Discovery of Jacksons Vanity, Notes on preface – Section 1
TO THE PRAEFACE OR SOME PASSAGES IN THE EPISTLE DEDICATORIE.
I Desire to fetche a walke in your Paradise of contemplation; & allthoughe you professe to encampe therin, & are very martiall in your wordes & phrases of terrour, litle answerable to that expectation which a Paradise doth bespeake; yet dothe it nothing dismay me, because you professe opposition only against the enimies of God, & my selfe, though a cheife of sinners, yet have found mercy at the handes of God, that I should be faithfull vntounto him & to his truthe in such sort, as to doe nothing against it, but rather ingage all my poore abilitie 1. Cor. 13. 8for it. And in case I finde your selfe going not the right way to the truthe of God, (an errour incident to as great an Apostle Gal. 2. 14.as S. Peter), I shall take boldnes to enterpose my iudgment forthe discovery of errour, & that I hope without all just blame, or deserved censure in respect of that old acquaintance which hath bene betweene vsus; for as much as I have learned bothe of my great Mr. in knowledge naturall, Amicus Socrates, amicus Plato, amicior veritas. And of my farre greater Mr. in knowledge spiritual, & to whose blessing allso Ethic. 1. 6. foreign.I cheifly owe my progresse in knowledge naturall, that he who loveth his Father or Mother more then him is not worthy of him; & whose peremtory voyce is this also; If any man come to me & hate not his Father, & Mother, & Wife & Children, & Bretheren & Sisters yea & his owne life allso, he cannot be my disciple. God Matth. 10. 17.forbid, the mayntenance of truthe shoulde be interpreted to proceede from hatred, or want of love to a mans person; Luc. 10. 16thoughe in the manner of cariage offense may be given bothe to God & man. For he is a perfect man that sinneth not in word. Luther was conscious of this, when before the German Princes Iam. 3. 2.in a meeting at Woormes, a part of his protestation was this, that he was not a man that made profession of holynes; acknowledginge that as a man, he might erre; but I am verily persuaded, he was conscious off a good heart towards God.
The cause that mooveth me herunto is partly the profession which you make in your Epistle Dedicatory, that diverse passages in your discourse doe manifest, that what I accoumpt the …ower leven of Arminianisme, is very tastfull unto you, which nowe you beginne to sett a broach in print, as hertofore you have uttered them in the pulpit, & afterwards by writing communicated unto others, wherof diverse particulars have lately come unto my handes; which have put me to some paynes, & to the spending of some precious time, in the scanninge of them. As for the passages, tending that way, in this booke of yours, I reserve them to be considered in their place. But as for the profession which you make in your praeface, I purpose here, to take that into consideration, before I passe on farther in my way. It is not so unusuall (you say) nor so much for you to be censured for an Arminian, as it will be for his Lordship (to whome you dedicate it) to be thought to patronize Arminianisme. Herby you seeme praepared to stand upright & not couched under the burthen of this censure, as Isachar was by Iacobs prophecy to couche under his: & withall you doe imply that, that honourable Lord, to whose patronage you inscribe this your Treatise, may herby be thought to patronize Arminianisme. And you doe well to signifie, that his Honour is not like to take it well, to be so conceaved off; as who hath ever hitherto bene accoumpted both orthodoxe himselfe, & a Patron of those that are such. Yet these insinuations of yours, seeme to me some th…nge strange on your part. For I have founde by experience in other writings of yours, that you hertofore have affected to be the inventor of a midle way, & soe the report goeth of you: though I confesse, I never founde the issue of your discourses answerable; which hathe made me conceave, that practise of yours to have bene but a praetence; & herin I am confirmed by this your praesent profession. For ought I perceave, you are more foule then Arminius himselfe, bothe as touchinge your Tenets, & the manner of maynteyninge them; they more voyde of truthe, this more voyde of Scholasticall argumentation, to proove what you undertake. It may be you take more boldnes to professe your opinions nowe then hertofore; allthough I see no reason for it, nor can believe, that Arminianisme is like to finde more countenance under the reigne of King Charles, then it did under the reigne of King Iames; who professed Arminius to be the enimy of the grace of God; & as I have heard, King Charles himselfe hath taken notice of his Fathers distast that way, & sometimes made profession of it. But satisfaction you endeavour to give unto his Lordship, which you say you are not bound to give to others. Yet it is well, that for his Honours sake, your reader is like to pertake of this courtesie in the way