Discovery of Jacksons Vanity, Section 1 · Chapter 3
CHAP. III.
Of Infinity of Beinge, or of absolute Infinity and the right definition of it by Ancient Philosophers.
BEFORE you come to your Philosophicall Divinitie, you are pleased to acquaint us with some Logicall formalities. You dispute that there is no medium betweene nihil & aliquid, praesupposinge that some Answerers in the Schooles, thoughe fewe, woulde make choyse to affirme a medium betweene these. You say to finde a medium betwixt them by abnegation, is as hard as to assigne a space or vacancy betweene a line and a point that terminates it. And this is a very harde matter I confesse, even as harde (to requite you in your owne Rhetoricke) as to finde a space betweene a part of a line and the point that joynes it to the other part. To this you resolately adde, that what name soever we propose, unles it have some degree or portion of entity answearinge to it, we may justly say, It is just nothinge. But this to my understanding is untrue. For to the name of God no degree or portion of entity is answearinge, but rather entity, without degree or portion. It may be you understande this part of your discourse as well as the former, of the names of entities create in distinct on from God the entity increate. For foorthwith you confesse, that these reasons notwithstanding thoughe they firmely holde in secular disputes of predicamentall or numerable entities, yet the infinite essence comes not within this division. So then God, is neyther aliquid, nor nihil. And therfore it is not so hard to finde a meane by abnegation betweene these, as to assigne a space betweene a line and a point that terminates it; unles you will say, that to acknowledge a God is as hard, as to acknowledge such a space or vacancy. As then God is not nothinge, so he is too excellent, you say, to be comprehended under the name of some thinge. And indeede the word Aliquid signifiethe a part of quidditie, or entity, which cannot be affirmed of God, neyther in respect of created quidditie; For in that respect, he is verily nihil, and not at all aliquid creatum; Nor in respect of quidditie increate; for that hathe no parts; and if it had, God shoulde be rather all that quidditie, then a part of it. And thus we may say that aliquid and nihil are not contradictories: if they were, it coulde not be avoyded, but God himselfe must admitt the denomination of one of them. But if it be farther objected, that God is aliquid in respect of quidditie or entity, neyther create nor increate in speciall, but considered in common to them both. So allso it may be denyed that God is aliquid, or a part of such entity or quidditie, seinge no entitie, is common to create and increate entities. For entitie is no univocall Genus, fitt to comprehend God & his creatures; thoughe some subtile inventions have bene on foote brought in by some to justifie that the word ens dothe univocally comprehende God and his creatures. But you seeme not to approove of such speculations. For as much as you deny him to be a numerable part of entity; and if he were a species of ens, he might well be numerable with the other species therof. Therfore I thinke it needeles for me to undertake the disproovinge of Scotus his reasons, thoughe curious ones, wherby he prooves the univocation of the word ens in respect of God and his creatures. It shoulde rather have bene your taske, who undertake a discourse of this nature, which for my part, I had never medled withall, had it not bene for some pieces of corrupt Divinitie, which you patch on in some places to this your Philosophy. Yet by the way we are to consider, that allthoughe the word aliquid be an unfitt denomination of God, yet ens is not, which thoughe it be not univocally attributed unto the Creator and the creature, yet usually it is analogically. God may well be sayde to be an ens independant, and upon whome all other entia doe depende. You farther proceede to give a reason why the Latine word ens, is not fitt to denominate God, so to make the Divine nature a meane by abnegation, not only betweene somethinge, and nothinge, but all so betweene ens and non ens. For the word ens you say, out of Mirandula, hathe the forme of a concrete. And every concrete hath his name from that nature wherof it participates; as hot is that, which participates of heate; white is such a nature as participates of whitenes. But God cannot be sayde to participate of essence. In this I finde some defect. First, because you doe not shewe, howe ens, which you call a concrete is divided, (as concretes are) into a part materiall participating, and a part formall participated. In a word, you doe not once offer to resolve ens into the parts of its signification. Secondly, there is litle congruity betweene ens that which hath beinge, & hot or white, that which hathe heate and whitenes. For that which hathe whitenes in it, or heate, is a substance, or subject really existent, wherin the qualitie of heate or whitenes is founde. But the word ens admittethe no division comparable, or congruous herunto. For you