all disputation against him. For we cannot dispute without groundes to insist upon. And no more evident groundes can be devised, then such as conteyne the rules of contradiction. Yet I will make it manifest, that this maxime must have place in all matter, whether finite of infinite. To maynteyne that the whole is not greater then the part in some case is to maynteyne that bothe parts of contradiction are true in some case. But bothe parts of contradiction cannot be true in any case; neyther in matter finite nor in matter infinite; Therfore in no case can it be truly maynteyned that the whole is not greater then the part. The minor I proove thus; there cannot be greater difference betweene matter sinite and matter infinite, then betweene ens & non ens. But both parts of contradiction cannot be true eyther about ens or non ens; (like as one part must be true de omni ente & non ente); therfore neyther can they be true in any matter whether finite or infinite. Agayne if this which he saythe were granted, then there coulde be no disputation as touching the nature of God, seinge he is infinite. And if we take away the rules of contradiction, we take away all disputation. Nowe I proceede in scanning that which followeth in your discourse.
7. I have hitherto followed you in the course of your owne suppositions, and shewed how farre short you fall of provinge what you intended, allthoughe your fictions have bene wonderous wilde. We commonly say, Uno data absurdo, mille sequuntur, we doe not say infinite. Yet I see no reason to the contrary, but that from these thousand absurdities, others may followe, and that in infinitum. Thoughe fewer followe it suffizethe us, if your collections be of the number of them. By the way, let me tell you, your marginall quotation stands in no congruity with the text. Then you compare impossibilities, and tell us, that for a mere logicall possibility, to take beginninge of actuall beinge from it selfe is as impossible, as for that which is thus supposed to take beginninge, to be restreyned to any determinate kind or part of beinge; Implyinge that the opinion of Philosophers, which you oppose did maynteyne, that a mere Logicall possibilitie did take beginninge of beinge from it selfe; wheras indeede there is no such matter. Never any Philosopher was founde to doate in such manner as you fashion the nobler sort of them. This is a mere fiction of your owne brayne. For first whether they maynteyned the World to take beginninge of it selfe, as you seeme to fancy they did, or the praejacent matter, wherof it was made to take beginninge of it selfe; yet herby they did not maynteyne that a mere Logicall possibilitie, did take beginninge of actuall beinge unto it selfe. For they were never founde to maynteyne that the World was a mere Logicall possibilitie, or that the matter praejacent wherof it was made, was a mere Logicall possibilitie. Secondly they never avouched, that eyther the World, or matter praejacent wherof it was made, did take beginning of being to it selfe, as you impute unto them, without all modestie, only endeavouring to supply the weakenes of your argument, and give some colour of strengthe to your discourse, by the corruption of other mens opinion. But Aristotles opinion was, that the World was without beginninge; and the former Philosophers opinion was, that the matter wherof the World was made, was without beginninge: and the reason of bothe was this, because they conceaved not how it was possible, that any thinge coulde be made out of nothing. So that your argument rightly accommodated should runne thus, It is as impossible that the World was without beginninge, as it is impossible that, that which is without beginninge shoulde have any limits of being, and be finite. Nowe this they woulde maynteyne to be utterly untrue; and were it true, yet is it not so true, as to be evident of it selfe. And you have hitherto affoorded no evidence at all to justifye it. And agayne there is both reason, why, whether a body have beginning of beinge, or no beginninge of beinge, yet can it not be infinite, because that implyethe manifest contradiction: and on the other side, Divines have bene founde to justify, that a body might have bene everlastinge, by the power of God, and consequently without beginninge. And agayne, if the World hathe a beginninge (as we believe it hathe) it must necessarily followe, that some thinge shoulde be made out of nothinge, which not only Philosophers conceaved to be impossible, but the H. Ghost allso professethe it to be a truthe so farre overreachinge the ordinary capacity of man, that he imputes it unto faithe, sayinge, By faith we believe that the World was made. What I thinke of your modells I have allready signified. Hebr 11. ….In fine you tell us, wherto they tende, which you expresse im pompe, sayinge, They are destinated to the errection of an everlasting aedisice. And that is a certeyne proposition concerning the nature of God, namely, that God is such a one, as he shoulde have bene, if he had had beginninge of himselfe. Which assertion of yours how well it becommeth the honour of God, let every sober Reader judge. For you affirme that God is of such a nature, as shoulde be existent, upon supposition of a thinge impossible; namely, The taking of beginninge of being from ones selfe. By the way I observe, that thoughe you maynteyne God to have no beginninge of beinge, yet you deny him to take beginninge of himselfe; and therby distinguishe betweene such thinges upon the confusion wherof alone, the plausibilite of your former discourse did wholy depend. For wheras Aristotle maynteyned that the World was without beginninge; and the ancient Philosophers before him were of opinion, that the matter praejacent, wherof the World was made, was without beginninge, you shaped their opinions in such sort, as if they had affirmed, that the World tooke beginninge of it selfe, or the praejacent matter wherof the World was made, tooke beginninge of it selfe, which indeede is most absurd; yet not their opinion but your fiction; the lesse was your ingenuitie in pinninge such a conceyte upon them: thoughe I confesse, it served your turne well, this corruption of their opinion wrought by you, being your best argument to strengthen your discourse. By the way I observe, you make God to be the sole Maker of all thinges, yet I never founde you to acknowledge God to be, the sole Author, or so much as Author of faithe and repentance.