of satisfaction unto many as well as unto one. For my part, I desire not to oblige you unto any thinge; but rather to entreate you, that you would be pleased to take notice of those morall obligations, that belong vntounto all, in the way of honesty; namely that you would undertake lesse, & proove more, as in this particular; when you professe that all other contentions in the point of Gods Providence & Praedestinat…on, betweene the Arminians & their opposites, will be only about wordes, in case they doe all agree in this, That your Allmighty Creator hath a true freedome in doing good; & Adams ofspring a true freedome of doing evill. I thinke since the beginninge of these differences, never any, neyther Papist nor Protestant; neyther Lutheran, Calvinist, or Arminian was of this opinion besides your selfe; but the more transcendent and supereminent shal be your sufficiency, in being able to perforforme this. And indeede, I have founde you wonderously conceyted, of the force of consequence, which these propositions (as you imagine) doe conteyne; & in two treatises of yours, you have spent a great many wordes, in dilatinge upon them, & shaping consequences from them, but as inconsequently, as an Adversary coulde expect; abusing your selfe with the confusions of those thinges, which being distingnished, the consequences you frame, woulde streite-way vanish into smoke, & proove to be no better, then mere imagination of a vayne thinge.
And this confusion of yours dothe appeare in that opposition which you make, of other positions to these; as when you say; If any in opposition to Arminius will maynteyne, that all thinges were so decreed by God before the creation of the world, that nothing since the creation, coulde have fallen out otherwise then it hath done, or that nothing can be amended that is amisse, then you must crave pardon of every good Christian to oppugne his opinion; & that not only as an errour in Divinitie, but as an ignorance. In which wordes of yours, I doe observe first, that you doe not herin oppose Gods decreinge all thinges, but only a certeyne manner of decreinge all thinges, as in denyinge that all thinges were soe decreed by God. Secondly you doe not well to couple your selfe which Arminius in this. For I never founde that Arminius maynteyned, that God did decree contingency, but not any thing contingent, which is your Tenet in diverse pieces both printed & manuscript. He excepts, I grant against Perkins for saying, God did will that sinne shoulde be. Yet he himselfe professeth, that Deus voluit Achabum mensuram Exam Praedest. sect. Pag. 162.scelerum suorum implere; & wheras the Iewes went farre enoughe in their ignominious handlinge of Iesus Christ, he confessethe that Deus voluit Judaeos progredi quousque progressi Pag 114. 115.sunt. Thirdly, I woulde this were all, (to witt sinne) that you are pleased to exempt from being the object of Gods decree. But the case is apparent, that you deny faithe, & repentance, & every gracious action to be the object of Gods decree. For it is manifest, that these all are contingent actions; Now your opinion is, that God decreethe Contingency but not any contingen… thinge. Though on the other side you confesse God cannot decree necessity, but withall he must decree things necessary allso. Lastly, doe you knowe any that maynteyne any such Tenet (eyther in opposition to Arminius, or otherwise) which here you obtrude upon your opposites? I assure you I knowe none such. But whatsoever our Tenet be, I pray remember your promise, that if we agree with you in the former, namely, that God hath a true fredome of doing good, & Man a true fredome of doing evill, then you will not dissent from vsus in other points controverted. And doe you knowe any of vsus to deny eyther of these? And yet we may desire explication of that, which you passe over smoothly, as thoughe it needed none. For what doe you meane by libertie of doing good, & liberty of doing evill? is it quoad specisicationem? or only quoad exercitium? dare you professe that God is free to doe evill, as well as good? or that Man since his fall, & in the state of nature is free to doe good as well as evill? quoad exercitium we grant that both God is free to doe or not doe, whatsoever he dothe; & soe likewise Man is free to doe or not doe, whatsoever he dothe. Why doe you take such pleasure in confounding things that differ, at least in not distinguishing them? Yet this is not all the confusion we complayne of. For Gods absolute power is one thinge, his ordinate power is another thing, for this includs his will. God coulde have refused to make the world, when he did make it, & he made it freely; but supposing Gods decree to make it, & to make it at that time it was impossible it should be otherwise, as it is impossible that Gods will shoulde be changed. In like sort, God dothe al this time continne the World, & he continueth it freely. But yet in respect of his decree to continue it certeyne yeares