cannot with sobrietie say, that ens signifieth a nature really existent, wherin essence is found distinct from the nature signified, or comming over and above unto it, as heate dothe over and above to the constitution of the subject. And therfore it followethe not, that because hot dothe signifie a subject participating of heate, therfore ens allso signifieth a subject participating of essence. A great deale of difference there is betweene concretes of accidentall denomination, and concretes of essentiall denomination. As Homo & Animall, which may be accoumpted concretes, in respect of such abstract notions, as are conceaved under the termes of Humanitas and Animalitas. The specificall essence beinge constituted by the abstract notion, and not participating of it, as bodies participate of heate. The truthe is, all compounds doe properly admitt a concrete denomination, as in whome the suppositum (as Homo and Animal, differethe from the nature denominatinge it, as Humanitas & Animalitas. But in things not compounde it is not so, least of all in God. For thoughe Homo be not Humanitas, yet Deus est ipsa Deitas. Aquin. 1 q. 3. art. 3. De rebus simplicibus loqui non possumus nisi per modum compositorum, a quibus cognitionem accipimus; & ideo de Deo loquentes, utimur nominibus concretis ut significemus ejus subsistentiam, quia apud nos non subsistunt nisi composita. Et utimur nominibus abstractis, ut significemus ejus simplicitatem. Quod ergo dicitur Deitas, vel vita, vel aliquid hujusmodi esse in Deo, referendum est ad diversitatem, quae est in acceptione intellectus nostri, & non ad aliquam diversitatem rei. That God is one, by whome all thinges are, is true; but this description is litle congruous to the nature of God; in as much, as it could have no place before the creation, or in case the World had never bene created. Yet Gods nature is still the same. I cannot admitt that thinges created participate of Gods being. They have their beinge from God, I grant; but I cannot admitt their being to be any part of Gods beinge, or Gods beinge to have parts. Yet if all thinges are from him, howe can you avoyde, but that God himselfe shall be from himselfe. Vnles the Apostle helpe you in this discoursinge, In that he hath put all thinges under him, it is manifest that he is excepted who did put 1. Cor. 1….all thinges under him. But be it so that all other thinges are from him; & then allso accidents as well as substances are from him, and can they participate of Gods being? Of accidentall beinge, I grant they doe participate and that from God, but not of Gods beinge. If so; howe much more must faithe and repentance be acknowledged to have their production from God; which I much feare, you will be founde to deny, if not at first hande, yet at least in a second place, by maynteyning it in such a manner to be the worke of God, as upon condition of mans will; which in my judgement is in effect to deny that God is the Author of them. The name of God I am, openeth a fayre way to the expoundinge of a mystery, which you medle not with, contenting your selfe with ventinge of phrases, in settinge foorthe the nature of God. The existence of all creatures may be accoumpted as a mere accident to their essence; for as much as all of them have being after not beinge; and from being eyther doe or may returne agayne to not beinge. It is not so with God, who is everlastinge and that formally by necessitie of nature. So that wheras the essence of every creature abstract from existence, includes a possibilitie formally indifferent to being or not being, Gods essence includes a necessitie of beinge, an impossibilitie of not beinge. Your lines of amplification are eyther very wilde and without sense, or my witts are too shallow to comprehend them, the rest I cannot construe, the close I can, when you say the essence of God is the bond of all thinges that can be combined or linkt together. I can construe these wordes, but not comprehend their meaninge. The combination of thinges together, you understand, it seemes in affirmations & negations. Nowe that Gods essence shoulde be the copula, wherby the subject and predicate in all propositions, are linkt together, and that whether true or false; Holy or profane, may well passe, I thinke, for the tenthe woonder of the world. God only is by nature, all other thinges by the will of God. I am that I am say the the Apostle, but by the grace of God. God only is in such sort as that his existence is his essence, we are in such sort, as that our existence is not our essence. For sometimes we were not; and if it pleased God, we might cease to be. But yet we live and moove, and have our beinge, & all in him. I cannot admitt that Angells participate of Gods essence, or that God communicates his essence to any, but to his Sonne. They, as all other things, have their essence from God, but not his; Yet are they according to the Image of God. Other creatures may have vestigia footestes of God. In the reasonable nature alone is found the Image of God; I say the Image of God, but not the essence of God.
2. Whether Angells are creatures, and consequently of a finite nature, no Christian makes question. But as touching their nature, understanding, place, and motion attributed unto them, they are such secrets and mysteries unto me, that I have no heart to medle with them. The Scriptures, tell us, that Marc. 5. 9.a Legion of divells were in one man; and of the good, that Mat. 18. 10.the Angells of litle children doe allwayes behold the face of God their Father. But touching the nature of God, to say that his indivisible unitie, comprehendeth all multiplicity is an ambiguous speeche; both because multiplicitie is found in evill as well as in good; and the phrase of includinge, to my thinking, inclines to signifie, comprehension formall rather then vertuall. As for Senecaes sentence, which you so much magnify, as if we coulde not say more of him in fewer words, I judge to be an unwoorthy speeche to denote the nature of God, as indeede more false then true, or rather false throughout, and voyde of all truthe. And why shoulde we expect any tolerable description of the nature of God from an heathen man, and from a Stoicke, as Seneca was. So Lucan, Deus est quodcunque vides, quocunque mover…, out of the mouthe of Cato Vticensis, a man of Stoicall profession, as Seneca was. And such sayings as these, Deus est totum quod vides, & totum quod non vides, savour hotly of an Atheifticall opinion, of such, as being ignorant of the nature of the true God, deified the nature. And commonly their severall Gods denoted only severall parts of the World, as Vesta the Earth, Iupiter the ayre, Baal or Bel, and as some say, Hercules, Tyrius the Sunne. Yet severall Nations, like enough had their severall opinions, but all concurring in this, namely in adoring the creature, and specially all the host of heaven, in steede of the Creator. And then withall they had an universall Deitie, whome they called Pan, representing the whole Vniverse. And according to Platonicall opinion, God was accoumpted Anima Mundi. And thus with them, God was Totum quod vides, & totum quod non vides. Yet I may well grant, that more coulde not be sayde in fewer wordes, but this is in the way of falshood, and not in the way of truthe. The best construction, that can be made of it, is to say that God is the Author of all that we see, and of all that we doe not see. Yet this was not the opinion of the Stoicks, of whose profession Seneca was. For thoughe he did believe the World was made, as Aristotle professethe in his bookes de Caelo, it was the opinion of all that went before him: Yet did he not believe, that it was made out of nothing, but that Lib. 1. cont. 102.the matter wherof the World was made, was eternall. Therfore they did not believe, that God was the Author of all, both of that we see, and of that we doe not see. Your selfe confesse, they conceaved the matter to have bene coeternall with him, and not so only, but able allso to overmatch the benignitie of his active power by its passive untowardlines. Agayne I doe not finde, that any of them maynteyned, that immateriall substances were made by God; for then they shoulde all be made out of nothinge. For Angells consist not of materiall extensions. And it was their generall voyce that nothing coulde be made out of nothing.