it is impossible, upon this supposition, that it shoulde ende before the time appoynted. Agayne, what meane you to feigne any such Tenet, on our parts in opposition to Arminius, as that God for soothe hath soe decreed all thinges, that nothing can fall out otherwise then it hath done? For we expressely to the contrary maynteyne, that God hathe decreed many things to come to passe in such sort, that they could have fallen out otherwise, to witt all such thinges as are contingent. For we doe not maynteyne that God hathe decreed, that all thinges shall come to passe necessarily; but some things only necessarily, & other things contingently. And in respect of these modi rerum in generall, which are necessitie contingency, we say it is impossible that any thing should come to passe otherwise, then God hathe decreed they shall come to passe, in this sense: to witt, if God hathe decreed some things to come to passe necessarily, they shall come to passe necessarily; if he hath decreed some things to come to passe contingently, they shall come to passe contingently, & it is impossible, that thinges should come to passe otherwise. And I praesume you will not deny this, though therby you shall contradict your selfe, in respect of that Tenet, which here you cast upon your Adversaries, & disavowe as an errour & ignorance. I say, contradict your selfe, unles you distinguishe those thinges, which in this your Tenet, you deliver without distinction, and confound as your manner is. But by your leave, whatsoever God hath decreed, that shal come to passe, & that in such sort, as supposing his decree, it shall be impossible to be otherwise; neyther will we feare your censures of errour & ignorance, noe nor your praesumptuous consequences of involvinge enmitie against your sweete disposition, of the all-seieng and vnerring providence of God; thus with wordes as sweete as butter, & as soft as oyle you woulde woorke in your Reader an opinion of your devotion to Godward, to praevent suspicion of ill affection to his providence, when you turne out All decreeing, & put in Allseeing in the place of it. Wheras before you made shewe, as if you excepted not against our Tenet of Gods decreeinge all thinges, but only against the manner of it, & his so decreing all thinges. But be not deceaved, God is not mocked. Let vsus ever feare to maske profanes, with the vizard of devotion, & doe not you thinke with the smoake of woordes, in such sort to dazle the eyes of your intelligent Reader as to disable him to discerne your deedes in their proper colours. Neyther have you any colour for this your Tenet in denying God to have decreed all thinges, but only in respect of sinne. And what reason have you to range sinne amōgst the number of Things, without distinction, consideringe; it is rather a mere privation of some thinge, then conteynes any positive thinge therin. Yet, as I sayde before, your opinion were tolerable, did you maynteyne all other thinges to be decreed by God besides sinne. But your opinion is, that God decreeth contingency, but not the thinges contingent, which is in effect to deny in playne termes that God hathe decreed that any Man shall believe, or repent, or performe any gracious action. God foreseethe these things, but decreethe them not; this is your fowle opinion, in that opposition to the praerogative of Gods grace. For if God by his grace & holy spirite dothe woorke men vntounto faithe & repentance (in shewing, mercy vntounto whome he will) then vndoubledly he did decree thus to woorke them. For God woorketh all thinges according to the Eph. 1. 11.caunsayl of his will. And his will I hope you will not deny to be aeternall. Yet you seeme to strengthen your opinion with a reason of State. Therfore be like (amongst other reasons yet concealed) you decline the acknowledgment of Gods all decreing providence; because that Tenet is aforerunner of ruine to most floorishing states, where it growes common, and comes to full light. Heathen States then undoubtedly, had never any experience of such ruines, proceeding from any such cause: I doubt not but you will accommodate this your prophecy, or politicall observation, unto Christian States. And what Ecclesiasticall history (I pray) hathe affoorded you this oracle? Noe ancient history I am persuaded, doe you rely upon in this; for as much as you will not acknowledge that this opinion which you impugne, was receaved amongst any States of ancient times. Is it then (as it is most likely) that the later times experience hath cast you vponupon this interpretation of Gods providence, wherupon you are bolde to make rules, & to commend them unto posterity? And I pray answere me, was the Kingdome of Bohemia one of those florishing States, wherin the conceyte of Gods all decreeing providence, was a forerunner to the ruine of it? And did Prince Palatine, & the lady Elizabeth, or their Asociates, bringe in this conceyte amongst them? did this opinion growe common there? Did that