3. The analogy you speake of, is without all proportion. For the picture of a man, thoughe it be no true man, yet it may be a true picture; and whether a true picture or no, yet undoubtedly it hathe a true beinge, thoughe imperfect, in comparison to the beinge of a man. And therfore herehence to conclude, that no creature truly is, is without all proportion: Man indeede is but the Image of God, as some things are the Images of men: Whence it followethe; as the Images of men are not men, so man the Image of God is not God. But to inferre that therfore man is not in truthe, or hathe no true beinge, hathe no ground, no foundation. If the beinge of a creature is but the shadowe of true beinge, then humanitie (which is the being of a man) is but a shadowe of true humanitie, & brutality, which is the beinge of a beast, is but the shadowe of true brutalitie. And is it proper thinke you to say, that the truthe of all these are founde in God, to witt true humanitie &c. David and Solomon were types of Christ; but I never read, nor heard, that the creatures are types of the Creator. Effects they are, and the workes of God; and as the cause dothe shine in the effect, so Gods eternall power & Rom. 1. 20.Godhead are made manifest by his workes. Yet the types of Christ, were not types according to their essence, but according to their course of life and actions. And yet the very actions, wherby they represented Christ, were true actions in themselves separate from typicall signification; thoughe the actions of Christ or office of Christ, were of farre greater dignitie and price then were the actions of men which represented him. Before the World was made, this proposition was true, God alone is, and he could agayne make it true if it pleased him, by turninge all thinges into nothing, from whence they came. But nowe other things allso are. Otherwise there could be no place, eyther for the name of creatures, or for the representation of God in them. And howe can that be sayde not to be, or not truly to be which as you say, participates of Gods beinge? It is true, God alone is in such sort, as whose essence and existence are all one. For as much as possibilitie in him is mere necessitie, not so in any creature; as who all were not, before they were, and agayne may returne to nothinge, if so it please him that made them, to dispose of them. What is that ancient Philosophy of the heathen you speake of, and howe well it accordes with this, I knowe not. As touching the nature of God, I knowe no such discourses superior, if equall to the discourse of Aristotle Lib. 12. c. 3. cont. 39.in a certeyne chapter of his Metaphysicks. Your text, I am God and there is none besides, is faire short of congruitie with your present discourse. For will it followe that because there is no God, besides him; therfore there is nothing that hathe any true beinge besides him?
4. It is incredible that the Stoickes or any other, helde nothing woorthy the name of essence, which was not foreign. Such speeches rather make men unworthy to be esteemed of any facultie of witt. But what thinke you? is God foreign? Cap. 1. …. ….Have you forgotten the diversitie of errours, which in the former chapter you mentioned out of Austin, the last wherof was, to conceave that God could beget himselfe? Yet if foreign shall be the propertie of God, as your selfe confesse by Plotins Philosophy (you might as well have sayde by the Philosophy of Heathens that denyed creation out of nothinge) there shall be many Gods, even as many as there be immateriall substances, which they called mindes or Intelligences from their narure; but from their office we call Angells. But this error, you say, was easy to be checkt, If the favourers of it had bene put in minde, that these their demy Gods, by necessary consequence of this opinion, must have bene acknowledged insinite in beinge. So that had you lived in their dayes, you had easily brought of not Plotin only but Aristotle allso & all others from this point of heathenisme. For necessary consequences all must yeilde unto, especially if the consequence be perspicuous allso, as you seeme to suppose, by the litle or rather no light you give unto it by force of argument. For oportet, ut lancem ponderibus, ita animum veris & perspicuis cedere. And seinge Intelligences, if made, must needes be made out of nothinge, which I am persuaded you will not deny, hence it followethe, that you coulde evidently convict all those Philosophers of error in denyinge the Creation. Yet shall not you by this your confidence any way hinder us, from givinge God thankes, for bringing us acquainted with his word, and givinge power unto it by his Spirite, to make us by faithe to believe that the world was made, and that the thinges Hebr. 11. 3.that be, were not made of thinges that doe appeare. But of this your confidentiary consequence we have discoursed enoughe in the former chapter. Touching the comparison betweene Plato, & Aristotle; or betweene Platonicall and Aristotelicall Christian, dothe any Aristotelicall Christian deny, that immateriall substances have their dependance on God? If any man by Aristotles discourse, hathe bene withdrawne from acknowledginge this truthe, he ceasethe to be a Christian, and becomes an Atheist. The meanest Christian by light of grace knowes more then Aristotle by light of nature concerning God. So might Plato, if by tradition he receaved something derived from the Word of God, and believed, which Aristotle eyther receaved or believed not. Compare their atchievements (if you please) by light of nature, eyther concerninge the nature of God, or the knowledge of the World & the parts therof: that is consider what each affirmed, & what reason for his assertion each delivered, and thence consider whose abilitie deserves to be preferred. Plato with the rest maynteyned the World to have a beginninge, but the matter, wherof it was made, to be eternall. Aristotle maynteyned the World to be everlastinge. Zabarell thinkes he had better reason for this opinion of his, then Plato, and the rest had for that opinion of theirs. I am of Zabarells judgement in this. The eternitie of the matter is as absurde to us Christians, and as contradictious to the truthe of God, as the eternitie of the World. But supposing the eternitie of the matter, and denyinge the eternitie of the World, this brings foorthe some proper absurdities over and above the former. The continuance of the World for everlasting is maynteyned by Plato as well as by Aristotle, herein cryed downe by others, in that maynteyninge it to have a beginninge, yet denyes that it shall have an ende. Plato maynteyned you say, the creating of immateriall substances, Aristotle denyed it: This was suitable with the opinion of Aristotle, who denyed the possibilitie of creation: that not suitable with the opinion of Plato. For if the World could not be made out of nothing, which Plato affirmed as well as the rest, why shoulde he thinke that Angells coulde be made out of nothing. For if the more excellent nature coulde be produced out of nothinge, why coulde not the lesser nature, such as matter is by the same power, be brought out of nothinge? Agayne you say, Plato denyed thinges sensible truly to be: Aristotle, we doubt not, professed the contrary, which of these opinions, I pray, is most agreeable unto reason? Is not the latter, and that both by the light of nature, and by the light of grace? Is it not true of us all, that in God we live and moove & have our beinge? And if our Act. 17. 2….life be a true life, our motion a true motion, is not our beinge allso a true beinge? especially, if as you say, all thinges that are, doe participate of Gods beinge. But let us come to Senecaes interpretation herof; that is they put on a countenance of beinge for a time, being incapable of the stability, and soliditie of true beinge. Marke, I pray, whether this be a sober speeche. For eyther the beinge of sensible things is a true beinge or no. You say a true beinge, then herin you shall contradict both, Plato and your selfe allso: If not a true beinge, then seinge it is sayde that in this they continue not, it followethe that they want not so much continuance of true beinge, as continuance of such a being, as is no true beinge. Nay the Glosse corrupts the text, as I proove thus. They that want continuance or stabilitie of true beinge, fayle not in the want of true beinge, but only in want of continuance of true beinge: so that her by it must be confessed, they have true beinge, thoughe they have litle or no continuance therin. Agayne it dothe not followe, that because they want continuance, therfore they are uncapable of continuance. For cannot God preserve the Heaven and Earthe for ever if it please him? Yet these are sensible thinges. Agayne what meant eyther the Author or the Interpreter to say, that sensible thinges have no stabilitie of being; when in the opinion of Plato, the Heaven and Earthe were to continue for ever, as well as immateriall substances; especially if the continuance of those were by nature, of these only by grant, or Chartar of their Maker. And of this we reade from you, of the other we reade not. I willingly confesse, the being of God cannot be communicated unto any, but by the Father unto the Sonne; and therfore I have allready misliked, that you should maynteyne, that the Creatures doe participate of Gods beinge.
5. That Principle Omnia unum sunt, was the position of Melisus as well as of Parmenides. And thoughe Simplicius dothe not double with you (for why shoulde you suspect that, especially seinge any man may erre and misreport anothers opinion without doublinge); but thoughe he erred not, and Parmenides indeede acknowledged distinction (and no other liklihood but he did), yet this is farre from justifyinge that mysticall interpretation which you make of Parmenides his meaninge: allthoughe you positively deliver that Parmenides meant the same that Plato did, to witt that Multitude of thinges visible is but the multiplyed shadowe of invisible independent unitie. He spake Poetically, you Figuratively; which kinde of discourse, as I remember, Aristotle sometimes reprehended in Empedocles. But surely, eyther you mistake, or I; who rather thinke that sayinge to be delivered in respect of the matter, wherehence all thinges are derived; and not in respect of the Agent, who derives them. Sure I am, it may as naturally signifie respect to the matter, as to the Agent; yea and much more, and that for two reasons. First, because the matter wherof every thiing consists, is of the essence therof, so is not the Agent. Secondly because all other thinges, besides the matter, came from the matter, in their opinion, but all other thinges besides the Agent, came not from the Agent. For the matter it selfe, in their opinion, proceeded not from the Agent, but was as eternall, as God himselfe. Nay nor all other thinges, besides the matter, came from the Agent; but some as it were in spight of the Agent, being overruled with the untoward lines of the matter, as your selfe but a litle before professed to be the opinion of the Stoicks. In Gods essence is only his owne being formally, ours vertually and eminently, in as much as God can produce it, and exemplarily allso, but that, I confesse, is somethinge mysterious unto me, save that I conceave, it respecteth his understandinge, like as to be in him vertually, respectethe his power. And I doubt not, but that the essence of God dothe represent unto him, all natures possible. But to say that this beinge of the creature in God, cannot be with safety committed to the creatures owne charge and custody, is a very wilde phrase, and as much as if you should say, Gods infinite wisedome, & power, and essence cannot be committed with safetye, to the creatures charge and custody: for nothing that is in the creature is formally in God; nothinge that is formally in God, can be communicated to the creature.