Kingdome consist of more Protestants then Papists? Or amongst the Protestants, was the number of Calvinists more, then of Lutherans? Speake playnly, & say, the choosing of a Calvinist to be their King, was the ruine of the State, & of the Provinces, which were as members incorporate therinto: say Calvinisme was the ruine of the upper & the lower Palatinate. And herupon let your Almanacke of Prognostications proceede, & be bolde to tell the States of the Lowe Countreys, that this Tenet is a forerunner of their ruine allso, & unles they & we foorthwith turne Arminians, we are like to be lost, & fall into the handes of Papists. But of what Papists? Not such as Thomists, & the Dominicans, the most learned Divines in the Church of Rome (for they maynteyne that God determineth the will of Men & Angells to every act of theirs whether good or evill, as touching the substance of the act, by influence generall; & over & above allso unto every good & gracious act, such as faithe is & repentance, by influence speciall. And as he dothe thus determine the wills of all his creatures, so from everlasting he did decree thus to determine them.) Belike the Iesuites are they into whose handes we are like to fall, unles with speede, we turne Iesuits, that so herafter we may comfort our selves as Themistocles did, with Periissemus, nisi periissemus, we had bene undone if we had not bene undone, & that vtterly both body and soule. Happy are the Lutheran & Arminian party, that they are acquainted with no such forerunner of their ruine. They are like to holde their owne, while they acknowledge a sweete disposition of the Allseeing, and unerringe providence, & leave out All deorecing providence, out of their Creede.
But let the Dominicans looke to it, least their ruine be not at hand allso, as well as ours. For there is to be found such an oracle in some Mens writings; that whosoever shall embrace the doctrine of Gods Alldecreeing providence, let them knowe this opinion is the forerunner of ruine ito most floorishing States & Kingdomes, where it growes common, or comes to full light. And the experience of the course of these times, & especially in the ruine of the Palsgrave, & of so many Christian Provinces with him. For certeinly … no time or part of the world besides, was any such experience to be founde, so conveniently to serve your turne. Is it not great pitie but that the Kinges majestie & his Counsell, & both houses of Parliament, should be acquainted with this mystery of State (for why shoulde I doubt but that God will heare the affectionate prayers of his people, & in good time establishe a perfect vnion betweene the King & his people. In the meane time we will wayt upon the Lord, who hath hid his face from the Es. 8. 17.house of Iacob, & we will looke for him; Yea & we will give him Es. 62. 7.no rest untill he restore Ierusalem the prayse of the world.) This I confesse is a way to supplant your Adversary opinions, but of any power you have to confute them, and therby to praevent the growthe of them, I have founde litle evidence in other of your writings, & by the generall survey I have allready taken, I have small hope to finde any great satisfaction in this. But let us examine this point a little more narrowly. You suppose that some in opposition to Arminius doe maynteyne, that all thinges were so decreed by God before the Creation of the world, that nothing since the Creation coulde have fallen out otherwise then it hath done; and nothing can be amended that is emisse. But I knowe none of any such opinion; nay rather they whome I concenve you doe most ayme at, doe directly teache the contrary. We are willinge to professe with Austin, that Non aliquid sit, nisi quod omnipotens fieri velit, velsinendo Enchirid. cap. 95.ut siat, vel ipse faciendo; Nor ought commeth to passe but that which the Allmighty will have to come to passe, eyther by suffering it to come to passe, or himselfe working it. And with the Articles of Ireland confirmed by our State in the dayes of King Iames, that God from all aeternitie did by his unchangeable counsayle ordeyne, whatsoever in time shoulde come to pusic. Now whatsoever God willethe, he willed eternally. For in God there is no variablenes nor shadowe of change. And Iam. 1.supposing the will of God that such a thing shall come to passe, eyther by his operation or by his permission; it is impossible in sensu composit…, in a compound sense, that it shoulde not come to passe. But this impossibility is not absolute but only secundum quid, in respect of somewhat, to witt of Gods will, decreeing it, & is allwayes joyned with an absolute possibility of comming to passe otherwise in sensu diviso, in a divided sense. As for example, it was absolutely possible that Christs bones shoulde be broken, as well as any of the theeves bones that were …rucified with him. For bothe his bones were breakable, & the souldiours had power & freewill to breake them, as well as the others bones: but supposinge the decree of God, that Christs bones shoulde not be broken, vponupon this supposition, I say, it was impossible, they shoulde be broken. Nay further we say, that unles thinges impossible to come to passe otherwise then God hathe decreed them, upon supposition of Gods decree, be notwithstanding absolutely possible to come to passe otherwise; it were not possible for God to decree, that some thinges shall come to passe contingently. For to come to passe contingently, is to come to passe in such sort, as joyned with an absolute possibility of comming to passe otherwise. Thus we say with Aquinas, that the efficacious nature of Gods decree is the cause why contingent things come to passe contingently & necessary thinges necessarily; his wordes are these: Cum voluntas divina 1. Quest. 14. art. 8.sit efficacissima non solum sequitur quod si antea quae Deus vult fieri, sed quod eo modo fiant, quo Deus ea fieri vult. Vult autem quaedam Deus sieri necessario, quaedam contingenter, ut fit ordo in rebus ad complementum universi. Seing the will of God is most effectuall, it followeth not only that those thinges come to passe, which God will have come to passe, but allso that they come to passe after the same manner that God will have them come to passe. Now God will have somethinges come to passe necessarily, somethinges contingently, that there may be an order amongst thinges to the complete perfection of the Universe. And accordingly God hath ordeyned all sorts of second causes, bothe contingent causes to worke contingently, as the willes of men & Angells; & necessary causes to worke necessarily, as fire in burninge, the Sunne in giving light, heavy things in mooving downewards, & light thinges in moovinge upwardes. And as he hath ordeyned them to be such kindes of Agents thus distinct; so he hathe ordeyned, that they shall worke agreably, & he setteth them going in working agreably to their natures, the one contingently the other necessarily. So that whatsoever, the will of God is, shall fall out contingently, the same fallethout in such sort, as it might have fallen out otherwise; if good, so as it might have fallen out woorse & bene marred: if ill, yet so as it might have fallen out better & bene amended. And the eleventhe Article of Irelande having professed that God from all eternity, did by his unchangeable counsayle ordeyne whatsoever in time shoulde come to passe, addethe herunto by way of explication that so this was ordeyned as therby no violence is offered to the wills of reasonable creatures, & neyther the liberty nor contingency of second causes is taken away, but established rather. So that the opinions which you make bold to supplant or prevent, are opinions of your owne makinge, not of others maynteyninge; And to sett an ende to his owne fancyes, every man may take liberty when he pleasethe, without any great paynes takinge, about argument to overthrowe them.
SECT. I.
IN the first Section and before the first Chapter, accordinge to exact method (as you professe) in reference unto your former Discourse, you propose two thinges to be enquired: 1. How this truthe of Gods being most certenly knowne by internall experience unto some, may by force of speculative argument be made manifest unto others. Secondly how his nature and attributes may be fitliest resembled. The latter of which two I shoulde never have expected in a Philosophicall, or Theologicall discourse. Yet I will prescribe to none, but give every vessell leave to vent his owne humour, & to be delivered of such notions, wherwith his braynes have bene conceaved. If we have any use to make of them, we may; if none, we are litle the woorse for that. Every beinge hathe three passions denominating it. For there is a truthe of it, there is a goodnes of it, there is an unity of it. Therfore allso all these are to be founde in the beinge of God. But it seemeth not to be your meaninge to speake of this truthe, which is a passion of beinge, a simple terme; but rather of the truthe of this proposition, There is a good, to witt, howe it may be made manifest by speculative argument, you desire to inquire; grantinge it to be most certenly knowne by internall experience, unto some, wherby unles you understande our Christian Faithe, I discerne not your meanninge. VponUpon the first point, you will not have us to looke for much as yet; and the reason you give, is enoughe to put us out of expectation of any thinge at all. For allbeit a desperate enimy despayring of his life, Is therby the more animated to sight; yet an Adversary in discourse, by evidence of argument brought to despayre of maynteyning his Tenet, is not therby the more provoked to dispute. And therfore I see no iust restraynt to hinder you from bestowinge your best ability upon this argument, even in this place. And your selfe confesse, that notwithstandinge all this, you may proceede upon such advantages, as groundes of nature give you. And your mayne purpose extendes no further.