6. Howsoever Aristotle had implyed his witt yet without grace it had never ended in his happines. And yet I tell you, he hathe done strangely herein, and in my judgement to the woonder of the World, in so much that I may woonder, that you take so litle notice of it. But seing he had only the booke of Gods creatures, whereabout to exercise his witt, & to reade God therin, and wherby his eternall power & Godhead is manifested; and you knowe, this booke is written in a woonderous hard language, and requires many yeares stoody to atteyne to the understanding of it; & necessarily we must beginne with the knowledge of the creatures: Therfore no merveyle if he beganne with the knowledge of things visible; but thence he ascended to the discovery of things invisible. In his Physicks he discoverethe unto us, a first moover; and he hathe Metaphysickes as well as Physickes; and in his 12. booke especially he discoursethe of the nature of this first moover, and that unto admiration. He sheweth allso the references of immateriall creatures unto him, and of materiall creatures unto them all. But as touching that reference which you glance at the reference of creation, he speakes nothing indeede therof. For he believed it not; but as touching the opinion then current with some, of the making of the World out of a praejacent matter, he gave himselfe to the utter disproovinge therof, in his 8. booke of Physicks. Vndoubtedly he gave himselfe to the contemplation of this (whatsoever you out of cunninge insinuate to the contrary, to make the better way, for the broachinge of your conceytes) yet never perceaved, that the definition of infinity imagined by him in the divisibilitie of magnitude or succession of time, was but a mooveable image of that true and solid infinity, to witt of God. We are reasonably well acquainted with the nature of God in the Schoole of Christ; yet have we not learned the Infinity of God to be such, as may sitly be resembled by the one, or by the other. To my understanding it is quite contrary, even by that definition of infinity which your selfe applaud in sayinge. Insinitum est extra quod nihil est, infinity is that without which nothing is. Nowe infinity in division of magnitude and succession is quite of a contrary nature, being such as semper liceat accipere aliquid extra, we may allwayes take somethinge without it; as when more and more divisions in magnitude may be still made; and more and more revolutions in time may still succeede. And Aristotle might well deny that definition of infinity, which you propose. For by that definition, the uppermost spheare of the Heavens, might justly be accoumpted infinite. And other Philosophers, that proposed this definition, which you say was censoriously rejected by him, did as well as Aristotle understande Infinite only in quantity. And if you blame Aristotle, for this acception of the word, you must blame the rest as well as him. So that with all these that maxime, insinitum est, extra quod nihil est, signified, that an infinite body was such, as without which no body was, or no quantitie was, the meaning wherof I conceave might be this; No measure of quantitie coulde be imagined, that was not comprehended under infinite quantitie. Nowe we knowe, that no quantitie, or bodily dimensions are to be found in God, but alltogether without him. Yet you seeme to attribute such a kinde of infinity unto God: for you would have the definition of insinite not to be appropriated to quantitie only, but to be simply and absolutely considered, as much as to say, it shoulde comprehend that which is infinite in quantitie allso. Yet we confesse, immensitie is one of the attributes of God, because he filles all places, but yet by your leave, without all quantitie. Your comparison is very incongruous. For infinity in lengthe comprehends all lengthe formally; but will you say in like …ort, that Gods infinity in being, comprehends all being formally? Is the being of a body of a man, of a beast in God formally? Exemplarily and vertually, or eminently they are in God; but so is not all longitude, in that which is infinite in longitude, but rather formally, and admi…th all denominations of lengthe. God dothe not admitt all denominations of beinge. Thus, say you, did these Ancients feele after, and seeke the Lord; wheras alas, they thought not at all of God in this their definition of infinitum, when they sayde, infinitum est extra quod nihil est. Aratus, I confesse, was farre more Theologicall, then most of them, when he sayde, that in God we live and moove & have our beinge; but this hathe litle correspondency with the former definition of infinitum. As sillily doe you conclude against Aristotle, as for the other Philosophers, when you say he came farre short of the truthe in sayinge insinitum est, extra quod semper aliquid est. For this is applyed by Aristotle only to division in magnitude, and succession in time, not unto God, as neyther did the other Philosophers, which gave another definition of infinitum; apply that their other definition unto God, but all of them accorded in this, that finitum and infinitum were the differences of quantitie and of corporeall dimensions. And as for infinity of being, Aristotle had nothing to doe with that consideration in his Physicks, where he treatethe of infinitum. For infinite applyed to beinge, is a difference of ens, and so belongs rather in consideration to the Metaphysicks, whose subject is ens, then to the Physicks, the subject wherof is corpus naturale. To inferre infinity of being from no better ground, then those branches of infinitie, which consist only in possibility and succession, were a very sory inference in my judgement, and litle becomminge any grave divine. For by continuance of time, and succession of creatures in time, no specificall perfection is added; but only individualls of the same kinde succeede one another. The Angells themselves being to continue for ever, shall ever produce newe thoughts newe actions; but dothe this argue any infinity in them? By this manner of discourse, Aristotle had better reason to conceave of Gods infinity, then we Christians. For he maynteyned succession of time and of the parts of this World by individuall propagations, bothe without beginning and without ende, which we doe not: but as we knowe the World hathe had a beginninge, so we believe it shall have an ende; And consequently the producing of more individuall substances shall have an ende. And wheras all Species, and individualls formerly produced, being put together, doe make up a number only finite, howe can this inferre, that God is infinite? especially if so be, more Species might be produced, then have bene produced. For eyther it argueth a greater power to produce more and more kinds of things, or no. If it dothe; then the producing of those that are produced, is no evidence of Gods greatest power. If is dothe not; then the number of thinges produced, were they double to that they are, or shallbe, cannot evidence that Gods power is infinite. Agayne, seinge God is yet in producing more and more, we can have no evidence herby of Gods greatest power, till he come to the ende of his workes: therfore as yet we have herby no evidence of his greatest power, or that his power is infinite, thoughe perhaps the world may have, to witt, when God is come to the ende of his workinge. Yet when that time is come, wherein God shall cease from producinge newe, all his workes put together being but finite, howe can that consideration, evince a power infinite? Wherfore Hill that Atheist in his Philosophia Epicurea &c. maynteyned, that the World allready made, was infinite; because it was fitt (as he thought) that an infinite cause should have an effect correspondent, and therfore, saythe he, the world must be infinite. To proceede a litle further; when the time shall come, that God shall surcease to produce any newe thinge eyther in kinde, or individuall the particulars produced put together from the beginninge of the world to that day shallbe but finite, and howe can this inferre a power infinite? Nowe all this discourse of yours proceedes, upon supposition, that all thinges are produced by God, and not only by course of nature; but by such a cause as was first created, and since maynteyned, and governed, and ordered by God, which truthe was nothing evident to the greatest Philosophers that ever were. And you well knowe that the creation of materia prima, was denyed by them all. And therfore I should conceave that the infinitenes of God, is rather evidenced by his manner of producing things, then by the number of thinges produced; as namely, by his creating of the World, & that of nothing. For if God hathe power to give beinge, unto that which hathe no beinge, but only is capable of beinge (as put the case to a man or Angell) and that by his word & will, he is as well able to give being to any thinge conceavable, (that is capable of beinge,) by his word and will; and Qui potest in omne possibile is est omnipotens. He that can give beinge to any thinge that is possible to be, he is Allmighty.
Agayne, if God were finite in perfection of entity, then it were easy to imagine a more perfect thing then God; & then that allso should have an existence. For if the essence or existence of a nature lesse perfect shoulde be all one, how much more should this be verified of a nature more perfect. And consequently, there shoulde be many Gods, one different in perfection above another.